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Abstract 
Turkish existence in Western European countries is a result of international 
labour migration started in the early 1960s. In four decades the number of 
Turkish people has exceeded 3 million. 
The four decades of existence abroad resulted in the appearance of second 
or third generation Turkish people in host societies. As many Turkish people 
do not intend to return to Turkey permanently, integration into the host 
society becomes crucial. As will be seen in chapter 3, scholars of immigration 
have produced a number of theories in order to explain or solve the problems 
between migrant groups and the host societies. These theories range from 
complete assimilation to integration or multiculturalism. 
This research is an empirical study of Turkish young people living in London. 
It aims to examine the relationships of Turkish young people at the family, 
community, and host society levels by taking into account ethnic and sub- 
ethnic group identities. 
Much of the available literature on Turkish people abroad mainly focuses on 
a single ethnic identity, the Turkish Muslim identity and ignores other ethnic 
and sub-ethnic group identities. This study differs from this omission and 
attempts to reveal the other side of the coin by examining the effects of these 
sub-ethnic group identities in the lives of Turkish young people. 
The findings of the research confirm that there are certain differences 
between the sub-ethnic groups of Turkish people living in London. These 
differences are examined in detail by this thesis. 
XI 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
The presence of Turkish people in Western European countries and some other 
non-European countries is a result of immigration, illegal immigration and 
refugee waves from Turkey particularly since the early 1960s. 
Although international immigration was also experienced before the Second 
World War in the form of importing colonial workers, the war made a great 
impact on Western European countries, ranging from reducing the population of 
native labour to destruction of the economies. However, following the Second 
World War, Western European countries started to rebuild their economies from 
the ashes. Marshal aid by the USA, in this context, helped these economies to 
a certain degree. Many new jobs were created as a result of booming 
economies and yet this huge demand for a labour force was not actually met by 
the peoples of these countries. Then came the solution of importing workers 
from abroad in order to break the labour shortage and be able to bring the 
native labour force under control. 
These countries, therefore, experienced great immigrant flows after the Second 
World War. Immigrant workers took either newly created or unwanted jobs by 
the indigenous people. They brought immigrant workers from their colonies or 
overseas countries such as Algeria, West Indies, India, Pakistan etc. (in Britain 
many came from Commonwealth countries). Then, countries receiving 
immigrant workers needed more workers and some other countries within 
Europe such as Greece, Spain and Italy entered the scene by exporting their 
surplus labour force. 
Turkey did not start exporting labour to the Western European countries on a 
large scale until the early 1960s due to the lack of demand by these countries. 
However, towards the early 1960s, West European countries were still in need 
of immigrant workers and demand for Turkish labour, particularly from 
1 
Germany, was beginning to open a new era for the Turkish existence abroad 
which reached over three million within four decades. 
It must be stressed that as a result of poor socio-economic circumstances, 
Turkey did not hesitate to send workers abroad, signing bilateral agreements 
with these countries. The first bilateral agreement was signed with Germany in 
1961 and then came the others (in 1964 with Austria, Belgium, The 
Netherlands; in 1966, with France; in 1967, with Sweden; and in 1970, with 
Great Britain). (Abadan-Unat, 1976; Rist, 1978) Turkey's hopes in sending 
workers abroad were simply to reduce unemployment and develop the 
economy with the assistance of remittances from the workers. 
Although Turkey, unlike the other immigrant sender countries, has had a very 
short period of exporting immigrants, the number of Turkish people who live in 
European countries exceeded three million at the end of 1998. (More than two 
million (2,107,426) of them live in Germany, 284,902 are in the Netherlands, 
274747 are in France, 142,231 are in Austria, 78,532 are in Belgium, 61,300 
are in the UK and the others live in other European countries)'. It should be 
noted that Turkish migration was first to Germany which has remained the most 
important destination. 
As has been well documented in the literature (Castles and Kosack, 1985; 
Paine, 1974; Abadan-Unat, 1976,1986; Gitmez, 1983; Turkdogan, 1984), 
although immigrant receiver Western European countries had enjoyed their 
booming economies by filling unwanted or newly created jobs with immigrant 
workers, an important thing was forgotten: immigrant workers were not just 
investment instruments. In the beginning, these countries did not take into 
account the socio-political outcome of importing immigrant workers. It was 
generally thought that once these immigrant workers were no longer needed by 
the host countries, they would return to their home countries without any 
1 These figures are taken from the Web Site of Turkish Ministry of Work and Social Security, at 
http: //www. calisma. ý,, ov. tr/tc/tahlo7. html 
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problem. For Germany, for example, they meant nothing but guest workers. 
Until recently, German authorities continued to deny the fact that immigrant 
minorities had become a part of the country with no desire of returning back to 
their home countries. However things did not turn out to be as hoped in the 
beginning. With the Turkish experience of immigration, it should be pointed out 
that despite all the efforts to stop the immigration, it has never stopped. In fact, 
the Turkish migration to Western European countries (mostly to Germany) 
continued in different forms such as 'family reunification', 'illegal immigration', 
'refugee waves', or 'illegal immigration in the form of refugee move'. According 
to United Nations (Cited by Parnwell, 1993: 15), a refugee is someone who 
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion is outside the country of his (or her) 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself (herself) of the protection of that country. 
Migration, on the other hand, is defined as a permanent or semi-permanent 
change of residence (Lee, 1996: 16). As seen, what makes refugees different 
from normal migrants is the fact that they are forced to move as a result of fear 
of torture or persecution, and unlike migrants they do not have the freedom of 
returning home unless the conditions change in the home country. 
As for Turkey, it is known that there were refugee moves to other countries from 
the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. However, what is 
important to say is that the 1980 military coup in Turkey was especially the 
main reason for high levels of refugee waves. Starting with socialists in the 
early 1980s, many Turkish people had to seek asylum in Western European 
countries. The rise of the Kurdish movement started in the early 1980s and the 
so-called low level warfare between the Turkish state and Kurdish guerrillas 
was another reason for the refugee flows. As Blaschke (1989) points out, in the 
early 1990s 60-70,000 Turkish people sought asylum in Western European 
countries each year. However, despite the high level of asylum applications, not 
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all of them were actually escaping from political pressures and fear of torture. 
For many of them, being a refugee was only another means of migrating to a 
European country. My research, for example, has shown this. Many of the 
respondents have stated that although they came to Britain as refugees the real 
reason was economic. Therefore, although many real refugees exist, it is 
plausible to claim that seeking asylum has also been used as a means of 
economic migration. 
It is very interesting to note that although at the beginning of Turkish 
immigration into Western European countries, the main intention of most of the 
immigrants was to save up just enough money to buy some land, open a small 
shop, buy a house or a car and come back to the home country (Abadan-Unat, 
1976; Caglar, 1994; Kaya, 1997), in reality most of them simply gave up this 
idea and settled in these countries constructing their networks and 
communities. The intention of returning home has remained as a myth. They 
were different from the native population in many respects. They arrived in the 
host societies with a different language, different religion, different history, 
different physical appearance and different dress and food. Therefore, they 
acted differently from the host society in many ways and they did not want to 
give up their cultural features. As is known, these differences caused prejudices 
in the host societies. Immigrant groups are sometimes called "snake eaters", 
"dog eaters", "camel riders" etc. by racist members of the host societies 
(Worsley, 1984). Turks, to some extent, have also been treated in a similar way 
in Germany. As Safran (1986: 109) stated, Turks are not served in some 
German restaurants and they are sometimes refused accommodation. He 
further says that there are even some Germans who describe Turks as sub- 
human. Racial attacks on Turkish people in Germany and The Netherlands 
have also shown the danger of xenophobia. 
The existence of different minority groups in a host society may cause problems 
where prejudices on both sides and hostility can create conflict. To explain and 
find solutions for these kinds of conflicts, a number of theories have been 
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produced by scholars of immigration ranging from complete assimilation to 
integration or recognition of multicultural rights of minority groups. For example, 
in America, the starting point in interpreting European migration in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries was actually to see America as melting all the different 
cultures into one super one, in other words a Super American Culture. Melting 
pot or other forms of assimilation had long been discussed by the scholars. 
(Gordon, 1964) However, in the end, the reality of cultural pluralism leading to 
today's multiculturalism had to be recognised. 
Multiculturalism, as we will discuss later, in today's usage, is seen as a 
democratic solution for different cultures living in a country. As Jopke (1996: 
449) puts it, multiculturalism is the quest for equal rights and recognition for 
ethnic, racial, religious, or sexually defined groups. Today's multicultural 
structures of most Western European countries, to a greater extent, were a 
result of international migration. Therefore, when we look at the current 
situation of immigrant receiver countries, we can say that today's picture is a 
multicultural one as a result of the immigrant groups' differences from those of 
the host societies such as religion, language, dress, food etc., no matter what 
the political treatments are. It is commonly agreed that the immigrant groups 
became ethnic minorities in the host societies by giving up the desire of 
returning back to their home countries. What is more important is that in most 
cases they do tend to pass their cultural characteristics to the new generations. 
In fact, ethnic differences do not disappear with the appearance of new 
generations (See Greeley, 1971) as opposed to some classical views (Gordon, 
1964; Taft, 1966) assuming that cultural differences can be lost through the 
assimilation process. These differences of immigrant groups in the host 
societies can easily be observed in their neighbourhoods. A visit to one of these 
minority neighbourhoods will reveal the fact that instead of using what the host 
society has to offer, they tend to establish culturally different things from the 
host society such as shops, cafes, restaurants to provide them with the food 
and dress they are used to in their culture; newspapers, weekly magazines and 
radio (sometimes TV) channels to learn what is going on in the community and 
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in their country of origin in their language; and branches of their countries' 
banks, solicitors, doctors, schools to help the community with all kinds of needs. 
However, although complete assimilation is extremely difficult as minority 
groups do not tend to give up their cultural differences, an important issue 
comes into existence whit the second or third generation of young people. The 
situation for the Turkish young people in European countries, for instance, 
shows different aspects in comparison to their parents or grand-parents living in 
the same host country. There are very important differences between these 
generations of Turkish people living abroad. Despite their parents, the second 
or third generation Turkish people have an excellent ability to use the language 
of the host society. They also have a better understanding of the host society's 
culture and way of life. However, as they live in two cultures, they mostly feel 
themselves between the two cultures. Belonging to the home country is mostly 
no more than a myth which mostly does not mean more than a summer holiday 
destination where they spend a month or so during their summer vacation. This 
situation actually brings out a serious issue. If the home country has only a 
mythological meaning to them and if they are bound to the host country with 
almost every aspect of daily life from friends to education and work, one might 
find it difficult to point out the real home country. 
The research conducted in Germany, Denmark (Caglar, 1994; Necef, 1996; 
Kaya; 1997) and my research have actually yielded that the idea of returning 
home permanently is not more than a myth. Starting with the early labour 
migration to Western European countries, the main intention of Turkish 
migrants, as we said, was to return to Turkey permanently as soon as they had 
enough money to buy a house, a shop, a car, some land etc. However, as we 
will see in chapter two, saving up enough money did not make the majority of 
them return to Turkey. Particularly following the family reunifications in 
Germany in the 1970s, they showed, perhaps for the first time, the signs of 
settling in the host country making the idea of retuning home a myth. Today, the 
Turkish existence in Western European countries is three to four decades old 
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depending on the receiving country, enough to see second and third generation 
Turkish people who were born and grew up abroad. Therefore, it can be said 
that the longer migrants stay in a host country, the more difficult it becomes to 
make a decision to return home permanently. Turkish young people are aware 
of the fact that everything they need is where they were born or grew up. They 
are also aware of the fact that they are different from people living in Turkey in 
many ways. Most of them during my research, for example, have raised the 
problem of (re)integration into Turkish society, a point I will explain in detail 
later. 
In relation to second or third generation Turkish people living abroad, there 
seems to be two main approaches to the differences of these generations. The 
first one is the so called "classical approach". This approach sees the 
differences found in second and third generation Turkish immigrants as 
unfortunate and unwanted changes. Scholars of this view think that these 
changes make Turkish young people gain considerably low levels of Turkish 
culture and become closer to the host society. These scholars try to find 
solutions to this problem and (re)gain these generations by educating them 
about Turkish culture. The fear of losing these generations plays an important 
role in their views. (See, Abadan-Unat, 1976; Turkdogan, 1984; Kagitcibasi, 
1987; Sezgin, 1992; Kilicarslan, 1992; Secmez, 1992; Guler, 1992). 
The second approach is mainly concerned with hyphenated identities. 
According to this approach, second or third generation Turkish people actually 
have hyphenated identities in terms of carrying some parts of both cultures 
(Caglar, 1994; Necef, 1996; Kaya; 1997). My research has also yielded the 
existence of hyphenated identities (Half British / Half Turkish) among Turkish 
young people living in London. Although at first glance these identities seem to 
be a result of mixed marriages, they do not always have to be in that way. As a 
means of interaction between new generation young people and the host 
society, they can absorb some of the host culture together with their minority 
cultural characteristics. This is a normal outcome of living abroad -a new reality 
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and a new way of life, which should be treated/seen as a different culture. 
These second or third generation Turkish people do not completely belong to a 
particular culture. They belong to the their way of culture as it has its unique 
way of expressing itself. For example, one of the main things with this hybrid 
culture is "switching codes" when they speak with each other. Using both 
languages in their everyday conversations with their friends, makes them and 
the dialog almost impossible to understand to a third party host society member 
or a native Turkish individual who does not speak the other language (Kaya, 
1997). Here, the concept of hybrid culture is used as a normal outcome of living 
in a host society for a considerably long time. Although hybrid culture is used to 
point out those who see themselves half British/ half Turkish, it should be noted 
that none of the respondents in this research came from a mixed marriage. 
Therefore, hybrid identity can only be associated with the interaction with the 
host society in schools, working place etc. It is mostly to do with the use of the 
English language or becoming a citizen of the UK. The use of hybrid culture 
here is very different from the colonial and postcolonial experiences of the 
concept: racially mixed marriages and colonial education policies (see Staples 
2000; Phonix and Owen, 2000; Young, 2000). As Staples (2000) puts it, the 
main aim of colonial education policies was to create Europeanised natives by 
the means of hybridisation: native in blood and colour, but English in taste, in 
opinion, in morals and intellect. As for mixed parentage, Phonix and Owen 
(2000) state that hybrid culture becomes a problem if the parents belong to 
distinct races - black and white. For children with such mixed parentage how to 
describe themselves becomes a problem. Are they white or black? Do they 
belong to a new mixed identity? (Phonix and Owen, 2000: 72) or as Robert 
Young (cited by Young, 2000: 156) puts it, should they mean "raceless chaos"? 
As seen, our use of "hybrid culture" has little to do with racially mixed 
marriages. The only connection is the use of some parts of both cultures. This 
is a result of interaction of Turkish young people with the host society members. 
As we said earlier, when we look at previous research on Turkish young people 
living abroad, there are two main approaches: The first one deals with cultural 
changes and as a result fears that Turkish culture will be lost in the lives of 
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Turkish young people if the required solutions are not taken into account by the 
authorities. The second approach is mainly concerned with the hyphenated 
identities which deals with having half Turkish and half host society's identity. In 
both approaches, Turkish identity is seen as a single instrument. That is to say 
that for many scholars there is only one single Turkish identity and this identity 
is strongly connected to religion: Islam resulting in a Turk-Islam identity. 
Therefore, the more important issue, which this research deals with, comes to 
the surface when the sub ethnic group identities are taken into account. This is 
a reality of Turkey. As is known, two of the main ethnic identity markers are 
language and religion or religious faith. When we examine Turkey using the 
language and religion criteria, we can say that there exist two main languages 
in Turkey: The Turkish and the Kurdish languages. It is a well-known fact that 
Kurds are an ethnic minority in Turkey, Syria and Iraq (Ghasselou 1965; Kendal 
1980a; Kendal, 1980b; Gstrein, 1991; McDowall, 1992; Besikci, 1993; 
Chaliand, 1994). Therefore, it is plausible to say that Turkey has two main 
ethnic populations namely Turks and Kurds. However, it is also clear that 
although 99 percent of Turkey's population is Muslim, a sect difference plays an 
important role in people's lives to identify themselves accordingly. There are 
two main sects of Islam in Turkey and, coming from a long historical 
background, these two sects see themselves as very different from each other. 
They are called Alevi and Sunni sects. We could have been able to define them 
as ethnic groups without using sub-ethnic group identities if the sects had not 
had any connection to the people who define themselves according to the 
languages they speak. A Kurd and a Turk can belong to one of these two sects 
creating diversity in the same main group (Sunni Turks -Alevi Turks and Sunni 
Kurds - Alevi Kurds). As we will explain in Chapter 4, this is the basis of so 
called sub-ethnic group identities. An example would make the situation clearer: 
A Turkish Alevi may feel closer to a Kurdish Alevi rather than a Sunni Turk 
using the sect connection and meanwhile can try to show his/her objection 
against Kurdish movement. A Sunni Turk can also feel the same against 
Kurdish Sunnis. It is also a fact that Turkish Alevis and Sunnis see themselves 
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different from each other, as do Kurdish Alevis and Sunnis. As we will explain 
this in chapter 4, today's situation is a result of long historical conflicts between 
Alevi Turks and Sunni Turks and Kurds in preventing Alevi support to Iranian 
Shahs during the period of the Ottoman Empire. 
Therefore, we can claim that although many of the scholars in both approaches 
given above seem to be concerned with a single Turk-Islam identity, this does 
not reflect the real picture. There are some researchers who are aware of the 
sub ethnic group identities such as Turkish and Kurdish Alevis and Sunnis but 
they do not deal with these identities and their effects on the lives of Turkish 
young people living abroad. As for the past research done on Turkish people in 
Britain, it should be noted that there are only very few studies (A Ph. D Thesis 
by Ladbury 1979, and two books by Sonyel 1988 and by Kucukcan 1999). 
Ladbury's Ph. D. Thesis Turkish Cypriots in London, Economy, Society and 
Culture has little to do with mainland Turkish people. Although she gives 
information about mainland Turks living in London, she states that the two 
Turkish groups are very different from each other. She goes further in saying 
that although Turkish Cypriots in London do not have any problems with the 
mainland Turks as they think mainland Turks are not a threat to their 
businesses, in the Northern part of Cyprus after the separation of the country, 
they do not want a mainland Turk be their next door neighbour. To some extent, 
she concludes, the feelings are mutual. In fact, mainland Turks think that 
Turkish Cypriots are corrupted when the religion and traditions are concerned 
as a result of mixing with Greek Cypriots (Ladbury, 1979). The existence of 
Turkish Cypriots in Britain starts much earlier than mainland Turks. Their 
migration to Britain starts as early as 1950 (Ibid: 1979). Ladbury estimated that 
around 40,000 Turkish Cypriots lived in Britain mostly in London in the late 
1970s and they are a well-established minority. There are a number of certain 
differences between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks along with many 
similarities. They both speak Turkish, but Turkish Cypriots have a strong accent 
which makes their conversation difficult to understand. Their religion is also the 
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same. However, as Ladbury states Turkish Cypriots are more likely to be more 
secular than religious mainland Turks. They also have sect differences. As we 
will see in chapter 4, Ottoman Sultans sometimes exiled Alevis to Cyprus 
making it a high possibility that one can find members of both Alevi and Sunni 
sects in Cyprus. As far as this research is concerned, in order to investigate 
mainland Turkish young people in detail by using language and religious (sect) 
criteria, within the limitations of a PhD study, the research had to be designed 
to include only mainland Turks. 
Sonyel's book The Silent Minority, Turkish Muslim Children in British Schools 
gives valuable information about both Turkish Cypriot and mainland Turkish 
children in schools. Sonyel is the first researcher who revealed hybrid identities 
among Turkish children in London although he did not use the term "hybrid". 
His quotations from Turkish children show the existence of belonging to both 
cultures: Turkish and British. However, he sees this as a threat to Turkish 
culture and urges Turkish authorities to act immediately to prevent complete 
assimilation. He further concludes that the British educational system fails to 
meet different ethnic groups' needs in schools. According to him, the majority of 
Turkish children in schools are not successful because they are faced with 
racial discrimination, and the difficulty of role playing in both cultures (Sonyel, 
1988). 
Kucukcan's book Politics of Ethnicity, Identity and Religion: Turkish Muslims in 
Britain also gives valuable information about Turkish people in London. 
However, he mainly focuses on Turk-Islam ethnic identity. In other words, this 
identity means Sunni Turks. According to him there is only one ethnic identity, 
which is Turkish and this cannot be separated from religion as 99 per cent of 
Turkish people are Muslims. Throughout his book, he represents the Turkish 
community in London with this identity. His main concern is similar to Sonyel's. 
He is also worried that Turkish young people are losing Turk-Islam ethnic 
identity. 
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It can be seen from these three main studies conducted in Britain that they did 
not deal with the different ethnic group identities. We can easily add some 
studies conducted in other Western European countries which do not touch on 
any other ethnic identities other than Turk-Islam identity. Lale Yalcin- 
Heckmann (1996), for example, manages to exclude Alevis from her research 
entitled "Moral and Religious Socialization Among the Turkish Migrant Families 
in Germany" and talks about the overlapping identities of Turkish and Islam (p: 
169). Tastan (1996) in his book Degisim Surecinde Kimlik ve Din : Kayseri'den 
Yurtdisina Isci Gocu Olayinin Kulturel Boyutu (Identity and Religion in the 
Process of Change: The Cultural side of the migration from Kayseri to Other 
Countries) examines the cultural changes among the Turkish immigrants in 
Germany and returned immigrants in Turkey. His research also does not refer 
to any different ethnic identities rather than Turk-Islam identity. Another study 
by Elke B. Stigler, Turkish Women in Germany in 1995, makes a serious 
mistake when she says, all the fundamentalist religious organisations in 
Germany are mostly financed by Kurds and claims that not all the Turks are 
Islamic fundamentalists, as the Kurds and people from Anatolia are (p: 43). This 
kind of misunderstanding about Turkish people is a result of the few 
publications which deal sufficiently with the different ethnic groups of Turkey. 
It is known that being ethnically different from another group requires certain 
differences found in religion, language, shared history etc. In this context, 
Turkey is a country of multi-ethnic groups (See Andrews 1992; Kaya 1988; 
Sener 1989). In other words, it is meaningless to claim that the Turkish people 
can only be represented by a single Turk-Islam identity. 
Therefore, this research was particularly designed to investigate Turkish young 
people living in London by taking into account these different sub-ethnic group 
identities and their effects on relationships within the family, community and to a 
larger extent within the host society. The main assumption of this research is 
that the differences found in these sub-ethnic groups affect the members of 
them in their relationships within the community and host society. As I will 
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discuss in detail later, without taking into account these different sub-ethnic 
group identities and their effects on the lives of Turkish young people, I think it 
would be impossible to have a deep understanding of them and their interaction 
with the host society. 
This research is designed to use both quantitative and qualitative data. 
Quantitative data was acquired by employing a structured questionnaire. The 
sampling technique for the main survey was Snowball sampling. As discussed 
in detail in chapter 5, the main reason for choosing the snowball sampling 
technique was the impossibility, within the limitations of a PhD study, of having 
a representative sampling frame by using a random selection. 
Prior to the main survey, the researcher visited the Hackney, Haringey and 
Islington boroughs of London in order to make preliminary observations and get 
to know the places where Turkish people mainly gathered. First contacts with 
the Turkish young people and members of some organisations were made in 
order to employ the snowball sampling technique. This is discussed further in 
Chapter 5. 
Main survey of this research started in April 1998 and took 10 months to 
complete together with face to face interviews which were used to obtain 
qualitative data. Using snowball sampling technique, 200 Turkish young people 
between the ages of 15-25 were contacted and asked to fill in a structured 
questionnaire. The researcher visited the three London boroughs of Hackney, 
Haringey and Islington on an average of four days a week during these ten 
months. During this sampling procedure, a substantial effort was made to get 
the sample to include the four main sub-ethnic group identities (Turkish Alevis 
and Sunnis and Kurdish Alevis and Sunnis) and gender differences. In addition 
to this, to get qualitative data, 20 individuals from those who filled the 
questionnaires and were volunteers for face-to-face interview were selected 
(the same attention was given to ensure that these 20 interviews included the 
gender and sub ethnic group differences as well). 
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Organisation of the thesis 
The thesis starts with this introductory section. Chapter two is a review of 
Turkish immigration into Western Europe. This chapter aims to give a detailed 
account for the last four decades of the Turkish experience of immigration 
including reasons for labour migration, the economic conditions of Turkey in the 
1960s and 70s, Turkey's migration policies, migration to Germany and Britain 
and finally the citizenship status of Turkish immigrants in Western European 
countries. 
Chapter three deals with the theoretical and conceptual framework. This 
chapter aims to provide a detailed account of theoretical issues on Ethnicity, 
Ethnic Identity, Assimilation and Multiculturalism. Ethnicity and ethnic identity in 
this chapter are required to explain different ethnic and sub-ethnic groups and 
identities in Turkey. Theories of Assimilation and Multiculturalism are also 
required to give a satisfactory explanation about what the future of Turkish 
existence in Western European countries would be. 
Chapter four aims to provide a detailed account of the ethnic diversity in 
Turkey. Since the main aim of this thesis is to question the effects of this ethnic 
diversity on the lives of Turkish young people, detailed information about four 
sub-ethnic groups in Turkey is given in this chapter. It is the claim of this 
research that there are differences between these four sub ethnic groups which 
affect their relationships inside the community and their interaction with the host 
society and other ethnic minority members of Britain. 
Chapter five gives a detailed account on chosen methods for sampling, 
surveying and face to face interviews to gather data from Turkish young people 
in London. This chapter explains why the snowball sampling technique was 
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chosen and why the use of both qualitative and quantitative data were 
preferred. 
Chapter six is the starting point for reflecting on the findings of the research. 
This chapter is mainly concerned with the socio-economic backgrounds of 
Turkish young people in London. In this context, age, sex, income, education, 
marital status, parents' educational and marital status and household size are 
examined. 
Chapter seven focuses on ethnic identity among Turkish young people. This 
chapter aims to provide a detailed picture of ethnic identities used by the 
Turkish young people. Hybrid identities and sub ethnic group identities are the 
focused topics of this chapter. Using both qualitative and quantitative data, this 
chapter examines the importance of ethnic and sub-ethnic group identities in 
the lives of Turkish young people. 
In chapter eight, the relationships of Turkish young people within the family and 
the community are examined by taking into account different sub ethnic group 
identities to show whether there is any difference among the members of 
different sub ethnic groups. With this chapter, the thesis finds important 
answers to some of the main questions it deals with. 
Chapter nine of this thesis is concerned with the relationships of Turkish young 
people with the host society and other ethnic minorities in order to have a better 
understanding of whether or not there is any tendency towards integration into 
British society. The effects of sub ethnic group identities are also focused point 
in this chapter. 
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The thesis concludes with chapter ten. This chapter brings together the main 
issues raised throughout the thesis: the usefulness of taking into account sub 
ethnic group identities when dealing with relationships of Turkish young people 
within the family, community and host society, what has been found in these 
differences, and tendencies towards integration or isolation. The chapter ends 
with suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 2: 
Turkish migration to Western European Countries 
This chapter aims to give a detailed account on the experience of Turkish 
international migration in the last four decades. As has been mentioned earlier, 
the Turkish presence in Western European and non-European countries today 
is a result of labour migration, family reunification, refugee waves, and illegal 
immigration from Turkey to other European countries. The illegal immigration in 
this context, to a large extent, can also be found in the form of refugee moves. 
That is to say that for many of the asylum seekers, the main aim in claiming 
asylum does not exceed economic reasons and my research also confirms this. 
Kucukcan (1995: 55-56) points out that emigration from Turkey to Europe can 
be traced to as early as thirteenth century with the expansion of the borders of 
the Ottoman Empire. However, apart from encouraged immigration to newly 
invaded territories and some refugee flows through the end of the Empire, the 
level of emigration to outside of the Empire's border had never been on a large 
scale. 
After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the level of migration 
into other countries had been very low until the early 1960s. Therefore, it is 
true to say that Turkey, starting with labour exportation in the early 1960s, is a 
late comer in comparison to other labour exporting countries such as Italy, 
Greece, and Yugoslavia. 
2.1. The factors causing Turkish labour migration 
As known, after the Second World War, with the assistance of Marshal Aid, 
European countries started to resurrect their economies. In the course of these 
resurrections, a great number of jobs was created. As a result of labour 
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shortages in these countries, they had to seek out help from other countries. In 
the first instance, France, Britain and The Netherlands used their former 
colonies to import immigrant workers while Germany received immigrant 
workers mainly from Italy, Greece and Spain. 
Until the early 1960s, Turkey did not enter the scene for two main reasons. The 
first was the fact that Turkish people had only limited rights to travel abroad until 
the new constitution in 1960. As Rist (1978: 89) puts it, "... fundamental political 
changes were materializing with the overthrow of the Menderes regime by the 
army in 1960. " With this military coup, Turkey's multiple party system was 
terminated for a while and state planned economy was started. It is interesting 
to note that, although at first glance it may seem strange, the military coup in 
1960 actually opened a new democratic era with the new constitution. It is 
argued that under Menderes' regime, the secular state was undermined by the 
religious discourse and therefore, the army had to intervene, which resulted in 
the execution of Menderes and a number of his cabinet with the accusation of 
treason. Abadan-Unat says, "In a way the Revolution of 1960 facilitated labour 
migration to Germany. Article 18 of the new constitution explicitly granted the 
right to travel abroad to each Turkish citizen... In 1960 the State Planning 
Organization was established and made directly responsible to the Prime 
Minister. "(Cited by Rist, 1978: 89-90) It was thought that economic 
development was only possible with the assistance of Five Year Development 
Plans. And from this point the First Five Year Development Plan was written, in 
1962, to guide socio-economic development of Turkey. It should be noted that 
migration of Turkish workers to Western European countries was first 
encouraged by this five-year plan covering the period 1963-67 (Abadan-Unat, 
1976). 
The second main reason why Turkey did not enter the scene until the early 
1960s was the lack of demand by the migrant receiving countries. However, 
after 1957, the number of immigrant workers from Italy - one of the traditional 
sender countries- started to decrease as a result of rapid industrialisation of 
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North Italy (Görsel Ansiklöpedi: 3598) while the demand by the receiver 
countries was continuing. As a result of this new situation, Western European 
countries had to turn to other countries (Yugoslavia and Turkey) to import 
workers. Then, the first demand came from Federal Germany in 1960 and 
Turkey's first bilateral agreement was signed with Germany on October 30, 
1961 (Abadan-Unat, 1976: 7). After this agreement, Turkey also signed some 
other bilateral agreements with other developed European countries such as 
Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands (1964), France (1966), Sweden (1967), and 
Great Britain (1970) (Rist, 1987: 90; Abadan-Unat, 1976: 6-7). 
Despite the relatively short period of emigration from Turkey, today over three 
million Turkish people live in western European countries. Starting in the early 
1960s, Turkey became the major worker supplier for Germany and an 
important contributor to other western European countries e. g. France, The 
Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and the UK. 
To understand why Turkey became a major labour supplier although she 
started to export her labour surplus later than other countries, we should have a 
look at the economic circumstances of Turkey in the1960s and 70s. 
2.1.1. The economic conditions in Turkey in the 1960s and 70s 
The most important factor is Turkey's economically active unemployed 
population. As Paine (1974: 34) cited, the number of unemployed people was 
985,000 in 1962,1,440,000 in 1967,1,562,000 in 1971 and 1,600,000 in 1972. 
It should be stressed that these numbers show only the official side of 
unemployment. The unofficial numbers for hidden unemployment was between 
1.5 and 5 million in1971 (cited by Abadan-Unat, 1976: 5) 
This high rate of unemployment was a result of explosive population growth. 
"Turkey, with a population of 36.5 million in 1972 has one of the world's highest 
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birth rates, which reached its highest point (44 per thousand) in 1960 and has 
shaped the age distribution of the Turkish population"(Abadan-Unat, 1976: 5). 
It will also be useful to show Gross Domestic Product Composition, and 
distribution of the working population in EEC countries and Turkey. 
Table 2.1. Sectoral Contribution to 1974 Gross Domestic Product Composition 
in countries of the EEC and Turkey (per cent) 
Countries Agriculture Industry Construction Services 
Germany 6 47 7 40 
France 6 36 10 48 
The Netherlands 8 32 7 54 
Belgium 4 35 7 54 
Italy 8 34 7 51 
Luxembourg 5 42 6 47 
Turkey 24 24 7 45 
Source: Rist (1978: 103) 
Table 2.2: Distribution of the Working population in EEC Member States and 
Turkey (per cent) 
Countries Agriculture Industry Others 
Germany 10.2 48.2 41.6 
France 15.8 40.4 43.8 
The Netherlands 7.9 41.3 50.8 
Belgium 5.6 44.9 49.6 
Italy 22.5 41.8 35.7 
Luxembourg 12.1 45.3 42.6 
Turkey 63.4 11.7 24.9 
Source: Rist (1978: 103) 
As can be seen from Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, Turkey was dominantly an 
agricultural country in 1974. While the other EEC countries did not have more 
than 8 per cent agricultural production, Turkey had 24 per cent. Accordingly, 
Turkey had also lower industrial production than EEC countries. As can be 
seen from table 2.2, Turkey's working population was mainly employed in 
agriculture. Only 11.7 per cent of them were employed in industry. The gap 
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between Turkey and EEC countries can easily be seen from these two tables. 
We should also add that Turkey has the lowest per capita (p. c. ) GNP in Europe 
since her p. c. GNP was only around $350 in 1969 and $360 in 1970, though 
Turkey is comparatively well off by Asian standards where, for instance, India, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan all had a p. c. GNP of $110 or below in1969 (Paine, 
1974: 27). As can be seen from table 2.3, Turkey's p. c. GNP reached $563 in 
1973. However, her p. c. GNP was the lowest among the other European 
countries. 
Table 2.3: Per Capita National Income of the EEC, Turkey and Greece, 1974 
(in US dollars) 
COUNTRIES PER CAPITA INCOME 
Germany 3,739 
France 3,403 
Italy 1,987 
The Netherlands 3,159 
Belgium 3,286 
Luxembourg 2,641 (in 1971) 
Greece 1,327 
Turkey 563 (in 1973 
Source: Rist (1978: 103) 
As a result, Turkish governments, starting in the 1960s, saw exporting workers 
as a solution to unemployment and balance of payments. It was thought that 
with remittances from Turkish workers, Turkey's economy would be developed. 
It was also hoped that immigrants would become semi-skilled or skilled workers 
and this would also help Turkish economy. 
It can be concluded, therefore, that with these economic circumstances, the 
idea of exporting workers was perhaps the most important solution for Turkey's 
economic problems. 
21 
As a result of encouragement by the governments, Turkish workers started to 
consider migration. As Sayari (1986: 89) stated, by the mid-1960s, a great 
number of Turks were attracted to the idea of being migrant workers. Their 
main expectation from becoming migrant workers was the economic return from 
employment in Western Europe. They were also attracted by Turkish workers 
who returned to Turkey for their annual vacation with expensive gifts for 
relatives and friends. Most of them were returning to Turkey with their own cars 
and they could buy new houses or land with saved money, which were not 
more than a dream for many of Turkish people at that time. As a result, an 
increasing number of people wanted to become migrant workers. They applied 
to the Turkish Employment Organisation and waited to be sent. Unknown 
numbers of them went to Western European countries with tourist passports 
and were able to find jobs as illegal workers. 
When we look at the results of international migration for Turkey, however, as 
Castles and Miller (1993: 105) state, 
Turkish expectations of the benefits of labour migration were... 
disappointed. Many of the migrants selected by German 
recruitment offices were not unemployed 'surplus population' but 
skilled workers. Since they were generally given unskilled jobs in 
Germany, they gained few qualifications relevant to Turkish 
industrialization. Worker remittances which ran at US $1.5 to 2 
billion per year in the 1980s, certainly helped the Turkish 
balance of payments, but they were mainly used for 
consumption or for the establishment of small tertiary sector 
businesses (taxis, cafes and shops) rather than for productive 
investment. 
In addition, the regional origins of Turkish workers were not from rural as was 
expected by the governments. This can be seen from the Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4: Percentage distribution of Turkish emigrant workers by regional 
origins. 
Regions 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Marmara 40 34 35 32 40 28 24 27 27 
Aegean 13 12 18 17 14 14 16 14 17 
Mediterranean 2 5 6 7 8 9 8 7 8 
S. E. Anatolia - - 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 
N. E. Anatolia 4 4 3 3 4 4 5 3 5 
Black Sea 11 15 12 12 9 14 13 13 12 
E. Central 3 5 5 5 3 6 6 6 5 
N. Central 22 19 13 15 15 13 15 21 16 
S. Central 6 7 7 9 5 9 11 9 10 
Source: Paine (1974: 73) 
Map 1. The regions of Turkey 
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As seen from table 2.4, the regional origins of Turkish workers abroad between 
1963 and 1971 were the richer, more westernised and more conveniently 
located regions of Marmara and North Central Anatolia and they had supplied 
higher proportions of migrants than the poorer regions-especially South- East 
Anatolia, East Central Anatolia and Mediterranean. (Paine, 1974: 72) 
Therefore, it can be said that Turkey could not find what she was expecting 
from sending workers abroad. The only positive side of sending workers abroad 
was perhaps the remittances which played a crucial role in the balance of 
payments. It is very interesting to note that the amount of remittances reached 
2 billion US dollars in the 1980s from 45 million US dollars in 1964 (Abadan- 
Unat, 1976: 24) 
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Before we continue with the Turkish migration to Western European countries, 
we should look at Turkey's policies on migration. 
2.2. Turkey's migration policies 
As mentioned earlier, in 1960 the State Planning Organization was established 
and made directly responsible to the Prime Minister. It was thought that 
economic development was only possible with Five Year Development Plans. 
The First Five Year Development Plan was written in 1962 to guide socio- 
economic development of Turkey. 
In this section, six five year development plans will be examined covering the 
period 1963 -1994. 
2.2.1. The First Five Year Development Plan (1963-67) 
This plan was written in 1962. Until 1962, as explained above, there was no 
large scale emigration from Turkey. Therefore, in this plan, migration of Turkish 
workers was not taken into account seriously. In fact, only a paragraph of the 
plan was related to migration (DPT, 1963: 456): 
Another direction of employment policy is to send surplus manpower to 
West European countries that do not have enough manpower. However, 
Turkey is a country that has surplus manpower but she does not have 
enough number of skilled workers. With high-level export of skilled 
workers, the shortage of manpower of Turkey would increase. To prevent 
this problem, possible solutions must be taken into account. 
As can be understood from this quotation, with the first five year development 
plan, Turkey actually started to realise the importance of the exporting surplus 
manpower for the unemployment problem. The only important thing was that 
Turkey was aware of the shortage of skilled workers and she was not willing to 
send them abroad easily. 
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2.2.2. The Second Five Year Development Plan (1968-72) 
When this plan was written, the number of Turkish workers abroad was 
increasing. The outcome of the migration abroad also started to be seen in this 
plan. In 1968, the number of Turkish workers in foreign countries was 176.045 
and their remittances were 107 million US dollars (cited by Gitmez, 1983: 259). 
It can be said that three important points were held by this plan: workers' 
remittances, the problem of sending skilled workers and the problems of 
Turkish people in foreign countries. 
As it is stated in this plan (DPT, 1968: 31), the importance of workers' 
remittances was a new phenomenon that was not anticipated by the first plan. 
Therefore, this plan stresses that remittances of workers will be stimulated and 
used efficiently (DPT, 1968: 121). This plan was the first among the others as it 
saw the importance of the remittances for Turkey's economic growth. 
As has been stated in the first five year development plan, this plan also 
pointed out the problem of sending skilled workers. According to this plan (DPT, 
1968: 141), since 1964,38 per cent of exported workers were skilled or semi- 
skilled. Therefore, this high proportion was not suited to the aim of exporting 
unskilled workers. The fact that 60 per cent of exported workers are mainly from 
western areas. 
This plan stresses that the future of exporting workers would depend on the 
demands of importing countries (DPT, 1968: 142). It also strongly stresses that 
exporting workers is not a long-term state policy and solutions will be found to 
keep skilled workers in the country (DPT, 1968: 135). 
As a new phenomenon, this plan stated that Turkey will try to provide better 
living conditions for Turkish workers abroad (DPT, 1968: 135). 
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To sum up, with this plan, Turkey started to understand the importance of the 
remittances for her balance of payments. Although Turkey did not want to lose 
her skilled workers, we must say that she has never been able to stop exporting 
skilled workers. Apart from these, although Turkey's governments were well 
aware of the poor conditions of Turkish workers in European countries, this 
situation did not change and Turkish workers continued to live in bad living 
conditions. 
2.2.3. The Third Five Year Development Plan (1973-77) 
It is interesting that although the results of exporting workers became clearer 
and although this plan was very detailed, it rarely mentions exporting workers 
and its results. 
This plan states that with the extraordinary progress of workers' remittances, in 
the last two years of the second five year development plan, the gap in the 
balance of payment became less and there was an increase on foreign money 
stocks (DPT, 1972: 121). 
This plan continues to complain about sending skilled workers to abroad: 
Increasing number of skilled workers going abroad created a heavy demand for 
these workers. In the period of 1965-70, because 88,000 skilled workers went 
abroad, the demand of Turkish economy for these workers increased by 26 per 
cent. (DPT, 1972: 81) 
In this plan, the problems of Turkish workers in foreign countries were not 
considered. 
2.2.4. The Forth Five Year Development Plan (1979-83) 
It is a well-known phenomenon that after 1973 Oil shortage, European 
countries started to give up importing workers. This situation also affected 
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Turkish workers. The amount of their remittances started to decrease. 
Therefore, when we look at this plan, it can be seen that the central issue for 
Turkish workers abroad was the problems of Turkish workers, their children and 
the teaching of Turkish culture to the new generations: 
After 1973, as a result of economic juncture in the immigrant 
receiving countries, instead of importing new workers, these 
countries found it important to apply some policies that provide 
solutions for integrating foreign workers. For instance, in Germany, 
permission for residency to foreign workers has been facilitated; 
unlimited residence permit has been granted to those who live in 
Germany more than five years... It should be expected that these 
countries, instead of demanding new workers, they fill the gaps with 
children of foreign workers (DPT, 1979: 137). 
As an important feature, this plan also states that (DPT, 1979: 282): 
- to give Turkish culture to children, in foreign countries and Turkey, 
special programmes will be provided. 
- With the assistance of the state, Turkish workers in foreign countries 
will be able to have houses in Turkey. 
- Their savings will be used in Turkey under the state guarantee. 
This plan also underlines a problem with the investments of Turkish workers in 
Turkey. It claims that previous investments did not help the Turkish economy as 
a result of lack of knowledge of enterprises (DPT, 1979: 312-313). 
To sum up, it should be noted that this plan was the first one which saw the 
educational and cultural problems of Turkish children. Teaching the Turkish 
Language abroad was also considered for the first time. 
2.2.5. The Fifth Five Year Development Plan (1985-89) 
When this plan was written, there were structural changes in Turkey's 
economy. These changes aimed to make the Turkish economy more liberal. 
With the economic decisions of 24 January 1980, liberal economy became a 
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basic economic policy of Turkey. Therefore, it can be said that this plan was 
only a result of constitutional requirement and was not valid for economic 
policies. 
However, detailed explanations about employment problems of Turkish workers 
in foreign countries and required solutions to these problems, socio-economic 
and cultural problems of workers and their families took place in this plan. 
Some important explanations about Turkish workers in foreign countries and 
their problems can be summarised as follow (DPT, 1985: 135): 
All the required solutions will be employed to solve economic and 
social needs of Turkish workers in foreign countries including their 
social security rights and to protect and develop their national ties and 
cultural values. 
It is required that for the period of this plan (1985-89), the number of 
exported workers must be higher than returning workers in order to 
have fewer problems with unemployment. 
This will be provided by sending workers to Middle-Eastern or North 
African countries. 
Solutions for integration problems of returning second generation to the 
society and entering Turkey's education system will be provided. 
2.2.6. The Sixth Five Year Development Plan (1990-94) 
It should be noted that this plan was a general replication of previous 
development plans in relation to Turkish emigrants, their families and their 
remittances. 
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Briefly this plan (DPT, 1989: 28) stresses that attempts will be made to try to 
solve the problems of Turkish people, and investment facilities for them will be 
developed. 
The only important difference from the other plans is that this plan stresses that 
to solve the integration problems of Turkish workers and their families in 
Western European countries, Turkey will help them with these countries ([bid, 
p: 28). 
In conclusion we can briefly say that, as it can be understood from these six 
plans, although Turkey was able to see the problems (the effects of sending 
skilled workers on her economy, remittances and investments problems, social 
security problems of workers, integration problems of Turkish people in foreign 
countries and in Turkey) she has never been able to solve these problems. In 
fact, she has never kept the emigration under control. The controlling element 
has been only the demands of immigrant receiving countries. As a result, as 
mentioned before, Turkey's economy was affected badly from this experience. 
It may be said that the only good effect of emigration was felt on her balance of 
payments for a short period. After family reunification started, remittances also 
started to decrease. 
2.3. Turkish Migration to Western European Countries 
Starting with the first bilateral agreement in 1960, Germany has always been a 
favourite country for Turkish migrants. Although until October 1960, the number 
of Turkish people living in Germany was only 7,000 (Abadan-Unat, 1976: 5), 
this number reached a total of 615,827 in 1973,1,552,328 in 1984,1,965,557 in 
1993 and 2,107,426 in 1998. Turkey's labour exportation to other European 
countries also showed similar characteristics although on a much smaller scale. 
This can be seen in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5: Turkish People in selected European countries 
1973 1984(*) 1993(**) 1998(***) 
Germany 615,827 1,552,328 1,965,577 2,107,426 
France 33,892 144,790 254,000 274,747 
Netherlands 30,091 154,201 252,450 284,902 
Austria 30,527 75,000 150,000 142,231 
Belgium 14,029 63,587 90,425 78,532 
Denmark 6,250 17,240 34,700 36,835 
Britain 2,011 28,480 51,390 61,300 
Norway ------ 3,086 5,577 10,000 
Sweden 5,061 20,900 36,001 35,724 
Switzerland 19,710 48,485 76,662 79,556 
TOTAL 777,727 2,108,097 2,916,782 3,111,253 
Sources: 
(*) 1973 and 1984: modified from Kucukcan, 1999: 59 
('`) 1993: Turkish Ministry of Work and Social Security, 1996: 3 
("*) 1998: Turkish Ministry of Work and Social Security, published at 
http: //www. calisina. gov. tr/tc/tablo7. httnl 
As seen in the table, the common characteristic of Turkish emigration can be 
found in its steady increase in numbers. 
When we look at the migration since the early 1960s, as Abadan-Unat (1986) 
points out, it is possible to say that there are several phases in the course of 
Turkish emigration to West Europe. Although she explains these phases in 
detail giving the periods such as 1956-62 phase (experimental), 1963-67 
(significant change in the volume of migration), 1968-73 (rapid increase of 
Turkish workers in Europe), 1975-78 (settling abroad, mixed marriages, family 
migration, educational problems), the course of Turkish migration can be 
summarised in three main phases. 
2.3.1.1960s to 1973 
Until the oil crisis emerged in 1973, immigrant receiver Western European 
countries were actually enjoying booming economies and filling their labour 
shortage by importing labour from other countries. It is interesting to note that 
these countries actually did not mind illegally entering immigrants, on condition 
that they must comply with the health measures and must show proof for their 
working place. As Paine (1974: 64) points out, a considerable number of 
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unofficial Turks received work permits with this way. For example, as a result of 
chain migration, many Turkish people, instead of dealing with the hassle of 
normal application procedure, went to Germany with tourist visas and got work 
permits by finding jobs in Germany. 
2.3.2.1974-1980 
As Kucukcan (1995: 57) rightly puts it, following the oil crisis in 1973, most of 
the bilateral agreements were modified or simply terminated. West European 
countries imposed restrictive policies to stop additional immigrant workers. 
It can easily be seen from table 2.5, that these restrictive policies could not stop 
Turkish migration. In fact over eleven years, from 1973 to 1984, the number of 
Turkish people in Western European countries showed sharp increases. In 
Germany alone, the number of Turkish people reached just over 1.5 million - 
an increase of nearly one million. This sharp increase, although on a smaller 
scale, was also experienced in other immigrant receiver countries. The main 
reason for this increase was simply family reunification. When the immigrant 
receiver countries terminated bilateral agreements with Turkey, many of the 
Turkish people away from their spouses and children started to bring them and 
settle in these countries. Other single people have also contributed to this by 
marrying in Turkey and bringing the spouses to the country in which they stay. 
This trend is still observable when Turkish people come to Turkey to spend 
their annual leave. As many of the Turkish families are fond of seeing their 
children live in a European country supposing that their children have a better 
life and opportunities abroad, they do not hesitate to let their children marry one 
of the 'Almancis' (a term used by Turkish people in Turkey to describe Turkish 
workers live in Germany or to some extent other European countries) (See also 
Caglar, 1994) 
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2.3.3.1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s: Refugees 
Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the first refugees 
consisted of anti-Kemalist politicians, officials, journalists, co-oparatists of 
Greek authorities, Muslim religious dignitaries and Kurdish groups. As Simpson 
(1938: 19) stated, the total number of these refugees did not exceed 1,350. 
After this first refugee wave, there is no significant proof of any other refugee 
flows until the 1960s. 
It can be said that the main reason for refugee waves after 1960, was military 
coups. Turkey has faced three military coups so far (in 1960,1971 and 1980). 
There is no doubt that these military coups created refugee flows from Turkey 
to other countries. 
As Blaschke (1989: 97) states, the refugees after the 1960 military coup were 
mainly religious and Kurdish. 
The second wave of refugees started after the 12 March 1971 military coup. 
However, as Blaschke (1989: 97) points out, although some refugees had to 
escape since they were suspected of socialist or separatist activities, this 
second wave should be understood as part of a chain migration which was 
interrupted only when the employment of foreigners was stopped in 1973. 
The third wave of refugees from Turkey started after the 12 September 1980 
military coup. As cited by Blaschke (1989: 97), this time, the wave was even 
larger and it reached its highest point in the winter of 1980. After this military 
coup, it was estimated that approximately 50,000 Turks became refugees and 
for the last few years (the early 1990s), 60-70,000 people, each year, applied 
for retreat rights stressing that they are Kurd and their lives are in danger 
(Dalman and Tabak, 1995: 3-4). Between 1991 and 1995, the number of 
applications of Turkish asylum seekers in Germany was 115,940 (cited by 
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Ministry of Work and Social Security, 1996: 14 from German Home Office 
statistics) 
As can be seen in table 2.6, the total number of applications of Turkish asylum 
seekers in the UK is 19,448 from 1979 to 1995. 
Table 2.6: Applications received from asylum seekers, excluding dependants in 
the UK from Turkish nationals between 1979-1995 
Years Number of Applications 
Years 
(Continued) 
Number of Applications 
(Continued) 
1979 6 1989 2415 
1980 21 1990 1590 
1981 1 1991 2110 
1982 38 1992 1865 
1983 43 1993 1480 
1984 61 1994 2045 
1985 34 1995 1820 
1986 111 1996 1495 
1987 210 1997 1445 
1988 643 1998 2015 
TOTAL 19,448 
sources: Home office, Statistical Bulletin: Refugee Statistics, issues: 16/88,25/89, 
22/90,12/92,9/96,10/99 
It is interesting to note that refugee flows following the last military take over 
were not directed to the UK. The first hit actually starts in 1988 when the total 
applications from Turkish asylum seekers reached 643. The following years 
show a heavy demand from thousands of Turkish asylum seekers. The main 
reason for the refugee flows from Turkey since the late 1980s has been the so 
called "low intensity warfare" between the PKK and the Turkish army located 
mainly in the south eastern regions of Turkey. 
The economic connection of refugee flows from Turkey should also be made 
clear. Some scholars touch on this. For example, Dalman and Tabak (1995) 
and Abadan-Unat (1976) claim that refugee movements from Turkey are mostly 
just another way of illegal migration with economic expectations. 
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This study has also found some evidence for the economic connection of 
Turkish asylum seekers. Many of the Turkish young people, in the course of the 
fieldwork, explained that their parents' aim was actually economic return 
although they applied for asylum here. However, although an important number 
of refugees has economic aims, this should not be generalised to all asylum 
seekers. There is also an important number of people who are genuine asylum 
seekers who need to be provided with shelter. 
2.4. The reasons for Turkish Workers' preference for Germany 
It has already been mentioned in this chapter that from the beginning of the 
Turkish migration experience, significantly, Germany has been the favourite 
country for many Turkish migrants. In fact over two million out of three million 
Turkish people have made Germany their home. Why did it happen in this way 
rather than a more or less equal distribution although Turkey signed bilateral 
agreements with a number of other European countries? At first glance, this 
situation may seem strange but there is some supporting evidence for it. 
We should stress that unlike other former colonies of some European countries 
such as Algeria, India, Pakistan, etc., Turkey has never had any colonial tie with 
a country. The Ottoman Empire itself had been one of the most powerful 
empires and ruled a number of different nations by means of invasions and 
extending its borders. Therefore, it would be wrong to assume that Turkish 
migration depended on colonial ties with Germany. However, as Moch (1992: 
186) puts it, Germany and Turkey had a history of relatively cordial relations 
originated from the period of Ottoman Empire. Abadan-Unat (1976: 6) notes 
that in the period of defensive modernisation of the Ottoman Empire's military, 
Prussian military advisers exercised a noticeable advisory role in the 
organisation of the army. The Ottoman Empire was also an ally of Germany 
during the First World War. However, being an ally of Germany did not provide 
any extra benefit to the Ottoman Empire. In fact, since Germany lost the war, 
the Ottoman Empire was also seen as a defeated country and it lost its 
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important territories. Although the good relationship between these two 
countries seemed to suffer as a result of Turkey's declaration of war against 
Germany towards the end of the Second World War, the reality was somehow 
different. In reality, Turkey actually kept good relations with Germany and the 
declaration of war towards the end of the Second World War was no more than 
symbolic, resulting in no real warfare between the two countries. As Zürcher 
(1995: 298) states, the main reason behind Turkey's declaration of war against 
Germany was to participate the foundation of the United Nations. 
Therefore, this good relationship between Turkey and Germany must have 
played an important role when Germany tried to rebuild its economy and 
needed workers from other countries. Being an old ally, Turkey with its 
promising labour reserves easily became a recruiting ground. 
Another reason for Germany to recruit high numbers of Turkish workers, as 
Abadan-Unat (1976: 6) stresses, is that most Turks are reputed for their highly 
praised military qualities (discipline, modesty, willingness to adjust and easy 
manipulation). This can also be regarded as an important factor for Germany to 
import great number of Turkish workers. 
Another factor can also be added easily. As known, German officials, unlike 
other immigrant receiver countries, began a programme of active recruitment to 
bring in foreign labour to fill the gaps and the Federal Republic established 500- 
600 offices for the recruitment of labourers in immigrant sender countries (Rist, 
1978: 111). 
To sum up, we can say that the reasons why Germany has been a favourite 
country for Turkish migrants are: 
1- Historical relationships between these two countries including 
Ottoman Empire's last period. 
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2- The reputation of Turks (discipline, modesty, willingness to 
adjust, easy manipulation and lack of desire to be members of 
unions). 
3- Active employment of Germany's recruitment offices in Turkey. 
4- Absence of former German colonies making Germany more 
open to migrant workers from other countries. 
2.5. Immigration to the United Kingdom 
As Castles and Miller(1993: 55) stated, Britain is the earliest industrial country 
to experience large-scale labour immigration. The early phase of 
industrialisation in Britain created bad living conditions, poor health, short life 
expectancy in industrial areas, and low level wages, forcing women and 
children to work in terrible conditions. As newly created jobs could not be met 
by the native population, Britain had to turn to its closest colony, Ireland, to 
attract Irish workers. The famines in Ireland in 1822 and 1846-47 played a 
crucial role in massive migrations to Britain, the USA and Australia. The number 
of Irish people in Britain reached over 700,000 by 1851. 
Britain was also a destination for 120,000 Refugee Jews coming from Russia 
between 1875 and 1914. (Castles and Miller, 1993: 55) 
Britain's labour recruitment continued after the World War 2 (WW2) and 
between 1946 and 1959 an estimated 350,000 Irish moved to Britain (Castles, 
1984: 41). About 460,000 foreigners from different parts of Europe also entered 
Britain between 1946 and 1951. In addition to this, the British Government 
recruited 90,000 "European Voluntary Workers" from refugee camps to take 
temporary jobs in the post-war boom (Ibid, 41). Castles also mentions about 
another 100,000 Europeans who came to Britain with work permits in the same 
period (1946-1951). 
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The post-war period and especially the 1950s witnessed another source of 
immigration: Commonwealth countries. As a result of the booming economy 
and the needs of industrial growth, workers from the West Indies, India and 
Pakistan started to be recruited by London Transport and British Hotels and 
Restaurants Association. (Castles, 1984: 42) 
Britain's immigration policies show two main trends: encouraging policies until 
1962, and discouraging policies afterwards. As Fielding (1993: 49) states, 
In the early part of the period the right of Commonwealth citizens to 
enter the United Kingdom was firmly established. Yet from 1962 
onwards this policy of providing privileged access to 
Commonwealth citizens was reversed and a quota system 
established which strictly controlled and reduced to a low level the 
numbers of Afro-Caribbean and Asian primary migrants permitted 
to settle in the country. 
The Turkish migration to Britain mainly starts with a bilateral agreement in 
1970. Since this study was carried out in the UK, this section of the chapter will 
be more detailed in order to give more information about Turkish people and 
their place of residence. It should be noted, however, that statistical information 
provided by both Turkish and British organisations is to a greater extent 
misleading. For example, due to the nature of the 1991 British census, one 
cannot reveal second or third generation Turkish people's country of origin. 
Another possibility is the confusing ethnicity question asked by the Census 
form. A lot of Turkish people would have been misled when they saw the option 
"white" because almost all of them see themselves in the white category. 
Coleman and Salt (1992) also touch upon this and state that Turks found 
difficult to place themselves in the categories. 
However, the 1991 British Census does give us valuable information about 
where Turkish people mainly live and what their involvements are. Therefore 
the 1991 census will mainly be used to provide detailed information on these 
matters. 
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Before starting to use the 1991 British census, let us have look at different 
numbers given by some of scholars and organisations. 
Table 2.7: Different numbers and estimations about Turkish People in the UK 
Organisation Total Numbers 
Turkish Labour and Social Security 61,300 Turkish Citizens 
Minist 1998 
26,597 (Turkish-born) 
The 1991 British Census (1993) 18,876 (Turkish as an ethnic group 
including Turkish Cypriot) 
Turkish Embassy 1997 70,000 Turkish Citizens (estimation) 
Cited by Kucukcan, 1999 from Gazioglu 115,000 
Cited by Kucukcan, 1999 from The 300,000 
Independent, 2 January 1996 
As seen in the table, the total numbers are between 18,876 and 300,000 and 
this is rather confusing. The high numbers were actually quoted from individuals 
(115,000 from a researcher and 300,000 from a custom officer) so we should 
not ignore the possibility that individuals are not necessarily a good source of 
statistical information. For some reason, during the fieldwork of this study, for 
example, I have always been given high estimations by Turkish individuals 
when I asked them about their estimation on the total Turkish population in 
London. 
My estimation on the total Turkish population in London depending on my 
observations during the fieldwork is close to the estimation of the Turkish 
embassy that between 70,000 and 80,000 Turkish people (excluding Turkish 
Cypriots) live in London. It can be observed by anyone that in Hackney, 
Haringey and Islington boroughs, the existence of Turkish people is quite 
remarkable. Along Green Lanes and Stoke Newington there are many Turkish 
and Turkish-Kurdish shops, Markets, Cafes, Restaurants etc. To give an 
example, in 1998 some of the famous Turkish Folk music singers and players 
(Arif Sag, Tolga Sag, Erdal Erzincan, and Belkis Akkale) gave a concert in 
London which was organised by the Cemevi. The saloon was able to take more 
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than an audience of 3,000. I was also there and saw that the saloon was full 
and further told by the organising committee that more than 3,000 tickets were 
sold. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to say that the actual number of 
Turkish people probably exceeds the number given by the 1991 British Census. 
In the 1991 British Census, the total number of Turkish-born people is shown 
as 26,597. It should be said that country of birth could not be used to define 
ethnic groups, because, it is possible that someone born in a country may not 
be a citizen of that country. It is also impossible to identify the second and the 
other generations who were born in the UK since country of birth does not 
include them. On the other hand, it may give some information about the 
composition of the population and composition of ethnic groups (Bulmer, 1996: 
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Table 2.8 shows the total male and female Turks in the UK according to their 
marital status by location within the country. 
Table 2.8: Turkish population in the UK by places and sex 
Places Total Males Females 
Single Married Widow. Divorced Single Married Widow. Divorced 
Great Britain 26597 5794 8644 95 537 4040 6428 635 424 
England 26016 5664 8412 92 521 3979 6307 624 417 
S. East 
Re ion 22993 5007 7302 70 403 3641 5685 505 380 
Greater 
London 20426 4569 6391 56 342 3293 5067 393 315 
Inner 
London 14475 3472 4402 31 242 2286 3575 223 244 
Source: Ethnic Group and Country of Birth, 1991 Census, Volume 1 of 2, pp: 26-83, London. 
As appears from the table, the majority of Turkish-born people (76.80 per cent) 
live in Greater London. In addition, the number of males is somewhat higher 
than the number of females. It can also be seen that the majority of Turks are 
married. 
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When Turkish people were asked to answer the ethnic group question, the 
majority of them ticked the "white" box. Only 1,680 of them identified 
themselves as "other others". It may be thought that choosing the groups 
offered made them confused, because they do not think of themselves as 
black. As Al-Rasheed (1996: 206) states, this is also valid for the Arab minority, 
the majority of whom ticked the box "white" when their ethnic group was asked. 
This situation can be seen from the table 2.9. 
Table 2.9: Turkish-born population by ethnic groups. 
Ethnic Group N % 
White 24,088 90.57 
Black Caribbean 62 0.23 
Black African 40 0.15 
Black other 445 1.67 
Indian 28 0.1 
Pakistani 25 0.09 
Bangladeshi 21 0.07 
Chinese 14 0.05 
Other Asian 194 0.72 
Groups Other 1,680 6.31 
TOTAL 26,597 99.96 
As can be seen from the table the great majority of Turkish-born people is 
white. It can also be said that the 1991 Census generally highlighted the main 
ethnic groups. Therefore, it is not easy to find out more about the features of 
Turkish people. 
The 1991 Census shows also different numbers of Turkish people according to 
ethnic group classification. This can be seen from the Table 2.10. 
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Table 2.10: Ethnic Group, full group code and summary classifications, Great 
Britain, 1991 
Code Category Number 
All Total 54,888,844 
0 White 51,810,555 
1 Black-Caribbean 493,339 
2 Black- African 208,110 
3 Indian 840,255 
4 Pakistani 476,555 
5 Bangladeshi 162,835 
6 Chinese 156,938 
Black-Other: Non-Mixed 
7 British 58,106 
8 Caribbean Islands, West Indies or 3,093 
9 North African, Arab or Iranian 6,471 
10 Other African countries 927 
11 East African Asian or Indo-Caribbean 1,271 
12 Indian subcontinent 4,005 
13 Other Asian 24,854 
14 Other answers 44,940 
Black-Other: Mixed origin Total 75,424 
15 Black/White 24,687 
16 Asian/White 69 
17 Other mixed 50,668 
Any other ethnic group: 
18 British-ethnic minority indicated 16,170 
19 British-non ethnic minority indicated 13,971 
20 Caribbean Islands, West Indies or 3,532 
21 North African, Arap or Iranian 58,720 
22 Other African Countries 3,325 
23 East African Asian or Indo-Caribbean 6,110 
24 Indian subcontinent 41,333 
25 Other Asian 119,961 
26 Irish n/a 
27 Greek (including Greek Cypriot) 17,982 
28 Turkish (including Turkish Cypriot) 18,876 
29 Other European 22,148 
30 Other answers 41,725 
Any Other ethnic group: 
31 Black/White 29,882 
32 Asian/White 61,805 
33 Mixed White 3,776 
34 Other mixed 61,393 
Source: Peach, Ceri, (1996), "Introduction", in Ethnicity in the 1991 Census, 
Wolume two, ed: Ceri Peach, pp: 1-24, London, HMSO 
This table shows that the UK has a number of ethnic groups. The number of 
Indians is 840,255, followed by Black-Caribbean with 493,339, Pakistanis with 
476,555, Black-Africans with 208,110, Bangladeshis with 162,835, and Chinese 
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with 156,938. As has been said before, this picture is mainly a result of the 
colonial experience of the UK. 
Although Turkish people were recorded with Turkish Cypriots, the total 
population is not more than 26,597. In fact, it shows a total number of 18,876 
Turks in the UK as an ethnic group. 
Table 2.11 shows Turks including Turkish Cypriots, as an ethnic group by area 
of residence. 
Table 2.11: Turks includinq Turkish Cvpriots by area of residence 
Area of Residence N 
Great Britain 18,876 
England & Wales 18,747 
En land 18,682 
Regions of England 
North 55 
Yorkshire & Humberside 137 
East Midlands 155 
East Anglia 87 
South East 17,569 
Greater London 16,621 
Inner London 10,966 
Outer London 5,655 
Outer Metropolitan Area 638 
Outer South East 310 
South West 154 
West Midlands 279 
West Midlands Metropolitan County 209 
Remainder 79 
North West 246 
Greater Manchester Metropolitan County 153 
Merseyside Metropolitan County 30 
Remainder 63 
Wales 65 
Scotland 129 
Source: Ethnic Group and Country of Birth, 1991 Census, Volume 2 of 2, pp: 859, London. 
Although this table shows different numbers from table 2.9, it can still be seen 
that the majority of Turks (88.05 per cent) live in Greater London. 
Since the majority of Turks live in the Greater London area, it should be useful 
to show the distribution of Turks by boroughs of the Greater London area. 
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Table 2.12: Turks in London by boroughs 
Boroughs N % 
Haringey 3,000 18.05 
Hackney 2,801 16.85 
Enfield 2,182 13.13 
Lewisham 1,203 7.24 
Islington 1,061 6.38 
Southwark 1,094 6.58 
Waltham Forest 861 5.18 
Newham 444 2.67 
Greenwich 412 2.48 
Redbridge 399 2.4 
Tower Hamlets 370 2.23 
Lambeth 336 2.02 
Barnet 306 1.84 
Croydon 266 1.6 
Bexley 247 1.49 
Bromley 227 1.36 
Wandsworth 156 0.94 
Camden 143 0.86 
Kensington & Chelsea 141 0.85 
Barking & Dagenham 124 0.75 
Brent 120 0.72 
Westminster, city of 110 0.66 
Hammersmith & Fulham 107 0.64 
Hounslow 86 0.52 
Havering 69 0.41 
Ealing 69 0.41 
Harrow 60 0.36 
Sutton 55 0.33 
Merton 54 0.32 
Richmond upon Thames 53 0.32 
Hillingdon 48 0.29 
Kingston upon Thames 17 0.1 
Total 16,621 -100 
Source: Ethnic Group and Country of Birth, 1991 Census, Volume 2 of 2, pp: 859-861, 
London. 
According to the table, the important boroughs that have more than 1,000 Turks 
are Haringey (with 3,000), Hackney (with 2,801), Enfield (with 2,182), 
Lewisham (with 1,203), Southwark (with 1,094) and Islington (with 1,061). 
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2.5.1. The employment and unemployment status of Turks 
Table 2.13: Turks in employment by age and sex (Brackets represent total 
numbers of each aae Group whether in employment or not) 
15-24 25-39 40-54 55-64 65 + Total Total 
Population 
Sex 
(Including 0-14 
ages) 
Males 825 3,192 1,735 252 78 6,081 15,070 
(2,526) (7,013) (2,612) (518) (457) (13,126) 
Females 600 1,129 589 88 38 2,444 11,527 
(2,489) (4,215) (1,713) 428 900 (9,745) 
Total 1,425 4,321 2,324 339 116 8,525 26,597 
(5,015) (11,228) (4,325) (946) (1,357) 22,871 
Source: HMSO, 1993: 934-938; HMSO, 1993a: 136-141 
As seen in the table, although the total number of economically active Turkish 
people is 22,871, the actual number of working people only comprises 37.27 
per cent of this. In other words, the great majority of the economically active 
people are not actually in employment. Although there seems to be a sharp 
decrease after the age 54, the reason for this is the sharp decrease of the total 
population of this and following age groups. The table also shows that the 
proportion of male workers is much higher than females. This may be a result of 
Turkish customs and traditions. In Turkey, especially in the rural areas, women 
are not expected to work outside the family. It may be thought that many 
Turkish people came here from the rural areas of Turkey. 
Table 2.14: Unemployed Turks by age and sex 
Sex 15-24 25-39 40-54 55-64 65 + Total Total Population 
Males 701 2,566 677 114 15 4,073 15,070 
Females 488 923 230 26 11 1,678 11,527 
Total 1,189 3,489 907 140 26 5,751 26,597 
Source: HMSO, 1993: 946-950 
The highest proportion of both unemployed women and men is seen in the 25- 
39 year age category. However, as the table reveals, the rate of unemployed 
males is much higher than females as the women's status in traditional families 
does not require work outside the family. 
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2.6. Gaining citizenship 
The issue of citizenship rights of migrant populations in host societies is one of 
the important matters today. How this question should be reconceptualised in 
the context of 'new Europe' is also a key issue in recent debate (Solomos and 
Wrench 1993: 11). Some of the important elements in this debate are 
1. the political rights of minorities, including the issue of representation in both 
local and national politics; 
2. minority religious and cultural rights, and their role in the context of a society 
which is becoming more diverse; 
3. the role of legislative interventions to protect the rights of minorities and 
develop extensive notions of citizenship and democracy in the 'new Europe'. 
(Ibid: 11-12) 
When we look at the citizenship rights of Turkish people in foreign countries, it 
can be said that there are different experiences among receiver countries. As 
Brubaker (1992: 31) points out, access to the citizenship rights is limited by 
every state. Some of them prefer to give citizenship rights at birth, some of 
them prefer immigrants to live a certain period of time in the country and have a 
good language skills. 
As known, countries that see themselves not a country of immigration such as 
Germany, Switzerland and Belgium are not willing to give citizenship rights to 
immigrants even if they were born and grew up in these countries. For example, 
Turks have lived in Germany since the early 1960s and since then, second and 
third generation Turks have been born and grew up there. However, since 
having citizenship rights is not easy (almost impossible), few of them have been 
given citizenship rights. On the contrary, as Kymlicka (1995: 23) stresses, 
ethnic Germans who have lived their whole lives in Russia, and who do not 
speak a word of German, are entitled to German citizenship. The reason for 
this, as Brubaker (1992: 72) states, is that German citizenship has always been 
attributed only to descendants of German citizens. It means that a person can 
only obtain German nationality by being born into the German community, so 
that 'tie of blood' became a label for ethnicity (Castles and Miller, 1993: 116). 
r 
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However, it should be noted that there are also some changes in German 
citizenship policy. For example, 
Until 1993, foreigners were obliged to wait 15 years and 
spend thousands of dollars in fees to apply for German 
citizenship, and even then there are no guarantees. Now 
an applicant must have eight years' residency, reasonable 
fluency in German and prove he can support a family 
without state assistance. But the bureaucratic obstacles to 
citizenship remain daunting. (Guardian Weekly, 18 May 
1997) 
The more important thing is that candidates for naturalization must ordinarily 
renounce their original citizenship in Germany. Germany has no political culture 
to support naturalization. This is clearly expressed in the administrative 
regulations governing naturalization. The Federal Republic is not a country of 
immigration and does not strive to increase the number of its citizens through 
naturalization (Cited by Brubaker, 1992: 77). These obstacles, no doubt, create 
unwillingness or inability among foreign people to apply for citizenship rights. 
On the other hand, five years' residency is required in France and the UK for 
naturalization. Therefore, we can say that France and the UK make it easier 
than Germany for migrants to acquire citizenship. In France, naturalization has 
been considered the normal and desirable outcome of permanent settlement 
(Brubaker, 1992: 77). In addition to naturalization, French law, automatically 
attributes citizenship (lure soli) to most second and third generation immigrants 
(Brubaker, 1992: 173). 
"In British legislation the concept of citizenship occurs primarily in the context of 
nationality and immigration. For example the British Nationality Act 1981 
describes two categories of citizen: British Citizen and British Dependent 
Territories Citizen. These two categories are used in relation to rights of entry or 
residence in the UK and not in connection with other rights"(Rooney and Steele, 
1997: 276). 
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As Bulmer and Rees (1996: 283) pointed out, " In Britain, almost all post-war 
immigrants from the New Commonwealth have enjoyed full citizenship rights 
from the moment they reached its shores. " Indeed, as Dummett and 
Martin(1984: 17) stressed, at the beginning of this century, Britishness meant a 
connection with the British Empire including Dominions and Colonies. We 
cannot say that although immigrants from somewhere else had not gained 
citizenship rights easily, their children had been given citizenship rights with 
their births in the UK until 1983, since, birth in the UK had been enough to give 
citizenship rights. After that, with The British Nationality Act 1981, as Dummett 
and Martin(1984: 27) states, 
A child born here from 1 January 1983 onward is a British 
citizen if it has one parent, at least, who is a British citizen or 
'settled'. 
Under other circumstances, for example, a child born in the UK who does not 
have "settled" or British citizen parents, to be given citizenship rights there must 
be 10 years passed living in The UK on condition that the child must not be 
absent from the UK more than 90 days in any one year out of ten. ( Dummett 
and Martin(1984: 9) 
For naturalization of immigrants in the UK, the basic requirements are 
(Dummett and Martin, 1984: 50-51): 
a- Applicant must be of full age (18 or over) and of full capacity (not of 
unsound mind). 
b- Applicant must have five-year residence and must not have been 
absent for more than a total of 450 days in this period, nor for more than 90 
days in the final year before applying. 
c- The applicant must be of good character. 
d- The applicant must have sufficient knowledge of either English, Welsh 
or Scottish Gaelic. 
e- The applicant must intend to make his principal home in the UK 
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The numbers of Turkish citizens who gained citizenship in European countries 
are as follows: 
Table 2.15. The numbers of Turkish citizens gained citizenship in selected 
European countries up to 1997/98 
Country Turkish citizens gained citizenship of host country 
The Netherlands 157,850 
The UK, between 6,688 
Germany 252,899 
Belgium up to 30,294 
France 287,000 
Austria 29,635 
Sweden 17,396 
Modified from Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2000 
As seen in the table, although more than 2 million out of 3 million Turkish 
people live in Germany, the number of those who have German citizenship 
comprise only around 10 per cent of the total population. As explained earlier, 
Germany is one of the difficult countries for foreigners to obtain citizenship 
rights as it depends on blood ties. The table also reveal that for many Turks in 
The Netherlands and France it is considerably easy to gain the citizenship 
rights of the country. The reason why the number of Turkish people who gained 
citizenship in the UK is less than the others can be explained with the relatively 
late start of Turkish migration to this country. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined four decades of Turkish migration to Western 
European countries. 
The first important thing with Turkish migration is that, Turkish governments, 
despite their intentions, have never been able to control it. Although, for 
example, it was the main intention of Turkish authorities to send unskilled and 
unemployed labour abroad, German recruitment offices in Turkey mainly 
employed skilled workers. 
It is important to note that apart from workers' remittances, there was no other 
positive side of the migration for Turkey. Permanent settlement of the workers 
in the host countries has also brought educational and cultural problems of 
second and upcoming generations, making Turkey invest further to give extra 
service to them (by providing teachers, imams etc. ). 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the main characteristic of Turkish migration 
can be found in its increasing continuity in numbers. In other words, Turkish 
people have always found new ways to migrate to the West European countries 
although these countries applied new rules in order to stop immigration. In spite 
of all these efforts, the number of Turkish people abroad has exceeded 3 
million. 
The permanent settlement of many Turkish people abroad, has brought a new 
issue to the attention of scholars: the integration of Turkish people into the host 
society they tend to settle in. This is also the main aim of this study which deals 
with Turkish young people living in London and their relationships with the 
Turkish community and the host society. 
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Chapter 3: 
Theoretical Framework: Ethnicity and Ethnic Identity, Assimilation, 
Integration and Multiculturalism 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the theoretical issues of the research. 
Therefore, this chapter focuses mainly on ethnicity and ethnic identity, and a 
series of theories from assimilation to multiculturalism. 
3.1. Ethnicity and ethnic identity 
There is a great body of research on ethnicity in the literature though it is a 
relatively new term - first appeared in the English language in the 1950s and 
was first recorded in the Oxford Dictionary in 1953 (Hutchinson and Smith, 
1996: 3). The term ethnicity was actually meant to be a replacement for 'race' 
following the failure of biological research to prove that human populations can 
be distinguished according to the 'supposed' races. (Jahoda, 1984: 37; 
Thompson and Priestley, 1996) Despite the intention to replace 'race' with 
'ethnicity', however, it can still be seen that the term 'race' is still used by a 
number of scholars as a stand-alone term or in combination with ethnicity. The 
main reason for this, as can be argued, is the cultural existence of the notion 
'race'. The term 'race' is mainly dependent on colour and physical differences to 
distinguish black and Asian people from white people and it finds its root in 
slavery and colonial times (See Banton, 1972) - though there exist different 
suggestions for the emergence of racism (Smaje, 2000: 9). For example, Park 
(1967) in his article "Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups" stated that racial 
assimilation could only be feasible among the same colour people from different 
cultures. It is the physical differences, in particular colour differences, to him 
that make assimilation of a group with a different skin colour impossible. He 
gives the Japanese and Blacks as an example of this and further comments, 
If they were given an opportunity the Japanese are quite as 
capable as the Italians, the Armenians, or Slavs of acquiring our 
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culture, and sharing our, national ideals. The trouble is not with 
the Japanese mind but with the Japanese skin. The Jap is not 
the right colour. (Ibid: 119) 
In another article, The Bases of Race Prejudice, Park (1967) actually defends 
racial prejudices. He says, "A man without prejudices is a man without 
conviction, and ultimately without character" (lbid: 169). According to him, 
therefore, "the public (also) thinks in stereotypes. There is, in fact, no other way 
in which the public can think" (Ibid: 172). He continues, 
Every effort of the Negro ... to move, to rise and 
improve his 
status, rather than his condition, has invariably met with 
opposition, aroused prejudice and stimulated racial animosities. 
Race prejudice, so conceived is merely an elementary 
expression of conservatism. (Ibid: 172) 
As understood from Park's explanations, race is only attributed to the social 
significance accorded to physical (colour) differences. However, Glazer (1983: 
234) precisely argues that although Swedes are physically somewhat different 
from Frenchmen or Italians, the term 'race' is not used to describe the 
difference. However, the fact remains that differences found in skin colour, 
facial appearance etc of different groups in a host society still play important 
roles in the matter of racial prejudice. Park is right when he says that 
assimilation of a different group with a different skin colour no matter how keen 
they are is impossible as the public continues (to him, will continue) to use skin 
colour as an indication of social difference. 
However, assimilation theories as will be explained later, have long been out of 
fashion. Even when there are no colour differences among different groups in a 
host society, historical evidence has shown that there are problems in complete 
assimilation. 
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In terms of Turkish and Turkish/Kurdish people's existence in Western 
European countries, the term 'race' cannot be applied as they are only culturally 
distinct groups from the host countries. Although prejudices and attacks on 
Turkish people in these countries are mainly described as racial, I think, 
'xenophobia' can be a better term to use. 
3.1.1. Ethnicity 
Ethnicity is a subject not only for sociology, but for anthropology and 
psychology. Perhaps this makes a sufficient definition of ethnicity almost 
impossible. When we look at the literature, we can note that almost all the 
writers address the difficulty of giving a universal definition. 
According to Max Weber, an ethnic group is a human collectivity based on an 
assumption of common origin, real or imaginary. (quoted by Greeley, 1973: 40) 
As Oommen (1994: 34) says, Ethnie is a French word referring to a people who 
share a common culture and life-style but who do not occupy the ancestral 
territory that is a homeland. According to him, an ethnic group can be described 
in terms of a multiplicity of attributes such as religion, sect, caste, region, 
language, descent, race, colour, culture, and so on. These attributes, singly or 
in different combinations, are used to define ethnic groups and ethnicity. (p. 34) 
M. G. Smith defines an ethnic unit as "a population whose members believe that 
in some sense they share common descent, and a common cultural heritage or 
tradition, and who are so regarded by others". (cited in Mason, 1995: 12) 
A. D Smith proposes six main features to define an ethnic group: 
1. a common proper name, to identify and express the 
'essence' of the community; 
2. a myth of common ancestry, a myth rather than a fact, a 
myth that includes the idea of a common origin in time and 
place and that gives an ethnic sense of fictive kinship ... 
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3. shared historical memories, or better, shared memories 
of a common past or pasts, including heroes, events, and 
commemoration; 
4. one or more elements of common culture, which need not 
be specified but normally include religion, customs, or 
language; 
5. a link with a homeland, not necessarily its physical 
occupation by the ethnie, only its symbolic attachment to 
the ancestral land, as with diaspora peoples; 
6. a sense of solidarity on the part of at least some sections of 
the ethnie's population. (quoted by Hutchinson and Smith, 
1996: 7) 
Finally, a very detailed list of features of an ethnic group comes from The 
Harvard Encyclopaedia of American Ethnic Groups, which records information 
on 101 ethnic groups. According to this encyclopaedia, ethnicity can be defined 
as a collective characterized by some combination of the following 14 features: 
1- common geographical origin 
2- migratory status 
3- race 
4- language or dialect 
5- religious faith 
6- ties that transcend kinship, neighbourhood, and community boundaries 
7- shared traditions, values and symbols 
8- literature, folklore and music 
9- food preferences 
10- settlement and employment patterns 
11-special interest in regard to politics in the homeland and the United States 
12- institutions that specifically secure and maintain the group 
13-an internal sense of distinctiveness 
14-an external perception of distinctiveness (quoted by Leets, et al, 1994) 
So far we have given a number of definition of ethnicity. It can be noted that the 
very common feature in these definitions is the "shared elements by a group - 
common culture, language, religion, and so on). As can be noted, from the 
definitions, these different features can singly or in combination construct an 
ethnic group. 
Having said this, we should also question the importance of ethnicity. Why is it 
seen as an important aspect of social life? The answer actually lies in 'being 
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different'. As Smaje (1995: 13) precisely puts it, being ethnic requires to be 
different from other groups. Therefore, it is very important to stress that ethnicity 
only has its meaning when two or more different groups are interacting (cited by 
Watson, 1977: 9). 
Two main approaches to ethnicity 
As we noted earlier, ethnicity is an interdisciplinary subject and that theorization 
of the concept can find its roots in anthropological, ethnological, psychological 
and sociological discourse. 
There appear to be two main perspectives in the area of ethnicity. These are, 
Primordial perspective and Situational approach. 
3.1.1.1. Primordial perspective 
The beginning of this approach to ethnicity starts with Edward Shils' well-known 
article "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties". In an effort to explain the 
relationships between theory and research by giving an autobiography of his 
experience, he talks about 'primordial attachments' (Shils, 1957). Through his 
research on primary groups among soldiers in the American and German 
armies, he notices the solidarity within the primary groups. However, as he 
says, he only reaches the conclusion about primordial attachments after a piece 
of research on family and kinship with Michael Young in 1952. He then realised 
the importance of primordial attachments. As he puts it: 
As one thought about the strengths and tensions in family 
attachments, it became apparent that the attachment was not 
merely to the other family member as a person, but as a 
possessor of certain especially 'significant relational' qualities 
which could only be described as primordial. The attachment to 
another member of one's kinship group is not just a function of 
interaction 
... 
It is because a certain ineffable significance is 
attributed to the tie of blood (p. 142) 
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Clifford Geertz (1996: 43-45) went a step further in elaborating this approach by 
including not only primary kinship groups but also 
1- Assumed blood ties, 
2- Race, 
3- Language, 
4- Region, 
5- Religion and 
6- Custom. 
He says, 
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 
'givens' ... of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin 
connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems 
from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a 
particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and 
following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, 
speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at 
times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is 
bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer, 
ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection, practical 
necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in 
great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import 
attributed to the very tie itself. The general strength of such 
primordial bonds, and the types of them that are important, differ 
from person to person, from society to society, and from time to 
time. But for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all 
times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of 
natural ... affinity than from social interaction. (Geertz, 1993: 259-260) 
As seen from the quotation, it is obvious that this approach sees ethnicity as the 
`given' of social existence; that is to say, ethnic membership is acquired at birth 
and therefore, it should be treated as a permanent and fundamental facet of 
social life. 
55 
Talcott Parsons also falls into this approach when he states, 
For the typical individual both his residence within the territory 
and his sharing of the common culture have been conceived as 
given by birth, that is, he has acquired the ethnic identification of 
his parents. (1975: 53) 
Another scholar in this approach is Harold R. Isaacs. According to him, 
Basic group identity is derived from belonging to what is 
generally ... called an ethnic group. It is composed of what have been called "primordial affinities and attachments". It is the 
identity made up of what a person is born with or acquires at 
birth (1975: 30) 
However, Isaacs is also aware of the distinctions between cultural and physical 
differences. He concludes, 
An individual can change his name, ignore or conceal his origins, 
disregard or rewrite his history, adopt a different nationality, learn 
a new language, abandon his family's religion or convert to a 
new one, embrace new mores, ethics, philosophies, take on a 
new style of life. But there is not much he can do to change his 
body. (p. 36-37) 
Donald L. Horowitz's view of ethnicity also echoes Isaacs' understanding of 
ethnicity. He agrees with him and the others that ethnic identity is generally 
acquired at birth. However, he is also well aware of the fact that there are 
possibilities for changing individual identity by means of linguistic and religious 
conversion. (Horowitz, 1975: 113-114). In addition to this, he goes one step 
further and become closer to the situational approach. As he puts it, "An African 
student in France will identify himself in one way; at home, in another" (p. 118). 
Therefore, we can say that Horowitz is actually in between these two 
approaches to ethnicity. 
As we will see in the following approach, some of the objections made by 
instrumentalists or situationalists, as it is seen here, have already emerged in 
56 
this approach with the idea of the possibility of changing identities or switching 
identities in different situations. However, the main argument continues, that is, 
ethnicity is acquired at birth. 
In brief, the main assumption of this approach is that ethnicity is made up of 
primordial attachments such as the ties of blood, religion, language, region, 
race, and so on. Therefore, one acquires ethnic identity at birth. According to 
this approach, one is born into the religion, language, race, etc. In other words, 
when a person is born, the primordial attachments are already there - in the 
family, or community - waiting for him/her. What is more, this approach sees 
ethnic identities as permanent and fundamental facets of human identity 
(Kucukcan, 1999: 38) although the later writers of this approach have noticed 
the possibility of changing identities. 
3.1.1.2. Situational or instrumentalist approach 
As Gil-White (1999) notes, 
... reactions against primordial view starts with Edmund Leach's Political Systems of Highland Burma (1954), followed later by 
Moerman's work among the Lue in Thailand (1965,1968). As he 
puts it, these studies argued that ethnic identities did not map 
neatly to the distribution of artifactual or ideational culture - 
towards a more subjective focus that relied heavily on the 
labelling process of ethnic actors themselves. This view climaxed 
in 1969 with the publication of Fredrik Barth's famous 
introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. His argument was 
that since the qualifications for a social identity are the conditions 
for being referred to by the linguistic expression that names the 
identity, then the ascriptions made by ethnic actors themselves 
are the only guides to the limits of the group. For the features 
that are taken into account by ethnics are not the sum of 
objective cultural differences, but only those which the actors 
themselves regard as significant. 
Leach (cited in Gil-White, 1999), had reported that people in the Burma Kachin 
Hills area sometimes switched identity. Barth (1996) also documented a similar 
behaviour in Swat, Pakistan. In the communities Barth studied, some individuals 
57 
born into the Pathan ethnic group were, later in life, labelling themselves 
'Baluch' as circumstances made this advantageous. With this argument, the 
circumstantialist - instrumentalist - school was born. 
In contrast to the primordial approach, instrumentalists argue that ethnicity is 
defined by social, not genetic forces. Barth (1996: 75-76) criticises the 
primordial definition of ethnicity. He argues that this definition allows the 
assumption that boundary maintenance is unproblematic and racial and cultural 
difference, social separation and language barriers are spontaneous. As 
Kucukcan (1999: 42) puts it, Barth thinks that ethnic groups are categories of 
ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have the 
characteristic of organizing interaction between people. Barth further argues 
that ethnic boundary - he says it is of course social- defines the group, not the 
cultural stuff it encloses (p. 79). 
According to Barth (1996: 77), 
The same group of people, with unchanged values and ideas, 
would surely pursue different patterns of life and institutionalise 
different forms of behaviour when faced with different 
opportunities offered in different environments. 
According to this approach, ethnic groups are made, not born. Ethnicity is a 
general social status like class, age and gender which can be used to organise 
interaction (Barth, 1996: 81). 
Following Barth, Stokes (1994: 6) claims that ethnicities need to be understood 
in terms of construction, maintenance and negotiation of boundaries. Like Barth, 
he also claims that ethnic boundaries define and maintain social identities that 
can only exist in a context of opposition and relativities (p. 6). 
Ratclife (1994: 6) points out that although primordial ties are a key element of 
ethnic consciousness, these are not fixed in a deterministic sense. 
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According to Okamura, 
the structural aspect of situational ethnicity denotes the restraints 
enjoined upon parties within social situations as a result of the 
setting of social action, which in this case is provided by the 
overall structure of ethnic group relations in a given society. The 
setting also includes the relative political and socio-economic 
statuses of these groups, the distribution of occupation, 
education, income, wealth and other social and material 
resources among them, their numerical proportions, and the 
immediate prospects for change in any of these areas. The 
structural dimension of ethnicity denotes the significance of 
ethnicity as an organising principle of social relations. (cited in 
Kucukcan, 1999: 43) 
In brief, according to this approach, as Mason (1995: 13) puts it, "Ethnicity is 
situational. The implication is that people have different ethnic identities in 
different situations. Their salience is affected by such factors as the distribution 
of desired resources and the objectives of the people concerned. " 
As Smaje puts it, 
... a Punjabi Sikh living in Britain may 
in some circumstances 
constitute themselves as 'black' to identify their experience of 
racism, at other times as 'Asian' to distinguish themselves from 
people of other geographic origins, and at other times as 'Sikh' to 
identify their particular set of beliefs and practices and to 
emphasise politically their distance from an 'Indian' identity. 
(1995: 17) 
It is argued that primordialism is a bankrupt concept as it refers to permanent 
and unchangeable ties gained at birth (Eller and Coughlan, 1996: 50). 
However, this judgement draws objections. 
As Leets at al (1994) puts it, 
Taken together, both the primordial and the instrumentalist approaches 
resulted in a productive and powerful definition. If a thorough analysis of 
ethnicity is desired, it appears reasonable that both must be considered. 
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This study also finds it useful to use both approaches in analysing the ethnic 
characteristics of Turkish people because as will be seen later in this thesis, the 
ethnic and sub-ethnic group characteristics of Turkish people have strong 
primordial attachments and at an individual level the situational characteristic of 
ethnicity is also observable. 
However, one thing should be made clear here. In both approaches, one may 
feel that something is missing. It is plausible to point out the differences for 
ethnic groups. However, in the literature there seems to be a tendency to see 
ethnic groups living in peace with each other. As can be seen from the 
understandings of both approaches, they do not touch upon any conflict 
between ethnic groups apart from instrumentalists' statement of competition 
between ethnic groups. Therefore, if we put them together to analyse ethnic 
groups without giving any attention to conflicts, it may lead to a real failure. As 
Stokes (1994: 7) puts it, ethnicities can never be understood outside the power 
relations and they are actually not the harmless and colourful 'folklore' of 
societies as these approaches tent to see. It should be said that the differences 
of an ethnic group are not always easily recognised nor is it an automatic 
process. History has shown (still does) us the violence between ethnic groups 
since the dominant groups are not always keen on seeing them a part of 
harmony. 
Another point I would like to touch on is the fact that the instrumentalist school 
thinks that if circumstances require, then ethnic group members can switch their 
identity to another one to make the most of the new situation. It is plausible to 
say that human beings are rational and try to maximise their profits in a 
competition. However, one should keep in mind that this approach actually 
ignores the solidarity in an ethnic group. It is true to say that we can still observe 
self-sacrifices of members of an ethnic group. 
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3.1.2. Ethnic identity 
The question "Who am I? " plays a crucial part for an individual to define 
him/herself. As a result of living in a society, individuals must develop a sense 
of identity in order to feel themselves a part of that society. As Pike (1969: 178) 
points out, 
The individual, if he is to function effectively in society and 
develop his potential, requires a sense of identity ... Widely 
accepted historical interpretations, or agreement by the majority 
of a people as to who their heroes and who their villains have 
been, which events have been triumphs and which ones 
tragedies, can provide an indispensable glue for holding 
together disparate geographic and ethnic groups within a 
country. 
Although there is, to some extent, a general view that sociology has little to say 
about personality and individual identity because personality is something fixed 
and innate and therefore the subject should be left to psychology (Abbot, 1998: 
14), it should not be forgotten that there are strong relationships between 
identity and social structure (class, ethnicity and gender). Sociology, in this 
context, mainly focuses on the reflection of group identity on individuals. It 
should be pointed out that ethnically different group's members, when defining 
themselves, use the name of their group even if they belong to a larger 
structure such as being citizens of a country. 
Today, we still observe the fact that ethnic identities, powered from their 
historical roots (heroes and struggles with other groups), are still kept alive and 
still valuable to their members. 
We have already reviewed the term ethnicity from both primordial and 
instrumental approaches. Ethnicity on the other hand is one of the identity 
makers because it actually gives an individual a sense of belonging to a group. 
Ethnic or other identities, as known, are acquired via socialisation mechanism in 
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society. It first starts in the family and continues through the education process. 
Therefore, we can say that ethnic identity is passed via family channels. 
The situation of ethnic minority members, in this context, has a different and 
complex aspect. As Markstrom-Adams puts it, this complexity can be attributed 
to colour, linguistic, and behavioural differences and social stereotypes. (quoted 
by Kucukcan, 1999: 49) Members of ethnic minorities therefore find themselves 
between majority and minority cultural values. As a possible result of dual 
socialisation, they develop different identities from their parents. As Weinreich 
shows us, 
... 
during primary socialisation within their homes they form their 
early identification with their parents and other members of their 
own ethnic community. Subsequently, during secondary 
socialisation at school, representing a different culture, and 
within the wider community, they form further identifications with 
significant others embodying values and aspirations of the 
subordinate community. Elements of the latter identifications will 
be incompatible with the earlier, home-based ethnic ones, so 
that these earlier identifications become conflicted. Thus, by 
adolescence, second generation boys and girls will tend to have 
conflicted identifications with people of their own ethnicity. (cited 
in Kucukcan, 1999: 50) 
In the remainder of this chapter I will deal with Assimilation and Multiculturalism. 
As multicultural solutions have become very important in treating immigrant and 
ethnic minority groups, it is important to examine how assimilation theories were 
abandoned and multiculturalism gained power over them. 
As known many Turkish people abroad have chosen to settle in permanently 
without giving up their cultural differences. In fact for many of them returning 
home is not more than a myth. Therefore, multiculturalism appears to be the 
only solution. 
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3.2. Assimilation theories 
Because of the differences of immigrants found in language, religion, custom, 
colour, dress, food etc., in the host society, an important problem has been 
taken into account by philosophers and social scientists: assimilation of the 
immigrants or immigrant groups into the host society. With the assimilation of 
the immigrants it was thought that the problems between host society and 
immigrants would be solved. Jansen (1970: 23), for example, suggested that 
integration of the migrant is an important aspect of migration which would be 
studied by sociology. 
It should be said that the assimilation problem is not a new phenomenon. As 
Betts (1961,10-11) states, assimilation became conspicuous as a policy during 
the days of the Roman Empire. At an early date Roman expansion led to the 
Latinization of barbarian regions, as was particularly evident in Caesar's times. 
In colonial times the experience of assimilation was different. It was assumed 
that native people would be assimilated into the invader group. The following 
quotation shows this: "The royal edicts of 1635 and 1642 stated that the natives, 
once converted to Catholicism, were to be considered citizens and natural 
Frenchmen"(Quoted by Betts, 1961: 12) 
When we look at the theoretical approaches of assimilation, we can say that 
since the 1950s sociologists have developed a variety of perspectives in order 
to explain the position of ethnic minorities and their effect on the stratification 
system and society as a whole. The variety of possibilities has been expressed 
as a continuum from 'complete absorption', through 'integration', 'multi- 
culturalism', to 'separatism', in which ethnic groups live totally separated from 
each other. (Thompson and Priestley, 1996: 59) 
We should say that early writings about assimilation were mainly related to the 
American experience. Milton M. Gordon's Assimilation in American Life, 1964, 
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Robert Park and Ernest Burges' "Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups", 
Charles Price's The Study of Assimilation are some examples of this. 
3.2.1. Traditional Models of Assimilation 
In the American experience three early traditional models of assimilation 
theories arose. These are (Gordon, 1964: 84-159): 'Anglo-conformity', 'Melting 
pot' and 'Cultural pluralism'. As Crispino (1980: 3) pointed out, "Having arisen 
serially, each has enjoyed a temporary prominence eventually to be supplanted 
by another, supposedly better, explanatory model. " 
3.2.1.1. Anglo-conformity 
The central assumption of the Anglo-conformity model was, as Gordon (1964: 
88) stresses, the superiority and desirability of preserving English institutions, 
the English Language, and English oriented cultural patterns as dominant and 
standard in American life. The Anglo-conformity model demanded that the 
newcomers renounce the cultural heritage of their home countries and adapt to 
the dominant cultural forms of the host society (Ibid: 104). We should stress that 
although there were substantial numbers of German, Dutch, Swedish, Swiss, 
Polish and Scotch-Irish residents in early America, only English cultural forms 
predominated and later immigrants were expected to give up their cultural 
features and adapt themselves to the English language and English cultural 
forms. 
During the 1880s, except the African slaves who were excluded from the 
process of the assimilation of newcomers, a significant shift in the national 
origins of the newcomers occurred. This change was from Western and 
Northern to Southern and Eastern Europe as the countries of origin and a 
change in characteristics to mainly semi-feudal peasants who did not have 
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education or occupational skills (Crispino, 1980: 4). As a result of these 
newcomers, as Crispino (1980: 4) states, the National state and local units of 
government, public and private welfare agencies and labour groups joined in a 
massive campaign to educate these immigrants about the English language, 
the American political system and the core values of the host society. 
These assimilative pressures continued increasingly with the beginning of World 
War I and the movement of '100 per cent Americanism' (Crispino, 1980: 4). 
Anglo-conformists were thinking that with the assimilation of newcomers, they 
would have no alien demands on the body politic, and thus civic assimilation 
would have taken place. However as Gordon (1964: 105-113) states, although 
the aim of Anglo-conformity achieved its aim with regard to acculturation for 
white migrants, as for coloured migrants, additional factors entered the situation 
and modified the outcome. Negroes have been barred from cliques, social 
clubs, and churches of white America. Therefore, they have constructed their 
own network of organisations. It should be stressed that prejudice and 
discrimination can still be observed on the American scene. 
3.2.1.2. Melting pot 
The idea of the melting pot is very old and can be traced to eighteenth century 
America. In 1782, Jean de Crevecoeur wrote, "I could point out to you a family, 
whose grandfather was an Englishman, whose wife was Dutch, whose son 
married a French woman, and whose present four sons have now four wives of 
different nations. " (Cited by Glazer and Moynihan, 1963: 288) 
As Crispino (1980: 5) stressed, the melting pot ideology was implied in the 
Anglo-conformity model. The difference was in the melting of immigrants. 
65 
The ideal-typical model of the melting pot may proceed as follows (Gordon, 
1964: 125-126): 
If large- scale intermarriage is to have taken place, then obviously the 
immigrants must have entered the cliques, clubs, other primary 
groups, and institutions of the host society and in addition, placed 
their own impressions upon these social structures to some extent. 
Prejudice and discrimination must be absent since there are not even 
any identifiably separate groups to be their target, and civic 
assimilation will have taken place since disparate cultural values are 
assumed to have merged and power conflict between groups would 
be neither necessary nor possible. 
It was expected that Italians, Jews, Poles and Czechs should melt into the 
behaviour and value system of the core group (Crispino, 1980: 5). 
The melting pot ideal had its fullest explanation by Frederic Jackson Turner in 
1893 who emphasised the role of a changing, variegated western frontier in the 
creation of the American political, social and economic institutions (cited by 
Crispino, 1980: 5). In 1908, the theme was expressed in a drama by Israel 
Zangwill entitled 'The Melting Pot' which described the experiences of a young 
Jewish immigrant who fell in love with a Gentile girl (Ibid: 5). To show the main 
idea of the melting pot it may be useful to quote a passage from the drama: 
... America is God's Crucible, the great Melting pot where all 
the 
races of Europe are melting and reforming! Here you stand, good 
folk, think I, when I see them at Ellis Island, here you stand in your 
fifty groups with your fifty languages and histories, and your fifty 
blood hatreds, and rivalries, but you won't be long like that brothers, 
for these are the fires of God you've come to -these are the fires of 
God. A fig for your feuds and vendettas! German and Frenchman, 
Irishman and Englishman, Jews and Russians -into the Crucible 
with you all! God is making the American. 
... The real American has not yet arrived. He is only in the 
Crucible, 
I tell you -he will be the fusion of all the races, the coming 
superman. (Cited by Glazer and Moynihan, 1963: 289) 
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Gordon (1964: 130) argued that the result of the melting pot process is a 
number of 'pots' or sub societies such as Protestant, Catholic and Jewish pots. 
Therefore, according to him, the picture can be called a multiple melting pot. 
However, the situation was much more complex than Gordon's argument. In 
fact, the multiple melting pots should be understood as a failure of the 'melting 
pot' idea since the main aim with this idea was to create a single American 
nationality. But as Glazer and Moynihan (1963: 290) precisely pointed out, "... in 
every generation, through the history of the American republic, the merging of 
the various streams of population differentiated from one another by origin, 
religion, outlook has seemed to lie just ahead. " Today, the 'melting pot' theory is 
rejected not only by members of the dominant culture but also by members of 
culturally different populations (Locke, 1992: xii). 
3.2.1.3. Cultural Pluralism 
In the American experience the last theoretical concern for three early 
approaches to assimilation is cultural pluralism. It can be said that it has also 
affected the recent debate on multiculturalism. 
As stated by Gordon (1964: 84-135), because of the existence of different 
communities such as German, Irish, French, Dutch, cultural pluralism was a fact 
in American society before it became a theory. In fact, this plural structure of 
America showed that it was not as easy as it was thought to make the cultural 
differences of groups disappear. It was understood by the scholars that 
different groups do not tend to give up their cultural heritage. Then, it can be 
seen that, the ideal of assimilation was abandoned. The reason was more likely 
to at least create a peaceful harmony between different groups and to keep 
America as a unique country. Also cultural pluralism was thought as an 
instrument for a more productive democracy. As Norman Hapgood said in 1916, 
Our dream of the United States ought not to be a dream of 
monotony. We ought not to think of it as a place where all people are 
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alike ... our hope should be to 
have in a country that occupies almost 
the whole continent twenty different kinds of civilization all 
harmonious. (Cited by Gordon, 1964: 140) 
In conclusion, we can say that traditional models of assimilation did not reflect 
the real picture of America. Anglo-conformity, the melting pot and cultural 
pluralism were indeed applied in America holding black people outside of this 
process. Despite the exception of black people, these attempts never yielded 
results. In other words, the new American or Superman has never been more 
than a dream. 
It can also be said that with the melting pot idea, it was thought that different 
features were going to be melted creating a new type of American people. 
However, the melting pot never worked and in the end it became a 'salad bowl'. 
3.2.2. Formal theories of assimilation 
After these three traditional models of assimilation, a number of new theories 
emerged. These are: The Race relation cycle by Robert Park & Ernest Burges, 
Process of assimilation by Milton Gordon, and The Facets of Assimilation by 
Ron Taft. 
According to Park and Burges, the race relation cycle consists of five stages. 
These are (quoted by Price, 1969): 1- contact: usually peaceful exploratory 
contacts; 2- competition: for scarce jobs and resources (housing etc. ); 3- 
conflict: the result of competition; warfare, riots and discrimination; 4- 
accommodation: a 'modus vivendi', sometimes based on the withdrawal by 
one group into niche occupations, a separate area, or inferior status; 5- 
assimilation: progressive intermixture and intermarriage until the two groups 
merge into one - ethnic groups disappear and persons become invisible as 
distinct ethnics. 
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A more detailed explanation about the process of assimilation comes from 
Gordon. According to him (1964: 71), the process of assimilation occurs as in 
the following table: 
Table 3.1. The assimilation process 
Sub process or Condition Type or stage of assimilation Special term 
Change of cultural patterns Cultural or behavioural 
to those of host society Assimilation Acculturation 
Large-scale entrance into 
cliques, clubs, and Structural assimilation None 
Institutions of host society, 
on primary group level 
Lar a-scale intermarriage Marital assimilation Amalgam tion 
Development of sense of 
peoplehood based Identificational assimilation None 
exclusively on host society 
Absence of prejudice Attitude receptional assimilation None 
Absence of discrimination Behavior receptional assimilation None 
Absence of value and Civic assimilation None 
power conflict 
Although the investigation was conducted in American society, Gordon(1964: 3) 
claims that his conclusions are applicable to other nations and areas of the 
world which have undergone similar process of urbanisation and 
industrialisation, and which have a population base of diverse racial, religious, 
and cultural backgrounds. 
As seen in the table, Gordon's explanation is much more detailed than Park's. 
However, the problem of the assimilation of coloured people is still an ignored 
matter. As Goldberg (1994: 5) said, prior to the 1940s, the model of 
assimilation, for the most part, did not apply to Blacks, for they were considered 
inherently inassimilable. It might be interesting to show how Abraham Lincoln 
thought about this matter. 
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Our progress of degeneracy appears to me to be pretty rapid. 
As a nation, we began by declaring that all men are created 
equal. We now practically read it all men are created equal, 
except Negroes. (Quoted by Gordon, 1964: 93) 
Another theorist on assimilation is Ron Taft. Following a twelve-year research 
programme carried out by individual studies at University of Western Australia, 
he published his book From Strangers to Citizens in 1966. 
Taft sees assimilation of immigrants as a case of resocialisation and according 
to him, it includes some psychological factors such as changes in attitudes, 
values and identification, the acquisition of new social skills and behaviour 
norms, changes in reference and membership group affiliations, and emotional 
adjustment to a changed environment (1966: 5) 
According to him relations between immigrants and the host society should be 
analysed according to five factors, so called 'facets'. These are: 
1- Cultural knowledge and skills including language 
2- Social interaction 
3- Group membership 
4- Integration into the group 
5- Conformity to group norms (Ibid: 6). 
He further argues that, although relations should be analysed according to 
these five facets, it is also important to note that each facet has four aspects: 
i- Motivation, i. e. the desired state 
ii- Conation, i. e. what the immigrant does to bring about this state 
iii- his Perceived Achievement of the state 
iv- his Actual Achievement of it (Ibid: 6). 
These five facets and their aspects in the end make him distinguish four general 
factors relevant to assimilation. These are, 
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1. Primary integration: Desires to stay (in Australia), self and wife 
satisfied with the place (Australia), not home-sick, identifies self as Australian, 
perceives Australians as unprejudiced, favourable to becoming naturalised. 
Feels at home. 
2. Secondary integration (or accommodation): Acculturation to behaviour 
norms, uses English, mixes socially with Australians. Acculturated. 
3. Attitude to own ethnic group: Pro or con the country and culture of 
origin (not completely independent of 1, and 2). 
4. Social class: Educational level, knowledge of English, occupational 
level (independent of 1 but not of 2) (Ibid: 9-10). 
As Taft (1966: 10) states, the first two factors are similar to Gordon's (1964) 
distinction between structural and cultural assimilation. 
So far, we have reviewed assimilationist approaches. We must say that in 
recent debates assimilationist approaches are not accepted. In fact, they are 
seriously criticised. Instead of assuming that a minority group will be assimilated 
into a host society, it is commonly accepted that assimilation is not possible 
(see Portes and Borocz, 1996: 165) since no ethnic group tends to give up its 
culture, religion, language, dress, etc. This approach is called as 'Multi- 
culturalism' or'Cultural-pluralism'. 
3.3. Multiculturalism 
Although there had been some early discussions about cultural pluralism in 
America, mono-culturalism was more or less an unchallenged ideological 
common sense of the first half of this century (Goldberg, 1994: 11). However, 
as Glazer (1983: 97) puts it, it soon after lost its importance and cultural 
pluralism or multiculturalism became the preferred model for responding to the 
reality of a multi-racial and multi-ethnic society. 
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As Goldberg (1994: 6) says, the civil rights and cultural movements of the 
1960s were showing the change from the dominant assimilative standard to the 
new one of integration. Integration emerged from left cultural groups. It can be 
said that the aim was to maintain the cultural differences of ethnic minorities. 
Greeley's acculturation model can be given as an example of this. 
3.3.1. Andrew M. Greeley's acculturation model 
Greeley has a cultural pluralist approach to ethnic minorities and he argues that 
ethnic differences could not be eliminated since members of ethnic groups do 
not tend to give up their ethnic identities. For him, acculturation consists of six 
steps. These are briefly (Greeley, 1971: 53-58): 
1- Cultural Shock: With arriving of new immigrant group to the host 
country, the old culture is felt to be under savage attack and the members of the 
immigrant group are frightened and disorganised. Almost all the new 
immigrants are indigent, and they work at the most manual and poorly paid 
tasks. For them surviving is the only issue. 
2- Organization and Emerging Self- Consciousness: "The immigrant 
group begins to become organized; its clergy, its precinct captains, the leaders 
of its fraternal organizations, its journalists, become the key figures in the 
communities. The immigrants are learning the language and their children are 
becoming 'Hibernicized' in the public schools. The newcomers become semi 
skilled and occasionally even skilled workers"(Ibid: 54). 
He stresses that after passing the first phase, the elite group of the community 
starts to be concerned about the assimilation process. Elite group, in this phase 
tries to protect the language, cultural heritage and religion of the community. 
There is still not much money, however, self-consciousness and ethnic pride 
start to emerge. (Ibid: 54) 
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3. Assimilation of the Elite: Greeley says that in this phase, 
ambivalence begins to emerge. The immigrant group has managed to be lower 
middle class. Then its members become storekeepers, artisans, skilled workers, 
clerks, policemen, firemen, transit workers and militant trade unionists. Money is 
saved to provide for the college education of children. The group's pride 
increases. (Ibid: 54) 
According to him, in this phase, also, the more talented individuals start to give 
up being in the ethnic mobility pyramids and join the host society. The degree of 
assimilation and alienation of elites at this stage varies from group to group, 
even from person to person. (Ibid: 54) 
4- Militancy: In this phase, he (Ibid: 55) says that the immigrant group 
becomes fully middle class and even climbs toward upper middle class. It is 
now militant and it also has power. A broad middle culture is created by the 
group. The community's members start to argue that the city is now also their 
city and they will run it their way whether the members of host society like it or 
not. 
According to Greeley (Ibid: 56), It is at this stage, one must note, that the ethnic 
group is most likely to engage in conflict with other ethnic groups. 
5- Self-Hatred and Antimilitancy: Greeley stresses that in this phase, 
the ethnic group becomes upper middle and professional class. Its young 
members start to have college education in large numbers and many are 
becoming successful and economically well-integrated members of the larger 
society. (Ibid: 56) 
According to him, 
There is no question, as in the case of the earlier elites, of 
these new and much larger elites alienating themselves 
from the immigrant group; but from the perspective of fully- 
fledged members of the larger society, they are acutely 
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embarrassed by the militancy, the narrowness, the 
provincialism of their own past and by the leadership of 
organizations which seem to have a vested interest in 
keeping that past alive. ... There are intense, emphatic demands for drastic and immediate modernization and 
intense ambivalence toward the ethnic group. (Ibid: 56) 
As can be understand from this phase, although Greeley is not specific about 
generation in third and forth phases, here he is mainly talking about second 
generation immigrants. 
6- Emerging Adjustment: According to Greeley (Ibid: 57), in this phase, 
another generation appears on the scene, securely upper middle class in its 
experience and equally secure in its ability to become part even of the upper 
class. This generation is conscious of its ethnic roots without being ashamed of 
its ethnic origin. They visit the old country not to visit family and friends, but to 
see how great-grandparents lived. The younger members of the ethnic groups 
delight over the differences that they find them interesting and so much fun to 
explain to friends and classmates of other ethnic groups. 
As can be noticed from these six phases, it should be noted that Greeley also 
uses class factors in the explanation of acculturation. Although the first 
generation immigrants find themselves at the very bottom of the working class, 
others can gradually become members of the middle or upper classes. 
To sum up, Greeley's approach to acculturation is much better than earlier 
approaches. As can be understood from his explanations about these six 
phases, integration of ethnic group to the host society can be accepted. 
However, complete assimilation cannot be mentioned as it is seen in the sixth 
phase. Even tough the ethnic group's second, third or fourth generations appear 
in the host society, this does not mean that they are willing to forget their ethnic 
identities. 
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3.3.2. Christian Joppke's multiculturalist approach 
Joppke's multicultural approach generally depends on ethnic minorities. He first 
tries to explain emerging of minorities: 
Historically, the existence of minorities is the product of the cultural 
homegenizing nation-state, and they first appeared in legal and political 
discourse in the wake of the nationalization of post-imperial Eastern 
Europe. Homeland-based minority claims predate explicit 
multiculturalism, and their affinity to monocultural nationalism makes them 
somewhat distinct from the latter.... 
Migrations, particularly from periphery of the modern world system, have 
produced the ethnic and racial diversity that is a central backdrop of 
multicultural claims. (Joppke, 1996: 451-453) 
According to him (Ibid: 453-454), assimilation is no longer plausible for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, contemporary migrations occur within a developed 
nation-system in contrast to earlier migrations in the age of empire. Secondly, 
as a result of advanced transport and communication, migrations can no longer 
be seen as 'one-way trips'. And finally, liberal states are not willing to impose 
particular cultural forms on their members since there is a common sense that 
forced assimilation violates the integrity and dignity of the individual, whose 
cultural habits should be a matter of his/her choice alone. Therefore, he strongly 
insists that liberal states today are necessarily multicultural (Ibid: 454). It should 
also be added that technological developments not only provide easy transport 
to allow migrants to visit their home countries more than used to be but also it 
helps them keep their ethnic identities alive and strong. Today with the help of 
satellite receivers, computer technology and the Internet, people easily send 
emails to each other within seconds, and can learn what is going on in their 
home countries. 
Joppke is precisely right when he points out the bad sides of forced 
assimilation. There are indeed examples to this situation. For example, forced 
assimilation was experienced in former USSR for a period of more than 70 
years. This period is enough to see third and fourth generations. At least, it is 
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assumed that after third generation, differences (see Greeley, 1971) such as 
language, dress, cultural heritage start to vanish. However, when we look at the 
situation in Russia, we can say that after returning to liberalism, the nations 
started to claim for independence and it has been seen that they have never 
forgotten their cultural heritage. 
What multiculturalism means for Joppke is basically to seek equal rights and 
recognition for ethnic, racial, religious, or sexually defined groups and therefore, 
multiculturalism is one of the most pervasive and controversial intellectual and 
political movements in contemporary democracies. (Ibid: 449) 
According to him, multiculturalism has been shaped during the contemporary 
international migration. Therefore, it should be stated that, with post war 
immigration especially, immigrant receiver Western European countries became 
multicultural states and some of them reflected this picture in their constitutions, 
issuing citizenship rights to immigrants and providing multicultural education to 
their children etc. Even in Germany where policies of sending migrant workers 
to their home countries have long been tried, the impossibility of this has been 
understood. It is interesting to note that one of the German TV channels, 
Franken Fernsehen, started to produce thirty-minute Turkish news every 
Sunday from 17: 00 to 17: 30 (Xn, 30.05.1997). This also shows how difficult it is 
to make immigrants give up using their languages. 
3.3.3. Peter McLaren's multiculturalist approach 
Peter McLaren's approach to multiculturalism is somehow different. According 
to him, there are four forms of multiculturalism: conservative, liberal, left liberal 
and critical and resistance multiculturalism (McLaren, 1994a: 47-62). 
Conservative multiculturalism. According to him, conservative 
multiculturalism can be traced to colonial views of African-Americans as slaves, 
servants, and entertainers. Conservative multiculturalism, it must be said, is not 
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what we understand from multiculturalism. It has no relation with contemporary 
multiculturalism. It can be understood as a forced segregation of black slaves 
from white culture. In this respect, we can say that this type of multiculturalism 
was indeed used by America in slavery times. McLaren also give very good 
example of conservative multiculturalism. 
... it can further be seen as a direct result of the legacy of doctrines of white supremacy which biologized Africans as 
"creatures" by equating them with the earliest stages of human 
development. Africans were likened by whites to savage beasts 
or merry-hearted singing and dancing children. The former 
stereotype led a ten year-old black boy -Josef Moller- to be 
exhibited at the Antwerp Zoo at the turn of the century. Closer 
to home and less remote in time is the case of Ota Benga, a 
"pygmy" boy exhibited in 1906 at the Monkey House in the 
Bronx Zoo as an "African homunculus" and as the "missing link" 
and was encouraged by zoo keepers to charge the bars of his 
cage with his mouth open and teeth bared. (p. 47) 
McLaren also adds that one bad aspect of conservative multiculturalism was 
the creation of a common culture with a persistent attack on non-standard 
English and the undermining of bilingual education. This common culture, no 
doubt, was to be constructed among whites. In this respect, the common points 
of conservative multiculturalism with early assimilation theories in America can 
easily be seen. Both were trying to create a common American culture 
depending on English language and English cultural values. In addition, both 
separated Afro-Americans from the white cultural world. As was mentioned 
before, in early applications of assimilation, it is commonly accepted that 
assimilation of Afro-Americans was not taken into account. 
For McLaren, there are some important reasons to reject conservative 
multiculturalism. These are: 
First, conservative or corporate multiculturalism refuses to treat 
whiteness as a form of ethnicity and in doing so posits whiteness 
as an invisible norm by which other ethnicities are judged. 
Second, conservative multiculturalism ... uses the term 
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"diversity" to cover up the ideology of assimilation that 
undergirds its position. In this view, ethnic groups are reduced to 
"add-ons" to the dominant culture. ... Third, ... conservative 
multiculturalism is essentially monolingual and adopts the 
position that English should be the only official language. ... Fourth, conservative multiculturalists posit standards of 
achievement for all youth that are premised on the cultural 
capital of the anglo middle class. Fifth, conservative 
multiculturalism fails to interrogate the high status knowledge - 
knowledge that is deemed of most value in the white, middle- 
class United States- to which the educational system is geared. 
(McLaren, 1994a: 49) 
McLaren warns us that racism can easily become a precondition for 
conservative multiculturalism. It is a true statement that if racism is supported 
by states, the previous picture will again come true in the future and this will 
cause more problems than before. 
Liberal Multiculturalism. According to McLaren, 
Liberal multiculturalism argues that a natural equality exists 
among whites, Afro-Americans, Latinos, Asians, and other 
racial populations. This perspective is based on the intellectual 
'sameness' among the races, on their cognitive equivalence or 
the rationality imminent in all races that permits them to 
compete equally in a capitalist society. (McLaren, 1994a: 51) 
However, he points out (Ibid: 51) that this equality does not exist in the United 
States, not because of black or Latino cultural deprivation, but because social 
and educational opportunities do not exist that permit everyone to compete 
equally in the capitalist marketplace. It is a well-known fact that until recently, it 
was possible to see racial discrimination in schools which limited racial groups' 
equal education rights. Therefore, we can say that although liberal 
multiculturalism defends the natural equality between different racial groups, in 
practice there is still not complete equality and hence, the ideal liberal 
marketplace which depends on equal competition, is still not created. 
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Left-Liberal multiculturalism. For McLaren (1994a: 51), left-liberal 
multiculturalism emphasises cultural differences and suggests that the stress 
on the equality of races smothers those important cultural differences between 
races that are responsible for different behaviours, values, attitudes, cognitive 
styles, and social practices. He stresses that left-liberal multiculturalism treats 
difference as an 'essence' that exists independently from history, culture and 
power (Ibid: 52). 
McLaren (1994a: 52) truly points out that although cultural differences are 
essentialised by those who work in this perspective, historical and cultural 
situatedness of difference is ignored. 
Critical and resistance multiculturalism. It should be said that critical 
multiculturalism was developed by McLaren. 
He says that he developed this idea from the perspective of a resistant, 
poststructuralist approach, which is located within the larger context of 
postmodern theory, to meaning, and emphasising the role that language and 
representation play in the construction of meaning identity. (Ibid: 53) 
For him ([bid: 53), the poststructual view asserts that signs and significations 
are essentially unstable and shifting and can only be fixed temporarily, 
depending on how they are articulated within particular discursive and historical 
struggles. 
According to him, 
From the perspective of ... "critical multiculturalism, " 
representations of race, class, and gender are understood 
as the result of larger social struggles over signs and 
meanings and in this way emphasizes not simply textual 
play or metaphorical displacement as a form of resistance, 
... but stresses the central task of transforming the social, 
cultural, and institutional relations in which meanings are 
generated. (McLaren, 1994a: 53) 
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He refuses conservative, liberal and left-liberal multicultural views. According to 
him (Ibid: 53), to stress on 'sameness' or 'difference' (that is made by other 
multicultural views) is a false opposition because identities based on sameness 
and difference are forms of essentialist logic. He (Ibid: 53) also refuses to see 
culture as nonconflictual, harmonious, and consensual. His democracy 
approach from this perspective is interesting in that he sees democracy "as 
busy -it's not seamless, smooth, or always a harmonious political and cultural 
state of affairs. " 
For him (Ibid: 53), resistant multiculturalism does not see diversity itself as an 
aim, but rather argues that diversity must be affirmed within a politics of cultural 
criticism and a commitment to social justice. 
3.3.4. Tom Bridges' multiculturalist approach 
Tom Bridges (1997) also sees multiculturalism as part of a postmodernist 
cultural agenda. He argues that the logic of multiculturalism carries us beyond 
Enlightenment liberal conceptions of cultural pluralism toward a postmodern 
redefinition and reconstruction of the cultural boundaries of the public sphere. 
He first defines the cultural project of Enlightenment. According to him, with 
Enlightenment, the main idea was that the reality could only be explored by 
using only scientific method, disregarding nationality, gender, religion and social 
class. Each discipline carves out a piece of that reality and the product 
generated by this research is objective -pure, colour-blind, class-blind, gender- 
blind, value-blind and valid for all and for all time. 
According to Bridges, postmodernism is a rejection of this Enlightenment 
project. Postmodern culture is based upon every possibility. For him, this 
means that every view, a human being can assume, is internal to some 
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historical community or another -including the supposedly objective view of the 
scientific expert. Thus, it can be said that the postmodern view refuses 
universal explanations. (Ibid) 
Bridges stresses that with a postmodernist view, it can be said that a new 
multicultural approach will claim new definitions as different from 
Enlightenment. This new definition of course will not be universal. In this 
respect, he says that this will be very disturbing for "research, university faculty, 
science-based professions, government bureaucracies, etc. " 
To sum up, multiculturalism in terms of postmodernity is seen as different from 
modernist explanations. As known, postmodernity is a refusal of meta- 
narratives that aim to explain facts in a broader perspective. Therefore, 
postmodernist multiculturalism is also a refusal approach to meta-narratives 
that claim to explain cultural diversity in terms of objective scientific methods. 
3.3.5. Criticisms of Multiculturalism 
Although multiculturalism is generally seen as a democratic solution for the 
problems of different cultural groups, it has also been seriously criticised. 
According to Waever et al (1993: 192-193), multiculturalism has not been a 
noticeable success in many of the places in which it has been tried. The 
multicultural policies applied in Canada, Britain and the United States, have 
arguably deepened cultural and political divisions and weakened the social 
cohesion of the state. Canada may not survive as a state. Britain, France and 
Germany face unresolved tensions between a homogenising view of citizenship 
and a multicultural reality. They also stress that the United States has deep 
ethnic divides and is beginning to lose the cohesion of a single shared 
language. 
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Another criticism on multiculturalism is made by neo-conservatives. As Stam 
and Ella (1994: 299-300) put it, they find multiculturalism threatening and 
according to them, multiculturalism is the intellectual and political regrouping by 
which different minorities can become a majority forming active intercommunal 
coalitions. 
The first criticism by Waever et al., of course, is very important and it must be 
taken into account. However, it must not be forgotten that the solution is not to 
return to previous applications. As Castles (1993: 28) puts it, ethnic minorities 
are now firmly established so that Western European countries have no choice 
but to accept some form of cultural pluralism for the foreseeable future. 
It should also be pointed out that although forced assimilation was tried in the 
formerly communist world, as Waever et al put it, 
As soon as coercive constraints were lifted, the Soviet and 
Yugoslav states quickly shattered along traditional ethno- 
national and religious lines, despite, in the Soviet case, 
seven decades of ruthless application of a homogenising 
strategy (Waever et al, 1993: 193). 
When we think about the Turkish existence in Western European countries in 
the last four decades, it can be concluded that they are actually settled in the 
receiving countries permanently by giving up the idea of returning home. The 
possibility of complete assimilation does not appear to be the real case, as 
Turkish people abroad do not want to give up their cultural differences. This is 
what makes multicultural policies very important. Only democratic solutions can 
solve the problems between ethnic minority groups and the host societies. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 9, Turkish young people living in London are open 
to the idea of integration into British society. Since the great majority has no 
intention of returning Turkey in the foreseeable future, integration becomes a 
very important issue not only for the Turkish community in London but also for 
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British society as well. Integration in the light of multiculturalism can only 
provide Turkish young people with the joy of keeping their cultural differences 
while contributing to the host society. 
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CONCLUSION 
As the Turkish existence in Western European countries cannot be examined in 
terms of racial differences, I have used ethnicity and ethnic identity to describe 
the cultural differences rather than physical or colour differences. Theoretical 
discussion of ethnicity is also a leading point in examining ethnic diversity in 
Turkey in the next chapter, in order to give sufficient answer to those who think 
that Turkish people can only be represented by a Turk-Islam identity. 
As already discussed, there are two main approaches to ethnicity: Primordial 
and Instrumentalist. Although it is important to use both approaches together 
(supposing that one gets his ethnic attachments by being born into a specific 
culture and one can switch or hide his ethnic identity depending on the situation 
to make the most of it), it is also important to note that the real picture does not 
always have to be situational as it is supposed. The situational aspect of the 
ethnicity can make sense at an individual level. However, for ethnic groups, it 
can be and mostly is problematic to live next to a different ethnic group. Cultural 
differences are not the joys they should be and the conflict between ethnic 
groups are not too small to ignore. The Kurdish movement in Turkey is a good 
example of this. If the situational approach was really working, then the Kurdish 
ethnic group would have long ago been assimilated into the Turkish culture. 
However, since the early 1980s, the rise of the Kurdish movement in Turkey 
and abroad has shown the opposite. 
I have also examined the assimilation and multicultural issues in order to lead 
the discussion to the fact that multiculturalism is perhaps the best option for the 
countries which have different ethnic minority populations. 
As seen in this chapter, the theoretical approaches of assimilation, integration 
or multiculturalism have a historical sequence. In other words, each period of 
experience was led by a dominant theoretical approach. For instance, until the 
1960s, the dominant theoretical approach was complete assimilation of 
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immigrants into the host society. Indeed, a number of implications can be seen 
in the American experience such as 'Anglo conformity' and 'melting pot'. 
However, assimilationist approaches were taken over by multicultural 
approaches by which it was thought that to create more democratic and 
harmonic society, the features (language, religion, dress, etc. ) of minority 
groups should be allowed to be kept by the members of the minority groups. 
It is my intention to address that with multicultural solutions, the tensions 
between ethnic minority groups and the majority can be lessened and by doing 
so the contribution of these minorities to the democratic state can be 
maximized. 
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Chapter 4: 
Ethnic Diversity in Turkey 
Introduction 
As we have already mentioned, in today's world, it is very difficult to point out 
a country without any ethnic diversity. Most countries have some ethnic 
diversity among their peoples. 
This chapter aims to explain ethnic diversity in Turkey because the ethnic 
diversity of Turkish people in London is a result of Turkey's circumstances, 
brought to other countries as a result of international migration. In other 
words, to understand the integration process of Turkish youth in Britain, we 
must explain this ethnic diversity in Turkey and its possible effects on 
integration into Britain. 
4.1. Explaining ethnic differences in Turkey 
As a result of Turkey's multi-ethnic social structure inherited by the Ottoman 
Empire, there exist different ethnic and sub-ethnic groups in Turkey which play 
crucial roles for individuals to define themselves and to be defined by others. 
Although there are a number of different ethnic and sub-ethnic groups, the 
most important differences come to the surface when the linguistic and 
religious issues are concerned. The linguistic differences are two major 
languages -Turkish and Kurdish, although the latter is not recognized by the 
state. According to the 1982 Turkish Constitution: 
Except the Turkish language, no other languages shall be taught to 
Turkish citizens as their mother tongue (Article 42). 
The second major difference is a religious one. As known, the great majority 
of Turkey's population is Muslim. At first glance, although this does not seem 
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to be an important issue in forming different sub-ethnic groups, when we look 
at the two major sects of Islam in Turkey, it can be seen that under the same 
religion there are two different ethnic identity markers so called 'Sunni sect' 
and 'Alevi Sect'. Since members of these two main religious sects count 
themselves under Turkish or Kurdish groups, it is then possible to give the 
following four groups: 
1- Turkish Sunnis, 
2- Turkish Alevis, 
3- Kurdish Sunnis, and 
4- Kurdish Alevis 
Although there is literature on Sunnis, Alevis or Turks and Kurds (see 
Eyuboglu 1989; Sener 1989; Pears 1911; Oz 1995; McDowall 1992, Besikci 
1993; Mango 1968; Hasretyan 1990), it should be noted that many of the 
scholars do not focus on these four categories. They mostly deal with Alevi 
and Sunni sect differences or the Kurdish question and Kurdish ethnic identity 
in general. Although some writers touch upon sect differences of both Turkish 
and Kurdish people, none of them examines these four categories in detail. 
If the Kurdish issue were to be taken into account alone, then it could have 
been possible to separate Kurds as a stand-alone ethnic group. However, the 
tie of religion intermingles, making these four groups so called 'sub-ethnic 
groups'. As will be discussed in detail in this chapter, these four groups show 
differences and indeed fall into the definition of ethnicity as the members of 
these groups see themselves as different and these differences are also 
confirmed by others in return. 
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Since Turkey is a secular nation-state, these and other differences are not 
seen as important issues from the governmental side. All the people living in 
Turkey are constitutionally equal under the law. Ethnic or religious differences 
do not play any important role in gaining citizenship rights and in accessing 
services. There are MPs who are Kurdish in the Turkish Parliament. Turgut 
Ozal who was a President of Turkey before Sulayman Demirel was also of 
part Kurdish descent (Poulton, 1997: 320). However this does not change the 
fact that as Poulton (1997: 221) argues, the authorities in Turkey still tend to 
deny the existence of the Kurdish Problem. Instead they prefer to talk about 
the economic problems of the southeast and the terrorism of the PKK. It has 
already been noted that the Turkish constitution does not allow the Kurdish 
Language to be taught as the mother tongue in schools. Despite all the 
promising equality of the laws, when it comes to talk about different ethnic 
minorities, especially Kurds and their differences, one can easily be accused 
of being a separatist and by all means charged accordingly. In this sense, 
Turkey as a nation-state is not flexible enough to tolerate different voices 
coming from different ethnic minorities. In fact, no matter how democratic are 
the approaches to these differences, the authorities immediately take action 
and see them as a threat to the unity of the state. Yet, it is commonly known 
that the effects of these differences play an important role when members of 
these groups interact with other groups. 
In terms of citizenship rights, as noted earlier, all the people in Turkey are 
Turkish citizens no matter what their religious sect is or what language they 
speak. The important thing here is that as will be seen in this chapter, these 
differences are not new. They have centuries of historical experience. 
Members of these different groups in Turkey lived together for centuries both 
in peace and in conflict from time to time. 
In reference to the language differences, Kurdish is spoken by an important 
number of people as their mother tongue in Turkey. Their number was 
2,219,547 according to the 1980 census (cited by Andrews, 1992: 153). In 
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addition to this there are various estimations by scholars varying from 3 million 
to 20 million. (Icduygu et al, 1999). The more appropriate estimate, however, 
seems to belong to Icduygu et al's article entitled "The Ethnic Question in an 
Environment of Insecurity: the Kurds in Turkey". Using the 1993 Turkish 
Demographic and Health Survey (based on a nationally representative sample 
of 8,619 households and consisting of questions relevant to language), they 
estimate that in 1993 Kurds (Kurdish speakers) comprised 15 per cent (or 8,9 
million) of the total population (59,9 million) in Turkey. Although their estimate 
seem plausible enough, one can still claim that there are important reasons 
why the census data and the estimates could be incorrect. The main reason 
for this is that some Kurdish people might be afraid of being seen as Kurdish 
by the Turkish officials, assuming possible political problems. Therefore, it is a 
strong possibility that an important number of Kurdish people could hesitate to 
state that their mother tongue is Kurdish. 
We must highlight that although there have been some political efforts to 
pretend that there is no Kurdish language, as a result of linguistic researches, 
it has been proved that Kurdish is a north-west Iranian language (Gstrein, 
1991: 46; Ghassemlou, 1965: 26; Chaliand, 1994: 11). At present, there are an 
Institute of Kurdoloji in Iraq (Baghdad) since 1958 and a Department of 
Kurdish Language and Literature in Iran (Tehran) since 1970 (Chailand, 1994: 
47). 
According to religious differences, there are also two major sects in Turkey: 
Alevi and Sunni. Serious differences between these two sects beg to be 
defined in the context of ethnicity as well. It must be pointed out that, in Islam 
until Mohammed (prophet) died in 632, there was no diversity among Muslims. 
However, as Et-Tiycani (1996: 26) puts it, after Mohammed died, the problem 
of who would be the caliph emerged. Although Ebu Bekir was chosen as the 
first caliph, there were also some other Muslims who supported All (brother-in- 
law of the prophet) believing that he deserved the right of being the first 
Caliph. Therefore, the first separatism between Muslims started. Then 
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supporters of Ali were called as Alevis. Therefore, the term Alevi is used to 
stress those who are supporters and followers of Ali (Erdogan.....: 6). As 
Pears (1911: 296) points out, this separatism had become very strict after the 
fatal battle of Kerbela. In this battle the prophet's grand-sons Hassan and 
Hossein were killed. Therefore, Kerbela and this battle are very important for 
the Alevis and Kerbela is seen as a chief place for pilgrimage among the 
Alevis. 
It should also be pointed out that the Sunni branch of Islam also has a number 
of sub-branches such as Hanifis, Safis etc. However, none of these Sunni 
sub-branches considers the others different from themselves nor is there any 
remarkable conflict between them. 
Alevis are sometimes given different names such as 'Kizilbashes' (Red 
Heads), 'Shias', 'Bektashis' and, in the period of the Ottoman Empire, 'Rafizis'. 
One can think that Alevis in Turkey are similar to 'Shias' in other Islamic 
countries. It is true to say that all are followers of All (brother-in-law of the 
Prophet). However, apart from this, there is no similarity between them. Alevis 
in Turkey do not practice Islam as the other Shias do in other countries. As will 
be seen later in this chapter, being different from other Shias in other 
countries, they do not go to mosques for prayer. They have a different place 
the so called 'cemevi' for their worship. Alevis in Turkey are more secular than 
the other Shias in other countries. They are not as strict followers of Islam as 
the others. 
As for Turkey, It can be said that Alevis added their Turkish characters to 
Islam as being different from Sunnis. The religious practices of the Sunni 
branch of Islam are fasting in Ramadan, prayer five times a day, going to 
Mecca for pilgrimage, sacrificing in the feast. On the other hand, the religious 
practices of the Alevi sect are very different from the Sunnis. These 
differences are as follows (Sener, 1989: 160-161): 
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- They (Alevis) only fast for 12 days in the month of Muharrem 
according to the Islamic calendar. During these 12 days, they do not eat meat 
and do not drink water. They do not touch any instrument that can be used for 
cutting or killing. 
- They (Alevis) have weekly religious meetings held on Friday evenings 
especially during the winter. In these meetings, wine is ceremoniously drunk, 
'baglama' (a Turkish musical instrument) is played and 'semah' (a kind of 
dance) is done by men and women together. In these meetings, they also 
make circle prayers. These meetings are led by the religious leaders called 
'dede'. It can also be said that these meetings play a court role for those who 
have problems with their neighbours or friends, etc. The religious leader 
usually judges the situation and solves the problem. It should be noted that, 
until the 1960s, the majority of Alevis did not apply to the courts to solve a 
problem with another Alevi. When an Alevi had a problem with another Alevi, it 
used to be said "wait for'dede', when he comes who is guilty will be found and 
punished". 
- Although they (Alevis) believe in God and the prophet Mohammed, 
they do not pray five times a day. 
- They (Alevis) do not fast in Ramadan. 
- They do not go to Mecca on pilgrimage Instead they go to Hachi 
Bektash in Nevsehir in Turkey for this aim 
- Their women are not veiled. This difference was most remarkable in 
the period of the Ottoman Empire as the religious issues were very strict and 
based on the Sunni sect of Islam since nearly the beginning of The Empire. 
Now, as a result of Kemalist revolutions, Turkish women are generally not 
veiled. However, since Islamic groups have gained remarkable power and 
support in recent years, again this difference has started to be observed in 
Turkey. 
To have a broader perspective on ethnic diversity in Turkey, we should 
examine the historical background of these groups in Turkey. 
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4.2. Historical background of ethnic diversity in Turkey 
As Mango (1968: 13) stated that there is a common view among Turkish and 
non Turkish historians that the origin of the Turks can be traced to Central 
Asia, Siberia and the great northern plains on either side of the Ural 
mountains, it can be seen that the main roots of Turkish words have remained 
unaltered. 
People who call and have called themselves Turks 
came from across the eastern frontiers of the 
Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia, where they had 
lived mainly as nomads organized in tribes; they 
penetrated the Muslim Middle East first as 
mercenaries of the Abbasid Caliphs in the ninth 
century; they entered the Middle East already as 
Muslims, having been converted in their homeland 
by Arab and Persian missionaries, and they spoke a 
language recognizably akin to that spoken in Turkey 
today. (Mango, 1968: 13) 
In both Turkish and English literature, there seems to be a lack of information 
about the conversion of the Turks in ninth century. This is a fact one cannot 
argue but almost no attention - to my best knowledge- has ever been paid to 
the process of this conversion apart from Aydin's work entitled Nasil 
Musluman Olduk? (How did we become Muslims? ). This process was actually 
a result of 300 years of warfare between Turks and Arabs. As Aydin (1996: 
31) argues, the Turks did not choose Islam voluntarily. They were indeed 
converted to Islam by force and during this 300-year period hundreds of 
thousands of people were killed on both sides. It is also very interesting to 
note that, once the Turks were converted to Islam, a lot of them were used as 
guards by the caliphs to protect their sovereignties. 
When they were converted to Islam, the conflict between Alevis and Sunnis 
was already a major problem. Therefore, although many Turks chose the 
Sunni branch of Islam, there was also an important number of Turks who 
chose the Alevi sect. 
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The history of the Turks' gathering in Anatolia started with the battle of 
Malazgirt (Manzikert) in eastern Turkey in 1071. In this battle, Turkish Seljuk 
Sultan Alparslan defeated the Byzantine Emperor Romanos Diogenes. 
(Mango, 1968: 14) Soon after this victory, Anatolia became a Muslim Turkish 
land because of the large influx of Turkish tribesmen. (Mango, 1968: 14) After 
this war, it is also stated that Kurdish tribes migrated to the southeast region of 
Turkey. 
The Turks lived as Seljuks depending on Seljuk's Sultans from 1071 to 1241. 
After that, the Seljuks were overwhelmed by the Mongols. As Mango (1968: 
17) states, the Mongols only destroyed the central authority of the sultans, but 
they did not destroy the Turkish Muslim civilization. This Mongol invasion 
created a second wave of Turkish influx to Anatolia and the number of Turks 
increased rapidly. (Ibid: 17) Then in 1299 Osman, who was one of the Turkish 
princes, founded the Ottoman dynasty which became one of the greatest 
empires in the world and lasted more than six centuries until Republic of 
Turkey emerged in 1923. 
4.2.1. Ottoman Empire 
As we already mentioned, the Ottoman Empire came into existence in 1292 
and lasted until the Republic of Turkey emerged in 1923. As Ahmad (1993: 2) 
puts it, 
The Ottoman Empire was a great military establishment which 
conquered vast territories in Europe, Asia, and Africa, and 
even threatened Vienna on two occasions, in 1529 and 1683 
The population of the empire consisted of Muslims and Christians. As Pears 
(1911: 2) stated, the Arabs, the Armenians, the Albanians, the Greeks, the 
Turks, the Kurds, the Bulgarians etc. formed the Ottoman Empire, although it 
was established by the Turks, and in this complex social structure, the Sultan 
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ruled over a number of peoples with varying aims and usually with opposing 
interests. 
It must be stressed that until the Ottoman Empire emerged, there was no 
information about the conflict between Alevi and Sunni sects among the Turks 
and Kurds. 
There is a common agreement that the Ottoman Empire ruled its muslim 
people according to the Sunni sect of Islam's rules. It is very interesting, 
however, to note that the main ideology in the very beginning was actually 
'Alevism'. As Oz (1992: 118) points out, the earliest Sultans were Alevi and 
Alevis took important positions in the Empire to help the appearance of 
organizations and order. According to him, the reason why the Empire chose 
the Sunni discourse later on lies behind the fact that prior to the appearance of 
the Ottoman empire, the religious preference in other Turkish civilizations was 
always the Sunni sect. Therefore, the Sunni principles were the common way 
of governing. As Oz argues further, there is no common agreement about the 
time of this change to the Empires preference of the sect. However, according 
to him the period of Sultan Yildirim can be seen as a starting point because in 
the 1402 Ankara war Alevis did not support the sultan thus causing his defeat. 
As scholars commonly agree, the approach of the Empire to Alevis was 
always very hostile. The main reason for this was the bad relationship with a 
neighbouring country - Iran - where the governing power was based on the 
Shia (another describing term for Alevis) sect of Islam. As the Ottoman Empire 
gave up its Alevi characteristics and started to rule its people according to the 
rules of the Sunni way of Islam, Alevis within the Empire saw that their 
salvation was only possible with the help of Iranian Shahs as a result of 
sharing the same sect. This situation ended up with the Alevi people's help to 
Iran at warfare times and it was not tolerated by the Sultans. Therefore, 
Ottoman Sultans did not hesitate to execute or exile their Alevi subjects to 
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prevent their help to Iran. When we look at the Sultans' edicts, this situation 
can easily be seen. Here are some examples (Oz, 1995: 60-72): 
To the Zulkadir Beylerbeyi (governor of Zulkadir): 
Accusing the Alevis with other false (made up) reasons, collect 
and execute them. Because they have good relations with 
Iran. (Year: 1576) 
To Behlul Bey of Boysan and Bozyan: 
Inspect the Alevis who have good relations with Iran and 
execute them with a different (made up) reason. (Year: 1576) 
To the Bozok Beylerbeyi (governor of Bozok): 
The copies of notebooks in which those who are accused of 
being "Kizilbash" (red head or Alevi) were written were sent to 
you. Inspect them, if they are really Kizilbashes, execute them. 
If their being Alevis cannot be proved, exile them to Cyprus. 
(Year: 1577) 
(Translated by the author from Turkish) 
As can be understood from these edicts, the relations between the Alevis and 
the Empire had always been a serious problem. Alevis had to escape from 
their homes and settle in other mountain areas where defence and hiding 
were easy. As a result of these problems, to survive, an important number of 
Alevis had to join Kurds and learned Kurdish (Erdogan, ....: 
30). Therefore, the 
term Alevi Kurds mainly originated from this point. As Andrews (1992: 155) 
pointed out, the majority of Kurds are Sunnis. In a reference to the Alevi 
Kurds, it is found that they keep their Turkish features. For example, although 
they speak Kurdish, in their religious meetings they always speak Turkish. 
(cited by Erdogan, ....: 30) Alevism indeed does not have a Kurdish root, 
because, Haci Bektash Veli, who established Alevism in Turkey, and the 
dervishes who came after him such as Pir Sultan Abdal, Hallaci Mansur, 
Yunus Emre and Fuzuli always spoke and wrote in Turkish. (Sener, 1989: 
148) 
What is more interesting is that some of the Alevi Kurds still do not use the 
term Sunni Turks. Instead they call them 'Turk' referring only to their sect 
difference. I have also observed this on a few occasions with the parents of 
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some of the respondents. On one occasion, the mother of one of the 
respondents was describing one of her neighbours. She said "they are Turks". 
At first I did not notice the point she made. When I asked her whether the 
family is Sunni or Alevi in order to find more respondents for my survey, she 
explained, "They are Sunnis but we call them Turks". When I asked how she 
calls Alevi Turks, she said she calls them Alevi no matter they if are Turks or 
Kurds. 
The following report by the Governor Cenral Bey before the Dersim Revolt in 
1937 clarifies this, 
Those who are Alevis and Turkmens have been oppressed since 
Yavuz (one of the Ottoman Sultans) and hundreds of thousands 
have been killed without any mercy. 
The problems in this area (Dersim) are a result of the treatments 
of Sunni Imams and Sunni people as they know little about 
Alevis. 
This has caused a strong unity among Alevi Turkmens. 
Many authorities have taken wrong actions against them 
supposing that they are the same with Kurdish Tribes 
If the pressure on them ends and authorities were sensible, 
Dersim people would become loyal subjects of the Republic. 
During my visit to Dersim, I have never come across anyone who 
can't speak Turkish nor could I find any Kurds here. Sunnis call 
Alevis as Kurds, and in return Alevis call them Turks. This 
mistake is even made by civil servants. (Kaynak Yayinlari: 101, 
1992: 166) 
Briefly, we can conclude that in the context of the Ottoman empire, the Alevis 
for the most part were always far from the power of government and they were 
always punished by being executed or exiled. During the period of the Empire, 
there were a number of Alevi revolts. However, none of them succeeded. 
They were all defeated by the Empire. As a result, they had to hide their 
religious differences from strangers. This is also pointed out by Pears (1911: 
265): 
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When asked by a stranger whether they are Moslems or Alevi they 
will probably answer, " We are all the slaves of Allah. " ... When once their confidence is gained by a European they are 
communicative. They hate the ordinary Moslem and are equally 
hated in return. 
When we look at the circumstances for the Kurds, we can say that their 
relations with the empire were much better than the Alevis. There may be two 
reasons for this. First, when they chose Islam, they usually chose its Sunni 
sect (Gstrein, 1991: 12). Second, and maybe more important, they were seen 
as a buffer between Iran and the Alevi Turks after they fought alongside the 
Ottoman Sultan Selim the Cruel during the Iran-Ottoman battle in 1514. 
(Kendal, 1980a: 22) Their geographic region was much more appreciated by 
the Sultans since they helped to stop Alevi support to Iran. Therefore, to keep 
Kurds in the southeast region, the sultans did not apply the 'Timar'(*) system to 
the Kurds. As Kendal (1980a: 22) stresses, the powerful chiefs of the Kurds 
were given independent status so that they could strike coinage, and the 
Friday public prayer (the Khutba) was recited in their name. They also did not 
have to pay the Sultan any tribute on condition that they provide military 
support and stay within the frontiers of their 'state'. In this region, the right of 
using fields had always passed from father to son. (cited by Sener, 1989: 148- 
149) In other words, the Ottoman Empire was not ruling this region. Therefore, 
Kurd chiefs controlled this region for a long time. During this period, it is said 
that an important number of Turkish people mixed with Kurdish people and 
forgot their mother tongue. Ziya Gokalp cites the Karakecili Tribe as an 
example of this. Although one part of this tribe in the southeast region speak 
Kurdish, the other part in the Aegean Region speaks Turkish. (Cited by Sener, 
1989: 149) 
In this system the owners of all the fields are simply the Sultans. They give these fields to the people 
on condition that they provide military support to the Ottoman army and give the required tax to them. In other words, the user of the land is not the owner. 
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Although in the beginning, Turks were respectful to the Kurds, later on this 
respect disappeared and towards the end of the nineteenth century, a number 
of Kurdish revolts emerged against the Empire (Gstrein, 1991: 13). One of the 
important reasons was, no doubt, that the Ottoman Empire became weak and 
it did not have a war with Iran any more. Therefore, the importance of the 
Kurds also disappeared. 
It must be pointed out that after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, as a 
result of new borders of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, Kurds became subjects 
of these countries and they were geographically separated from other Kurds in 
other countries. 
4.2.2. Republic of Turkey 
It is true that the conflict between Alevis and Sunnis in Islam is a result of 
efforts by the sultans and by the hierarchy of the 'ulema' as they tried to 
impose Sunnism. (Mango, 1968: 103) Therefore, as a result of these 
oppressions by the Empire, Alevis voluntarily supported the establishment of 
the Republic, because what the republic meant to them was simply freedom. 
As Erdogan (.... : 67) stressed, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was given a great deal 
of support by the Alevis. Not only did they help in the establishment of the 
republic, they also helped to defeat religious rebellions against the republic. 
They also supported Kemalist revolutions. 
Under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's leadership, the Republic of Turkey was 
founded in 1923. The Kemalist revolution aimed to create a western society 
from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. In this context, one of the most 
important Kemalist revolutions was to put an end to the Ottoman Dynasty by 
transforming the country from a religious to a secular one. Religion was no 
longer a ruling authority. He successfully removed the religious organizations 
from governmental affairs. The revolution actually meant a complete change 
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for the people from education to dressing style. Women were no longer 
isolated from the public sphere. As a result of education, work and voting 
rights. Ataturk's aim was to see a modern Turkey with a developed structure. 
However, one thing in organizing the social structure of new Republic of 
Turkey was missed or unforeseen. This was simply the possible outcome of 
two sects of Islam and the multi-ethnic heritage of the Ottoman Empire. With 
the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, as Erbas (1997) stresses, 
Kemalist ideology used nationalism that can be called territorial nationalism. 
However this turned into ethnic nationalism which is developed by a 
Sociologist, Ziya Gokalp (very interesting to note that he was Kurdish). The 
basic assumption was "All people are Turks and all are Muslims" (Sunni 
Muslims). This meant denying the other ethnic groups and the Alevi sect of 
Islam. As a result, in 1924, the teaching of the Kurdish language in school and 
any claims by ethnic groups were banned as it was thought that this would 
undermine the national unity. (Chaliand, 1994: 12) 
It must be noted that despite the secular structure of Turkey, Islamic 
publications and official organizations have always been run according to the 
rules of the Sunni branch. Alevi religious practices shortly after the 
establishment of the republic were banned. Here, one can see a historical 
reappearance, as this happened in twice exactly the same way in the early 
Ottoman Empire. As can be remembered, we already mentioned the 
contribution of Alevis to the establishment of the Ottoman Empire in the early 
period (they were also left alone by the sultans later). 
Until recently, Alevis used to support the social democrat or socialist parties or 
individuals. For example, the main source of votes of the Republican Public 
Party (RPP) and Turkey's Worker Party has always been Alevis. However, 
today, this situation has started to change. Although the majority of the Alevis 
are still supporters of left-wing political parties, they have started to vote for 
right wing parties as well. (Sener, 1989: 159). However, it must be noted that 
99 
they do not have any connection with the recent rise of Islam in Turkey. They 
are supporters of the secular system and are seen as guards of this system. 
It should also be stressed that before the 1950s, Alevis had not been owners 
of even small shops in the towns and cities. Then, gradually this situation 
changed. Now, there are important numbers of Alevis who own powerful 
companies and are effective in import and export. (Sener, 1989: 159) 
However, although they are accepted legally in the market, their religious 
practices are not tolerated, as the mainstream Sunni way of Islam was seen 
as the only way of practicing the religion. It can be said that the pressures in 
the period of the Ottoman Empire have also continued after the Republic of 
Turkey emerged. (Sener, 1989: 160) 
When we look at the social relations between Alevis and Sunnis, it can be said 
that there are still serious problems between them. Since 1970 there have 
been four Alevi-Sunni conflicts in Turkey and hundreds of people have been 
killed on both sides. These Alevi-Sunni conflicts emerged in 1978 in 
Kahraman Maras, in 1980 in Corum and Sivas, and in 1993 in Sivas again. 
(cited from Tempo by http: //rummelplatz. uni-manheim. de/--fayton/alevil. html). 
In addition to this there was also an Alevi uprising in a borough called Gazi In 
Istanbul in March 1995. (see Marcus, 1996: 24-26 
A false report that Alevis had attacked a Mosque was always enough to start 
the conflict. The religious differences between the Alevis and the Sunnis have 
created some irrational prejudices in each group. For example it can still be 
observed that marriages with the members of the other group are unwanted 
events by the parents. Some Sunnis do not even believe that Alevis are 
Muslims. Since Alevis had to hide their religious meetings from the public, 
these meetings had long been seen as venues for group sex since Alevi men 
and women go to the religious meetings together as opposed to the Sunnis. 
As known, in the Sunni sect, women and men cannot go to a mosque and 
worship together. 
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We can briefly conclude that the main problem of the Alevis with Turkish 
Governments --although there have always been representatives and 
ministries in the governments-- is that they are not represented in the 
Presidency Religious Affairs which is a government organisation. Another 
problem is that although the state builds mosques in cities and villages, it has 
not so far built a 'cemevi' for the Alevis. Although Turkey is a secular country, 
this does not mean that the state is completely apart from religious affairs. In 
fact religious affairs are organized by a governmental organisation and most 
of the financial help comes from the budget of this organisation and therefore 
from the taxes paid by people. This means that Alevis contribute automatically 
to the building of mosques and to the salaries of Imams, although they have 
nothing to do with the Sunni way of practice. In schools, religious classes are 
compulsory for all students. However, these classes are also designed for the 
aims of Sunni branch. Therefore, Alevi students have to attend these classes 
and learn the Sunni discourse. 
Nowadays, some signs of change in the approaches of the Turkish 
Government to the Alevis can be noticed. According to an article in a Turkish 
newspaper (Millivet Gazetesi, 18.10.1997), Alevi institutes are going to be 
established at the University of Ankara and the University of Gazi in Ankara. 
The Alevis have also been promised that the state will help in building 
'cemevis' and they will be represented in the Presidency of Religious Affairs 
Organization. 
When we look at the Kurdish problem, we can say that this problem is much 
more important than sect differences of Islam. 
It is a fact that although it cannot be said that all Kurdish people want to have 
a country independent from Turkey, the Kurdish question in Turkey has 
always been a major ethnic problem since the first religious Kurdish revolt in 
1925 (see Icduygu et al, 1999) 
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It is very important to highlight that after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 
Kurds did not fight to establish their own state as the other minorities of the 
Ottoman Empire did. As Ahmad (1993: 4) states, Kurds failed to do so 
although other nationalities of the Ottoman Empire such as the Greeks, the 
Bulgarians and the Albanians managed to establish their own states. In 
addition to this, Kurds did fight alongside the Turks during the Independence 
War and therefore helped the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. 
As in the period of the Ottoman Empire, Kurds stayed mainly in the South 
East and in some parts of the Eastern Anatolian Regions until the 1950s. After 
that, as a result of internal migration from rural areas, many of them moved to 
the cities in the West regions. However, it is true that in the South East and 
some parts of Eastern Anatolia the proportion of Kurds is still dominant. 
(Iktisadi Kalkinma Vakfi, 1994) Indeed, the provinces in which most Kurds live 
are the poorest and most undeveloped places in Turkey. This creates a sharp 
contrast between the Western and Eastern regions in Turkey. 
As Ahmad (1993: 218) stated, "The modern Kurdish movement may be dated 
from the early 1960s when Kurdish intellectuals joined the growing left in a 
struggle for equality and cultural autonomy, and a demand for a greater 
economic development in the eastern provinces. " Then this movement 
became more militant and by 1979 many provinces in the east were under 
martial law. (Ibid: 218) 
After the 12 September 1980 military coup, the generals decided to solve the 
Kurdish problem by force. Turkey was placed under martial law and in the 
eastern cities this continued long after it was ended in other cities. It was a 
poor choice, which caused nearly 35,000 deaths and the expenditure of lots of 
money for the fight against the PKK (the Workers' Party of Kurdistan). In 
Turkey there is a common view that if this money was spent on the 
development of this region, the problem could have easily been solved. 
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Here I also would like to touch on another characteristic of the Kurdish 
movement. The recent period starting with the capture of the leader of PKK, 
Abdullah Ocalan, has shown that the Kurdish movement can change its 
directions and aims. In the first few weeks following the capture, Kurdish 
protests and demonstrations in West European countries (Germany, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Britain) were escalated (The Guardian, 18 February 
1999). In Turkey the situation was no different at all. Kurdish attacks and 
demonstrations also noticeably increased, leading to fears of a possible 
chaos. However, it did not turn out to be what was feared. Soon after the trial 
started, Ocalan, revealed a new strategy. The PKK was to give up the war and 
become a political organisation on the condition that Kurdish cultural rights 
were recognised and the economic development of the south east region was 
given more attention. He said that Kurdish people by no means want to have a 
separated territory. Both peoples should live within the same borders in peace 
and for this the recognition of their cultural rights is a necessity. This call was 
soon approved by the PKK, and Kurdish guerrillas started to leave the country 
and Kurdish attacks soon ceased. Ocalan also stated that the recognition of 
their cultural rights was only possible with a more democratic Turkey and for 
this they would contribute whatever they could. Soon after this, the Kurdish 
movement which always tried to prevent Turkey's socio-economic progress by 
urging tourists not to spend their holidays in Turkey, and by negative 
propaganda, again changed its characteristics and the world witnessed their 
support and contribution to Turkey's application to become a member of 
European Union. 
These facts might make one think that ethnic movements can be heavily 
dependent on a single person, the leader of the PKK. The latest progress 
actually shows the importance of multiculturalism for countries which have 
different ethnic minorities. The guerrilla war started in 1984 has claimed more 
than 30,000 lives for the sake of Kurdish cultural rights. Multicultural issues 
have long been a worrying matter to Turkish authorities, as they fear to lose 
the unity of the state. However, there are examples that multicultural solutions 
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in a democratic country can actually lessen the tensions between ethnic 
groups and make them loyal to the system. Therefore, the main solution for 
Turkey to overcome the problems of different ethnic minorities is to think 
seriously about multicultural issues. 
So far, I have given detailed information about sect and language differences 
found in Turkey leading to constructing sub-ethnic group identities namely; 
Sunni Turks, Alevi Turks, Sunni Kurds and Alevi Kurds. The reason for using 
these four categories is a result of sect differences. Both Turkish and Kurdish 
people are bound with religion and therefore sect differences create another 
type of ethnic group identity which we call them as sub-ethnic group identities. 
The attachments of these groups to ethnicity can be found in a number of 
characteristics of ethnicity. 
Firstly, these sub-ethnic group identities are primordial. In other words, 
members of these groups are born into them. 
Secondly, they share a common history, language and the same sect. As 
noted earlier, Alevis for example had suffered during the period of the 
Ottoman Empire. The historical background shows many revolts, exiles and 
executions. Kurds also have a similar history. Although to some extent they 
were treated in a good way by the Sultans and were able to carry on their 
cultural differences, this was one of the important things for the Republic of 
Turkey to stop. They were forced to give up their differences and as a result 
the south east region has always been in conflict with the state. 
Thirdly, the use of 'we' and 'others' by the members of these groups is also a 
very important factor. Even if a member of one of these groups is not keen on 
using the identity of the group, others easily remind him. It is to some extent 
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very easy to identify one as Alevi Sunni or Kurd Turk by looking at his 
birthplace, family and the neighbourhood he lives. 
Finally, what makes these four groups distinct from each other is religion and 
language. For example, although the Sunni Turks and Kurds share the very 
same sect, Sunni Turks because of the Kurdish question see them separatist 
and therefore different. Alevi Turks may also share this. However Kurdish 
Alevis can feel close to Kurdish Sunnis although some of them think (I 
observed this in Turkey) that they are also religious and once they get 
independence their lives can also be in danger. However, the Sunni and Alevi 
sect of these groups share some characteristics. That is to say that, Alevi 
groups are likely to be more secular than the religious Sunnis. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, there is no doubt that ethnic diversity exists in Turkey, no matter 
how strongly the authorities deny this and point out the ethnic unity of the 
state which is Turk and Islam. The ethnic minorities in Turkey surely fit the 
definition of ethnicity as they share common characteristics i. e. language, 
sect, and history. 
As we have seen in this chapter, the relationships of these groups with each 
other are not necessarily friendly. In fact, Alevi Sunni and Turk Kurd conflicts 
provide us with the opposite. 
When we look at the areas of residence of Kurdish people, it can be seen that 
they are the poorest and most undeveloped areas of Turkey. This can be 
attributed to the misguided approach of successive Turkish governments. 
Although it is not easy to say that the economic development of these areas 
would have solved the ethnic problems, it must be stressed that investments 
in the southeast region should have been given a higher priority, because, as 
was mentioned before, the claim of the first Kurdish movement was to have 
equality and economic development of the region. 
The more important solution for lessening the tension between these groups is 
to start dealing with multicultural issues with a more democratic structure. 
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Chapter 5: 
Research methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide a detailed account of the methods used in this 
research. The fieldwork of this study has consisted of several main phases 
namely sampling, preliminary observations, pilot and main study. The main 
data gathering instruments were structured questionnaires and in-depth 
interviews, making the structure of this study both quantitative and qualitative. 
5.1. Aim of the research 
As noted earlier, the main aim of this research is to investigate Turkish young 
people living in London by looking at their ethnic and sub-ethnic group identities 
and their effects on relationships at the family, community and host society 
level. 
Much of the available literature on Turkish people abroad mainly focuses on a 
single identity: Turkish Muslim or simply Turk/Islam. This study is in a way a 
challenge to these studies by showing that available literature and the reality in 
Turkey is somewhat different from what they tend to report. Without knowing 
these differences among Turkish people and applying them to their 
relationships, one could not produce a correct picture and therefore would 
cause misunderstandings. This is really the case for many of the Europeans 
who read the available literature on Turkish people and end up thinking Turkish 
people are Sunni Muslims and they go to mosques, though in the last few years 
there has been a growing interest on the differences among Turkish people. 
However, it is known that an estimated 20 million Turkish people are Alevis 
(see Sener 1989; Andrews 1992) and they do not have anything to do with the 
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mosques and Imams. Their religious place is called 'cemevi' and they do not 
fast during the Ramadan. One can, therefore, cover only the Sunni population 
when they draw on a sample using the mosques and other Sunni 
organizations. 
Although there is a growing interest in Kurdish ethnic identity, it is also a fact 
that much of the available literature does not focus on this issue, supposing 
that they are Turkish citizens and therefore they should be seen as belonging 
to Turk/Islam identity. 
Therefore, it is a necessity to go beyond the single definition of Turk/Islam 
identity as different sub-ethnic group identities are used by Turkish people 
which affect how they lead their lives. 
This research includes only Turkish people from the mainland. Although there 
seem to be a considerable number of Turkish Cypriots living in London, in order 
to investigate mainland Turkish young people in detail by using language and 
religious (sect) criteria, within the limitations of a PhD study, the research had 
to be designed to include only mainland Turks. 
As noted earlier there are only three studies conducted in Britain on Turkish 
people: Ladbury (1977), Sonyel (1988), Kucukcan (1999) and none of them 
dealt with sub-ethnic group identities of Turkish people here. Ladbury's Ph. D 
thesis is about Turkish Cypriots in London and she touches only on mainland 
Turks in relationships with the Turkish Cypriots. Sonyel and Kucukcan are 
mainly concerned with Islamic characteristics of Turkish people in London. By 
no means one can see any explanation dealing with the ethnic identities of 
Turkish people. Sonyel mainly focuses on Turkish children's needs in schools 
and their loss of Turkish culture. Kucukcan's study does not give any further 
information regarding the different ethnic identities used by Turkish people. His 
main concern also is that Turkish young people are increasingly losing their 
Islamic characters. 
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Therefore, it can be said that this research is the first one which goes beyond 
the traditional national classification and gives further information about the use 
of different ethnic identities and their effects on the lives of Turkish young 
people. 
5.2. Research questions 
This research seeks out answers to the following main questions: 
1- What is the importance of sub-ethnic group identities? Do they affect Turkish 
young people's relationships with each other and the host society? 
2- Is there any difference in relationships of Turkish youth in the family and the 
community in terms of sub-ethnic groups? 
3- How do they place themselves within British society? Are they willing to be 
integrated into the host society. Do they feel themselves British? 
4- Do the networks in the community make them outsiders of British culture or 
help them to a better integration? 
5.3. Context of the research 
5.3.1. Geographic location 
As we already discussed in chapter 2 (see table 2.8), the majority of Turkish 
born people (20,426 out of 26,597) in the UK live in London. Furthermore, as 
can be seen in table 5.3, they tend to gather in a few boroughs of London 
namely Hackney, Haringey and Islington. Therefore, the research was carried 
out in London and starting boroughs were these three boroughs. However as a 
result of the use of snowball sampling technique, some other boroughs were 
also involved in this research. 
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Map 2: London boroughs 
Source: http: //www. brent. gov. uk/brent/brent/brent/other/londmap. htm 
5.3.2. Preliminary observations and informal interviews 
Prior to the pilot study, some unstructured observations were made in the field 
in order to be familiar with the environment where Turkish people gathered. 
Before the researcher went to London, he had some information from previous 
research (Ladbury, 1977 and Sonyel, 1988) that the important boroughs where 
Turkish people mainly gathered were Hackney, Haringey and Islington. The 
researcher went to these boroughs more than 15 times from 24th September to 
the end of October 1997 in order to find out the general features of the Turkish 
population. During this period, the researcher made observations and had 
informal conversations with 16 Turkish people who were mostly shop owners or 
staff members of some shops and three organizations: Turkish Library, Turkish 
Youth Center and Alevi Cemevi. It was found that in these boroughs, there is 
an extensive Turkish population. Despite the relatively short time of the 
existence of Turkish people in London, it must be said that they had 
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constructed a well organized community and network. For example, in the early 
1980s there were only a few Turkish shops in these boroughs. Now, many 
shops can be seen along the same street. For example, the researcher 
counted the number of Turkish shops, cafes, newsagents, etc. along Green 
Lanes (from Turnpike Line Tube Station to Wood Green) which is shown by 
map 3 This can be seen in the following table. 
Table 5.1. Turkish shops, cafes, supermarkets, etc., along the Green 
Lanes (from Turnpike Tube station to Wood Green) in London. 
Businesses Number 
Restaurants &Kebab shops 18 
Market, Supermarket and Grocery shops 14 
Cafes & Social clubs 10 
Travel Agents 6 
Electric, Electronic (repair & sell) 4 
Hairdresser 4 
Jewellery 4 
Photo studio 3 
Music / Video 3 
Newsagent 3 
Patisserie 3 
Butcher 2 
Solicitors 2 
Bank 1 
Letting Agency 1 
Insurance 1 
Furniture 1 
Olay Newspaper 1 
TOTAL 81 
(This table is produced by counting the shops which had Turkish names in January, 1998 
and may well include Turkish Cypriot shops as well) 
As can be seen from the table above, the main Turkish businesses along 
Green Lanes are restaurants, Supermarkets and Cafes. However, when we 
look at the table, it is seen that there are various types of businesses from 
insurance to travel agents, solicitors to bank. In a way, it can be concluded that 
this variety is shaped according to the needs of the community. In other words, 
when they need something they are able to find it from a Turkish shop etc. 
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easily. For many of them who cannot speak English, this is such a good service 
since the spoken language in these shops is Turkish. 
Map 3. Green Lanes 
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It should also be stressed that the Turkish community in London is 
organised. This can be seen in the following list of Turkish organisations. 
Turkish Bank (UK) 
Ziraat Bank 
Is Bank 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi (Bank) 
Turkish Association Cyprus 
Turkish- British Chamber of Commerce & Industry 
Turkish Consulate General 
Turkish Cypriot Cultural Association 
Turkish Education Group 
Turkish Law Office 
Turkish Radio (UK) ltd 
well 
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Turkish Speaking Peoples Cultural Centre 
Turkish Women Support Group 
Turkish Youth Association ltd 
Turkish Association Club 
Turkish Community 
Turkish Community Library 
Turkish Social Club 
London Alevi Cultural Centre & Cemevi 
London Islamic Turkish Association 
Halkevi 
Toplum Postasi (Weekly Newspaper) 
Olay (Weekly Magazine) 
Anadolu Kultur (Anatolian Culture) 
Komkar (Kurdish Advice Centre) 
As can be seen from the list, the Turkish community in London has various 
cultural, educational, and financial organisations. There is no doubt that they 
assist Turkish people in different ways. 
Although the estimates about the size of Turkish people from the mainland 
vary, it should be useful to give my impression about it. It can easily be 
observed that in Hackney, Haringey and Islington boroughs, the existence of 
Turkish people is quite noticeable. Along Green Lanes and in Stoke Newington 
there are many Turkish and Turkish-Kurdish shops, Markets, Cafes, 
Restaurants etc. To give an example, in 1998 some of the famous Turkish Folk 
music singers and players (Arif Sag, Tolga Sag, Erdal Erzincan, and Belkis 
Akkale) gave a concert in London which was organised by the Cemevi. The 
saloon was able to take an audience of more than 3,000. I was also there and 
saw that the saloon was full and further told by the organising committee that 
more than 3,000 tickets were sold. 
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5.3.3. Age group 
It appears that dealing with young people brings the problem of the definition of 
age borders. In other words, there is no common agreement to define youth 
depending on specific ages (See Banks et al, 1992; Coleman and Husen, 
1985; Family Policy Studies Centre, 1988). For this research Turkish young 
people between 15 and 25 ages were used in the sampling procedure. 
5.3.4. The minimum period of stay in the UK 
In order to mention about integration, it is necessary for migrants to stay in the 
host country for some years. This is required for learning the host society's 
language and the way of life. For this research, in selecting the respondents, a 
minimum five years of residence in the UK was looked for. 
5.4. Choice of method 
For the aim of this study, it was thought that the use of both qualitative and 
quantitative data would be appropriate. 
As Dunsmuir and Williams (1990: 7) stated, quantitative research aims to 
gather facts and figures by mainly social surveys or analysis of statistics while 
the aim of qualitative research is to gain a more in-depth understanding of a 
situation or events. (See also Patton, 1987: 9) Bearing in mind this explanation, 
it was thought that quantitative data could be gathered with a structured 
questionnaire in order to use statistical analysis. Apart from this, it was also 
thought that using a small sub-sample, qualitative data must be gathered to 
provide more detailed information in relation to the issues asked in the 
questionnaire. In brief, the aim of collecting qualitative data was to support and 
strengthen the data obtained by the structured questionnaire by interviewing 
Turkish young people. As Bryman (1988: 135) points out, qualitative data can 
assist the analysis of quantitative data. 
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As this study deals with sub-ethnic group identities of Turkish people, it is very 
difficult to cover all the topics in a single questionnaire. The necessity of 
detailed information by the respondent, therefore, made this study use 
qualitative data gathered by face to face in-depth interviews not only to support 
quantitative data but to go beyond the issues asked in questionnaires and to 
get respondents' insights on them. 
As Miles and Huberman (1994: 41) pointed out, argument over quantitative and 
qualitative research is not productive. These two types of data can be used in 
research and qualitative data can help the researcher from the early phases of 
the research design to the end of the fieldwork by helping to obtain necessary 
information to prepare the questions and later to go beyond the structured 
questions and gain in-depth information and insights from the respondents. 
(Ibid: 41) 
This study, therefore, is another example of the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative data. 
5.4.1. Sampling Design 
As Dixon et al stress (1987: 137), there are basically two types of sampling 
procedure: random and non-random. It is a fact that in order to have a 
representative sample, a random sampling procedure must be used. For this 
procedure, the target population must be suitable for listing and each member 
of it must be given an equal chance to be selected. Briefly, it can be said that 
the random sampling procedure provides a representative sample of the target 
population. 
However, when it comes to drawing a sample from an ethnic minority or a rare 
group, various types of problems arise. As has been noted by a number of 
scholars, sampling minority or rare groups is one of the most difficult tasks in 
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social research. (see Hedges 1978; Bryman 1988; Lee 1993; Ratcliffe 1994b) 
In order to have a representative sample of a minority, Hedges (1978) suggests 
two main ways: the use of lists and screening. Depending on the characteristics 
of the target population, although sometimes a full list can be obtained - say list 
of doctors, solicitors, etc., this is not always the case for ethnic minorities. In 
fact for many minority groups, as he puts, no list at all is available. Screening 
comes as a solution if there is no list from which to draw a representative 
sample. In order to do this, the sample designer has to consider taking a 
general population sample sufficiently large to contain a sufficient number of 
members of the ethnic minority. Hedges further argues that, for the screening, 
if the target minority group is only one per cent of the total population and 500 
members of it are needed then the required number of screening sample is 
50,000. Lee (1993: 64) gives an example to show how screening requires 
intensive work. He says, screening 216 houses in two streets in North London 
took 2.5 months which resulted in only 11 interviews and 10 refusals. 
In the UK, four national surveys of ethnic minorities have been conducted since 
1966 (in 1966,1974,1982 and 1994) by Political and Economic Planning 
(PEP), which later became the Policy Studies Institute (PSI), The 1974 PEP 
study represented about 76 per cent of Asian and West Indian minorities in the 
UK using random selection, excluding the areas of low concentration of these 
minorities (Ratcliffe, 1994: 126). However, the last two of these studies in 1982 
and 1994 came close to conducting a national probability sample as they 
included the low concentration areas of the minority populations (Brown, 1984; 
Modood et al, 1997). 
Having given the example of PEP studies, it can be understood that in order to 
have a relatively representative sample, financial sponsorship and 
organisational work are required. Therefore, this makes it very difficult to draw 
a representative sample from a minority group for a PhD study such as this. In 
fact, a long list of studies on migrants or minority groups which did not employ 
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representative sampling can be made. The following list is only a small 
example of this situation. 
1- Patterson, Sheila, 1963; 
3- Ex, J. 1966; 
4- Scott, William A. and Scott, Ruth 1989; 
5- Taft, Ronald, 1966; 
6- Zebrowska , Anna 1986; 7- Ratcliffe, 1994b; 
8- Caglar 1994; 
9- Kaya 1997; 
10- Kucukcan 1999. 
In this research, it was not feasible to draw a representative sample from 
Turkish young people living in London, as the funds could not cover employing 
a number of team workers to create an ideal list of Turkish young people living 
in London. As we said before, this requires organizational work and a huge 
amount of work and money. 
It is well known that most of the time researchers of small minorities or rare 
groups even have to deal with a variety of problems, from economic to 
establishing contacts in the field. As Hedges (1978: 248) puts it, for many 
minority populations there is even no list of the target population and if there is 
one, it is often the case that the list is out dated or incomplete. He further 
argues that in surveying a minority, the sample designer may not even know 
the size of the target population (p: 247). These facts are also valid for this 
research in that neither obtaining a satisfactory list of the Turkish young people 
nor having specific information about the size of the target population was 
possible. 
The 1991 British Census seems to be the only valuable source in 
understanding the concentration places of Turkish people in London although it 
is hard to claim that the numbers given by the census show a correct picture. 
As a result of the ethnicity question used in the 1991 Census, as Coleman and 
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Salt (1992) have pointed out, Turks found it difficult to place themselves in the 
categories. When we look at the ethnicity question, we can see that the 
provided choices are "White", "Black-Caribbean", "Black-African", Black- Other", 
"Indian", "Pakistani", Bangladeshi", "Chinese", and "Any other ethnic group". It 
should be highlighted that these choices do create confusion. For example, 
almost all the Turkish people are white. Therefore, it is a strong possibility that 
a lot of them ticked the 'white' box without considering any other possibility. 
This situation can be seen in Table 5.1. 
However, despite the fact that there are good reasons for believing that none of 
the estimates nor the 1991 British Census adequately describe the mainland 
Turkish population in Britain, the 1991 Census birthplace data can still give us 
valuable information. For example, one can derive information about the 
birthplace of each person enumerated and to some extent their ethnic group 
although the latter is not necessarily dependant on the former because of the 
fact that birthplace is not always an indicator of the ethnic group. 
As we saw in table 2.9, the total number of Turkish born people enumerated in 
the Census is 26,597 and the majority of them classified themselves under the 
'white' category. Although it is not clear to understand what ethnic group they 
stressed in the 'other other' category, it is a strong possibility that the majority 
of the 6.31 per cent stated their ethnic group as Turkish. 
As already mentioned in chapter two, the 1991 Census shows also different 
numbers on Turkish people according to ethnic group classification. As seen 
from table 2.10, the UK has a variety of ethnic groups. However the main 
groups in the total population are relatively small and, as far as the Turkish 
group with which this research is concerned the number is very small. As it is 
seen, the number of Indians is 840.255. This is followed by Black-Caribbean 
with 493.339, Pakistanis with 476.555, Black-Africans with 208.110, 
Bangladeshis with162.835, and Chinese with 156.938. As discussed in chapter 
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two this picture is mainly a result of the colonial experience of the UK which 
allowed them to come to the country freely until the early 1960s and to enjoy 
the right of citizenship from the moment of their arrival. As for Turkish 
immigrants in the UK, it should be noted that Britain did not have a colonial or 
economic and political relationship with Turkey as opposed to Germany's 
economic and political relationship with Turkey which to some extent gives us a 
point to comment on the huge difference between the number of Turkish 
people in Germany and in the UK. 
Although Turkish people were counted with Turkish Cypriots, the total number 
of the population is not more than 26,597. In fact, it shows a total number of 
18,876 Turks in the UK as an ethnic group. This is understandable in terms of 
the nature of the questions asked by the Census form. The number 26,597 
refers to the birthplace question and the number 18,876 represents the findings 
of the ethnicity question. How can we, then, give an answer to this difference 
between the number of Turkish born people and the number of those who 
stressed their ethnic origin as Turkish? This may depend on the fact that 
Turkish people who were born in England stressed their ethnic origin as 
Turkish. As can be seen from table 5.1,90.57 per cent Turkish born people 
ticked the white box without considering any other choice. Therefore, the 
answer is likely to be with English born Turkish people who stressed their 
ethnic origin as Turkish. 
As Fink (1995: 23) points out, there are four types of non-probability samplings 
namely, convenience sampling, snowball sampling, quota sampling and focus 
groups. 
For this research snowball sampling was employed. Fink comments that 
snowball sampling "relies on previously identified members of a group to 
identify other members of the population. As newly identified members name 
others, the sample snowballs" (1995: 19). Lee (1993) also sees snowball 
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sampling as a solution to the sampling problems of small minorities or rare 
groups. 
As mentioned earlier, this research was designed to find out the effects of sub- 
ethnic group identities of Turkish young people on integration into British 
society. Therefore, one of the main reasons in employing snowball sampling, 
was to solve the problem of asking people what sub-ethnic identity they have. 
In a way, asking Turkish people's sub ethnic identities can be seen as a 
sensitive topic. As Lee points out, the phrase 'sensitive topic', 
is often used in the literature as if it were self-explanatory. The 
term, in other words, is treated in a common-sense way without 
being defined (Quoted by Lee, 1993: 3). 
However the sensitive topics mostly include taboo topics (sex, death), study of 
deviance and social control, political thread, Sexual diseases, AIDS etc (Lee, 
1993: 4-9). 
With this explanation in mind, when we look at the possible outcome of asking 
Turkish people's sub-ethnic identities and their effects on the relationships 
inside and outside the community, it can be said that a researcher can easily 
be suspected of being a spy. As we discussed in chapter 4, these sub-ethnic 
groups were always in conflict from the beginning of the Ottoman Empire. As a 
result of oppression not only from Ottoman Sultans but, until recently from the 
republican governments on Alevis, for example, they always tend to hide their 
being Alevi in public -though this situation has recently changed and Alevis do 
not hide their identity in most circumstances. The situation is much the same 
with Turkish-Kurds. Most of them are refugees and although many of them are 
illegal economic migrants they mostly do not have Turkish passports. It is 
interesting to note that in either case whether they are genuine asylum seekers 
or illegal immigrants, they have to stay away from having Turkish passports to 
strengthen their cases. Therefore, it is right to assume that asking about their 
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sub-ethnic group identities is a sensitive matter. As can be remembered from 
the occupation of Greek Embassy following the seizure of Ocalan, some 
Kurdish people are real political refugees and no doubt there exists, to some 
extent, tension between Turks and Kurds on this matter. To give an example of 
the sensitivity of this issue, it is interesting to note that just opposite to the 
Halkevi (mainly used by PKK) is the Aziziye mosque which the researcher felt 
uneasy visiting so as not to be seen as a spy or a secret agent. In other words, 
while dealing with one group from Turkey, as it can be expected, one becomes 
familiar with the members of the group. The problem of studying Turkish people 
actually starts here. If the members of a group see the researcher with the 
other group members, then it would become very difficult to get satisfactory 
responses and insights from them. In order to prevent this, the researcher 
instead of visiting the mosque, used the area called Newington Green known 
as a concentration place for many Sunni Turks to make contacts with them. 
However, it should be noted that the researcher did not experience any 
difficulty, after having a conversation or being introduced by someone who is a 
friend of the respondent, in asking questions about their sub-ethnic identities 
and their insights on them. It was noticed that once they feel that there is no 
problem with the explanation of their sub-ethnic identities, they are more 
communicative. Therefore, although the topic seems to be a sensitive one, 
once the difficulty of being introduced to the respondent is solved, the 
sensitivity of the topic can be overcome. 
It should also be noted that although this research is very different from other 
highly sensitive topics, such as AIDS research, drug abuse, paedophiles etc., a 
substantial effort was made in designing the structured questionnaire and in 
asking the questions during the face to face interviews in order not to cause 
any discomfort to the respondents. 
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It must be highlighted that in using the snowball sampling technique, the first 
contacts have vital importance. During the pre-pilot and pilot study, the 
researcher, therefore, established the first contacts with a number of Turkish 
people who could nominate some other people who were suitable for the 
administration of questionnaires. The first contacts included two college and 
two university students, the librarian of the Turkish library in Islington borough, 
a staff member of a Turkish Youth Organisation, three shop owners and one 
cafe owner, and four shop assistants. 
In selecting the sample for this research, 15 to 25 year old (inclusive) Turkish 
youths who had lived in London for at least five years were considered. 
According to the 1991 Census, more than 76 per cent of Turkish born people in 
the UK live in London. Therefore, other Turkish youths who reside in other UK 
cities were excluded from the sampling in order to gain easy contacts in the 
research field. The number of respondents considered for this research was 
200. 
The main wards where Turkish born people mostly gather are Wood Green and 
Tottenham, Stoke Newington, Dalston and Haggerston (Map 4). As Hackney, 
Haringey and Islington boroughs (see Table 5.3) include these wards and they 
are also very close to each other, it was thought that it would be convenient to 
start with these boroughs. It should be noted that this does not mean that the 
research was only carried out in these boroughs. As a result of snowball 
sampling, some of the respondents appeared to be living in other boroughs 
such as Enfield and Barnet. 
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Map 4. Population born in Turkey living in wards in London -1991 
Wood Green and Tottenham 
201 to 393 (18) 
81 to 200 (40) 
26 to 80 (122) 
0 to 25 (578) 
Source: (Created from1991 Census data by Storkey, Marian et al, 1997: 26) 
5.4.2. Structured questionnaire 
It was planned to carry out the research using several research tools. The first 
one was a structured questionnaire. 
For the questionnaire, some questions were adapted or redesigned from 
previous studies (Taft, 1966; Turkdogan, 1984; Erdogan, 1988; Scott and Scott, 
1989; Tastan, 1996; and Zebrowska, 1986) and some were developed according 
to the needs of the research. 
The questionnaire (reproduced in full in both English and Turkish in Appendix 
1) consisted of six parts covering the socio-economic background of the 
respondents, relations inside the families, features of the living place, definition 
Number born in Turkey 
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of themselves, relations of Turkish youths inside the community with the other 
sub-ethnic groups and outside the community with British society, and 
tendencies towards the integration into British society. 
The aim of the first stage was to examine the socio-economic background of 
Turkish youth. At this stage, to obtain the data, the important key factors were 
age, gender, place of birth, marital status, period of staying in England, family 
structure, education level, income level, parents' income and education levels, 
geographical background in Turkey, and their ability to speak English. 
The second stage was to explain the relations inside families. For this, key 
factors have been thought as "the decision making process", "relations between 
parents and children", "spoken language at home", "family pressure on 
children", and "feelings against parents". 
With the third stage, the aim was to find out the features of the living places. 
Here, important factors and questions are; "do they live in the same 
neighbourhood? ", "are they owners of their properties or just tenants? ", "do 
they have strong relations with other Turkish families? ", and "the security of the 
neighbourhood". 
The aim of fourth stage was to examine how Turkish youths define themselves. 
In this section, the key factors are 'Turkish identity' and 'sub-ethnic identities'. 
Here, the most important thing is to find out which identity comes first. In other 
words, does Turkish identity play a more important role in their life than other 
sub-ethnic identities? 
The fifth stage aimed to explain the relations of Turkish youths inside the 
Turkish community with other sub-ethnic groups, and outside with British 
society. As related to the relations inside the community, the most important 
thing was to find out if there was any conflict inside the community or not. For 
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this, the following key questions were considered: "do they go to a shop or a 
cafe which is owned by a member of another sub-ethnic groups? ", "do they 
make friends with the members of other sub-ethnic groups? ", and "what are 
their feelings towards the other sub-ethnic groups inside the Turkish 
community? ". 
Regarding the relationships with British society, the key factors can be 
summarized as "their feelings towards British society", "making friends with the 
members of British society", "problems which appear in relationships with 
British people at schools, work places, and in other places", "prejudices by the 
host society and Turkish youth against each other" 
In this section, it was also considered that the relationships with members of 
other ethnic minorities such as Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Indians, and Greeks 
should be examined in order to get a more detailed picture. Therefore, related 
questions were included. 
The sixth stage aimed to find the tendencies of Turkish youth towards 
integration. Key factors were: their approaches to marriages with a member of 
British society, their wish to continue to live in the UK, and their friendships with 
British people in schools, work places, and in the other public places such as 
pubs, cafes, and etc. 
The questions were mostly closed questions with a number of multiple choices 
for the respondents to tick. This made the questionnaire easier to complete 
and provided an easy data entry for statistical analysis. 
However, as with all questionnaires the respondent has to have a certain level 
of education in order to understand and respond to the questions. To minimize 
this weakness, an effort was made to construct clear, understandable and easy 
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to answer questions (the full questionnaire in both English and Turkish can be 
seen in Appendix 1). 
As explained in the "pre-pilot study" section, since respondents did not feel 
comfortable with the method of the interviewer asking questions and recording 
answers, a self administration method was considered. It was also thought that 
if a respondent did not have enough time to complete the questionnaire, he/she 
could be given a questionnaire with a pre-paid envelope and after completing 
the questionnaire, he/she could send it to the researcher. In order to encourage 
them to return the questionnaires, the researcher explained the importance of 
the study and sometimes used follow up procedures by phone or by visiting 
them several times. 
5.5. Pre-pilot Study 
The first version of the questionnaire consisted of many open ended questions. 
In order to modify and convert these open-ended questions, eight Turkish 
youths were interviewed. 
After administration of the questionnaires, conversations were carried out with 
the respondents to get more information about their thoughts on the 
questionnaire and the subject. 
At the end of this phase, most of the open-ended questions converted to closed 
questions providing multiple choices. Some other questions were also added. 
For example, in the first version of the questionnaire following the open-ended 
question converted to a structured one. 
"If you had a choice about your family's migration to England, would you 
support them to come here? 
() Yes (reasons ............................................................... 
) 
............................................................... () No (reasons 
)" 
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In the semi-final questionnaire this question was divided into two parts: 
Q100- Have you or your family encouraged your fellow 
countrymen to emigrate to England? 
() Yes, because, England provides more opportunities than Turkey 
() Yes, because, human rights are very important here 
() Yes, because, the British people are very polite and helpful 
() Yes, because, terrorist actions are very rare here 
() Yes, because . ...................................................... () No, because, a lot of British people have prejudices against us 
() No, because, surviving in this country is very difficult 
() No, because, Turkey is better than here 
() No, because . ...................................................... 
Qi01- If your answer is yes, did you or your parents help new 
comers who were encouraged to come to England by you or your 
parents? 
() Yes: We provided temporary accommodation to them 
() Yes: We gave them some money 
() Yes: We helped their official procedures 
() Yes: We helped them to get jobs 
() Yes: other ......................................................... No 
At the end of this stage, the semi-final version of the questionnaire was 
designed. 
The last draft of the questionnaire was written both in English and Turkish in 
case some respondents did not have sufficient English knowledge to complete 
in English. Each page was divided into two sections. On the left hand side 
questions were written in English and on the right side in Turkish (see Appendix 
1). 
5.6. Pilot Study 
As May (1993: 76) pointed out, "Even if initial fieldwork is possible, the 
questionnaire still needs to be piloted on a sub-sample before it reaches the full 
sample. ... it is then possible to revise the 
layout, question wording and design 
(and) to take account of any criticism and problems. " 
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With this explanation in mind, the last draft of the questionnaire was piloted on 
14 Turkish youths using the self-administration method. It was seen that the 
average time of completing the questionnaires was approximately 30 minutes. 
The respondents were asked to be as critical as they could about 
understanding and style of the questions. They were also asked to add 
questions that they felt that they were important which had not been included in 
the questionnaire. 
At the end of this stage unforeseen mistakes were corrected and some 
questions were redesigned. An effort was also made to sequence the questions 
to start with the easy to answer questions. Lastly filter questions were added in 
order to eliminate the reading of unnecessary questions by the respondents. 
5.7. The main phases of data collection 
For the main study, data gathering instruments were structured questionnaires 
and in-depth interviews. 
5.7.1. The administration and analysis of the structured questionnaires 
The final version of the questionnaire was administered to 200 Turkish youths 
chosen by snowball sampling. In early April 1998 the questionnaires started to 
be administered. This stage and the following in-depth interviews took 10 
months in total 
The starting point for the use of snowball sampling was to use the earlier 
contacts. Since the main sub-ethnic identities are 'Turkish Alevi', 'Turkish 
Sunni', 'Kurdish Alevi' and 'Kurdish Sunni' a substantial effort was made to 
recruit sufficient numbers of respondents from each group. A similar effort was 
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also made to get sufficient numbers of males and females. Table 5.5 shows the 
Turkish people's definitions of themselves. 
Table 5.2. What do respondents think about themselves? 
Turkish Alevi 35 17.5 
Turkish Sunni 38 19.0 
Kurdish Alevi 32 16.0 
Kurdish Sunni 39 19.5 
British Alevi 8 4.0 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 6 3.0 
Only Alevi 16 8.0 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 9 4.5 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 13 6.5 
Other (who don't see themselves in these 
categories because of their political views 
such as socialists) 
4 2.0 
Total 200 100.0 
Total Alevis: 106, Total Sunnis: 90 
During these ten months the researcher went to London an average of four 
days per week. As a result of using snowball technique, nominated 
respondents were contacted by making appointments with their friends or by 
making phone calls. However, this procedure was not always easy. For 
example, a few times the respondents did not show up. 
Since the questionnaire was self administrated, another method of reaching the 
respondents was also used. When the nominated person could not be 
contacted for some reasons such as lack of his/her address or phone number, 
his/her friend was asked to give him/her a letter attached to the questionnaire 
with a prepaid envelope. It is also interesting that several respondents wrote 
letters asking to be sent some more questionnaires in order to help with 
distribution. 
During the administration of the questionnaires, some of the Turkish-Kurdish 
organisations were also used. Especially, the use of Alevi Cemevi and Cultural 
Centre provided a number of respondents from those who see themselves as 
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Turkish and Kurdish Alevis. A youth centre, a worker association and Halkevi 
were also used to reach different respondents. 
The researcher was also helped by three people two of whom were also 
researchers. Using their help, a total of 48 respondents were contacted. 
The data entry for the structured questionnaires was started through the end of 
the field work. 125 questionnaires were already entered to the computer when 
the fieldwork was finished in January 1999. Therefore the remaining process 
was not difficult. Since almost all the answers to the questions were pre-coded, 
it made data entry easy. However each questionnaire after data entry was 
checked again in order to eliminate wrong entries. 
The data obtained by the structured questionnaire was analysed by computer 
using the SPSS statistical package. Findings were tabulated and cross 
tabulated and the results were interpreted using appropriate statistical tests. 
5.7.2. In-depth interviews 
In this study, the use of interview techniques was required for two reasons. The 
first reason was to go beyond the structured questions in order to have in-depth 
information about experiences and thoughts on racial issues, ethnic identities, 
relationships inside and outside the community etc. The second reason was to 
support and strengthen the data gathered by the structured questionnaires. 
The respondents were asked on the last page of the structured questionnaire to 
give contact details if they were willing to be interviewed later on. The 
researcher's address and phone numbers were also added to the first page of 
the questionnaire in case some of the respondents did not want to give their 
names but wanted to contact the researcher in order to be interviewed. 
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Using given contact details a small sub-sample of 20 respondents was drawn 
up by giving extra attention to their sub ethnic identities in order to get sufficient 
numbers from each sub-ethnic group. It should also be noted that two of the 
respondents contacted the researcher accepting the face to face interview on 
the condition that their names were not revealed. They are also included in the 
20 face to face interviews. Table 5.6 shows the sub-ethnic identities of 
respondents of face to face interviews by sex. 
Table 5.6. Sub ethnic identities of respondents for depth interviews by sex 
Who Female Male Total 
Alevi Turks 2 2 4 
Alevi Kurds 2 3 5 
Alevi 1 - 1 
Sunni Turk 3 2 5 
Sunni Kurd 2 3 5 
TOTAL 10 10 20 
Face to face interviews took from 30 to 45 minutes and 19 interviews were 
taped. Only one respondent did not want the interview taped. Therefore, it can 
be said that the use of a tape recorder increased the reliability of the data since 
it eliminated mistakes and the possibility of missing points because of 
remembering difficulties. 
Before starting each interview, a chat with the respondent was usually carried 
out in order to make them feel comfortable. 
During the phase of face to face interviews, finding a suitable place to hold the 
interview was a major problem. I visited one of the respondents at his home. I 
was introduced to his parents. Before starting the interview I spent two hours 
with his parents because it is a common custom for Turkish people to serve tea 
or coffee to the visitor and to have a chat about everyday life etc. Then I had to 
ask to use a separate room in order to conduct the interview. Since the 
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respondent was male no problem occurred. However, in a way I did not feel 
comfortable asking them to provide me with a room for the interview. 
I also held an interview in one of the cafes without a tape recorder. Although I 
was able to get the information I needed, there were lots of noises which 
interrupted us several times. 
The problem of finding a suitable place for the interviews was then solved when 
several organizations offered one of their offices. I used the Alevi Cemevi and 
Cultural Center, a youth organization and one other office provided by a 
researcher in the workplace. It was then easy to make appointments with the 
respondents and meet them in one of these places. 
Data gathered mainly by a tape recorder was transcribed and entered into the 
computer. Using a qualitative data analysis software (NUDIST) the data was 
coded and indexed in order to make quotations from the interviews. It is 
important to note that the use of the computer with the qualitative data analysis 
helped the researcher to conduct the analysis in a considerably shorter period 
of time. Once the data entering process was completed, depending on the 
characteristics of the research, the remaining part only involved creating codes 
and gathering the related parts from each interview. Then, without dealing with 
the highly time consuming process of manual analysis, a researcher can quote 
from the interviews using the codes or construct frequency tables to give the 
general tendency of the interviewees about a topic. In this research, because 
we also used quantitative data and presented a number of tabulations and 
cross-tabulations, the qualitative data analysis was mainly used in order to give 
detailed insights from the responses to explain matters in more detail. 
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Conclusion 
From the discussion about the methodology in this chapter, it can be concluded 
that integration of Turkish young people into British society and the effects of 
sub-ethnic group identities on this procedure can best be studied using both 
qualitative and quantitative data. As we discussed earlier snowball sampling in 
finding respondents was the only way of overcoming the difficulties of dealing 
with the sub-ethnic group identities of Turkish young people. In this context, 
snowball sampling provided the opportunity of easy access to the community. 
Another positive result of the use of snowball sampling was to have real 
answers instead of imaginary answers. As the respondents were contacted via 
their close friends and explained that the research was only for a scientific 
study, it can be thought that this must have increased the reliability of the data. 
However, it should also be clarified that the sample drawn is not a 
representative one as a random sampling could not be employed due to the 
reasons explained earlier in the chapter. Therefore, the researcher, by no 
means, claims that his findings can successfully be generalized to the whole 
Turkish community in London. However, It is the researcher's intention to say 
that, although findings statistically cannot be generalized to the total population, 
they are still meaningful and signs of the findings can be observed easily in the 
Turkish Community in London. 
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Chapter Six: 
Socio-economic background of the respondents 
6.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the socio-economic status of the respondents 
by looking at a number of aspects such as age, sex, marital status, place of birth, 
period of stay in the UK, geographic locations, educational level, legal status in the 
UK, occupation, income, family type, household size, property, and information 
about their parents such as their educational level, occupation, marital status, 
status of life and death, place of birth. The information in this chapter will be given 
in the form of tabulations and interpretations. 
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6.2. Demographic characteristics 
During the course of the fieldwork a substantial effort was spent to make the 
sample consist of sufficient numbers from both sexes. Although the number of 
male respondents is slightly higher than the number of females, it can be said that 
the aim of having sufficient numbers from both sexes was achieved. 
Table 6.1. Classification of the respondents by sex 
Sex Frequency Percent 
Male 107 53.5 
Female 93 46.5 
Total 200 100.0 
As seen in the table 6.1, more than half of the respondents are male while female 
respondents are represented at a slightly lower rate. 
Table 6.2. Classification of the respondents by age 
Age Groups Frequency Percent 
15-17 71 35.5 
18-20 69 34.5 
21-23 36 18.0 
24-25 24 12.0 
Total 200 100.0 
As explained earlier, in the course of research design, the age range for the 
sampling was chosen between 15 and 25 (inclusive). Although it is impossible to 
give an exact figure about what proportion this age range (15-25) occupies in the 
Turkish community, the 1991 Census can give an idea. According to the Census, 
the number of 15-24 aged Turkish born people is 5,015 (2,526 males and 2,489 
females) making 18.86 per cent of the total Turkish born people in the UK. (1991 
Census Ethnic Group and Country of Birth, Volume 2 of 2, p: 916-925). 
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As can be seen from the table, the majority of the respondents are mainly under 
the age of 21. In other words, the age range of seventy per cent of the sample is 
between 15 and 20. As seen in table 6.2, the rate of 21 to 25 age respondents 
falls sharply to thirty per cent. 
Table 6.3. Classification of the respondents by marital status 
Marital Status Frequency Percent 
Single 176 88.0 
Married/Living together 20 10.0 
Divorced/Se pa rated 4 2.0 
[Total 200 100.0 
One of the expected outcomes of studying a youth population is the higher rate of 
single people. Accordingly, this can be seen in the table. The great majority of the 
respondents are single. Only a small fraction of the sample is married/living 
together or divorced/separated. It should be noted that marriage depends on 
different factors in the Turkish experience such as education level, gender, 
employment and age. According to Turkish "Marriage Statistics 1995", marriage 
rates differ according to sex, age and educational factors. As for sex and age, the 
main marriage age for women is between 15-24 while it is 20-29 for men (State 
Institute of Statistics, 1997: 3). When education and age at marriage is examined, it 
can be said that there is a tendency for marriage rates to decrease as the 
educational level of people increases. (Ibid, page: 4) Although at first glance it 
seems that findings in table 6.3. are not parallel to the Turkish Marriage Statistics 
1995, it should be noted that the majority of the respondents of this study has at 
least secondary school education and indeed more than half of the respondents 
are still students. Therefore, the findings of marital status should be seen as 
normal with a consciousness of educational level and current occupation of the 
respondents that the majority of them are actually students. 
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Table 6.4. Marital Status of the respondents by age 
Age range 
Marital Status 15-17 18-20 21-23 24-25 Total 
Single 70 60 30 16 176 
Married/Living together 7 6 7 20 
Divorced/Separated 1 2 1 4 
Total 71 69 36 24 200 
Although the number of married respondents is very low, as can be seen in table 
6.4., they mainly belong to three age groups 18-20,21-23, and 24-25. It is 
interesting to spot that one respondent, despite belonging to the youngest age 
group is divorced or separated. Sex difference among the respondents does not 
show any significant difference as the number of married male and female 
respondents is very close. 
Table 6.5. Marital Status of the respondents by sex 
Sex 
Marital Status Male Female Total 
Single 94 82 176 
Married/Living together 9 11 20 
Divorced/Separated 4 4 
otal 107 93 200 
As can be seen in table 6.5., nearly half of the married respondents are females 
while the number of married males is slightly lower. However, it is interesting to 
note that all the divorced or separated respondents are males. 
Table 6.6. Place of birth 
Place of birth Frequency Percent 
Turkey 157 78.5 
The UK 43 21.5 
Total 200 100.0 
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As can be seen from the table, 78.5 per cent of the respondents are Turkish born 
while 21.5 per cent of them were born in the UK. The main reason for this is the 
relatively short history of Turkish migration to the UK, which mainly started after 
1970, in comparison to the longer history to Germany, France, The Netherlands 
and Austria since the early 1960s. In addition to this, many of the Turkish people 
migrated to the UK quite recently. Therefore, the appearance of second or third 
generation Turkish people is considerably later than other countries. 
Table 6.7. The length of their stay in the UK 
Stain Period Frequency Percent 
5-7 years 97 48.5 
8-11 years 46 23.0 
12-16 years 26 13.0 
17-21 years 30 15.0 
22+ 1 .5 Total 200 100.0 
In selecting the respondents, one of the important things was their five-year 
minimum residency in the UK. This was needed in order to deal with their 
relationships with the host society. As known, in order to get a sufficient level of 
knowledge of the host society's language and way of life, there should be a 
sufficient time period. Once the learning of the language is achieved, then it may 
be possible to talk about interaction between immigrants and the host society. 
If we examine table 6.7., it can be noted that almost half of the respondents have 
been living in the UK for five to seven years. It can also be seen that as the staying 
period increases the rate of the respondents starts to fall. With the 8-11 years of 
residency it falls sharply to 23 per cent. Another sharp decrease can be seen with 
12-16 year of residency. However, with 17-21 years residency, a2 per cent 
increase is seen. Finally, only one person's staying period is higher than 21 years. 
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Table 6.8. The Boroughs in which the respondents live 
Boroughs Frequency Percent 
Haringey 65 32.5 
Hackney 62 31.0 
Islington 55 27.5 
Enfield 13 6.5 
Barnet 5 2.5 
Total 200 100.0 
As seen, the main boroughs in which Turkish people live are Hackney, Haringey 
and Islington. The proportions of people in these three boroughs are close to each 
other. In fact, 32.5 per cent of the respondents live in Haringey, 31 per cent in 
Hackney and 27.5 per cent in Islington. This is followed by Enfield with 6.5 per cent 
and Barnet with 2.5 per cent. The three boroughs (Hackney, Haringey and 
Islington) are also known as the main gathering places for Turkish people. As 
explained in the methodology chapter, this was the main reason for carrying out 
the fieldwork in these boroughs. However, since the snowball sampling technique 
was employed in selecting the respondents, two other boroughs Enfield and Barnet 
also appeared here. 
6.3. Educational, occupational and employment status of the respondents 
Table 6.9. Educational level of the respondents (current or highest) 
Educational level Frequency Percent 
Primary school 4 2.0 
Secondary school 88 44.0 
College/Sixth form 80 40.0 
University 23 11.5 
Master's degree 5 2.5 
Total 200 100.0 
Except Primary school with a small percentage, it can be noted that almost all the 
respondents have a minimum secondary school education. Here one thing needs 
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to be clarified. That is the fact that a number of the students answered the question 
according to their ongoing education. In other words, they answered the question 
stressing their current involvement. Here, these educational levels should not be 
taken as gained ones. In fact, some of the respondents can still be students in 
these levels. As can be seen from table 6.10., the total number of the students is 
111. This means that more than half of the respondents are still students at the 
time of filling in the questionnaire. 
Table 6.10. Occupations of the respondents 
Occupation Frequency Percent 
Student 109 54.5 
Factory worker 24 12.0 
Sales assistant 16 8.0 
Housewife 11 5.5 
Self Employed 4 2.0 
Shop Keeper 3 1.5 
Waiter 3 1.5 
Cashier 2 1.0 
Kebab shop worker 2 1.0 
Unemployed 2 1.0 
Student + part time working 2 1.0 
Part time worker 1 .5 
Career Adviser 1 .5 Salesman 1 .5 
Chef 1 .5 Art +design adv 1 .5 Architect 1 .5 Technician 1 .5 Air hostess 1 .5 Missing data 14 7.0 
Total 200 100.0 
As seen from the table, the majority of the respondents (54.5 per cent) are 
students. However, being a student does not bring income. Education is only a way 
to get an occupation. When we look at the occupations given in the table, we can 
see that 12 per cent of the respondents are Factory workers. Although the type of 
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work is not given here, almost all the Turkish factory workers work at textile 
factories owned by their fellow countrymen. Sales assistants among the 
respondents have the second highest proportion i. e. 8 per cent. This is followed by 
housewives with 5.5 per cent, self-employed with 2 per cent and shopkeepers with 
1.5 per cent. Seven per cent of the respondents did not answer this question. 
Since this research deals with young Turkish people, it is not surprising that the 
occupational scale is not wide. 
Table 6.11. Net monthly income levels of the respondents 
Income (monthly) Frequency Percent 
Less than £600 15 25 
601-800 21 35 
801-1000 18 30 
1001-1200 5 8.33 
1401 + 1 1.67 
Total 60 100.0 
The total number of the respondents in employment is 60 out of 200, -140 
respondents left this question unanswered since they are mainly students or 
unemployed. When we look at the income levels, it can be seen that 15 
respondents have £600 or less income. The majority of these 60 respondents' 
income lies between £601 and £1,000. The number of those whose income is 
more than £1,001 is only 6. 
Table 6.12. Legal status of the respondents 
Leal status Frequency Percent 
Turkish citizen 63 31.5 
Refugee 46 23.0 
Naturalized British citizen 25 12.5 
British citizen by birth 39 19.5 
Missing data 27 13.5 
Total 200 100.0 
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The question about the respondents' legal status in the UK was needed in order to 
find out if they are Turkish citizens, Refugees, Naturalized British citizens or British 
citizens by birth. As can be seen from the table, the highest proportion (31.5 per 
cent) are Turkish citizens. On a smaller scale come refugees with 23 per cent. This 
is followed by British citizens with 19.5 per cent and Naturalized British citizens 
with 12.5 per cent. The total proportion of British citizens, therefore, is 32 per cent. 
The reason why 13.5 per cent of the respondents did not answer the question can 
depend on both 'refugee' and 'illegal immigrant' factors. 
6.4. Information about parents, family and property type 
Table 6.13. Mortality status of the respondents' parents 
Parents Frequency Percent 
Both of them are alive 189 94.5 
Only father is alive 1 0.5 
only mother is alive 9 4.5 
Neither of them is alive 1 0.5 
Total 200 100.0 
This table shows that a great majority of the respondents' parents are alive. Only 
one or both parents of the 11 respondents are not alive. Since the majority of the 
respondents live with their parents and the great majority of the parents are 
married, it can be thought that majority of the respondents have a normal family life 
in terms of Turkish family structure. 
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Table 6.14. Marital status of the parents of the respondents 
Marital status Frequency Percent 
Married 181 90.5 
Divorced 4 2.0 
Widowed 11 5.5 
Separated 3 1.5 
Total 199 99.5 
Missing data 1 .5 Total 200 100.0 
As can be seen from the table, the great majority of the parents (181 out of 200) of 
the respondents are married. This is followed by widows with 5.5 per cent, divorced 
with 2.0 per cent and separated with 1.5 per cent. The number of missing cases is 
only one. This table also shows the importance of marriage ties within the Turkish 
community in London. When we look at the divorce rates in Turkey it can also be 
seen that Turkey has the lowest rate among European countries. This can be seen 
in the following table. 
Table 6.15. Divorce rates in the selected countries by years 
Country Year Rate (0/00) 
The UK 1993 3.08 
Norway 1994 2.54 
Austria 1994 2.11 
Belgium 1991 2.09 
Germany 1994 2.04 
France 1995 1.96 
Turkey 1996 0.47 
Source: State Institute of Statistics of Prime Ministry of Republic of Turkey, 1998: 9 
As seen in the table, the UK has the highest divorce rate among the countries. The 
difference between Turkey and the other countries is remarkable. Therefore the 
figures in table 6.14 show a similar trend with the low divorce rate of Turkey. 
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Table 6.16. Legal status of the fathers of the respondents 
Leal status Frequency Percent 
Turkish citizen living in Turkey 11 5.5 
Turkish citizen living in England 54 27.0 
Refugee 41 20.5 
Naturalized British citizen 53 26.5 
Missing data 41 20.5 
Total 200 100.0 
When we look at the legal status of the fathers of the respondents, it can be seen 
that 27 per cent of them are Turkish citizens living in the UK and 26.5 per cent of 
them are naturalized British citizens. Depending on the relatively short period of 
Turkish existence in the UK, it is not surprising that there is no British citizen by 
birth. 20.5 per cent of the fathers are refugees and 5.5 per cent do not live in the 
UK. Missing cases appear to be high with a percentage of 20.5. As mentioned 
before, this can depend on several factors such as unwillingness of reporting their 
refugee status etc. 
Table 6.17. Legal status of the mothers of the respondents 
Leal status Frequency Percent 
Turkish citizen living in Turkey 14 7.0 
Turkish citizen living in England 58 29.0 
Refugee 41 20.5 
Naturalized British citizen 55 27.5 
Missing data 32 4 16.0 Total 200 100.0 
The legal status of the mothers of the respondents is not very much different from 
the fathers. As can be seen from the table, the majority of them are Turkish citizens 
living in the UK, 55 of them with 27.5 per cent are naturalized British citizens and 
41 of them with 20.5 per cent are refugees. Only 7 per cent of them live in Turkey. 
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Table 6.18. Educational status of the fathers of the respondents 
Educational level Frequency Percent 
Primary school 59 29.5 
Secondary school 31 15.5 
Lise (High School) 23 11.5 
University 8 4.0 
None 37 18.5 
Missing data 42 21.0 
Total 200 100.0 
As can be seen from the table, the majority of the fathers of the respondents do not 
have higher education. In fact, only 15.5 per cent of them have High school or 
University education. As can be seen in table 6.20, as a result of low level 
education, their occupations mainly belong to blue collar occupations. Many of 
them are indeed manual workers. 
Table 6.19. Educational status of the mothers of the respondents 
Educational level Frequency Percent 
Primary school 77 38.5 
Secondary school 21 10.5 
Lise (high school) 8 4.0 
University 5 2.5 
None 54 27.0 
Missing data 35 17.5 
Total 200 100.0 
The situation of the mothers of the respondents is not very much different from the 
fathers. The largest group, here, have also none or Primary school education. The 
proportion of those who have high school or University education is remarkably 
lower than the fathers' education which sharply falls to 6.5 per cent. In general, it 
can be said that women have less education than men. For older generations, this 
can be seen normal. However, for new generations, the access to the education 
system does not differ much depending on the sexes. In fact, in Turkey primary 
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school education, which takes 8 years - it has recently been increased from five 
years to eight-, is compulsory for all Turkish children. 
Table 6.20. Occupational status of the fathers of the respondents 
Frequency Percent 
Factory worker 50 25.0 
Shop Shopkeeper 10 5.0 
Tailor 10 5.0 
Kebab shop owner 8 4.0 
Retired 5 2.5 
Kebab shop worker 4 2.0 
Farmer 4 2.0 
Driver 3 1.5 
Builder 3 1.5 
Cook 3 1.5 
Manager 2 1.0 
Mechanic 2 1.0 
Teacher 2 1.0 
Mariner 1 .5 Window cleaner 1 .5 Public servant 1 .5 Painter 1 .5 Chef 1 .5 Salesman 1 .5 Cafe owner 1 .5 Catering 1 .5 Councilor 1 .5 Welder 1 .5 Unemployed 18 9.0 
Missing data 66 33.0 
Total 200 100.0 
As can be seen from the table, the majority of the fathers of the respondents, with 
25 per cent, are factory workers. The factories they work in are mainly Turkish 
textile factories. Shopkeepers including kebab shops and cafes are also 
remarkable with 9.5 per cent. Depending on the low educational status of the 
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fathers, it is not surprising to note that almost all the occupations listed in the table 
represent only manual kinds of jobs. 
It should also be noted that 33 per cent of the respondents, the highest proportion 
in the table, left the question unanswered. 
Table 6.21. Occupational status of the mothers of the respondents 
Occupation Frequency Percent 
Housewife 113 56.5 
Factory worker 31 15.5 
Tailor 7 3.5 
Shop keeper 5 2.5 
Manager 2 1.0 
Secretary 1 .5 Unemployed 9 4.5 
Missing data 32 16.0 
Total 200 100.0 
Unlike the fathers of the respondents, the mothers seem to have significantly less 
variety of occupations. It can be seen from the table that the majority are 
housewives. In the case of the older generation, it would be true to assume that 
women were not wanted to work outside their families. They were expected to stay 
home and raise their children. However, this situation is not valid with the new 
generations. Especially in Turkey, with the difficulty of supporting a family due to 
insufficient income, men are now keen on marrying working women and women 
are also expected to support the family by contributing to the family income. 
It can also be seen that the highest proportion of women are factory workers, 
mainly employed by Turkish textile factories. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
working in a factory is one of the main characteristics of the Turkish community in 
London. 
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Table 6.22. Birthplaces of mothers and fathers of the respondents 
Birth Place Fath er Mot her 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Turkey 193 96.5 200 100.0 
Missing data 7 3.5 
Total 200 100.0 200 100.0 
Except missing cases, all the fathers and mothers of the respondents were born in 
Turkey. As mentioned before, due to the relatively short period of Turkish existence 
in the UK, this situation should be seen as normal. 
Table 6.23. Family types of the respondents 
Family types Frequency Percent 
Nuclear family 146 73.0 
Broken family 8 4.0 
Other (living alone or with friends) 14 7.0 
Missing data 32 16.0 
Total 200 100.0 
As seen in the table, 73 per cent of the families of the respondents are nuclear 
families. There exist broken families which are made up of one of the parents and 
children. Here the percentage of broken families is quite low. seven per cent of the 
respondents live either alone or share a house with friends. It can be concluded, 
therefore, that the majority of the respondents live with their parents. 
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Table 6.24. Household size 
Size Frequency Percent 
1 2 1.0 
2 23 11.5 
3 32 16.0 
4 80 40.0 
5 41 20.5 
6 15 7.5 
7 5 2.5 
Missing data 2 1.0 
Total 200 100.0 
This table shows that the highest proportion (40.0 per cent) of the respondents 
have a family size of four. This is followed by 20.7 per cent with five people, 16.2 
per cent with 3 people , 11.6 per cent with 2 people, 7.5 per cent with 6 people 
and 2.5 per cent with 7 people. The mean household size is 4.01. 
Table 6.25. Property 
Property Frequency Percent 
Owner occupied 32 16.0 
Rented privately 48 24.0 
Rented from Housing Association 15 7.5 
Rented from Council 101 50.5 
Other 4 2.0 
Total 200 100.0 
When we look at the table, it can be seen that the property that the respondents 
mostly live in is rented from the council, housing association or rented privately. In 
other words, 82 per cent of the respondents live in rented houses while 16 per cent 
of them have their own houses. Two per cent of the respondents live with friends 
one of the relatives or in B&B hotels. 
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CONCLUSION 
As noted in this chapter, the proportions of male and female respondents are close 
to each other. The majority of the respondents are still students and have been 
staying in the UK for more than 5 years. As can be expected, due to the age range, 
the overwhelming majority are single and live with their parents. Due to the 
considerably late migration to the UK, the number of those who were born in the 
UK is only 43 which is supported by the fact that almost all the parents' birthplace 
is Turkey. However more than half of the sample have been staying here for at 
least 8 years and more, which means that many of them have spent their childhood 
in the UK. 
Some of the respondents are refugees and a considerable number of them are 
either naturalized British citizens or British citizens by birth. 
The educational level difference between the respondents and their parents is also 
noticeable parents have a lower education than the respondents. Parents' 
occupational status also suggests that they are mainly involved in manual jobs 
and, as for mothers, the majority of them are, expectedly, housewives. 
150 
Chapter 7: 
Ethnic identity among Turkish young people in London 
7.1. Introduction 
The main aim of this chapter is to present the findings concerning ethnic identity 
among Turkish young people in London. In order to have a better understanding, 
ethnic identity will be examined by looking at different aspects such as religious 
and linguistic differences and changed cultural values which lead to gaining some 
of the host society's cultural values and resulting in definitions such as Half Turkish 
Half British and British. 
As discussed in chapter 4, as a result of Turkey's multi-ethnic social structure 
inherited from the Ottoman Empire, there exist different sub-ethnic group identities 
in Turkey, which play crucial roles for individuals to define themselves and to be 
defined by others. Religious sect differences and linguistic differences create four 
main sub-ethnic group identities as a result of the fact that members of the both 
Turkish and Kurdish languages can belong to one of the sects: Sunni or Alevi. 
Therefore it is possible to mention the existence of four main sub-ethnic groups. 
1- Turkish Sunnis, 
2- Turkish Alevis, 
3- Kurdish Sunnis, and 
4- Kurdish Alevis 
7.2. Turkish young people and their expression of themselves 
The question "Who am l? " plays a crucial part for an individual to define 
him/herself. In the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to define 
themselves. The following table shows their definition of themselves. 
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Table 7.1. Ethnic self-definition (What do you think of yourself as? ) 
Frequency Percent 
Turkish 73 36.5 
Kurdish 71 35.5 
H Turk /H British 22 11.0 
Only Alevi 16 8.0 
British 8 4.0 
H Turk/ H Kurd 6 3.0 
Other 4 2.0 
Total 200 100.0 
As seen in the table, the most popular identities are Turkish and Kurdish: 36.5 per 
cent ticked the Turkish identity while 35.5 per cent ticked the Kurdish identity. It is 
also important to note that an important proportion of the respondents (11 per cent) 
think that they are half Turk and half British. One might think that their expression 
of half Turk I half British has something to do with Britishness of one of their 
parents. However, as can be seen in table 6.22, Turkey is the birthplace for all the 
parents of the respondents. Therefore, their answer as "half Turk / half British" 
should be understood in terms of their feelings as attachment to both cultures. This 
is also the case for eight respondents who see themselves British. Kucukcan's 
book Politics of Ethnicity, Identity and Religion: Turkish Muslims in Britain has 
already suggested that young Turks in Britain will develop a hyphenated identity 
(Kucukcan, 1999: 116). As our findings suggest, developing a hyphenated identity 
is already happening with a number of young Turks. Therefore, it can be assumed 
that this will increase with the increasing length of stay of them in Britain. A good 
example for this comes from Necef s study on Young Turks in Denmark (1996: 
179). He has also encountered a wide use of hyphenated identity among young 
Turks in Denmark where 42 per cent of his respondents found the option 'Turkish 
Dane' was more convenient for defining themselves. 
However, as for those who see themselves 'half Turk / half Kurd', there might be 
two possibilities to be noted. The first one is the possibility of the Kurdishness of 
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one of their parents and the second possibility is the sign of their assimilation into 
Turkish culture. As Necef (1996: 179) puts it, having lived and socialized with Turks 
both in Turkey and abroad, they might feel Turkish and therefore put themselves 
under the category of 'half Turk / half Kurd'. 
Since it is a relatively unexpected answer - in fact, I did not offer the option on the 
questionnaire they all came with the respondents' inserting the answer to the 
'other' open ended option-, let us have a closer look at the people who see 
themselves 'only Alevi'. Kaya (1998: 38) also notices the single use of Alevism by 
Turkish youth in Berlin. He comments that Alevi young people in Germany used to 
identify themselves with their Turkishness to resist racial attacks. However, after 
the Sivas and Gazi incidents which claimed a number of Alevi lives, they suddenly 
turned to celebrating their Alevism. At first glance this can seem a strong 
connection to the situational approach and show the signs of ethnic boundary 
changes, but it should be noted that the change in identification from Turkish to 
Alevi has a lot to do with the changing source of threats. Here, a strong connection 
can be made to the term 'others'. As the others were German racists and the 
Alevis were also targeted in racist attacks, it can only be a normal outcome of 
describing themselves using the "others' description". We should not ignore the 
fact that German racist attacks targeted the whole Turkish people without 
discriminating any sect or language differences. However, with the incidents in 
Sivas in 1993 and in Gazi in 1995, the Alevis were targeted directly. Therefore, it 
also affected Alevis living abroad to describe themselves accordingly. 
Our findings also give a different angle to the problem. One of the respondents was 
asked why they saw themselves only Alevi during the face to face interview. 
I am only an Alevi. I do not consider myself anything else. I am very 
proud of being an Alevi because Alevism is a universal philosophy ... We don't discriminate people according to their religions, sects, skin 
colour, sex, nationality, etc. I believe that these are not important. We 
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have three basic rules: Control your hands (do not steal), your tongue 
(do not lie), and your genitals (do not have affairs). You see what I 
mean? If these rules are respected by all people can there be any 
conflict in a society? Therefore, I love being an Alevi and, to my mind, 
it is not a problem for me to think about what my nationality or 
language is. Ok, I don't say that I am not Turkish. I have my Turkish 
and British passports but when I ask myself who I am, the first answer 
comes to my mind is always the fact that I am an Alevi. (Respondent 
4) 
As seen, the interviewee uses Alevi discourse in order to modify the Alevi sect as 
different. Since Alevi identity becomes Alevism, it also becomes universal for some 
of the Alevis. The respondent is a British and Turkish Passport holder and although 
she can express herself by saying she is half Turk / half British, she chooses to be 
(seen) as an Alevi, nothing else. Here, we should point out an important factor in 
the use of "only Alevi" identity. With high-level emigration from Turkey to other 
European countries, Alevis found the freedom to get organized in these countries. 
They established a number of cultural and religious centres and taught the Alevi 
culture to new generations. Therefore, it can be said that the high level of Alevi 
expression by Alevi youth is also a result of these Alevi organizations. 
As discussed earlier, in Turkey, linguistic differences and religious sect differences 
play a crucial role in defining ethnic characteristics. The table 7.1. has already 
shown the use of linguistic differences in defining the respondent's ethnic identities. 
As seen the great majority of the respondents feel that they are Turkish or Kurdish. 
However, if we leave the definition of ethnic identity in the basis of the provided 
choices, it would be a mistake. As seen in the table, although there was not any 
provided choice in reference to religion, the 'only Alevi' description of 16 people 
begs further examination of this table by adding the religious attachments of the 
respondents. 
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Table 7.2. Self-definition by religious attachments 
Which of the following Islamic branches do you or your parents belong to? 
Alevi Sunni Other Total 
Turkish 35 38 73 
H Turk /H British 9 13 22 
Kurdish 32 39 71 
British 8 8 
Other 4 4 
Only Alevi 16 16 
H Turk/ H Kurd 6 6 
Total 106 90 4 200 
As seen in the table, almost all the respondents are aware of their religious 
attachments. They know which sect they or their parents belong to. In order to find 
out if they feel any attachment to a religion other related questions were also asked 
in the questionnaire. 
Table 7.3. Sect attachments by religion 
Do you belong to a religion? 
Yes: Islam Yes: Other (Alevi) No Total 
levi 44 25 35 104 
Sunni 85 5 90 
Other 4 4 
otal 129 25 44 198 
(i he row "other" is excluded from the Chi-Square Test ) 
Chi-Square=59.832; DF=2; Significance < . 000 
This table reveals interesting results. The difference between the Alevi and Sunni 
sect is statistically significant. As seen in the table, Alevis are more likely to refuse 
religious connections than their Sunni fellowmen. This is a result of the fact that 
Alevis have more secular characteristics than Sunnis. Another difference comes 
into existence when the "Yes: other' answers are concerned. In fact, 25 Alevis see 
the Alevi sect not as a sect but as a religion. 
Necef (1996: 192) has also found similar characteristics with Alevis in his analysis. 
Alevis, in his research, appeared to be less interested in religion than Sunnis. 
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However, it should be noted that the great majority of the respondents checked the 
"Yes: Islam" option. 
In order to find out the intensity of their religious practice the following table needs 
to be examined. 
Table 7.4. Attending religious places 
Places 
A Mosque A Cemevi None of them Total 
Alevi 51 16 67 
Sunni 45 5 50 
Other 4 4 
Total 45 51 25 121 
As known, the mainstream Islam is commonly practiced in mosques. In fact, the 
mosque is one of the very few things which symbolizes Islam. However, in terms of 
the Alevi sect in Turkey, this is not the case for the great majority of Alevis. Their 
practice of Islam, as mentioned earlier, is mainly carried out in Cemevis. Therefore, 
it is not surprising to see that Alevis attend a Cemevi while Sunnis go to a Mosque 
for religious practice. At first glance, one might think that the number of Sunnis who 
go to a mosque for religious practice is less than the number of Alevis who go to a 
Cemevi. However, the answer can be found with the fact that the Sunni way of 
Islam can easily be practiced anywhere, at home, at work, etc. In the Alevi 
practice, this is not possible because Alevi rituals have to be led by a 'dede' 
(religious leader), and people have to gather in a place. 
So far we have seen the ethnic self-definition of Turkish young people and their 
religious attachments. In conclusion, it can be said that although they see 
themselves as Turkish, Kurdish, and Half Turk / half British, etc., it is also important 
to note that their religious attachments are still alive and, as a result of the Turkish 
reality they also play a crucial role in constructing one's group identity. As will be 
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seen in the remainder of this chapter, as the face to face interviews revealed, 
people do use their religious sects as a part of their self-definition. When we use 
the table 7.1: Ethnic self-definition, and the table 7.2: Religious sect attachments, it 
is possible to see the so-called sub-ethnic group identities of Turkish young people. 
This can be seen in the following table. 
Table 7.5. Sub-ethnic group identities 
Who are they? Frequency Percent 
Turkish Alevi 35 17.5 
Turkish Sunni 38 19.0 
Kurdish Alevi 32 16.0 
Kurdish Sunni 39 19.5 
British Alevi 8 4.0 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 6 3.0 
Only Alevi 16 8.0 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 9 4.5 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 13 6.5 
Other 4 2.0 
Total 200 100.0 
As seen in the table, the great majority of the respondents belong to what we call 
four main sub-ethnic groups: Turkish Alevi, Turkish Sunni, Kurdish Alevi and 
Kurdish Sunni. Examples of the use of these four sub-ethnic group identities singly 
or in a combination can also be found in the literature. (See, Kaya 1998; Necef 
1996; Pierse 1997; Sonmez and Kirisci 1998; White 1995; Ostergaard-Nielsen 
2000) However, it should be noted that this study examines these four sub-ethnic 
group identities in a greater detail. 
Although there appears to be a small group of people who see themselves as 
belonging to Half Turk / half British Alevi or Sunni groups or only British Alevi 
group, this can only be an indicator of the beginning of the cultural change process 
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among the young Turks in London. As the overall existence of Turkish people in 
Britain is relatively shorter than in other immigrant receiver countries such as 
Germany, France, The Netherlands and Denmark, this should be seen as normal 
and further changes should be expected in future. As Necefs (1996: 181) study 
shows, as the staying period of Turkish people abroad increases, hyphenated 
identities such as half Turkish / half Danish start to be used widely among second 
and third generation Turks. 
Since this study is designed to measure the effects of the main sub-ethnic group 
identities on integration into British society and on their relationships inside the 
community and with other minority populations in London, in the remainder of the 
thesis, the findings of table 7.5 will mainly be used in cross tabulation form. 
Before we continue, it is worth presenting the findings of one question in the 
questionnaire. In order to measure the use of a broad Turkish identity, the 
respondents were asked if they agree or not about the following expression: "It 
does not matter coming from different backgrounds in Turkey such as 
Kurds, Alevis and Sunnis. They are all Turkish people" The results of this 
question can be seen in the following table. 
Table 7.6. Agreement on Turkishness 
Agree or not 
Who Yes No Total 
Turkish Alevi 31 4 35 
Turkish Sunni 35 3 38 
Kurdish Alevi 25 7 32 
Kurdish Sunni 30 9 39 
British Alevi 6 2 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 5 1 6 
Only Alevi 15 1 16 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 9 _ 9 H. Turk / H. British Sunni 13 - 13 Other 3 1 4 
Total 172 28 -4 200 
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It is very interesting to note that despite their ethnic self-definition as Turkish, 
Kurdish and religious attachments, the great majority of each group agreed that all 
the people who come from Turkey are Turkish people no matter what their 
language or religious differences are. One can suppose that because of the 
Kurdish problem in Turkey, Kurdish respondents would not consider themselves as 
Turkish. However, when we look at the table, it can be seen that only 17 Kurdish 
respondents out of 77 do no agree that they are Turkish. It is true that the number 
of 'no' answers among Kurdish respondents is higher than the others. However, as 
will be seen later in this chapter, the main aim of Kurdish people in Turkey is not to 
have an independent state. The main issue raised by the Kurdish movement is 
simply to get the right to enjoy their cultural differences. It is obvious in the table 
that they do not mind being Turkish citizens. Another possible explanation is the 
fact that the majority of the Kurdish respondents did not actually come from 
Turkey's southeast region. Although we do not have enough data about their last 
place of residence in Turkey, during the course of the field work, I witnessed that 
many of the Kurdish people actually come from central Anatolia. This hypothesis is 
also supported by the revelation of the findings about their language ability in 
Kurdish. As will be seen later, only a very small number of Kurdish respondents 
have the ability of speaking, understanding and writing the Kurdish language. In 
addition to this, many of the respondents gave the economic reasons behind their 
or their parents' asylum seeking in this country. Therefore, it is worth assuming that 
some of the Kurdish respondents in London are somehow assimilated into the 
Turkish language and therefore a Turkish culture. 
In order to get more information about their feelings towards Turkey, the 
respondents were also asked to answer a question about the importance of two 
countries: Turkey and the UK. 
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Table 7.7. Which of the two countries is more important to you? 
Which of the two countries is more important to you? 
Who Turkey Britain Both Total 
Turkish Alevi 11 11 13 35 
Turkish Sunni 33 1 4 38 
Kurdish Alevi 9 12 11 32 
Kurdish Sunni 1 2 36 39 
British Alevi 4 2 2 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 1 5 6 
Only Alevi 3 3 10 16 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 1 6 2 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 4 4 5 13 
Other 4 4 
Total 67 41 92 200 
Here, for the majority, Turkey, and both countries are important. Only a small 
proportion see that Britain as more important for them. This should be seen as 
normal because the longer they stay here the more they gain British culture. The 
majority of them have already spent an important part of their lives here. Therefore, 
it would be wrong to assume that all the Turkish people are devoted to their 
country. As we will discuss in another chapter, the majority of them do not want to 
return to Turkey, addressing issues such as educational problems, human rights 
problems, employment problems, etc. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that 
Britain is becoming more important for them. 
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7.3. Sub-ethnic identities 
7.3.1. Turkish Alevis and Sunnis 
As discussed earlier, when a person is asked to answer who he/she is, two 
important factors are encountered: belonging to a group, community or a country 
and consciousness about the differences between one's group, community or 
national identity and the outsiders. As Solomos puts it, 
... identity is about belonging, about what we have in common with 
some people and what differentiates us from others. (1 996: 11) 
This was also revealed by the in-depth interviews. The common motive found with 
almost all the interviews was the fact that the person had a sense of who he/she is 
and who the opposite group are. In addition to this, with the explanation of the 
differences of other groups, they sometimes revealed their feelings against the 
other group. Kaya (1998: 38-39) reports that, in Germany many Sunnis are hostile 
towards Alevis. Our findings have also confirmed this. The hatred towards the Alevi 
sect of Islam and its members by two of the Turkish Sunni interviewees can be 
seen in the following quotations. 
A Turkish Sunni respondent said, 
I am a Muslim Turk. I am elhamdulullah a Muslim. We (his 
group) are the real Muslims because we pray five times a day. We 
fast during the Ramadan. We read and listen to the Quran.... I 
know very well that Kizilbashes (Alevis) do not practice Islam as 
we do.... They are not real Muslims. I think Alevism is the most 
corrupt and the most blasphemic sect I have ever seen in my life. 
Alevis worship Ali and not ALLAH and this is a great sin. Alevis 
pretend they are Muslims but they do not believe in the Quran and 
I do not know what kind of religion do they follow. (Respondent 5) 
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In addition to this, another Turkish Sunni respondent said, 
Alevism is an heretic sect that worship the devil. They are kafirs 
and sinners because they say that Ali is God estagfirullah!. 
(Respondent 6) 
As seen from these two quotations, although it should not be generalised to all the 
members of the Sunni sect of Islam, some have very negative thoughts on Alevis 
denying the fact that they are also Muslims, believe in God, Mohammed and Ali. 
This belief, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, finds its roots in the Ottoman 
Period which ruled its entire Muslim people according to the rules of Sunni sect. As 
can be remembered, the sultans did not hesitate to kill or exile Alevis, causing 
hatred between the two sects. Pears' (1911: 265) observation of this in the early 
1900s is indeed remarkable: 
When asked by a stranger whether they are Moslems or Alevi they will 
probably answer, " We are all the slaves of Allah. " ... When once their confidence is gained by a European they are communicative. They hate 
the ordinary Moslem and are equally hated in return. 
These negative thoughts of some Turkish Sunnis, in fact, are not surprising. It is 
widely known in Turkey that some of the members of the Sunni sect do not see 
Alevis as Muslims at all. Some years ago, one of the Turkish TV channels 
broadcast a discussion between a researcher (Cemal Sener) and a Sunni Imam 
about the Alevi sect. What this Sunni Imam raised in that discussion about Alevis 
was not very much different from these two quotations here. Shankland (1996: 85) 
made a similar observation during his fieldwork between 1988 and 1990 among 
villages in Ankara - Turkey. He says that the Alevi and Sunni largely live apart 
from one another in different villages. If they live in the same village then in 
different village quarters and Sunnis claim that Alevis are not Muslim. In return they 
are seen as fanatics by the Alevis. 
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Although Alevis are also expected to have a similar reaction against the members 
of Sunni sect in return, our interviews have not revealed this. However, this should 
not be generalised to the whole Alevi population nor is it to say that they approve of 
their Sunni fellow citizens. In fact, as can be seen in the following quotation, they 
do not like their highly involvement in the religion. The main fear comes with the 
rise of fundamental Islamic movement in Turkey which is one of the main threats to 
the secular republic. 
One of them said, 
Well, I am an Alevi and a Turk living in London. Although I don't 
know enough about Alevism, I am happy to be an Alevi. We are not 
fanatic Muslims nor are we trying to demolish our country's secular 
system. Alevism is the real Turkish way of Islam. We took what is 
good for us in Islam and we left others. In my opinion, others 
(Turkish Sunnis) are assimilated into Islam. They have been trying 
for an Islamic revolution in Turkey. But they cannot achieve this 
because we Alevis will not let this happen. Democracy is the only 
way for us to express ourselves. We know what will happen once 
they achieve the Islamic revolution in Turkey. They will immediately 
start an ethnic cleansing against us. (Respondent 1) 
Another Turkish Alevi respondent said, 
Thanks to the Cemevi here, two years ago I started to wonder 
about my religion (Alevism). I have learnt here (cemevi) quite a lot 
about Alevism. I have read a number of books related to Alevism 
and it's aspects. Now, I know how my ancestors suffered under the 
control of Ottoman (Empire). I wish I had lived at that time. I could 
have fought against them to protect Alevis. (Respondent 2) 
As can be understood from the quotations, the members of each Turkish religious 
sect define themselves using their sense of themselves and the other branch. This 
is actually what G. H. Mead meant when he used the terms 'I' and 'Me'. With the 'I', 
he referred to the idea of how an individual sees him/herself, and with the 'Me' he 
referred to the idea of how others see them. (quoted by Abbott, 1998: 47) In other 
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words, in constructing a group identity both the members' sense of themselves and 
how they are seen and treated by others are very important. It is possible that 
some members of a specific ethnic group may not get the sense of their difference 
until they interact with the members of other groups. In this case, although they 
have not given any thought to their ethnic difference, when they are treated 
differently by being discriminated, they come to understand their ethnic difference 
and start to learn more about their difference by asking their parents or, if they are 
old enough, by reading the related literature. The following quotation from a PhD 
thesis (Miah, 1998: 179) is an obvious example for this. 
... when my 5-year-old daughter went to a predominantly white 
children's school -a Church of England School -I thought she would have better opportunities, but I was wrong. One day she came home 
and started to cry and told me that some of her friends were calling 
her 'Paki' and 'Blacky'. Obviously, she did not understand what they 
meant, but stood in front of a mirror and asked her mother, "Why 
can't I change my face colour? ". After this incident she became very 
quiet and sometimes refused to go to school. 
Although there may be some parents in Turkey who do not intend to let their 
children know about their ethnic origin, sooner or later their children learn the fact 
when they first meet members of the same or opposite ethnic group. In a way, 
these religious differences are gained at birth and known by others no matter if the 
individual knows his/her ethnic identity. I also had similar personnel observations 
in Turkey that some people said that they were not aware of their Alevi/Sunni 
identity until they started secondary or high school and came across discrimination 
from others. The individual may not be religious, he/she may well be an atheist, but 
he/she is still related by others to an ethnic identity. This experience of ethnic 
identity finds its echoes in the literature as well. Guttmann (1971) and Kokosalakis 
(1982), for example, argue that, although Jewish identity heavily depends on 
religion, those who are secular or non-religious Jews are always related to the 
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Jewish ethnic identity. Guttmann (1971: 7) rightly reminds us that although Karl 
Marx's parents were converted to Christianity, he is still considered as a Jew. 
7.3.2. Kurdish Alevis and Sunnis 
What makes Kurdish people different from Turkish people is mainly the difference 
in their mother tongue -though there seem to be strong objections coming from 
different Turkish authorities and elites that Kurdish is a mixture of old Turkish, 
Persian, Arabic and Armenian language (see Poulton, 1997: 125). As seen from 
the table 7.1 a total of 77 (including half Turk half Kurds) see themselves as 
Kurdish. The following table shows their ability to use the Kurdish language. 
Table 7.8. Rating knowledge of the Kurdish Language 
Speaking Reading Wri tin 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
e good 5 6.8 2 2.7 1 1.4 
Good 11 14.9 5 6.8 4 5.4 
Average 8 10.8 - - 2 2.7 Poor 10 13.5 4 5.4 4 5.4 
Not at all 40 54.1 63 85.1 63 85.1 
otal 74 100.0 74 100.0 74 100.0 
As seen in the table, the ability of the great majority of the respondents to use the 
Kurdish language is below average. In fact, 85.1 per cent do not have any reading 
or writing ability of the Kurdish language while more than half of the respondents 
do not speak it at all. If the Kurdish language is the basis for a distinct Kurdish 
identity, the question of how they can define themselves as Kurdish without 
knowing it becomes a difficult one. As Necef (1996: 222) suggests, this is a direct 
result of the high rate of linguistic assimilation to the Turkish language. Mutlu 
(1996: 519) sees this situation as a result of mixed marriages and the migration of 
Kurds to the cities. 
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Another likely possibility in direct relation with Necefs suggestion is the importance 
of where they come from. It is known that in the southeast region of Turkey, the 
Kurdish language is widely used as the mother tongue. However, especially in 
central Anatolia, as a result of linguistic assimilation, people of Kurdish origin either 
do not use the Kurdish language or do not need to teach it to their children. As 
Poulton (1997) rightly states the Turkish language campaign -vatandas Turkce 
konus (Citizen Speak Turkish)- of the 1930s and the constitutional banning of the 
Kurdish language from schools and the organizations, show the intensity of the 
linguistic assimilation. However, although they were linguistically assimilated into 
the Turkish language, table 7.8 actually shows that the Kurdish identity is still used 
by the respondents. This also gives us the importance of the symbols. It is clear 
that without knowing the Kurdish language one can still claim to be a Kurdish. The 
primordial attachments of ethnic identity have already been discussed in chapter 3. 
This situation also applies to the Kurds as well as to sect members. Therefore, one 
can be aware of his/her Kurdish origin without knowing the language. Another 
contributor should not be forgotten as well. That is the rise of the Kurdish 
movement after the early 1980s. As known, Kurdish people in Western European 
countries are well organised. This can easily be understood from the immediate 
demonstrations by them just hours after the seizure of Ocalan (the leader of 
P. K. K. ). Thus, these two matters: primordial attachments and the political status of 
the Kurdish issue, alone or in combination, can make the awareness of Kurdish 
identity alive. 
During the face to face interviews with Kurdish Alevis and Sunnis, one thing was 
remarkable that is to say that religious sect differences were not as important as 
with Turkish Alevis and Sunnis. 
Although they defined themselves by using religious and linguistic difference, they 
mainly focused on linguistic difference and the cultural aspects of being Kurdish. 
They did not seem to discriminate against the opposite Kurdish religious sect. 
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However, one of the Kurdish Alevis addressed a very interesting point. As we 
discussed earlier in this chapter, some of the Alevi Kurds are not really Kurds. 
They actually became Kurds in order to save their lives from the pressures of the 
Ottoman Empire. This interviewee said that her parents although they are known 
as Kurdish, feel themselves Turkish because their ancestors were Turkish. 
One of the Kurdish Sunni respondents said, 
For me, being a Kurdish is more important than my religious sect. 
The main reason for this is simply the fact that although religious 
practices are allowed by the Turkish state, we are not allowed to 
carry on our cultural differences. I mean, I have no problem with the 
religion thing but I do have problems when I say I am a Kurd and 
want to keep my cultural differences.... I am not a Supporter of the 
PKK but it is obvious that Kurds are not allowed to keep their 
cultural differences and pass them to coming generations. If this is 
not the intention of Turkey to assimilate us by force, what could it 
be called then? Let me tell you something. The more I see the 
Turkish pressures on Kurds, the more I feel myself Kurdish. I mean 
my Kurdish identity is getting stronger as Turkey continues to treat 
us in this way. ... I don't think having an independent state would 
solve our problems. ... As a Kurd, I know that we Turkish and Kurdish people can live together. Our ancestors did this so we can 
do the same in peace. ... It is a fact that great numbers of Kurdish people live in big cities (together) with Turkish people. Therefore, all 
we need is to be allowed to keep our differences and for this, a 
better approach is essential by the Turkish state. 
As for the Kurdish Alevis, I can't see them different from us. We all 
suffer from the same problems. Their main problem is also the 
same. (Resp. No. 10) 
One of the Kurdish Alevi respondents said, 
... the main thing is being Kurdish. Of course being an Alevi is also important but we mainly suffer from our Kurdish identity. If you are a 
Kurd in Turkey, then you are seen as a second-class citizen and 
you are treated in that way. You are not allowed to speak your 
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mother tongue in schools and other organizations in Turkey. I am 
asking you, if your children cannot get education in their mother 
tongue, then how are they supposed to develop their brains? A 
great number of our children in Turkey do not know a word of 
Turkish when they started to go to primary schools. Now, can you 
tell me, how they are expected to be successful in schools while 
they are struggling to learn Turkish? You know, Kurdish education 
is not allowed in Turkey. Therefore, majority of Kurds don't know 
how to read and write in Kurdish and if they live in cities, forget it, 
their children cannot speak Kurdish either. I don't know if you have 
been to the Sought East region of Turkey but it is clear that Kurds in 
this region are very poor. Most of them are unemployed and Turkey 
does not do anything to improve the conditions there. To me, the 
solution of the Kurdish question is not that difficult. If Turkey were to 
invest in that region, and give Kurds the right of keeping their 
cultural values alive, the problem would be solved in peace. I don't 
understand why this problem exists in Turkey. We Turkish and 
Kurdish people are grandchildren of those who fought to establish 
Turkish republic. We must have the same rights with Turkish people 
in order to enjoy our cultural differences. (Resp. No. 11) 
It is obvious from these two quotations that the main problem of the Kurds is the 
use of their Kurdish identity. Since the use of Kurdish identity brings problems, they 
mainly focus on this rather than religious differences. As one of the respondents 
pointed out, the problem is something to do with poor economic conditions in the 
southeast region of Turkey and being unable to keep the Kurdish cultural values. 
They do not claim any separation from Turkey. 
These two quotations from Kurdish interviewees have similar characteristics with 
the earlier quotations. That is to say that although they did not use the opposite 
sect to define theirs, they did use the expression 'Turkish people' to address their 
differences. However, as will be seen in Chapter 8, with the relationships inside the 
community, there exists another type of bridge between Turkish and Kurdish Alevis 
which makes them closer to each other as they share the same sect. This is, as 
Bruinessen (1996: 10) puts it, a result of the fact that most of the Kurdish Alevis 
define themselves as Alevi first and then as Kurds. However, the sect bridge 
between Turkish and Kurdish Sunnis does not work in the same way as it does 
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with Alevi Turks and Kurds. The reason is easy to guess. The rising Kurdish 
nationalist movement is a threat to the nation state which is defined in terms of 
Turkish ethnic majority. 
7.3.3. Gaining British identity? 
As known, the law in the UK allows foreigners to become naturalized after a-five 
year residency. Following naturalisation immigrants can apply for British citizenship 
and become British passport holders. It should also be noted that dual citizenship 
is allowed by British laws, leaving immigrants the opportunity to enjoy their original 
citizenship rights with their country of origin which is only a dream for more than 
2.5 million Turkish immigrants in Germany alone. 
However, this is not to say that in gaining citizenship rights one actually changes 
ethnic identity nor is it easy to claim that they really get a new identity. As 
discussed earlier this depends heavily on the individual's sense of him/herself and 
the acceptance of others. 
Table 7.5 also shows us another interesting point. As can be seen from this table, 
there are British Alevis, Half British / Half Turkish Alevis and Half British / Half 
Turkish Sunnis among the respondents. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
hyphenated identities are mainly a result of a long stay in a different country. 
Therefore, in order to explain these identities we need to cross tabulate the 
respondents' expression of themselves and the period of residency in the UK. 
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Table 7.9. Who are they? By period of residency in the UK 
Resid enc 
Who 5-7 
years 
8-11 
years 
12-16 
years 
17-21 
years 
22 + Total 
Turkish Alevi 15 9 6 5 35 
Turkish Sunni 23 1 9 5 38 
Kurdish Alevi 19 8 2 3 32 
Kurdish Sunni 26 8 1 4 39 
British Alevi 2 2 4 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 2 4 6 
Only Alevi 8 6 2 16 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 4 2 3 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 4 2 6 1 13 
Other 4 4 
Total 97 46 26 30 1 200 
Table 7.9 examines the expression of "who they are" and the "period of residency 
in the UK". As seen, nearly half of the respondents have 5-7 years of residency in 
Britain. Although the other half has more than 7 years of residency, as we 
examined earlier, the number of those who were born or grew up in Britain is 
remarkably low because of the relatively short history of the Turkish existence in 
the UK. However, this table shows the importance of the long residency on 
hyphenated identities. If we look at the table, it can be seen that gaining British 
identity starts after seven years of residency in the UK. One can assume that being 
half British is something to do with the parents of the person. If one of the parents 
is British and the other is Turkish, the person is then seen as half British / half 
Turkish. However, none of the respondents of this research has such a condition. 
Therefore, here, gaining British identity depends heavily on the period of residency 
in the UK and comes with learning the cultural aspects of British society (language 
and the way of life) 
As for British Alevis, there is an important factor which needs to be explained. 
They are children of real refugees and therefore it can be assumed that because of 
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the negative views of their parents about Turkey, they do not tend to use Turkish 
identity and because of their long term residency and ability to speak English they 
might feel closer to British society than Turkey. 
Another interesting thing in table 7.8 is the stability of religious identities which go 
along with others (Turkish, Kurdish, British). As can be seen from the table, as their 
period of residency increases, they gain British identity but they still keep their 
religious identities as well. The main reason for this is the long historical roots of 
these sub-ethnic religious and linguistic identities. As Abbott (1998: 109) quotes 
from David Marquand, the nation state, although it may be seen to be natural, is a 
relatively recent creation which can be defined as a geographical area governed by 
one sovereign political authority, and whose members share a belief in some 
common identity. As known, the Republic of Turkey was established as a nation 
state in 1923. Since then, as a requirement of a nation state, all the people living 
within the borders of Turkey have been seen as Turkish without any consideration 
of group differences (language and religious). Different groups that were in conflict 
before the republic formed the Republic of Turkey and as Turkey allowed the 
mainstream's cultural practices (briefly Sunni belief system and the official use of 
the Turkish language) banning the right of the use of the Kurdish Language and 
Alevi practices. In a way it helped these sub-ethnic differences to be kept strong. 
Therefore, although Turkish young people are born and grew up in a different 
country, they do not seem to give up their religious identities. 
Although at first glance, it may be seen that as time goes by, living in a different 
country, people begin to lose their national identity, this cannot be predicted from 
the findings of this research. What is more important is the fact that as Greeley 
(1971: 53-58) points out, although the first few generations may lose the 
conciseness of their origins in the process of integration into the host society, 
future generations may well strengthen the national identity by waking up the 
conciseness of their roots. 
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One of the half British / half Turkish Alevi respondents commented on gaining 
British identity. 
... I think I started to feel that I am also a British after making a lot of English friends in schools. Except a few incidents, my English 
friends have never refused my friendship. I suppose I learned the 
way of British life from them. I am also a Turk and although I know 
very little about Alevism, I also see myself an Alevi.... Fortunately my 
parents are not conservative people to force me to get only Turkish 
culture. That is why I do not have any problem in expressing myself 
half British and half Turkish. (Resp. No. 17) 
Although this respondent did not have any problem with being in between two 
cultures, one of the respondents explained how difficult it is to be in such condition 
although he sees himself a half British / half Turkish Sunni. 
... one the one side there is this family thing and rules of your 
parents and on the other side there is a different society which 
allows you to enjoy the freedom of being an individual. Some of my 
friends are English and I do enjoy being with them. However, my 
parents always try to control me by telling me how bad they are and 
what sort of problems I might have if I continue to make English 
friends.... My parents always tell me how our own culture is better 
than English culture by giving me examples from our ethical issues 
and religion.... However, they do not know anything about English 
culture or what they know about it depends on what they watch on 
TV or what they hear from their Turkish friends. Now, I feel that I do 
not belong to either culture and I don't know how I'm gonna deal 
with this problem. (Resp. No. 20) 
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Conclusion 
The main assumption of this research was the fact that Turkish people abroad 
should not be taken as a single Turk-Islam identity. Although many scholars tend to 
study Turkish people abroad by using this single Turk-Islam identity, this actually 
does not mean that they show the real picture of Turkish people. As noted earlier, 
as a result of ethnic diversity inherited from the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is a multi 
ethnic country in terms of language, cultural and sect differences. 
As discussed in this chapter, it is a fact that this ethnic diversity does not disappear 
when Turkish people migrate to other countries. In fact, in Turkish communities the 
effects of different sub-ethnic identities play important roles in their relationships 
with each other (see chapter 9) and they do not give up expressing themselves by 
using their sub-ethnic identities. 
It is also obvious from the quotations that some of them actually developed hatred 
against their fellow countrymen without considering the fact that they share the 
same main religious identity and they are the citizens of the same country. 
Briefly, this chapter has shown that Turkish people take their sub-ethnic identities 
with them wherever they go. Therefore, any research in relation to Turkish 
immigrants or Turkish people abroad has to take into account these differences. 
Otherwise, findings of a research can only be biased and cannot show the real 
situation. 
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Chapter 8: 
Relationships inside the family and community 
Introduction 
The family is the first stage in learning the linguistic and cultural characteristics of a 
society, or an ethnic group. Individuals, in a way, are firstly educated in the family 
unit to be a member of the society or of a different group. 
This chapter aims to examine the relationships of Turkish young people within the 
family and the Turkish community in London. To understand the general 
characteristics of the Turkish family, firstly various aspects of the Turkish family 
(family structure, authority patterns in the family, the status of women in this picture 
and the issue of feminism in Turkey) will be discussed. Then, in the light of findings 
from the main survey and face to face in depth interviews, relationships inside the 
family and the community will be examined in detail. 
8.1. Turkish family 
Although only little is known about the family in the period of Ottoman Empire 
mainly depending on some observations of foreign travellers on Turkish women in 
Istanbul (Erder, 1984: 6), Afetinan (1982) points out that the main structure of the 
Turkish family was a patriarchal extended family. She states that, in this structure, 
three generations live together under the authority of the oldest man in the family. 
Mehmet Izzet also points out, " In the past, it was very difficult to imagine anyone 
without his/her family. Men usually carried out the family occupation. " (Quoted by 
Degirmencioglu, 1989: 361) 
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As mentioned earlier, the basic ruling system of the Ottoman Empire was religious. 
In other words, the Sultans had ruled their people according to Islamic rules. In this 
frame, everything had to fit with the expectations of Islam. As commonly known, in 
mainstream Islam there is strong sex segregation, which results in separating 
females from the social life. As a result of the religious expectations as Afetinan 
(1982: 61) points out, the architecture of houses had to allow sex segregation in 
the house. However, this was not for the family members. The aim was to provide 
two types of reception rooms: one for male visitors and one for female visitors. In 
other words, when the family had guests, the members of both families had to be 
separated according to their sex. Males had to stay in the men's section called 
'Selamlik' with the host members and female guests had to stay in the women's 
section called 'Harem'. As usual the food was prepared by women but served to 
the male guests by the male family members. 
After the republic, in order to modify Turkish society from old values and belief 
systems to a modern society, a number of revolutions were carried out. (Latin 
alphabet, Modern dressing, Secularism, etc. ) The model for these revolutions was 
simply modern western civilisations. The traditional family structure of Turkey was 
also a part of this huge change. 
Especially after the 1950s, Turkey found herself in a stage of rapid economic and 
social change. As a result of, to some extent, industrialisation and pressures in 
rural areas such as insufficient land and population increase, great waves of 
migration from rural to urban areas emerged. The following table shows Turkey's 
urban and rural population from 1927 to 1997. 
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Table 8.1. Turkey's urban and rural population by census years (Thousands) 
Urban Population Rural Po pulation 
Years Total Ur. Pop. % Rur. Pop. % 
1927 13,648 3,306 24.20 10,342 75.80 
1935 16,158 3,803 23.50 12,355 76.50 
1940 17,821 4,346 24.40 13,475 75.60 
1945 18,790 4,687 24.90 14,103 75.10 
1950 20,947 5,244 25.00 15,703 75.00 
1955 24,065 6,927 28.80 17,138 71.20 
1960 27,755 8,860 31.90 18,895 68.10 
1965 31,391 10,806 34.40 20,585 65.60 
1970 35,605 13,691 38.50 21,914 61.50 
1975 40,348 16,869 41.80 23,479 58.20 
1980 44,737 19,645 43.90 25,092 56.10 
1985 50,664 26,866 53.00 23,799 47.00 
1990 56,473 33,326 59.00 23,147 41.00 
1997* 62,606 40,735 65.00 21,870 35.00 
Modified from Kongar, 1998: 549 
1997* data are estimates used by the same source 
As the table reveals, until the early 1980s, more than half of the Turkey's 
population lived in rural settlements. Highest proportions of rural population 
between 1927 and 1950 are also noticeable. As we noted earlier, the first decrease 
in the proportion of the rural population was first indicated in the 1955 Census and 
continued to fall afterwards. 
The continuing decrease in the proportions of the rural population brought new 
problems. Since newcomers could not find/afford accommodation in big cities, they 
built huts in which to live. These improper houses surrounded the cities and the 
areas of these huts were called 'Gecekondu' (Shanty town). 
People who live in gecekondus were different from city dwellers as a result of their 
rural backgrounds. They tried to protect their traditional cultural values from the city 
way of life. Kongar (1989: 590) states that the common family structure of 
gecekondus is nuclear. However, it is also a fact that the general tendency in these 
families is the continuity of patriarchal male dominance in the decision-making 
176 
procedure in the family from children's marriages to a wife's contribution to the 
family budget. (quoted by Kongar, 1989: 590) 
Despite the fact that patriarchal male dominance in the family is to some extent 
more common in rural and gecekondu families, it is not in any way excluded in city 
families. Available literature suggests that male dominance or patriarchal 
relationships between family members can be found in the majority of families in 
Turkey. (See Kongar, 1998; Icli and Yalcin, 1995; Kagitcibasi, 1990: Kandiyoti, 
1977) 
8.1.2. The general characteristics of Turkish family 
In Turkey, the distribution of family types according to the regions can be seen 
from the following table. 
Table 8.2. Family types in Turkey by the regions (1985) 
Family 
Types 
Central 
Anatolia 
Black 
Sea Region 
West 
Anatolia 
Mediterranean 
Region 
East 
Anatolia 
TURKEY 
Nuclear 63.6 46.3 59.1 67.4 63.0 59.7 
Patriarchal 
extended 
17.6 33.6 15.2 14.4 16.6 19.0 
Temporary 12.4 11.6 15.0 12.7 13.3 13.1 
Broken or 
incom lets 
6.4 6.8 12.3 6.7 6.1 8.3 
(Source: Sayin, 1990: 170): 
As seen in the table, the nuclear family is the common family type in Turkey. 
Among the regions, the nuclear family type is the most common especially in the 
Mediterranean Region with a percentage of 67,4. However, although the 
patriarchal extended family has a lower rate, it can be seen that it reaches the 
highest value in the Black Sea Region with a percentage of 33.6 and overall rate of 
this structure is still important. 
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The household size of Turkish family can be seen in the following table. 
Table 8.3. Household size by Rural and Urban areas (1985) 
Regions Rural Urban Total 
West Anatolia 4.60 3.90 4.03 
Sought Anatolia 5.26 4.71 4.96 
Anatolia 5.17 4.24 4.72 
Black Sea 5.20 4.36 4.97 
East and South east 6.48 5.81 6.24 
TURKEY (General) 5.39 4.27 4.75 
Source: (Cited from DPT, 1992: 48 by Kongar, 1998) 
According to the 1985 census, as seen from the table, apart from East and South 
east regions, the average numbers of households are close to each other. It can 
also be seen that there is a remarkable difference between rural and urban areas. 
In urban areas the average household size is less than rural areas. The table also 
reveals that among the regions West Anatolia has the smallest household size. 
The highest average household size, however, is found in East and Southeast 
regions of Turkey. As seen the average household size of Turkey is 4.75. 
However, as Kongar (1998: 586) points out, a recent household survey by DIE in 
1994 has shown that the difference found in average household size in rural and 
urban areas had decreased and the average household size for both areas 
appeared to be between 4 and 4.5 
8.1.3. Relationships inside the families in Turkey 
Being independent from the family types, patriarchal relationships can still be 
observed in the families no matter if they are in urban or rural areas. Kagitcibasi 
(1990: 60) notes that in Turkey the authority in the families depends on the man 
(father or the oldest son). Icli and Yalcin (1995: 47) also confirm this view. They 
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found patriarchal relationships (in 1995) in some of the nuclear families even if the 
couples had higher education. 
8.1.4. State policies about the Family in Turkey. 
Turkish family life, before the republic, was ordered by religious regulations. In 
Islamic law, the aim of the marriage is basically for the satisfaction of the man 
(Velidedeoglu, 1976: 18). 
During the period of Ottoman Empire, men were allowed to have more than one 
wife. After the end of the Empire, a reform of marriages was made and a new 
family law was accepted ( Hukuk-u Aile Kararnamesi) in October 1917. With this 
new law, the state began to be involved with marriages. According to this law, to 
have a second wife, men had to have his first wife's permission. In addition, men 
under 18 years of age and women under 17 were not able to marry without the 
permission of the Judge. However, since this new law was found too modern, it 
was terminated in June, 1919, and the state returned to the old religious law 
(Velidedeoglu, 1976: 19). Therefore, it is plausible to say that Turkey did not have 
a proper family law until 1926. 
Following the emergence of the Turkish Republic, the traditional patriarchal 
extended family structure of Ottoman society was one of the institutions that 
Atatürk's revolution wanted to change. His aim was to provide freedom to women 
by changing the family structure. (Kongar, 1985: 427) Therefore, in order to carry 
out these changes to family life, Swiss Civil Code was adapted in 1926. As Kocturk 
(1992: 31) rightly states, 
Overnight, Turkish women had gained exactly the same civil rights as 
those of women in Switzerland! Poligamy was abolished and women 
were given equal rights in matters relating to marriage, divorce, 
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inheritance and custody of children. Mutual consent at marriage 
became compulsory. 
With Atatürk's reforms, women started to be able to participate in social life outside 
the family. They were given better educational opportunities resulting job 
opportunities, voting rights, equal sharing of heritage, etc. In brief, Atatürk's reforms 
were part of the idea of westernising the country. 
The most reforming feature of Civil Law is found with the principle of equality 
between women and men. The 35th sentence of 1961's Constitution and the 41St 
sentence of 1982's Constitution are related to the family. It is stated "Family is the 
basic institution of Turkish Society". According to these constitutions, "the State 
provides the needed policies to protect the family such as obligated education for 
both girls and boys and family planning. (See Gozubuyuk & Kili, 1982: 157 and 
Soysal, 1987: 426) 
8.1.5. Feminism in Turkey and its effects. 
Feminism started as an intellectual movement in Turkey towards the end of 19th 
century. However, the women's movement was not political. It was based on a 
wish of women to join in social life. (Findikoglu, 1991: 11) 
It is argued that the Turkish Civil Law made the feminist movement weak. 
Although there were a number of associations to fight for women's rights before the 
republic, as a result of equal opportunities created by the new law, these 
associations had to be closed down. (Kurnaz, 1992: 122) Elite women showed 
their respect to Atatürk because of the introduced women's rights, and in a way 
they did not need to struggle to get additional rights. Because of the weak feminist 
movement in Turkey, Tekeli concludes that the Turkish family is still a strong 
institution in society and women still cannot be thought outside the family as 
opposed to other societies where feminism developed. (Tekeli, 1985: 60-63) 
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According to Tekeli (1985: 60-63), in Turkey, there have been two obstacles for the 
feminist movement. These are: 
a) Structural obstacles and 
b) Ideological obstacles 
Among the structural obstacles, underdeveloped capitalism comes first. The most 
important result of this was the dependence of women to the family structure. 
Another structural barrier is the family with its ideology and its economic bases. 
Starting with the emergence of the Turkish Republic, the legal position of women 
resulted from the adaptation of Swiss Civil Code did not leave anything for 
feminism to deal with. Women's freedom was provided by the state. Therefore, the 
Turkish state was an important example for state sponsored feminism (Tekeli, 
1985 and Kandiyoti, 1991), leaving Turkish women, to some extent, nothing to 
struggle with in the name of feminism. In a way, as a result of this automatic 
gaining of women rights, Kemalism meant feminism. As for some important 
numbers of women, as Tekeli (1985: 63) puts it, they were mainly dependent on 
Islamic values which had nothing to do with feminism and therefore they could not 
be in the feminist movement.. 
However, it is true that after the military coup in 1980, as Arat (1992: 84-85) states, 
Turkish feminism found itself in an acceleration phase. Starting from 1980, 
associations and foundations which defended women's rights were founded. 
Feminist publications in other languages were also translated into the Turkish 
language. An important outcome of this acceleration was the cancellation of the 
438th sentence of the constitution which says "if a raped woman is a prostitute, the 
punishment should be lighter". (Arat, 1992: 83) However, despite all the reforms to 
provide Turkish women with equal rights with men and the accelerated feminist 
movement in Turkey, the position of women in Turkish society still shows that 
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equality has remained as a fiction rather than a fact. Mostly in private sector, they 
get less payment than men for the same jobs and to some extent they are treated 
as second class citizens. (Kongar, 1998: 601) Patriarchal structure of the 
relationships in families, on the other hand, put the Turkish Women under extra 
pressure. 
8.2. The Family in the Turkish Community 
The family structure in the Turkish community in London shows similar 
characteristics to the Turkish family in Turkey. Although we should not disregard 
the effects of living in a different culture on family matters, it is a strong possibility 
that patriarchal oppression of women still exists. 
8.2.1. Family structure 
Table 8.4. Family types of the respondents 
Family types Frequency Percent 
Nuclear family 146 73.0 
Broken family 8 4.0 
Other (living alone or with friends) 14 7.0 
No Answer 32 16.0 
Total 200 100.0 
As seen in the table, the majority of the families of the respondents are nuclear 
families. There are also broken families, made up of one of the parents, and 
children. A small proportion of the respondents live either alone or share a house 
with friends. Extended family type has not been observed during the fieldwork. This 
mainly depends on the difficulty of migration to the UK with the whole family. A 
similar characteristic among Asian families in Britain was also observed by Anwar 
(1976: 17). He argues that despite the fact that the common family type is 
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extended in the Asian sub-continent, because of the nature of migration and 
immigration restrictions, the extended family type in the Asian communities in 
Britain is less common than in their countries of origin (Ibid: 16-17). 
Table 8.5. Household size 
Size Frequency Percent 
1 2 1.0 
2 23 11.5 
3 32 16.0 
4 80 40.0 
5 41 20.5 
6 15 7.5 
7 5 2.5 
No Answer 2 1.0 
Total 200 100.0 
This table examines the household size of the respondents. The most noticeable 
thing found in this table is that 40 per cent of the respondents' household size is 4. 
This is followed by household size 5 with 20.7 per cent, 3 with 16.2 per cent, 2 
with 11.6 per cent, 6 with 7.6 per cent and 7 with 2.5 per cent. The mean of 
household size is 4.01 and this score is very close to the findings of the latest 
household survey by DIE in Turkey in 1994 (see www. die. gov. tr) 
Table 8.6. Marital status of the parents of the respondents 
Marital status Frequency Percent 
Married 181 90.5 
Divorced 4 2.0 
Widowed 11 5.5 
Separated 3 1.5 
No Answer 1 0.5 
Total 200 100.0 
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As can be seen from the table, the great majority of the parents (181 out of 200) of 
the respondents are married. This is followed by widows (5.5 per cent), divorced 
(2.0 per cent) and separated (1.5 per cent). The number of missing cases is only 
one. This table also shows the importance of marriage ties within the Turkish 
community in London. 
Although the Turkish community in London is also seen as a Muslim community, 
Turkish family structure differs from the other Muslim communities in London. For 
instance, Eade et al (1996: 154) pointed out that the family structure of the 
Bangladeshi community in the UK is similar to the Indian and Pakistani populations 
as the households include two or more families. As Miah (1998: 122) points out, a 
nuclear family in Bangladesh or in Britain may also be a part of a joint family. In this 
respect, since the incomes of the branches of the joint family are distributed for 
major family occasions i. e. marriage ceremonies, buying land, or promoting 
businesses, these branch families are regarded as part of an extended family no 
matter if they live in different houses (Ibid: 124). Jeffery (1976: 33) explains this 
with the term 'biraderi' used by Pakistanis. She defines the term as a group of 
people "in the same patrilineage, and also people related through marriage" She 
further adds that biraderi is used as a kinship network in which marriage 
arrangements are made. When we look at the characteristics of the Turkish family, 
we can say that these features are not very much seen in the Turkish families in 
London. The importance of the patriarchal extended family is no longer a dominant 
factor in shaping individuals' lives. Arranged and forced marriages are mainly a 
reality of the past. As Kucukcan (1999) points out, new generations do not want to 
be involved in arranged marriages. They want to be free in choosing their spouses. 
However as he concludes, the importance of parents' approval in choosing a 
spouse is still important. The difference between Turkish families and other ethnic 
minority Muslim families can only be explained with Ataturk's reforms resulting in a 
secularist structure of Turkey. 
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8.2.2. Relationships inside the family 
In order to find out the characteristics of the relationships inside the families a 
number of questions were asked in the main survey. 
One of the questions was related to the parents' understanding of the respondents, 
as seen by the young people. The following table shows the results of this. 
Table 8.7. Parents' understanding of the respondents 
Father's understanding Mother's understanding 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
e well 30 15.0 89 44.5 
Fairly well 55 27.5 72 36.0 
Not very well 79 39.5 18 9.0 
Not well at all 10 5.0 1 .5 No Answer 26 13.0 20 10.0 
Total 200 100.0 200 100.0 
As seen from the table, there is a strong difference between the understanding of 
mothers and fathers. The great majority of the respondents think that they are well 
understood by their mothers while a considerably lower proportion (32.5 per cent) 
think the same for their fathers. As seen in the table, 44.5 per cent of the 
respondents think that their fathers do not understand them while only 9.5 per cent 
of them think the same for their mother. A strong statistical relationship between 
sex and fathers' understanding of the respondents reveals the existence of 
patriarchal relationships inside the families. This is seen in the following table. 
185 
Table 8.8. Sex by Fathers' understanding of the respondents by sex 
Bein understood b the father 
Sex Very well Fairl well Not ve well Not well at all Total 
Male 21 41 30 4 96 
Female 9 14 49 6 78 
Total 30 55 79 10 174 
Chi-Square=21.391; df=3; Significance <. 000 
As seen in the table, there is a statistically significant relationship between sex and 
the understanding of fathers of the respondent. The majority of males think that 
they are well understood by their fathers, while the majority of the females think the 
opposite. It becomes even more interesting when we cross-tabulate the mothers' 
understanding of them by sex. 
Table 8.9. Mothers' understanding of the respondents by sex 
Sex Very well Fairly well Not very well Not well at all Total 
Male 56 36 7 99 
Female 33 36 11 1 81 
Total 89 72 18 1 180 
Chi-Square=6.094; df=3; Significance < . 107 
Although there appears to be a weak statistical relationship between mothers' 
understanding and sex, the table reveals that respondents think that mothers have 
a better understanding of their children than fathers. One can assume that fathers' 
oppression of female children is the main reason for this, making female 
respondents think that they are well understood by their mothers. 
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Table 8.10. The closeness of the family members. 
Frequency Percent 
e close 50 25.0 
Pretty close 43 21.5 
Neutral 40 20.0 
little distant 61 30.5 
Pretty distant 1 .5 No Answer 5 2.5 
Total 200 100.0 
As can be seen from the table, nearly half of the respondents think that their family 
members are either very close or pretty close to each other. However, the 
proportion of those who think that the members of their families are not close is 
also worth noting. As mentioned above, the reasons for this can be various such as 
patriarchal relations, oppression of female children etc. 
In understanding the relationships inside the families, the independence status of 
the respondents from their families was also asked in the main survey. 
Kucukcan (1999: 121) found that more than half of his respondents felt that 
parental control was 'too much'. As one could expect, it was the girls who felt too 
much parental control in his study. Although my research has yielded similar 
results, the number of those who are in total control of their parents appeared to be 
less than Kucukcan's findings. 
Table 8.11. Independence status of respondents from the Family 
Count Pct of Res. Pct of cases 
All the decisions about me are made by parents 57 20.5 29.5 
I am economically independent 42 15.1 21.8 
I can go out at night without asking 47 16.9 24.4 
I can make my own friends 97 34.9 50.3 
don't live with parents 33 11.9 17.1 
Other 2 
.7 1.0 Total 278 100.0 144.0 
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As seen in the table, apart from a small proportion, the majority of the respondents 
have a deal of independence, from being economically independent to being able 
to make their own friends and go out without asking permission of their parents. 
However, since dependency on the family is an important factor, we need to 
examine those who say all the decisions about them made by parents. 
Table 8.12. Sex by "All the decisions related to me made by parents" 
All the decision s related to me mad eb parents 
Sex Yes No Total 
Male 16 90 106 
Female 41 46 87 
Total 57 136 193 
Chi-Square=23.558; df=1; Significance <. 000 
As seen in this table, female respondents are more likely to be under the control of 
their parents. Within the families of 41 female respondents out of 87, all the 
decisions relating to them are made by parents. This can also be seen as a 
continuity of patriarchal relationships inside the family. This situation can also 
depend on the religious characteristics. As addressed earlier, Alevi Turks and 
Kurds are likely to be more secularist than their Sunni fellowmen. 
Table 8.13. Sects by decisions made by parents 
All the decisions related to me made b parents 
Sects No Yes Total 
levi 83 19 102 
Sunni 49 38 87 
Total 132 57 189 
Chi-Square=13.989; df=1; Significance <. 000 
As table 8.13 shows, in addition to the significant relationship found in table 8.12, 
there is also a strong significant relationship between sects and "all the decisions 
related to the respondent made by parents". While the great majority of the Alevis 
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tend to think that they are to some extent free to make their own decisions, the 
number among Sunnis who think the same falls sharply. The number of "yes" 
answers of Sunnis, as seen, is double that of Alevis. This can only be explained, 
therefore, with the strong religious connection of the Sunni sect. 
Table 8.14. Ethnic identities by "All the decisions related to me made by 
parents" 
All the decisions related to me made by 
parents 
Who are they? Yes No Total 
Turkish Alevi 5 28 33 
Turkish Sunni 20 16 36 
Kurdish Alevi 6 26 32 
Kurdish Sunni 12 26 38 
British Alevi 3 5 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 6 6 
Only Alevi 2 12 14 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 3 6 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 6 7 13 
Other 4 4 
Total 57 136 193 
As can be seen from the cross tabulation, among Turkish and Kurdish Sunnis, the 
proportion of "all the decisions related to the respondent made by the parents" is 
higher than Turkish and Kurdish Alevis. Therefore, it may be said that religious 
issues have also a connection with the decision making process in the family. 
However, it would be wrong to assume that all the Sunni families share this 
characteristic. Controlling children no matter what their sex can be seen in all 
Turkish families depending on some other factors which were revealed in the 
course of the face to face interviews. 
189 
One of the respondents said, 
... it is some bad things like the high numbers of Turkish drug dealers. My parents are quite concerned about my friends. They 
keep saying that I have to be very careful in order to stay away 
from any trouble. Well, my parents do not control me as long as 
they know my friends are decent people and would not be 
involved in any kind of trouble. (Resp. No. 7) 
Unfortunately, this quotation reflects a reality that in the Turkish community the 
number of people who are involved in illegal things like drug dealing is rising. One 
can easily find half, sometimes full pages of adverts in weekly Turkish newspapers 
(Toplum postasi and Londra Haber) by solicitors advertising that they can help 
those who have been caught and charged with drug offences. This could be a sign 
of the increasing numbers involved in drug dealing. Therefore, it is plausible to 
assume that parents in a way feel responsible to control their children and keep an 
eye on their circle of friends. 
Another respondent said, 
... No, no I don't. I can't feel independent. I tried it. It is just that they don't say ... you belong to us but the way they act, they do. They make me feel that I belong to this family. I can't do without 
them. So they got this secret way of holding me. 
And my father, ... he is not as strict as other Turkish fathers. Traditions... would not matter. Sometimes they put the girls in 
home and say you can't go out and you can't do this. Like, my 
parents did that to my sister and she ran away and got married 
so they did not do that to me because they just had this 
experience that if we put her home and force her to do things 
which she dislikes, she would run away. ... My parents aren't like the Turkish parents as far as I see, never like them. (Resp. No. 3) 
As for the religious issue, one of the male respondents said, 
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... You know what our people think if a girl goes out with a boyfriend. In our religion, a woman should keep her virginity for 
her husband. We, unfortunately, live in a different country where 
losing virginity before marriage or going out with boyfriends are 
seen normal. Therefore, in order to protect girls from these bad 
things something has to be done. For example, I would not let 
my sister go out alone. I always ask her to have female company 
either her sister or one of her female friends when she wants to 
go out. (Resp. No 5) 
It should be highlighted that keeping virginity until marriage is the most important 
thing for both Sunni and Alevi families. Namus (honour) is the first thing when a 
marriage is concerned. Therefore, as Tan and Waldhoff (1996: 140) point out, 
The control exercised by Turkish males over female members of their 
families is also intended to prevent a potential loss of honour, since 
the standing of a family and esteem in which it is held is presumed to 
depend above all on the blameless behaivour of its female members. 
For example, Kucukcan (1999: 99) states, "in London parents who would like to 
arrange a marriage for their son look for namus (honour) in the prospective bride". 
The control over children affects girls especially rather than males. Karakasoglu 
(1996: 162) states, 
Young Turks in Germany are confronted with two partly contradictory 
value systems: that of their Turkish home and that of their German 
social environment. These conflicting pressures affect girls more than 
boys, since the notion of `honour' requires them to maintain a 
demonstrative distance from German influences and adopt a visibly 
traditional, conformist behaviour. For boys it seems easier to appear 
compliant with Turkish norms and nevertheless taste some of the 
freedoms German society has to offer 
On one occasion, I found an opportunity to exchange views with a German about 
Turkish people living in Germany. His observations on Turkish people was very 
similar to the above quotation. He said, 
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When they (Turkish boys) want to go out with our German girls, they 
find hardly any obstacles to prevent them from doing so. However, if I 
want to go out with a Turkish girl then problems are likely to appear. I 
am more likely to be beaten up by her brothers or male relatives if our 
relationship is revealed 
The same situation also applies to Turkish people in London. However, the level of 
control of girls varies depending on the religious issues. As Alevi families practice 
Islam in a different way and are more secular than religious Sunni families, their 
control of girls appears to be patriarchal rather than religious. 
Briefly, we can conclude that when the independence of children from their parents 
is concerned, three main factors need to be dealt with. The first one is the fact that 
parents aim to protect their children from danger, bad friends and crime. Secondly, 
religious issues are the main source of pressure on girls. And finally, the patriarchal 
structure of the families, results in pressure on women and therefore girls. 
8.2.3. Marriage 
A question was asked in the main survey, in order to reveal whether there is a 
preference among parents that their children should marry someone who belongs 
to their culture. Before giving a detailed cross tabulation, first we should have a 
look at the sect differences to see if there is a statistical significance. 
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Table 8.15. Sects by Do your parents believe that you should marry a person 
who belongs to your culture? " 
Do your parents believe that you should marry a person who 
belongs to your culture? 
Sects Yes No Total 
levi 34 72 106 
Sunni 65 24 89 
99 96 195 
Chi Square=32.472; dfl; Significance <. 000 
As seen in the table, the relationship between sects and parents' belief that 
children should marry someone who belongs to their culture is statistically 
significant. Alevi parents appear to be less worried than Sunni parents. Although it 
is impossible to conduct a chi square test for the full classification, the following 
cross tabulation also gives detailed information about the matter. 
Table 8.16. Ethnic identities by "Do your parents believe that you should 
marry a person who belongs to your culture? " 
Do your parents believe that you should marry a 
person who belongs to your culture? 
Who are they? Yes No Total 
Turkish Alevi 8 27 35 
Turkish Sunni 30 8 38 
Kurdish Alevi 10 22 32 
Kurdish Sunni 28 11 39 
British Alevi 4 4 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 5 1 6 
Only Alevi 4 12 16 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 3 6 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 7 5 12 
Other 2 2 4 
[Total 101 98 199 
As can be seen from the table nearly half of the respondents say that their parents 
believe they should marry a person who belongs to their own culture. This culture 
could be Turkish in a broad meaning or their sub ethnic identity. However, it is still 
a reality that even if the other person is Turkish, parents and other people in the 
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same sub ethnic group do not like the idea of their children's marriage to someone 
from another sub ethnic group although there are quite a number of examples of 
this kind of marriage. A recent incident reported by Milliyet newspaper (29 May 
2000) shows the importance of this. A Sunni father shoots his Alevi son in law 
because the marriage between his daughter and the Alevi son in law happened 
without his approval. 
The other information derived from the table is that Alevi Turk and Kurd 
respondents think that their parents do not encourage them to marry someone 
from the same culture.. 
Although what the parents believe about their children's marriage is important, the 
more important thing about marriage is what the respondents think about it. The 
following table shows what they think about marriage. 
Table 8.17. To marry a person which of the following are more important for 
you? 
Frequency Percent 
rich person 9 4.5 
An Alevi Turk 3 1.5 
Sunni Turk 3 1.5 
An Alevi Kurd 4 2.0 
Sunni Kurd 2 1.0 
socialist person 4 2.0 
Falling in love with someone is enough to marry 126 63.0 
I have never thought about this 49 24.5 
[Total 200 100.0 
Although the respondents were provided with the options representing sub-ethnic 
group identities, as seen in the table, a great proportion of Turkish young people 
think that falling in love with someone is the first thing to consider for the marriage. 
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This fact shows us that no matter if parents believe that they should marry 
someone from their own culture, Turkish young people would not accept any kind 
of encouragement to marry someone they did not love. As can be seen from the 
table the selection of the other options is very low. The main reason for 49 people 
to choose the option of "I have never thought about this" is the age factor. Mainly 
up to 18 years, people do not think about getting married. 
Although falling in love is seen as enough to get married, most of the respondents 
also expressed their opinion in a slightly different way during the face to face 
interviews. As an example one of them said, 
Well, I would marry someone without asking what her beliefs and 
identity are if I love her. However, if she is (were) an Alevi then it 
would be even better because in future problems depending on 
cultural differences may appear and whose culture will be taught 
to the children may be a big problem. I am not saying that I 
object to marrying someone from another culture but you see, it 
can be a real problem in future. You would not find it easy to 
criticise the other culture if you were married to someone from 
that culture. Do you know what I mean? (Resp. No. 1) 
As can be understood from the quotation, It can be said that it is still an important 
issue to marry someone from the same culture although the great majority of the 
respondents think that falling in love is enough to marry. Therefore, we can 
conclude that Turkish respondents, in fact, are aware of possible problems if they 
marry someone from a different culture. 
Table 8.18. Would you try to prevent your children from marrying a member 
of other groups (such as Alevi Turks, Alevi Kurds, Sunni Turks and Sunni 
Kurds)? 
Frequency Percent 
es 16 8.0 
No 131 65.5 
I haven't thou ht 53 26.5 
, Total 200 100.0 
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In the questionnaire a hypothetical question was also included to measure the 
opinions of the respondents about their children's or future children's marriage. As 
seen, the majority of the respondents would not try to stop their children's marriage 
to members of the other groups. One of the respondents said, 
You know, it is not good to stop your children if they want to 
marry someone from another group. I would not do this because 
I know in the end I will be blamed for stopping the marriage. To 
me, it is the worst thing to do. I mean how can you ask your 
children not to love someone if they are really in love? This 
would be something against the human nature. (Resp. No. 8) 
When we look at the table, it can be seen that an important number of the 
respondents actually have not thought about this. This can depend on the age 
factor as it may play an important role for some of the respondents who are 
between 15 and 18 to think in this way. Among the main reasons for some of the 
respondents who said yes are cultural and religious differences. This can be seen 
from the following table. 
Table 8.19. The reasons for preventing children from marrying a member of 
other groups (such as Alevi Turks, Alevi Kurds, Sunni Turks and Sunni 
Kurds)? 
Frequency Percent 
Cultural differences 13 81.25 
Religious difference 3 18.75 
Total 16 100.0 
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8.3. Relationships inside the community 
In order to analyse the respondents' relationships inside the community a number 
of questions was asked in the main survey. One of them was their membership of 
Turkish organisations such as student society, social and cultural societies, 
occupational based organisations and religious organisations such as a Mosque or 
a Cemevi. 
Table 8.20. The respondents' membership status to the Turkish 
organisations 
Count Pct of Res. Pct of cases 
Student clubs and societies 35 17.3 17.5 
Social & cultural organisations 65 32.2 32.5 
Organisations based on occupation 2 1.0 1.0 
Mosque or Cemevi 29 14.4 14.5 
Not member of any organisation 71 35.1 35.5 
Total 202 100.0 101.0 
(Multiple response) 
As can be seen from the table, the majority of respondents are members of 
different Turkish organisations. Social and cultural societies have the largest 
proportion among the Turkish organisations. Here, it needs to be clarified that the 
Cemevi (a religious place) is also seen as a cultural organisation. Therefore a 
number of those who chose Social & cultural organisations may well refer to the 
Cemevi. Another reason for this can be the fact that some of the Alevis do not have 
to be religious in order to be a member of the Cemevi. 
Since an important number of the respondents are students, "student clubs and 
societies" in the table have the second place among the organisations. This is 
followed by Mosque or Cemevi. 
However, it should also be stated that an important proportion of the respondents 
(35.5 per cent) are not members of any kind of organisation, the reason given 
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being lack of interest. Of the 71 non-members of these organisations, 58 
respondents stressed that they are not really interested in these organisations. 
Among other reasons given are that they find Turkish organisations either too 
political or too religious. 
It is also important to find out the reasons for being a member of these 
organisations. They can be seen in the following table. 
Table 8.21. The reasons for being a member of any Turkish Organisations 
Frequency Percent 
My parents wanted me to 6 3.0 
My friends belong 9 4.5 
I like being with Turkish people 11 5.5 
I can practice my Turkish 2 1.0 
They build up an awareness of being Turkish 7 3.5 
They provide new occasions to make friends 35 17.5 
They give a feeling that I really do something good 53 26.5 
Other 4 2.0 
Missing data 73 36.5 
Total 200 100.0 
As seen in the table, nearly half of the members of any organisation express the 
fact that membership of the organisation gives them a feeling that what they do is 
something good. Another important group are members of an organisation 
because they want to make friends, or they like to spend some time with other 
Turkish people, or their friends already belong to the organisation. Therefore, it can 
be said that some of the Turkish organisations are important for the respondents 
as they provide places for people to gather and meet other people. 
One of the respondents said, 
... The main reason for me to come to this place (Youth Centre) is that not only I can meet other friends here and have nice time 
with them but it is also something that I feel comfortable with. 
Here, we can read, discuss about issues with the friends, play 
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baglama (a Turkish musical instrument), and sing a song. Well, I 
love this place and being with my friends. (Resp. No. 12) 
Another respondent said, 
I am a member of the Turkish Society at the University. 
Basically, ... it gives me the opportunity to meet other Turkish 
people. It also gives me the feeling that I am doing something 
good. It is the Turkish Society that I can practice my Turkish and 
feel Turkish. (Resp. No. 8) 
We said that although the Cemevi has the religious character, some of the 
respondents do not go there for religious reasons. A respondent said, 
My main reason to be a member of this place is that I can meet 
other people here and can make new friends. This centre 
provides good opportunities to the people such as teaching 
playing the baglama (a Turkish musical instrument) and semah 
(Alevi religious dance), helping students with some of the 
courses for the school, meetings of youth group. One can have a 
good time with friends here because almost everything is 
provided by the centre from table tennis and snooker to a good 
library. (Resp. No. 1) 
As can be understood from the quotations, the Turkish organisations are seen as 
important places by the majority of the respondents as they provide opportunities 
to make and meet new friends and the feeling that they do something good. 
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Table 8.22. Helping each other inside the community 
Count Pct of res. Pct of Cases 
Finding a job 141 42.6 70.5 
Finding a place to live 88 26.6 44.0 
Financial help 48 14.5 24.0 
Other ways 1 .3 .5 They do not help each other 18 5.4 9.0 
I do not know 35 10.6 17.5 
Total 331 100.0 165.5 
(Multiple response) 
This table examines the observations of the respondents about solidarity inside the 
community. As seen, the great majority of the respondents agree that people in the 
community help each other in different ways, most importantly in finding a job. The 
Turkish community, with hundreds of shops, textile factories, kebab shops, 
restaurants etc. (504 of them are already registered by an Internet company at 
http: //www. turkishuk. com when I took the final figure on 4th of June 2000), is indeed 
capable of offering jobs to its members though this is in both parties' interest, as 
the employers tend to pay less and this is to some extent only possible with 
employing Turkish people. People in the community also get help when they need 
to find a place to live and financial support. Only a small proportion of the 
respondents stated that people in the community do not help each other at all. 
However, as will be discussed in this chapter, people tend to have close 
friendships in their sub ethnic groups. Therefore, although this table explained the 
available help inside the community, it is more likely that different groups provide 
help to the group members. 
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8.3.1. Friendships inside the Community 
According to Kucukcan (1999: 140), Turkish young people tend to make friends 
from Turkish people in the community. The majority of his respondents claimed 
that it is easier to make friends with Turkish people rather than English people. 
However, this account does not reveal the correct picture of what is actually going 
on in the Turkish community. As our research findings suggest, different sub-ethnic 
group members within the Turkish community actually find that it is easier to make 
friends from the same group while it is difficult to do the same with other groups. 
Table 8.23. Making friends from the groups (such as Alevi Turks, Alevi Kurds, 
Sunni Turks, Sunni Kurds) they belong to and from the other groups they do 
not belong to 
from the same group from the other groups 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
e easy 89 44.5 4 2.1 
Easy 106 53.0 45 24.1 
Difficult 5 2.5 115 61.5 
Nery Difficult 23 12.3 
[Total 200 100.0 187 100.0 
As can be seen from the table, almost all of the respondents think that it is either 
easy or very easy to make friends in the group they belong to. Since members of 
any of these groups share similar cultural characteristics, it is a strong possibility 
that these characteristics make the members of a group close to each other, in 
friendships being made in the same group rather than outside the group. As seen 
in the table the difference between making friends in their group and in another 
group is quite remarkable. The great majority of the respondents think that it is not 
easy to make friends from the other groups they do not belong to. This situation 
can be well seen with their answers to the question of who their first, second and 
third best friends are. This is examined in the following table. 
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Table 8.24. First, second and third best friends by ethnic identities 
First Friend Second Friend Third Friend 
Fr Pct Frq Pct Fr Pct 
Turk 9 4.5 16 8.1 31 15.7 
Kurd 22 11.0 14 7.1 20 10.1 
Sunni Turk 36 18.0 31 15.7 40 20.2 
levi Turk 53 26.5 50 25.3 47 23.7 
Sunni Kurd 10 5.0 21 10.6 7 3.5 
levi Kurd 37 18.5 40 20.2 24 12.1 
Turkish Cypriot 1 .5 3 1.5 British 25 12.5 13 6.6 19 9.6 
Other 7 3.5 10 5.1 10 5.1 
Total 200 100.0 198 100.0 198 100.0 
As seen in the table, the most important factors in declaring the best friend's 
identity are religious and linguistic differences. A great majority of the respondents, 
instead of generalizing the identities of their friends to the national level, did not 
see any problem in giving further details about their friends' cultural differences. 
The noticeable thing from the table is the high numbers of sub-ethnic group 
identities as first second and third best friends. The situation, however, changes 
slightly in the third best friend column where the number of those who give a 
national level identification (Turk) for their third best friend increases sharply from 
4.5 percent in the first column and 8.1 percent in the second to 15.7 percent in the 
final column. 
The description of the best friends according to their sub-ethnic groups can also be 
seen as a powerful sign for the use of these identities and the following three cross 
tabulations reveal strong evidence for this. 
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Table 8.25. Ethnic identities by first best friend 
First friend 
Turk Kurd Sunni 
Turk 
Alevi 
Turk 
Sunni 
Kurd 
Alevi 
Kurd 
Turkish 
Cypriot 
British Other Total 
Turkish Alevi 14 9 1 11 35 
Turkish Sunni 2 29 3 1 1 2 38 
Kurdish Alevi 2 12 4 14 32 
Kurdish Sunni 1 20 5 7 5 1 39 
British Alevi 5 1 2 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 1 3 2 6 
Only Alevi 2 9 2 3 16 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 2 1 6 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 3 4 1 1 4 13 
Other 3 1 4 
Total 9 22 36 53 10 37 1 25 7 200 
Table 8.26. Ethnic identities by second best friend 
Second friend 
Turk Kurd Sunni 
Turk 
Alevi 
Turk 
Sunni 
Kurd 
Alevi 
Kurd 
Turkish 
Cypriot 
British Other Total 
Turkish Alevi 5 1 13 4 8 1 2 34 
Turkish Sunni 7 24 3 1 1 1 1 38 
Kurdish Alevi 2 4 5 8 9 3 31 
Kurdish Sunni 4 2 18 14 1 39 
British Alevi 1 4 3 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 2 3 1 6 
Only Alevi 4 7 4 1 16 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 1 5 3 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 1 5 2 5 13 
Other 4 4 
Total 16 14 31 50 21 40 3 13 10 198 
203 
Table 8.27. Ethnic identities by third best friend 
Third friend 
Turk Kurd Sunni 
Turk 
Alevi 
Turk 
Sunni 
Kurd 
Alevi 
Kurd 
British Other Total 
Turkish Alevi 3 3 13 7 7 1 34 
Turkish Sunni 4 26 4 1 3 38 
Kurdish Alevi 1 4 1 10 2 10 3 31 
Kurdish Sunni 7 4 4 13 11 39 
British Alevi 1 4 3 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 2 1 2 1 6 
Only Alevi 1 5 4 3 3 16 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 2 3 1 1 2 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 2 7 1 1 2 13 
Other 4 4 
Total 31 20 40 47 7 24 19 10 198 
As can be seen from these three cross tabulations, each group tends to choose 
their first and second friends from the group they belong to. Here, a strong 
difference between Turkish Sunnis and Alevis, in general, can be observed. That is 
to say that Turkish Sunnis do not tend to make friends from either Kurdish Sunnis 
or Kurdish Alevis although they share the same religious sect with the former. This 
can be seen as a result of Kurdish question. Therefore, the sect connection 
between Turkish and Kurdish Sunnis seems to have minimum effect on the 
relationships of these two groups. 
However, Turkish Alevis do not seem to have any problem with making friends with 
Kurdish Alevis. This can be related to the Alevism. Since they share the same 
religious sect, they can use it as a connection between them. As Bruinessen (1996: 
10) puts it, most of the Kurdish Alevis define themselves as Alevi first and then as 
Kurds. 
In addition to this, although there is no strong evidence, some of the Kurdish Alevis 
especially parents of the respondents do not see themselves Kurdish. This can 
make some of the Turkish and Kurdish Alevis see themselves close to each other. 
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In order to find out the respondents' relationships with the groups (Alevi Turks, 
Alevi Kurds, Sunni Turks, and Sunni Kurds) they do not belong to, a question was 
also asked in the main survey. 
8.3.2. Relationships with the other Turkish/Kurdish groups inside the 
community 
Table 8.28. Relationships with other Turkish/Kurdish groups 
How is your relationships with members of other groups (Alevi 
Turks, Alevi Kurds, Sunni Turks, and Sunni Kurds 
Who They are 
different 
I do not like 
them 
No 
difference 
No Problem Total 
Turkish Alevi 7 12 5 11 35 
Turkish Sunni 14 15 9 38 
Kurdish Alevi 8 21 2 1 32 
Kurdish Sunni 19 15 5 39 
British Alevi 4 2 2 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd 1 5 6 
Only Alevi 6 3 2 11 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 3 5 1 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 4 7 1 1 13 
Other 4 4 
Total 66 70 41 18 195 
As can be seen from the table only a small proportion of the respondents think that 
there is no difference between these groups. 66 respondents out of 195 think that 
other groups are different. What is more significant is the fact that 70 out of 195 
expressed their feelings against other groups by saying that they do not like them. 
Therefore, it is not true to assume that everything is all right between these groups. 
This is actually the other way around and supported by the findings of the main 
survey. As can be seen in the table, the great majority of the four main groups 
(Turkish Alevis, Turkish Sunnis, Kurdish Alevis, and Kurdish Sunnis) either see the 
other groups differently or do not like them. However, as explained before, the 
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situation is different between Turkish and Kurdish Alevis and between Kurdish 
Alevis and Sunnis. 
One of the respondents said 
... Well, in a way you come to feel uncomfortable with the 
members of other groups as it is not easy to talk about cultural 
differences because of the fact that they may feel insulted. I do 
have some Sunni friends for example and when we are together 
we do not talk about Alevilik-Sunnilik (Alevism and Sunnizm). 
Instead we talk about general things like football matches, our 
teams' performance, etc. (Resp. No. 2) 
Table 8.29. In your opinion, is there any conflict between Alevi, Sunni, Turk 
and Kurd groups? 
Frequency Percent 
es 126 63.0 
Not at all 5 2.5 
I do not know 69 34.5 
, Total 200 100.0 
The majority of the respondents agree that there are some problems between 
these groups. As we have seen in their answers on the relationships of the 
respondents with the other groups, this result should not be seen as a surprising 
one. Let us have a look at the problems between these groups. 
Table 8.30. Problems between groups 
Frequency Percent 
he members of these groups do not like each other 63 48.8 
There is no communication between these groups 17 13.2 
If a group's members go somewhere, others do not go to that 7 5.4 
They always struggle 4 3.1 
They have negative propaganda against each other 32 24.8 
Other 2 1.6 
I do not know 4 3.1 
Total 129 100.0 
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As expected, nearly half of the answers show that the members of these groups do 
not like each other. The second highest proportion of them thinks that groups have 
negative propaganda against each other. It is also important to note that as a result 
of the first two reasons it is highly possible to say that there is no communication 
between these groups and they do not go to places which are used by the other 
groups. 
One of the Alevi respondents said, 
A Sunni girl went to my other close Sunni friend and told them 
"she is not proper Muslim you should not hang around with her". 
... (One of) My Sunni friends, she went off and said, "why don't 
you shut your mouth. She is my friend and she helps me". And 
she came and gave me a cuddle and said, " ... I don't care about 
your religion. I care about your personality. (Resp. No-3) 
As seen from the quotation, members of different sub-ethnic groups can still be 
judged according to their cultural differences. 
In a way, it can be thought that living in a different country can make people closer 
to each other. However, the following table does not support this idea at all. 
Table 8.31. In your opinion, does living in a foreign country make Turkish 
people closer to each other even though they are members 
Frequency Percent 
es 49 24.6 
No 106 53.3 
I do not know 44 22.1 
, Total 199 100.0 
As seen from the table, the majority of them think that living in a foreign country 
does not make Turkish people closer to each other even though they belong to 
different sub-ethnic groups. 
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One of the respondents said, 
No, it has nothing to do with living in a different country. If the 
number of Turkish people was less than a few thousand in 
London, I would agree with this but the number is quite high and 
all the different groups have the ability of constructing their way 
of lives depending on their cultural differences. Besides, 
migration to another country does not affect cultural differences. 
People carry on their cultural differences. So, I don't suppose 
one changes his/her relationship with the other groups. I mean 
the relationships between these groups are almost similar to the 
relationships in Turkey. In my opinion problems exist here as 
they exist in Turkey. (Resp. No. 1) 
Table 8.32. For shopping, where do you usually go? 
Frequency Percent 
to the nearest shop or supermarket 109 54.5 
to big stores (Tesco, Sainsbury, etc. ) 67 33.5 
to a Turkish shop 9 4.5 
to a shop owned by an Alevi Turk 2 1.0 
to a shop owned by an Alevi Kurd 5 2.5 
to a shop owned by a Sunni Turk 7 3.5 
Other 1 .5 [Total 200 100.0 
Erbas (1996) found that there is a sort of organised attitude in the Turkish 
community in London. That is to say that people go to Turkish shops and cafes if 
they are owned or run by people from their own culture i. e. from the same village, 
etc. This could be true for the older generation. However, as the findings show, it 
cannot be generalised to Turkish young people in London. It is interesting to note 
that despite all the supporting evidence, Turkish young people mainly do not have 
any discrimination against shops even if their owners are members of a different 
sub-ethnic group. As can be seen from the table, a great majority of the 
respondents go to the nearest shops, supermarkets, or big stores (Tesco, 
Sainsbury, etc. ). However, since majority of the respondents live in three main 
boroughs it is likely that most of the nearest shops or supermarkets are run by 
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Turkish or Turkish-Kurdish shopkeepers. A similar question was also asked to find 
out if there was any preference for the cafes by the respondents. The results were 
quite similar to the findings in this table -a great majority of the respondents who 
go to cafes quite often do not choose any specific cafe depending on the owner's 
cultural aspects. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the family structure of Turkish people living in London 
and the relationships of Turkish young people inside the family and the community. 
As our findings suggest, the common family structure of Turkish youth in London is 
the 'nuclear' type. Although available statistical information on the Turkish family 
structure in Turkey shows that there exists 'extended family' structure in Turkey, 
our findings did not reveal any sign of extended Turkish families in London. As 
noted earlier, this is a common outcome of the problems of migration. In other 
words, it is worth saying that although the family in the country of origin may well 
be an extended one. However, when it comes to migrating to a different country, 
migration of whole family may become very difficult because of the laws of the 
receiving country, or the unwillingness of older members of the family to leave 
Turkey. 
As seen in this chapter, the findings confirm that there are differences between 
male and female respondents in commenting on the understanding of their 
parents. As tables 8.8 and 8.9 revealed, male respondents are more likely to think 
that they are well understood by their fathers. This is a result of the control applied 
to female members. As noted earlier, male dominance is still a main characteristic 
of the Turkish family. 
A significant relationship was also found between Alevis and Sunnis regarding the 
decisions related to the respondents. As seen in table 8.13, while the great majority 
of Alevis think that they are to some extent free to make their own decisions, the 
number of Sunnis who think the same is noticeably less. Therefore, it can be said 
that Alevi families do not pressure their children as much as Sunni families do. 
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Another interesting finding was thoughts about marriage. Although the respondents 
think that their parents would like them to marry someone from the same culture 
(Table 8.15), when they are asked to comment on it, the important answer was 
"falling in love with someone is enough to marry". 
The relationships of Turkish young people in the community in London also show 
important characteristics. One of the main aims of this research was to find out if 
there were any tendencies among Turkish young people to choose their friends 
from their sub-ethnic groups. The findings confirm that there is such tendency 
among them (see tables 8.22,8.24,8.25,8.26,8.27). 
The findings also indicate that Turkish Alevis tend to make friends with Turkish and 
Kurdish Alevis while Turkish Sunnis to a greater extent choose their friends from 
the same group. The question as to why they do not construct the sect bridge for 
relationships with Sunni Kurds can only be explained in terms of the Kurdish 
question in Turkey. Turkish Alevis, however, do not seem to have any problem in 
making friends with Kurdish Alevis and the main reason for this, as noted earlier, is 
that many Kurdish Alevis tend to define themselves as Alevi first and as Kurd later. 
As noted earlier, many scholars studying Turkish people tend to use a single 
Turk/Islam identity. However the findings in this chapter have actually shown the 
opposite. It is obvious from our findings that, Turkish young people do use their 
sub-ethnic group identities to make friends and the sub-ethnic group identities do 
affect their relationships with each other. 
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Chapter 9: 
Relationships with British Society and with other ethnic minorities 
Introduction 
Living in a different country brings the issue of interacting with the host society. 
To a large extent, people from a different country have to interact with the host 
society in order to survive and to get the best possible help in that host society. 
This interaction is not always unproblematic. In fact, for various reasons, hatred 
against the host society and ethnic minority groups can develop and affect the 
relationships of each side with each other. These kinds of problems have long 
been observed in different countries which have large foreign populations. 
However, the intensity of the problem varies depending on the level of the 
reception of the multicultural issues. In other words, if the main population of the 
country is not willing to accept the multicultural solutions then the problem 
between the host society and ethnic minority groups is likely to be intensified. 
This chapter aims to examine if there is a tendency among the Turkish young 
people in London towards integration into British society. In order to have a 
better understanding of this, three main issues will be discussed in this chapter: 
relationships with the host society and with other ethnic minority groups and 
tendencies towards integration. 
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9.1. Relationships with the host society 
Britain is a multicultural country as a result of migration from its former colonies, 
and there are a number of ethnic communities living in the country. When we 
look at the relationships between the ethnic communities and British society, it 
can be said that the situation has always been problematic. Racial issues have 
long been the major point for the relationships between the host society and 
ethnic minorities. The problem is mostly associated with the colour differences. 
In this context, black is used to describe ethnic minorities from the ex-colonies, 
Africans, Pakistanis, Indians etc. Beginning with the high level of migrations 
from ex colonies as a result of labour shortage, bad relationships have always 
been a focal point. As Skellington et al. (1992: 60) puts it, racial violence and 
harassment in Britain can be traced back to 1919 when a series of attacks on 
black people in the docks took place. Despite the fact that the Race Relations 
Act was passed in 1965 in order to prevent discrimination on grounds of colour, 
race, or ethnic or national origin in certain places of public resort, (Daniel, 1968: 
11), the remnants of racial discrimination, even institutional racism, can still be 
observed today in the UK. 
Turkish people's appearance in high numbers in the UK started in the1970s in 
the form of immigrant workers, as a result of a bilateral agreement (Abadan- 
Unat, 1976) between two countries. The migration from Turkey to the UK 
continued after the cancellation of the agreement in different ways such as 
illegal immigration and refugee flows although the latter has a strong connection 
with the former. Following the military coup in 1980 the flow of refuges 
increased and with the emergence of low level warfare in the Southeast region 
between Kurdish guerrillas and Turkish State, it continued to the present time. 
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Today there are an estimated 70.000 Turkish people living in London. With 
hundreds of Turkish shops, textile factories, banks, different organisations, a 
radio channel, and newspapers, it can be said that the Turkish community is 
one of the well-organised communities in London, affecting the relationships of 
the community members with the host society and other ethnic minorities. 
It is important to note that with the relationships with the host society, we mean 
that the subject has two important sides. On the one side, it is important to have 
good relations with the members of the host society but more important is the 
good perception of these relations by the host society. Therefore, in order to talk 
about whether Turkish young people in London have good relationship and 
feelings toward the host society, their feelings against the host society and their 
observations of the treatments of the host society should be taken into account. 
In order to interact with the host society, immigrants have to have the ability to 
speak the language of the host country. Therefore, it is very important to know 
about Turkish youths' ability of the use of the English language. 
Table 9.1. Language used with the questionnaires 
Language Frequency Percent 
English 145 72.5 
Turkish 55 27.5 
Total 200 100.0 
In the main survey, the respondents were given bilingually written 
questionnaires in Turkish and English and asked to respond in whichever 
language they felt most comfortable with. 
As can be seen in the table, the overwhelming majority of the respondents 
answered the questions by using the English language. It should be highlighted 
that some of the respondents preferred using the Turkish language although 
they believe that their English is either very good or good. With the face to face 
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interviews, only one interview out of twenty was carried out completely in 
Turkish. However, as a result of being bilingual some of the respondents 
switched between the two languages whenever they felt it more convenient to 
explain their ideas and feelings. 
In the main survey, respondents were asked to scale their ability of using the 
English language (Speaking, reading and writing). 
Table 9.2. Rating knowledge of the English Language 
Speaking Reading Writin 
Fre Prc Fre Prc Fre Prc 
e good 101 50.5 67 33.5 65 32.5 
Good 89 44.5 96 48.0 96 48.0 
vera e 10 5.0 37 18.5 39 19.5 
ota I 200 100.0 200 100.0 200 100.0 
As can be seen from the table, none of the respondents believe that they have 
below average ability to use the English language. The major factor here is the 
fact that a minimum five year residence in England was asked. When we 
compare the period of their residency in England with the level of their English 
they think, it can be said that the longer their residency is in England the better 
they have the knowledge of the English language. This can be seen from the 
following table. 
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Table 9.3. Period of stay in England by rating knowledge of English 
speaking 
Rating knowledge of English s eakin 
Period of stay in England Very good Good Average Total 
5-7 years 12 75 10 97 
-11 years 34 12 46 
12-16 years 24 2 26 
17-21 years 30 30 
2+ 1 
- 
1 
- Total 101 89 10 
ý 
200 
As the table reveals, some respondents think that they have only average ability 
of speaking the English language among those who have been living in England 
for 5 to 7 years. As the period of residence increases, their rating of speaking 
English also increases. This table shows that, after twelve years of residency in 
England, the rate of the ability of speaking English is very good among the 
respondents. Necefs study (1996: 226) in Denmark shows similar 
characteristics with the findings of this research that the knowledge of the host 
society's language increases as the period of residency in that country 
increases. 
Kucukcan (1999: 13) encounters a difference between Turkish young people 
living in London and Berlin. During his fieldwork, he spoke only Turkish in Berlin 
and Turkish and English in London. He reports that the young generation Turks 
use English overwhelmingly in their social interaction, and simultaneously 
switch to Turkish or English whenever they feel more comfortable with one of 
the two languages. My observations during the fieldwork also confirmed 
Kucukcan's experience. It was interesting to note that many of the Turkish 
young people I met had an intention to speak English with their friends. On 
many occasions I observed that they used mainly English when they meet their 
friends. As their parents have only little understanding of English, they speak 
Turkish with them and with other members of the older generation. Although 
Kucukcan reckons that the use of English is a result of feeling comfortable with 
the language to explain their ideas and feelings (1999: 13), 1 sensed that 
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Turkish young people had a different aim in speaking English with their friends. 
The main idea to make me sense this aim to draw a border between parental 
control and their freedom from this control. Because their parents and others 
from the older generation do not understand English well. Therefore, I think, 
with the assistance of the English language they easily create means of escape 
pods. 
Although the ability to use the host society's language has a positive 
relationship with the length of stay in that country, this is not to assume that 
parents of the respondents can also gain the same level of ability to speak the 
English language with the same length of stay in England. This can be seen 
from the following table. 
Table 9.4. Comparison of English with their parents 
Frequency Valid Percent 
My English is better than theirs 132 89.8 
Their English is better than mine 3 2.0 
No difference 12 8.2 
Total 147 100.0 
As seen in the table, a great majority of the respondents think that their English 
is better than their parents. During the course of face to face interviews, all the 
respondents have also pointed out that their parents do not have a sufficient 
level of English. There are some basic reasons for this. Firstly, unlike the 
respondents, the parents do not have the opportunity to gain the English 
language through education. Most of them have to support their families by 
working long hours and therefore do not find enough time to improve their 
English. Their working places are mainly either textile factories or restaurants 
where owners and workers are mainly Turkish, providing no necessity to speak 
English. Since banking, shopping and working are provided by the Turkish 
community in London, most of the parents might even not need to deal with 
learning the English language. Whereas, Turkish young people have to learn 
English as they are required to have at least a secondary school education. If 
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they were born in England or grew up here, then they have no difficulty in 
learning both languages as their mother tongue. However, if they came to 
England during their secondary school education, problems with the English 
language are likely to emerge. Although they are allowed to take a preparation 
course before they continue their secondary school education here, some of the 
interviewees stressed that they witnessed some of the late comer Turkish 
students' inability to follow the classes as they have only little knowledge of the 
English language. 
In order to understand the respondents' relationships with the host society, one 
of the important things is their membership and participation of British 
organisations such as student societies, cultural organisations, support groups, 
etc. The following table examines this. 
Table 9.5. Membership of British organisations 
Frequency Percentage 
Student clubs and societies 67 42.7 
Social & cultural societies 1 0.60 
Organisations based on occupation -- -- 
Support group 10 6.40 
Not member of any organisation 81 51.60 
Total 157 100 
(Multiple response) 
The majority of the respondents are not members of any English organisations. 
A great majority of the memberships are seen with the student clubs and 
societies. This should be seen normal because more than half of the 
respondents are actually students. The type of student clubs revealed in the 
face to face interviews is mainly schools' sports team such as football, 
basketball and volleyball. 
It is also interesting to note that although a number of the respondents are 
actually employed, none of the respondents is a member of the occupational 
organisations. The number of the members of other English organisations is 
also very low. 
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Table 9.6. The reasons for memberships of English organizations 
Frequency Percent 
My friends belong to 24 34.3 
I like being with British people 28 40.0 
They provide new occasions to make friends with British 
people 
16 22.9 
They give a feeling that I really do something good 2 2. 
Total 70 100.0 
As seen in the table, the majority of the members of an English organisation 
enjoy being with British people and this is the main reason for their 
membership. Another important reason is the fact that their friends belong to an 
English organisation. Here the effect of friends who are members of an English 
organisation is quite obvious. In other words, introduction by a friend plays a 
crucial role in becoming a member of any organisation. The last important 
reason is their aim to make friends with British people. 
An important factor with the membership of an English organisation appears to 
be sex difference among the respondents. 
Table 9.7. Membership of English organisations by sex 
Membership of En lish organisations 
Student clubs 
and societies 
Social & cultural 
societies 
Organisations 
based on 
occupation 
Support 
group 
Not member 
of any 
or anisation 
ale 40 5 40 84 
Female 27 1 5 41 73 
[Total 67 1 10 81 157 
As can be seen from the table, the proportion of female members of English 
organisations is considerably lower than males and this is probably because of 
family or religious pressures on female children. However, there seems to be no 
significant difference between different sub-ethnic groups in the Turkish 
community as the majority of the members of an English organisation are only 
members of student club and societies. 
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Table 9.8. Student clubs and societies by who are they and sex 
Student clubs and societies 
W ho are they? 
Turkish 
Alevi 
Turkish 
Sunni 
Kurdish 
Alevi 
Kurdish 
Sunni 
British 
Alevi 
H. Turk / 
H. Kurd 
Alevi 
Only 
Alevi 
H. Turk / H. 
British Alevi 
H. Turk / H. 
British Sunni 
Other Total 
Male 7 8 5 8 1 4 1 5 1 40 
Female 4 5 4 3 3 1 4 3 27 
Total 11 13 9 11 4 5 5 8 1 67 
Although it is important to examine the membership of British organisations, it is 
also important to find out why the Turkish young people are not members of 
them. This is examined by the following table. 
Table 9.9. The reasons why they are not members of British organizations 
Frequency Valid Percent 
My parents did not want me to 2 2.7 
I see them far from mculture 16 21.9 
I am not really interested 55 75.3 
Total 73 100.0 
As this table shows, the main reason given by the great majority for not being a 
member of an English organisation is the lack of interest. This is followed by an 
important proportion that think English organisations are far from their culture. In 
order to find out which sub ethnic groups mainly focus on this option the 
following cross-tabulation is needed. 
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Table 9.10. The reasons for not being members of an English organisation 
by sub-ethnic identities 
If you have never belonged to a British organization, why not? 
My parents 
did not want 
me to 
I see them far 
from my culture 
I am not really 
interested 
Total 
Turkish Alevi 15 15 
urkish Sunni 1 6 8 15 
Kurdish Alevi 13 13 
Kurdish Sunni 9 4 13 
British Alevi 3 3 
H. Turk / H. Kurd 
levi 
4 4 
Only Alevi 4 4 
H. Turk / H. British 
levi 
1 3 4 
H. Turk / H. British 
, Sunni 
1 1 2 
Total 2 16 55 73 
As the table reveals, those who gave the cultural differences as the main 
reason not to be members of any English organisation are mainly members of 
the Turkish-Kurdish Sunni sect of Islam. Due to the secular characteristics of 
the Alevi sect, it can be thought that they do not mind the cultural differences as 
much as their Sunni fellowmen do. 
9.1.1. Friendships with English people 
So far, we have tried to examine Turkish young people's membership of any 
British organization. Our findings in this frame have not yielded a sufficient 
organizational level interaction between Turkish young people and British 
organizations. In fact, many of them are not interested in being a member of 
any British organization. Although membership of these organizations is 
important, providing occasions to make friends with English people, 
organizations are not always the only place to get to know people. On a larger 
scale, friendships can still be established in the neighbourhoods, schools and 
via other friends. 
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Let us first have a look at what Turkish young people think about how easy it is 
to make friends with British people. 
Table 9.11. The easiness of making friends with British people? 
Fre uenc Valid Percent 
e easy 58 31. 
Easy 8 47.1 
Difficult 4 21. 
Very difficult 1 
Total 18 100. 
Missing 1 
Total 20 
As seen in the table, for the great majority of the respondents, making friends 
with British people is easy. However, there is an important proportion of 
respondents who think that making friends with British people is difficult. Only 
one respondent thinks that friendship is very difficult with British people. These 
results should be seen as a positive sign for the future relationships with the 
host society because the more friendships they have with British people, the 
more easily they will be integrated into British society. 
Table 9.12. The easiness of making friends with British people? By ethnic 
identities 
How easy is it for you to make new friends with British 
people? 
Very easy Easy Difficult Very difficult Total 
Turkish Alevi 12 16 5 33 
Turkish Sunni 9 10 15 1 35 
Kurdish Alevi 7 22 3 32 
Kurdish Sunni 5 14 12 31 
British Alevi 5 3 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 2 4 6 
Only Alevi 7 8 1 16 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 6 3 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 5 8 13 
Other 4 4 
[Total 58 88 40 1 187 
222 
When we look at the table, the difference between the groups can easily be 
noticed. The majority of those who think that friendship with British people is 
difficult are members of the Turkish-Kurdish Sunni sect. The proportion of 
Turkish-Kurdish Alevis who gave the same answer is considerably lower. 
It is interesting to note that there is a parallel link between thinking that making 
friends with English people is easy and having British friends among the 
respondents' first, second, and third best friends. When we look at the 
differences on having British friends between sub ethnic identities, it can be said 
that Turkish and Kurdish Alevis tend to have more British friends among their 
first, second and third best friends than their Sunni countrymen. This can be 
seen from the following table. 
Table 9.13. British friends among first, second, and third best friends of 
the respondents by sub ethnic identities 
British friends ng their best friends 
Frequency Percentage 
Turkish Alevi 20 35.09 
Turkish Sunni 2 3.51 
Kurdish Alevi 6 10.52 
Kurdish Sunni 2 3.51 
British Alevi 5 8.77 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 1 1.75 
Only Alevi 7 12.28 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 11 19.29 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 3 5.26 
Total 57 99.98 
In the previous chapter, it was found that the respondents mainly tend to 
choose their friends from their sub ethnic groups (see table 8.24,8.25, and 
8.26). Kucukcan's study (1999: 140) gives a similar picture. His findings also 
suggest that Turkish young people mostly tend to choose their friends from 
Turks despite the fact that they mostly do not find it difficult to make friends with 
non-Turks. 
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However, as our findings suggest, it is also important to note that a 
considerable number of Turkish young people have British people as their best 
friends. 
As can be seen from the table, 57 respondents out of 200 have British friends 
as their first, second or third best friends. This actually shows that Turkish 
young people at a remarkable proportion interact with the host society. 
However, when we look closer at the sub ethnic groups the difference between 
the Alevi and Sunni sects appears to be quite noticeable. If we count the 
percentages of the Alevis from all groups, it can be seen that they comprise 
88.40 per cent of the total 57 respondents who have British friends among their 
best friends. 
When we look at the overall situation, however, for nearly a quarter of the 
respondents, friendship with British people is difficult. The main reasons for this 
are simply religious and cultural differences and the fact that the Turkish 
community in London provides a number of opportunities for Turkish people to 
make friends inside the community. Because of the wide range of opportunities 
provided by the Turkish community, some Turkish youths stressed that there is 
no reason to make friends with British people. 
As one of them puts it, 
... making friendship with British people? I don't think that is what I 
need. All my friends are Turkish. My friends at school are also 
Turkish. We have a lot of Turkish places to go and meet friends. I 
think I could not get the same feeling if I hang around with British 
friends (Respondent 5). 
During the course of the face-to-face interviews, another interesting thing was 
also revealed. A number of the respondents stressed that their British 
classmates make fun of their home country. As one of the respondents puts it, 
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There is also another thing. We do get discuss about our country too 
because it's like Turkey and turkey. There is one turkey, which is the 
one thing that they eat, and Turkey the country we are in. They call 
us like Turkish delight and all these funs about our country too 
(Respondent 3). 
The interviewees were also asked to describe their friendship with British 
people, from visiting each other's home to going together to pubs, cinemas, 
discos etc. The following table gives the details of friendship. 
Table 9.14. Details of friendships with British people 
No friends Home visits Going out together to pub, disco, 
and cinemas 
Turkish Alevis - 3 4 
Turkish Sunnis 3 1 2 
Kurdish Alevis 3 2 2 
Kurdish Sunnis 2 2 3 
Only Alevi 1 1 
Total 8 9 12 
As can be seen from the table, 12 out of 20 respondents have British friends 
with whom they go to the pub, disco, and cinema. And nearly half of them visit 
each other's home which actually shows us how close they are. Turkish Alevis, 
as seen in the table, are again more likely to spend more time with their British 
friends than their Sunni fellowmen. 
In conclusion, it can be said that when it comes to making friends with British 
people, depending on two specific reasons - cultural differences and religious 
concerns-, Sunnis are less likely to make friends. However, Alevis, with their 
secularist characteristics appear to be very different as they make more friends 
with British people. 
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During the course of face to face interviews, the interviewees were also asked if 
they had a British boy or girl friend. Only one female and one male interviewee 
said that they had a relationship with a British boy/girlfriend. 
One of them said, 
Well, I went out with an English boyfriend. ... we did have little 
problems due to the fact that we are from different countries and 
cultures but these were not big problems for us. We tried to 
understand each other's differences and achieved to overcome 
these little problems during our relationship (Resp 13). 
The other one said, 
I have lived with a British girlfriend for nearly three years. Everything 
was just fine. We even came to a stage of discussing marriage. In 
the last six months, however, things started to change. I am not 
saying she was the reason for splitting up but we both understood 
that we could not go on. When I think about this relationship, I think 
it was also my fault that my behaviour to her changed dramatically 
after we started to make plans for marriage. In the beginning of the 
relationship we both were free individuals. Then, ... it must have been a typical characteristic of a Turkish person, I started to try to 
control her. It was also a bit of jealousy making me behave in that 
way. ... If I hadn't tried to control her, I believe, we would not have had any problem (Resp 2). 
9.1.2. Relationships in the neighbourhood 
As we have seen in chapter six, Turkish people mainly gathered in three main 
boroughs; Hackney, Haringey and Islington and the main reasons for this can 
be seen in the following table. 
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Table 9.15. Reasons for choosing the borough 
Reasons Frequency Valid Percent 
We were shown this place by British officials 28 15.0 
We knew other Turkish people live here 73 39.0 
Our relatives live here 80 42.8 
Other 6 3.2 
Total 187 100.0 
Missing data 13 
Total 200 
The table shows that the overwhelming majority of the respondents or their 
parents chose the boroughs in order to be close to their relatives or other 
Turkish people. A small proportion of the respondents or their families was 
shown their accommodation by British officials. These people can be either 
refugees or simply those who have council accommodation. With the option 
"other", there are two types of answers. Choosing the borough as a result of 
chance, or the place they live is close to where they work. 
It can be said that, in a foreign country for various reasons such as chain 
migration, or the need to find other people from the home country, newcomers 
try to find accommodations close to people who share similar characteristics. 
The sign of chain migration is also very remarkable in the Turkish community. 
This can be seen from the following table. 
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Table 9.16. Encouraging friends or relatives to migrate to England by Sub 
ethnic identities 
Encourage for immigration 
Yes: England 
provides 
more 
opportunities 
Yes: Human 
rights are 
very 
important 
here 
Yes: 
British 
people are 
very polite 
Yes: 
Violence 
is very 
rare here 
No: British 
people 
have 
prejudice 
against us 
No: 
Surviving 
here is 
very 
difficult 
No: Turkey 
is better 
than here Total 
Turkish Alevi 12 8 1 2 10 32 
Turkish Sunni 23 1 5 2 4 35 
Kurdish Alevi 10 14 1 2 9 1 31 
Kurdish Sunni 2 19 1 9 30 
British Alevi 5 4 1 1 8 
H. Turk / H. 
Kurd 
4 1 6 
Only Alevi 2 1 6 4 2 16 
H. Turk / H. 
British Alevi 
4 1 2 9 
H. Turk / H. 
British Sunni 
4 1 3 1 1 13 
ther 3 3 4 
[Total 69 52 3 18 30 18 184 
Columns are multiple response. Total yes=124, Total no=60 
As seen from the table, a great majority of the respondents said that either they 
or their parents have encouraged friends or relatives in Turkey to migrate to 
England. This shows us a strong link for chain migration. When we look at the 
table, the main reasons for encouraging friends and relatives to migrate are 
mainly more opportunities in England and the importance of human rights in 
England. There seems to be a difference between Kurds and Turks here. The 
major reason for Kurdish people is the importance of human rights, whereas 
Turkish respondent are mainly focused on the opportunities provided by 
England. 
It is very interesting to note that, although the majority thinks that British people 
are prejudiced against Turkish people (Table 9.20), it appears that this is not 
seen by the respondents to discourage their friends or relatives in Turkey to 
migrate to England. It can be said that, although they experience prejudice in 
the host society, the level of the prejudice is not serious when it is compared 
with prejudice towards other ethnic minorities in Britain. Therefore, it could be 
the case that they actually ignore all kind of prejudice. 
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Although Turkish people live mainly in the three boroughs of London, when it 
comes to their neighbourhood, it cannot be said that they are completely 
isolated from British people. In other words, they mainly live in a mixed or British 
dominated neighbourhood. This can be seen from the following table. 
Table 9.17. Definition of neighborhood 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Isolated place, mostly Turks live in 39 20.0 
Mixed 110 56.4 
Mainly British people 46 23.6 
Total 195 100.0 
As can be seen from the table, only 20 per cent of the respondents say that 
they live in an isolated neighbourhood. The majority live in a mixed 
neighbourhood, with neighbours from different ethnic minorities or with British 
people. Only 23.6 per cent of the respondents define their neighbourhoods as 
British dominated places. Therefore, it can be concluded that the gathering of 
Turkish people in three main boroughs does not mean that they are completely 
isolated from the host society. Since the majority define their neighbourhood as 
not isolated, then the question of relationships between Turkish people and 
others and the type of relationships become very important. This issue was also 
raised during the course of face to face interviews. The main answer that the 
interviewees gave in the beginning was that they have no problems with their 
neighbours. However, when they were asked to describe what kind of 
relationships they experience with the neighbours, it was understood that the 
relationship between their parents and the neighbours differs from the 
relationships which the children have with the neighbours. For example, while 
the respondents can visit each other's home, parents normally are not involved 
in this kind of experience. They usually say hello to each other when they meet 
and ask how they are. Apart from this none of the interviewees told of any 
further relationships. One of the respondents said that the good attitude of her 
mother created a very good atmosphere so that all the neighbours started to 
like her family. 
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She said, 
My mom, ... she is really sweet woman. She is really kind to her 
neighbours. All the places we have lived, all the neighbours loved us 
so much. They did not wanna leave us because of my mom's 
sweetness... she doesn't know much English but every morning she 
sees them she says, "good morning, how are you? " and all that 
(Resp 3). 
Minimal relationships of parents with British neighbours, in a way, should be 
seen as normal because they live in the capital city and people, for various 
reasons, may not spare time for further relationships with the neighbours even if 
the neighbours are their own nationals. 
As mentioned above, however, the interviewees have friendships with their 
neighbours' children and they sometimes visit each other's home or go out 
together to cafes or cinemas. One of them said, 
Yeah, I have quite a few English and other friends in the 
neighbourhood. I sometimes go out with them to play football. Many 
times I invited them for a lunch or dinner in my home and they also 
call me for the same reason. My parents do not mind my friends ... in a way they actually like seeing me mixing with them. But to tell 
you the truth I spend most of my time with my Turkish friends. I 
guess the main reason is ... I feel the same with them (Resp 2). 
Table 9.18. Police's attitude in the neighbourhood 
Police's attitude in the neighbourhood Frequency Percentage 
No problem with police 135 75 
If a crime occurs they are firstly suspicious about us 19 10.56 
They stop/search us too often 15 8.33 
They ignore crime committed against us 27 15 
otal 180 108.89 
is table is a multiple response one 
As can be seen from the table, the great majority does not have a problem with 
police in their neighbourhoods. However, nearly 19 per cent of the respondents 
stressed the treatment by the police is not good. A number of them think that 
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police firstly get suspicious with them when a crime occurs and a small 
proportion of them actually face being stopped or searched by the police quite 
often. A number of them also think that when a crime committed against them, 
police simply ignore it instead of doing whatever is required to stop the crime. 
Table 9.19. British people's treatment 
British people's treatment Frequency Percentage 
Normal 166 87.83 
They see us as inferior 9 4.76 
They don't like us 11 5.82 
We face verbal abuse 6 3.17 
[Total 189 101.58 
(*) This table is a multiple response one 
It should be said that great majority of the respondents see British people's 
treatment in the neighbourhood as normal. Only a small proportion of the 
respondents stressed that there are some problems with British people's 
treatment such as being seen as inferior, facing verbal abuse or not being liked 
by them. 
9.1.3. Problems with the host society 
As mentioned before, living in a different country actually brings a number of 
problems. The most important one is, no doubt, prejudices and discrimination 
by the host society. 
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Table 9.20. In your experience, do British people have prejudices against 
Turkish people? 
In your experience, do British people have prejudices 
against Turkish people? 
who are they? Yes No Total 
Turkish Alevi 10 25 35 
Turkish Sunni 25 7 32 
Kurdish Alevi 18 14 32 
Kurdish Sunni 23 14 37 
British Alevi 6 2 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 5 1 6 
Only Alevi 6 10 16 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 9 9 
H. Turk/ H. British Sunni 10 3 13 
Other 3 1 4 
[Total 106 86 192 
As seen in the table, the majority of the respondents think that British people 
are prejudiced against Turkish people while 44.8 per cent think the opposite. A 
remarkable difference between Alevis and Sunnis can also be seen in the table, 
a smaller number of Alevis think that British people are prejudiced against 
Turkish people. The main reasons for the prejudices are explained in the 
following table. 
Table 9.21. The main reasons for the prejudices 
reasons for prejudice Frequency Percentage 
They don't like Turks in the UK 72 70.59 
They don't like Islam and therefore us 35 34.3 
They don't want us to get jobs 23 22.54 
They don't know more about us 44 43.13 
They think we don't want to learn English 11 10.78 
They think we break the English rules 48 47.06 
Total 233 228.4 
Multiple response 
As can be seen from the table, the main reasons appear to vary. Five important 
reasons for prejudices against Turkish people can be derived from the table. 
The most important reason the respondents think is that British people do not 
like Turks in the UK. The second one is that British people think that Turks are 
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breaking the English rules. The third reason is that British people do not know 
more about Turkish people. The fourth one is that British people do not like 
Islam and since almost all the Turks are Muslims, they do not like Turkish 
people. The last important reason is that British people do not want Turks 
getting jobs here. In order to see if there is any difference between sub ethnic 
identities, the following table is needed. 
Table 9.22. Reasons of prejudices by who are they? 
Reasons for prejudice 
They 
don't like 
Turks in 
the UK 
They don't 
like Islam 
and 
therefore u 
They don't 
want us to 
get jobs 
They don't 
know more 
about us 
They think 
we don't 
ant to learn 
English 
They think 
we break 
the English 
rules 
Total 
Turkish Alevi 7 1 3 2 4 4 10 
Turkish Sunni 19 22 4 1 1 25 
Kurdish Alevi 10 10 6 3 12 17 
Kurdish Sunni 18 6 24 24 24 
British Alevi 5 5 1 3 6 
H. Turk / H. Kurd 
levi 
4 1 1 2 5 
Only Alevi 6 4 1 2 1 6 
H. Turk/ H. British 
Sunni 
3 6 2 1 1 6 
they 3 3 
Total 72 35 23 44 11 48 102 
As can be seen from the table, the difference between Alevis and Sunnis comes 
to the surface when the religious issue is concerned. In other words, the 
majority of the Sunnis give their religious difference from the British society as 
the main reason for the prejudice. Apart from this, majority of the respondents 
who answered the question agree that the most important reason is the fact that 
British people do not like Turkish people. 
Table 9.23. Have you ever faced a verbal/physical racist attack? 
Frequency Percent 
es 74 37.0 
No 126 63.0 
Total 200 100.0 
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As seen from the table, although the great majority has not faced any racial 
abuse, the proportion of those who have faced verbal/physical racist attack is 
significant. 
About coming across racial abuse, one of the respondents said 
I haven't. Not for myself but I have seen other people saying 
"refugees get out".... 
I had one for myself too. It was in the classroom. We were sitting 
somewhere and the teacher said ... "you refugees you made this 
country Turkey"(Resp 3). 
Another respondent said, 
British classmates and teachers knew we were refugees. ... They 
never got on well with us. They don't tell you off because of you're a 
refugee but the way they look at you, you can feel what they actually 
mean.... Because of the unkind things I saw with the ... British 
classmates and teachers in the past, I always feel uneasy about 
friendships with them (Resp 12). 
It is interesting to note that Turkish young people also come across bad 
treatment by the other ethnic groups as well. As one of the respondents puts it, 
When I was a child, we could not go to the parks because we would 
get bullied. My sister nearly lost her baby. She was pregnant and 
she tried to protect me and some other kids ... These black people, rude people, they came and started hitting my sister and she nearly 
lost her baby. It's been nearly three or four years I can't remember 
(the reason) but... It might have been ... well you walk on a street 
and then they just go and say "why are you looking at me? " and 
when you say, "oh, I am not looking at you", they say, "oh, am I 
lying? " and then they start fighting with no reason. ... It could have been like that (Resp 3). 
One of the respondents who is a kebab shop worker made an interesting 
comment. He said, 
We work in a kebab shop. The shop is open till late and we have 
quite a number of drunken customers coming from pubs or 
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nightclubs. As usual they do not behave I mean they use bad 
language to each other and to us and they fight. What we do is quite 
simple. We make friends with them and as they pop in the shop we 
have a short chat with them asking how they are etc. This is a very 
efficient way to decrease the fights. I mean, they are mostly drunk 
when they pop in. You cannot argue with a drunk. You have to smile 
and try to calm them down if they are looking for a trouble. The more 
we make friends with them the less trouble we face. To me this is 
not only good for us and for the customers but also it is a kind of 
help to the police as they are not involved in as many incidents as 
they used to be (Resp 9). 
In the main survey they were also asked to answer where they came across 
prejudices. The following table shows the results for this question. 
Table 9.24. Places for the prejudices 
Places for the prejudices Frequency Percent 
In school by British classmates 35 51.47 
In school by British teachers 37 54.41 
In the work place 2 2.94 
, By the police 19 27.94 
otal 68 136.76 
Multiple response 
As can be seen from the table, the major place for prejudiced attitudes is the 
schools. The majority of the respondents who answered this question saw 
prejudiced treatment by either their British classmates or teachers. The 
proportion of those who had prejudiced treatment by police is also remarkable. 
The main reason that schools have the highest proportion for prejudices is the 
fact that the majority of the respondents are actually students and more than 
half of them came across prejudices in schools. 
One of the respondents said that during her undergraduate education one of the 
professors tried to fail her. She said, 
... I passed all the exams except one. I was very surprised when I learnt that I failed one of them. I wasn't expecting this result ... I 
went to the department and told that the result of the exam I failed 
was not what I was expecting and I told that I need to see my exam 
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paper. ... A few days later a 
friend of mine asked me if I had a 
British passport. When I asked the reason she had to tell me the 
truth. ... she said that she went to the department to see the 
professor before the results were explained and he asked her about 
me - where I come from and if I have a British passport. I thought 
this is a racist insult. If I were British then this could not have been a 
problem for that professor. Having heard this, I went to the 
department to see the professor. ... He was very angry and said, "no bargain". I said to him that I did not come to see him for a 
bargain. All I need is to see my papers and have them checked by 
someone else. I said, "I am going to sue you". He said that he could 
not give me the papers but instead he could show my mistakes if I 
wanted to. ... There were three essays. He says, "the first one is ok, the second one is ok, and third one is also ok but I can't give you a 
passing mark. Someone else could give but I can't" ... This made me 
very suspicious about him and I said to him that he was a racist. ... I 
also mentioned about his conversation with my friend about my 
nationality and told him that I did not care that he was a professor 
because of the discrimination he made. When I said that I would 
certainly take him to the court, he started to smile. I was very angry. 
Later on someone spoke with me saying that it is not a good idea to 
sue him. I then said that I could forgive him if he made an apology to 
my friend and me. Eventually, he said sorry and I passed the exam 
(Resp 13). 
Another respondent narrated one of his observations. She said, 
I was on my way home when I saw this man beating up his son. I 
knew them because the man was a friend of my dad. I stopped him 
and asked what was wrong. He said, "this child is always a trouble 
maker in school and his teachers always complain about him. Since 
they were here for a short period they could not speak English good 
enough to understand what was actually going on at the school.... 
We went to school together and saw the head teacher to discuss the 
problem. Firstly I asked the student to tell me what happened in 
Turkish. He said that it was a group of students who treat him badly 
because of his weak English and the fact that he is a refugee. He 
also said that he sometimes had nothing but to fight them and as a 
result of this he was always seen as a scapegoat and punished. 
When I told all this to the head teacher, he apologised to the father 
and he said that he would immediately deal with the problem. ... A few days later I visited the family and they told me that the problems 
at school were over (Resp 14). 
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9.2. Friendships with other ethnic minority groups 
We have already discussed that there is a significant difference between Alevi 
and Sunni sects of Muslim Turkish-Kurdish people. It is a well known situation 
that some of Britain's ethnic minorities have strong connections with Islam such 
as Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and some Indians. The Alevi sect of Islam in 
Turkey differs not only from the Sunni sect but also from Shias in other Islamic 
countries in many ways. One can argue that since the Alevi sect in Turkey has 
more secularist characters than their Sunni fellowmen, the religious issue does 
not play an important role for them in making friends with the other Islamic 
ethnic minorities. Therefore, Alevis can be expected to have fewer friendships 
with other ethnic Islamic minorities than Sunnis in London. 
Table 9.25. The easiness of about making friends with other ethnic 
minorities by sub ethnic identities 
How easy is it for you to make new friends with other ethnic 
minorities such as Indian, Bangladeshi etc.? 
Very easy Easy Difficult Very difficult Total 
Turkish Alevi 2 9 23 1 35 
urkish Sunni 16 15 3 34 
Kurdish Alevi 3 11 16 2 32 
Kurdish Sunni 10 22 6 38 
British Alevi 2 5 1 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 1 4 1 6 
Only Alevi 1 4 9 1 15 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 1 3 5 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 7 4 2 13 
they 4 4 
[Total 41 74 74 5 194 
As can be seen from the table, the majority of respondents find friendship with 
the other ethnic minorities either easy or very easy. As the other ethnic 
minorities also live in Islington, Hackney and Haringey, relationships between 
Turkish youths and other ethnic minority youths is not surprising. 
When we look at the table, the difference between Alevis and Sunnis can also 
be seen again. The majority of the Turkish-Kurdish and other category Alevis 
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find friendship with the other ethnic minorities difficult whereas the Sunnis find it 
either easy or very easy. During the course of face to face interviews, only one 
Alevi interviewee out of ten said that she has friends from other ethnic 
minorities. She said, 
They are nice. My relationships with them are really good. In my 
class I've got Albanians from Kosova. One of my best friends is 
South African. I've got Pakistanis, Indians and Iranians from all 
those countries. I like them more because they got the similar things 
like me, like, they are not proper English. ... I think 
I could cope with 
them more than I could cope with someone who was born in here, 
because they like me (Resp 3). 
As can be seen from the quotation, she does not make any reference to the 
religious differences. Although her friends come from a mainly Islamic 
background, what is more important to her is the fact that these friends are not 
proper English. As for the other Alevi interviewees, they do not have any proper 
friends from other Islamic ethnic minorities while they make friends with other 
black people. 
One of them said, 
Well, in school I got on well with a Pakistani guy but it did not 
continue for a long time. He did not know that I was an Alevi Turk. 
One Friday he asked me to go with him to the Friday Sermon. I said 
to him that I am not familiar with the prayer (namaz) and we do not 
pray as they do. At first he seemed ok but after a while our 
friendship was over.... 
With other ethnic minority people, yeah, they are cool. I have quite a 
few black and Indian friends and let me tell you I feel comfortable 
with them rather than Islamic fanatics (Resp 1). 
As for Sunni respondents, however, it is no problem to make friends with other 
ethnic Islamic minorities. For the majority, the main point is the fact that they 
share the same religion and what is more is the same sect. However, although 
this is not to say that for the majority being from Turkey is not important, for 
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some, religious issues seem to be more important than anything else. As one of 
the Sunni respondents puts it, 
... other ethnic minorities? No problem for me as long as they are Muslims (because, )... for real Muslims the most important thing is 
the religion. If they are (other ethnic group members) real Muslims 
then I would not ask anything else. All Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
Muslim people are my brothers and sisters. Therefore, it is not 
difficult to make friends with them (Resp 5). 
As face to face interviews revealed, there are three major different views among 
Turkish Sunnis; for some, the religious issue is the main point of their lives while 
for others although the religious issue is important, their nationality is the most 
important thing. In both cases the religious issue plays crucial role in their 
relationship with friends. The third group is very different from the others. They 
share quite a number of characteristics with Alevis as they have secularist 
features and see that religious fanaticism is very dangerous for the future of 
their home country. 
As an example for the last group of the Sunnis, one of them said, 
... Well, to be honest with you, I don't like religious people. Ok, I am 
a Sunni Turk and I believe in God but that is it. Religion should be a 
private thing for people. I mean, it should be between individuals 
and God. You see, their practice of Islam is actually political. They 
try to change the system and turn back to the old times when Islam 
was ruling the country. I don't think this is the real practice of the 
religion. Well, I do have friends with other ethnic Muslim minorities 
but my friends are not that religious. We rarely talk about religion. 
The main issues we talk about are simply daily life in London, 
sports, etc. (Respondent 7). 
9.3. Integration or Isolation: Towards a conclusion 
As known, the relationship between immigrant populations and immigrant 
receiving societies has long been an important research topic in sociology. 
Scholars have produced a number of approaches to examine and solve the 
239 
problems between foreign communities and native societies. The literature 
suggests a number of solutions for these problems, from assimilation of the 
immigrant populations into the native populations to the acceptance of different 
cultures by the host societies (multiculturalism). 
It should be noted that, especially integration problems of immigrant 
communities become very important if the immigrants have lost the desire of 
returning to their home countries. Especially, in the case of Turkish immigration, 
as it is known, when the immigration to Western European countries started, 
many of the immigrants intended to return to Turkey as soon as they saved just 
enough money to buy some land, a house, a car, or to establish a small 
business. However, it was soon understood that once the immigrants were 
settled and had their families in foreign countries, their basic aim to return to 
their country would change. A number of factors play a crucial role in this. The 
main factor is found with the differences between Turkey and their host 
countries. For many, conditions provided by the European countries are better 
than in Turkey. For example, they can get free health treatment, income 
support, better education for their children, etc. providing a better life style. 
Especially, having children and the issue of their future increase the hesitation 
to return to their home country. In a way, their desire to return to Turkey is 
nothing but a symbolic idea (Caglar, 1994; Necef, 1996; Kaya; 1997). What they 
miss is actually their past lives and past relationships with old friends and 
relatives in Turkey. For their children this is not a problem because they were 
either born or grown up here. Therefore, all their lives were actually shaped 
here. They now have two countries one is a real home country -Turkey- and the 
other one is also a real home; England. When they are asked what they think 
about the two countries or returning to Turkey, they are actually given a puzzle 
to solve. As can be seen later in this chapter, for many of them, Turkey is only a 
cultural symbol. In reality they do not intend to return to Turkey and that is what 
makes integration of these young people into British society so important. 
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9.3.1. Maintaining links with the home country 
Before we examine their feelings towards integration into the host society, it is 
important to examine their links with Turkey. It appears that parents' maintaining 
relationships with relatives and friends in Turkey is different from their children. 
Table 9.26. Parents' maintaining strong links with relatives and friends in 
Turkey by who are they? 
Parents' Maintaining strong links with relatives and friends in 
Turkey? 
who are they? Yes No Total 
Turkish Alevi 27 5 32 
Turkish Sunni 31 4 35 
Kurdish Alevi 20 5 25 
Kurdish Sunni 34 2 36 
British Alevi 6 2 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 5 5 
Only Alevi 16 16 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 4 5 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 10 3 13 
Other 3 3 
Total 156 26 182 
As can be seen from the table, without any significant difference between all the 
sub ethnic identities, parents of the great majority of the respondents have 
strong links with their relatives and friends in Turkey. Only a small number of 
the respondents stressed that their parents do not have a strong link with their 
relatives and friends in Turkey. 
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Table 9.27. The respondents' contacts with people in Turkey by who are 
they? 
Do you have any contacts with people of your age living in 
Turkey? 
Who are they? Yes No Total 
Turkish Alevi 14 21 35 
Turkish Sunni 26 12 38 
Kurdish Alevi 11 21 32 
Kurdish Sunni 23 16 39 
British Alevi 2 6 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 6 6 
Only Alevi 7 9 16 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 2 7 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 5 8 13 
Other 3 1 4 
Total 99 101 200 
As seen, the respondents differ from their parents. While only a small proportion 
of the parents do not have strong links with people in Turkey, nearly half of the 
respondents do not have any contacts with people who live in Turkey. A slight 
difference between Alevis and Sunnis can also be seen here. Alevis have fewer 
contacts with people in Turkey than Sunnis. However, although there seems to 
be a slight difference between the Alevis and Sunnis, the main determinant 
comes to the surface when the period of stay in England is concerned. As seen 
in the following table, as their stay in England increases, the chance of having 
contacts with people of their age in Turkey dramatically decreases. 
Table 9.28. The respondents' contacts with people in Turkey by the length 
of stay in England 
Do you have any contacts with people of your age 
ivinq in Turkey? 
Length of Stay in England Yes No Total 
5-7 years 71 26 97 
-11 years 20 26 46 
12-16 years 5 21 26 
17-21 years 3 27 30 
2+ 1 1 
Total 99 101 200 
i-Square=bl. b3U; at=4; 5igniticance <. 
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There is a significant relationship between the period of residency and having 
contacts with people of their age in Turkey. The number of "yes" answers, 
decreases dramatically depending on the period of residency in England. 
Therefore, it can be said that if the respondents had been all English born 
second or third generation Turkish people, the number of those who have 
contacts with people in Turkey could have been less than this figure. 
Table 9.29. Who are they? by Have you ever visited Turkey? 
Have you ever visited Turkey ? 
who are they? Yes No Total 
Turkish Alevi 31 3 34 
Turkish Sunni 38 38 
Kurdish Alevi 19 8 27 
Kurdish Sunni 20 9 29 
British Alevi 7 1 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 6 6 
Only Alevi 15 1 16 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 8 1 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 13 13 
ther 3 3 
[Total 160 23 183 
This table shows the status of the respondents' visiting Turkey. This question 
was understood in two ways. The first meaning is valid for those who were born 
here and the second meaning is for those who were born in Turkey and spent 
their childhood there. For the latter, it means the period after they came to 
England. However, as can be seen from the table, the great majority of the 
respondents have visited Turkey. Only 23 out of 183 respondents have never 
visited. As said, this can depend on the second group who were born in Turkey. 
This can be seen from the following table. 
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Table 9.30. The length of stay in England by visiting Turkey 
Have you ever visited Turkey? 
Length of stay Yes No Total 
5-7 years 73 13 86 
-11 years 41 2 43 
12-16 years 23 2 25 
17-21 years 22 6 28 
2+ 1 1 
Total 160 23 183 
As this table shows, a number of the respondents, although they were born in 
Turkey, stressed that they have never visited Turkey. What it means is that after 
they came to England, for some reasons they did not visit Turkey. The main 
reason could be their legal status in Turkey. That is to say that for political 
reasons, in order to stay away from trouble, they do not want to visit Turkey. 
9.3.2. Importance of the countries 
In order to have a broad understanding of the integration, the importance of the 
home and host country for the respondents is also another important matter. 
Table 9.31. Which country is more important to you? by who are they? 
Whic h country is more import ant to you? 
Turkey Britain Both are 
important 
Both are 
important, but 
Turkey is 
more so 
Both are 
important, but 
Britain is 
more so 
Total 
Turkish Alevi 6 5 13 5 6 35 
urkish Sunni 3 1 4 30 38 
Kurdish Alevi 3 9 11 6 3 32 
Kurdish Sunni 2 36 1 39 
British Alevi .2 2 4 8 H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 5 1 6 
Only Alevi 3 10 2 1 16 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 1 2 1 5 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 4 1 5 3 13 
they 4 4 
[Total 19 21 88 50 22 200 
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As can be seen from the table, nearly half of the respondents did not choose a 
specific country. For them, both countries have an equal importance. This is 
followed by those for whom Turkey is more important. However, when we look 
at the numbers of those who see Britain more important, it can be said that their 
proportion among the respondents is also important. 
Table. 9.32. Supporting Turkish team of footballers, athletes or other 
sportsmen from Turkey 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Turkish side 133 67.9 
British side 14 7.1 
Neither 49 25.0 
Total 196 100.0 
In the early 1990s, a Conservative politician, Norman Tebbit, expressed his 
view about the loyalty of immigrant groups to Britain. He suggested that Asians, 
or West Indians who continue to support their home countries' cricket teams 
were lacking loyalty to the nation which offered them citizenship. (Abbot, 1998: 
108) As one can argue, this is simply unacceptable for almost all immigrants. As 
we have seen in chapter 2, even after several generations immigrants could still 
feel loyalty to their country of origin no matter how strong the assimilation was. 
Our findings also show that the majority of the respondents would support the 
Turkish side if a Turkish team plays against a British team. However an 
important proportion of Turkish young people appear to be neutral for this kind 
of event. As seen, a small proportion of them would support a British side. 
Technology does provide strong connections to the country of origin. Britain is 
only a-four-hour journey by aeroplane. Those who can afford the cost of flying 
to Turkey can even visit their relatives or spend their weekends in Turkey. 
Cheap international calls and the Internet provided by a variety of companies 
are other means of staying in touch with relatives and friends in Turkey. Finally 
satellite dishes bring the real connection to the home country giving them the 
opportunity to learn via TV what is going on in Turkey and providing children 
with the opportunity of getting familiar with the country and improving the 
mother tongue. 
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Table 9.33. Watching Turkish/Kurdish TV Channels 
Frequency Percentage 
Turkish TV Channels 117 82.98 
Med TV (Kurdish TV) 24 17.02 
Total 141 100.0 
As seen in the table, an overwhelming majority of the respondents watch 
Turkish TV channels. Med TV (Kurdish channel) is also watched by a relatively 
small proportion of them. 
Table 9.34. Reasons for watching Turkish/Kurdish TV channels 
Frequency Valid Percent 
To learn about what is going on in Turkey 117 72.67 
To help children learn about Turkish culture and 
language 
14 8.70 
To help coping with homesickness 11 6.83 
To learn about what is going on in Kurdish 10 6.21 
To watch Kurdish programmes on MED TV in 
Kurdish 
9 5.59 
, Total 161 100.0 
n>141 Multiple response) 
As we already said, the main reason for watching Turkish/Kurdish TV channels 
is actually to learn what is going on in Turkey. Even some of the respondents 
watching Kurdish TV channel have the same aim. Learning Turkish culture and 
language appears to be very low in the table. This could be because that the 
existence of Turkish immigrants in Britain does not have a long historical 
context. Therefore, even the second and third generations have a sufficient 
level of the Turkish language. As seen in the following table, almost all the 
respondents can read Turkish. 
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Table 9.35. Reading Turkish literature 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Turkish newspapers 83 48.26 
Turkish Novels 55 31.97 
Turkish Technical &scientific books 15 8.72 
, Turkish Journals 19 11.05 
otal 172 100.0 
Majority of the respondents reads Turkish newspapers. In London, apart from 
locally published weekly Turkish newspapers, other Turkish newspapers 
(Sabah, Hurriyet, Cumhuriyet, Milliyet) coming from Turkey can easily be 
bought in the boroughs where Turkish people live. Therefore, they have no 
limitation in accessing Turkish newspapers. This is also true with Turkish 
novels. They can easily order them via the Turkish library or several book 
stores. 
Table 9.36. Wishing to return to Turkey permanently in future by who are 
they 
In the future, would you return to Turkey rmanently? 
Yes No I do not know Total 
urkish Alevi 4 25 6 35 
urkish Sunni 7 21 10 38 
Kurdish Alevi 4 25 3 32 
Kurdish Sunni 4 31 35 
British Alevi 3 4 1 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 5 1 6 
Only Alevi 3 13 16 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 7 2 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 1 5 7 13 
Other 4 4 
26 140 30 196 
As seen from the table, the great majority of the respondents do not intend to 
return to Turkey in future. Therefore, there is no difference between sub ethnic 
groups' approaches to returning to the home country. The situation of 'British 
Alevis' here appears to be very interesting because as we discussed in Chapter 
7 (p. 170), all of them are children of real refugees and this might make them 
use only 'British Alevi' identity ignoring the Turkish identity because of the 
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negative views of their parents. However, as seen in the table, 3 of them 
actually consider returning to Turkey permanently in the future. It can be said 
that although they have negative views about Turkey, this does not mean that 
when the circumstances change and allow them to return to Turkey all of them 
will stay in the host country. If this happens, one can expect that they will also 
start using their Turkish identity as well. 
Table 9.37. The reasons not to return to Turkey In the future 
Reasons not to return to Turkey Fre uenc Percent 
I can't follow the culture and customs 4 3.39 
England provides better conditions 14 11.86 
I am happy here 23 19.49 
I am used to the life here 1 . 85 I don't like Turkey 4 3.39 
I grew up here 20 16.95 
Life is not easy there 27 22.88 
No freedom for Kurds 6 5.08 
Political corruption 1 . 85 here is no human rights 18 15.25 
[Total 118 100 
As seen, the main reasons to stay in England is related to better conditions 
provided in England. Either the better conditions in Britain or that life is not easy 
in Turkey are the main reasons given by 34.74 per cent of the respondents for 
remaining in England. There are, however, three other important reasons for 
them to stay here. The first one is their happiness. The second reason is that 
they grew up in England and the last one is the human rights issue. 
One of the respondents said, 
I have been living in London for more than 14 years. We came here 
when I was five. I also visit Turkey every year for a month. When I 
think about England and Turkey, to me, it is obvious ... England is my home although I am a Turkish. I mean I grew up here and all my 
friends are here. When I think about what I can do in Turkey if I go 
back, believe me the number of the options are very limited there. 
You know, there are a lot of problems in Turkey and most people 
have to deal with them to survive and to be safe. But here, things 
are quite different. One can enjoy being an individual. From 
consumer rights to human rights everything is arranged in order to 
provide a comfortable life to the people here (Resp 4). 
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Although the number of those who want to return to Turkey permanently in 
future is very low (table 9.36), it can still be useful to show the reasons for this. 
Table 9.38. The reasons to return to Turkey permanently in future 
Reasons Frequency 
Because it's our home 5 
Don't feel like 1st class citizen in the UK 1 
Don't like English people 1 
I am always a foreigner here 1 
I love my country 8 
I miss Turkey very much 1 
We cannot keep children under control 1 
Total 18 
As seen in the table, only a small number of the respondents have given the 
reasons why they want to return to Turkey permanently in the future. The main 
reason to return to Turkey is the love to the home country. A similar reason is 
that Turkey is their home. However, there are different reasons, such as being a 
foreigner here or disliking English people. 
9.3.3. Integration or Isolation? 
As we saw above, the great majority of Turkish young people do not want to 
return to Turkey permanently in future. Therefore, integration into the host 
society becomes very important. Since they are involved in education and some 
work in the host society, to get the best possible help from the host society, they 
more or less need to be integrated into the host society. For the integration, the 
first thing is, no doubt, the ability to use the host society's language. In the 
literature, there exist studies arguing that Turks are not able to speak another 
language and they cannot be integrated. For instance, Landau (1996) having 
compared Turkish immigrants in Germany with Syrian-Lebanese in the United 
States concludes an overall separateness of the present generation of Turkish 
Diaspora in western European countries from the host societies in language, 
culture and religion. Not only can these kinds of studies be seen as prejudiced 
but they can also be concluded that the authors do not have sufficient 
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knowledge of Turkish people. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that he also 
finds (Ibid: 222) that since the Turkish language is very different and difficult in 
vocabulary and syntax, a Turk cannot learn another language easily. However, 
when we look at the ability of Turkish young people to use the host society's 
language (English), it can be said that the assumption that Turks are unable to 
learn another language is simply not true. As mentioned before, 72.5 per cent of 
the respondents completed the questionnaires in English although this was not 
essential and the great majority of them rated their English as either good or 
very good. Therefore, we can conclude that the Turkish young people, if they 
had been in England for more than 5 years, appear to have a sufficient 
knowledge of the English Language to interact with the host society. 
Table 9.39. Do you think that people born in England but of Turkish 
parents should be brought up with knowledge of the Turkish language, 
culture, history etc. or not 
Frequency Percent 
es, because when they return to Turkey, they may need it 68 35.2 
Yes, because these are worthwhile to be taught 20 10.4 
Yes, because new generations must learn their historical origin 95 49.2 
Yes other 2 1.0 
No, because second and other generations born here will live 4 2.1 
No, because these create identity problems 4 2.1 
Total 193 100.0 
As seen from the table, the great majority of the respondents believe that 
English born Turkish children should be taught the Turkish Language, culture, 
history, etc. This table therefore shows that Turkish young people do not want 
to lose their cultural differences. The main reason for this is the necessity of 
learning historical backgrounds. Another important reason is the possibility of 
returning to the home country one day. With a significantly low rate, the last 
important reason is that the Turkish culture, history and language are worth 
teaching to Turkish children born in foreign countries. 
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It should be noted that keeping cultural differences is not an obstacle for 
integration nor does it create isolation from the host society. In order to 
understand their feelings towards integration into the host society, the followings 
need to be examined: 
1- Thoughts about marriage to British people 
2- Mixing with British people 
3- Getting the Host society's values 
9.3.3.1. Thoughts about marriage to British people 
As seen in chapter eight, for the majority of the respondents, falling in love with 
someone is enough reason to marry. During the course of the face to face 
interviews, the respondents were asked to explain their thoughts about marrying 
a British person. Although the majority of them do not object to marrying a 
British person, it can be said that they still have the feeling that if they marry 
someone from the same sub ethnic group, the chance of the marriage for 
surviving would be better because of the fact that they would not face any 
cultural difference which would create problems when the issue of raising 
children is concerned. Among the 20 respondents with whom in-depth 
interviews were carried out, only one Alevi and two Sunni respondents had 
objections to marrying British people. 
The Alevi respondent said, 
Marriage? (laughing) 
... well mainly I wouldn't have minded if the 
person was in different religion. But I would not ... marry a person... to be disliked by my family so for that reason I would 
get married to an Alevi person. 
If you fall in love with an English person, what would you do 
then? 
I force myself not to do that. I force myself not to look at them 
because me and English person couldn't be together. Maybe if I 
have lots of education, maybe my parents would be more than 
that. Another thing, I wouldn't want it too because the person that 
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I want to get married I would like him to have similar background 
with me. Because if he was an English person then he would 
have been, I mean, enjoying himself for a long time but Turkish 
men have got rules like my family's rules so I believe that if you 
have got similar things you could cope. But English men they like 
going out and enjoying themselves. I like quietness that's why I 
wouldn't want a man who is so different from my background 
(Resp 3). 
As seen from the quotation, she does not mind the religious difference but what 
she looks for is the similar cultural background that is to say that the person 
should be an Alevi. For her, the main important thing is to have her parents' 
approval for the person she wants to marry. It is interesting to note that, she 
actually attempts to describe what an English man is like. The cultural 
difference, here, is described as that they are "going out and enjoying 
themselves". 
For the other two Sunni respondents, the main reasons to object to marrying a 
British person can be found mainly in religious and cultural differences. 
One of them said, 
Why should I marry a British person? If I fall in love with a (an 
English) girl, ... the first thing I would expect from her is to 
change her religion. But this is not enough. ... I, well, ... would not marry a British girl because I don't think she can make a 
good wife. I mean ... you know, they go out with a lot of boyfriends and having sex with them is actually very normal for 
them and their parents. This is a part of their culture you cannot 
change.... I don't think I can trust a British girl to marry. ... Well, I'd marry someone if she is a proper Muslim then there wouldn't 
be any serious problems with cultural differences (Resp 5). 
A Sunni female respondent said, 
Well, first of all, ... I just can't marry an English man. ... Well yes, it is the religion thing. My religion is Islam, which is the most 
important thing for me, and I can't compromise. First of all, he 
has to give up his religion and ... willing to be converted into 
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Islam. If he can do this and my family accepts him then why not? 
(Resp 6) 
As seen from the both quotes, for some of the Sunni respondents, religion 
comes first where marriage is concerned. Both respondents have special 
conditions to marry an English person that is the conversion of the religion of 
the person. From these two quotations, one other difference between male and 
female Sunni respondents can also be seen. While the male one would not be 
comfortable marrying an English female due to her early sexual experiences, 
the female Sunni respondent does not mind this as long as the man is willing to 
be converted into Islam. 
As we said before, almost all the other respondents have no significant 
objection to marrying British people if they are in love with them. As one of them 
puts it, 
No no I have no problem with that.... I can marry any person if I 
really love him. If you are really in love with someone, then you 
should not look for something else. ... Ok, cultural differences are important but I don't think they are as important as the real love. 
... We all are different and don't share exactly the same views 
with each other and most of the times we simply compromise. I 
mean why shouldn't we do the same if the other person does not 
share the same culture with us. I believe that if people try to 
understand each other, there wouldn't be any problems (Resp 
17). 
In the main survey, the respondents were also asked a hypothetical question 
about their children's marriage to British people. They were asked if they would 
try to prevent their children's marriage to a British person. The findings to this 
question are as follows. 
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Table 9.40. Would you try to prevent your children's marriage to a British 
person by who are they? 
Would you try to prevent your children's marriage to a British 
person? 
who are they? Yes No I haven't thought this Total 
Turkish Alevi 1 21 11 33 
Turkish Sunni 17 9 9 35 
Kurdish Alevi 2 24 3 29 
Kurdish Sunni 10 12 12 34 
British Alevi 7 1 8 
H. Turk / H. Kurd Alevi 4 2 6 
Only Alevi 1 10 5 16 
H. Turk / H. British Alevi 7 2 9 
H. Turk / H. British Sunni 4 8 1 13 
Other 4 4 
Total 35 106 46 187 
As can be seen in the table, majority of the respondents do not intend to stop 
their children marrying a British person. Although the number of yes answers is 
quite low, the difference between Alevis and Sunnis is quite remarkable. Almost 
all the yes answers belong to the Sunnis. Therefore, it can be said that the 
religious and cultural differences in marrying a British person play an important 
role in the Sunnis' lives. 
In conclusion, the Alevi young people in London seem to be more willing to be 
integrated into the host society. Since they don't mind the religious differences 
as much their Sunni fellowmen do, they find hardly any problems with mixing 
with the host society. However, the Sunnis appear to be more conservative in 
keeping their religious characteristics alive. They even think that they should try 
to stop their children's marrying British people. 
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9.3.3.2. Mixing with British people 
Table 9.41. Preferences to mix with by who are they? 
Here are some social situations. Please tick three groups you would most like: to 
mix with social) 
Turkish 
people 
(general) 
English 
people 
Sunni 
Turks 
Alevi 
Turks 
Sunni 
Kurds 
Alevi 
Kurds 
Turkish 
Cypriots 
I do not 
mind 
Total 
Turkish Alevi 2 9 6 16 33 
Turkish Sunni 2 2 18 1 13 36 
Kurdish Alevi 2 4 3 8 14 31 
Kurdish Sunni 3 5 4 5 3 15 35 
British Alevi 5 1 2 8 
H. Turk / H. 
Kurd Alevi 
1 1 4 6 
Only Alevi 3 2 11 16 
H. Turk / H. 
British Alevi 
1 5 3 9 
H. Turk / H. ýBritish Sunni 
3 1 3 4 2 13 
they 4 4 
otal 16 33 21 15 9 12 1 84 191 
As seen in the table, nearly half of the respondents do not have a preference in 
choosing people to mix with. This is followed by 33 respondents who want to 
mix with English people. This figure actually shows that Turkish young people 
started to want to mix with English people, which can be concluded as a sign for 
integration. 
9.3.3.3. Getting the Host Society's values 
Ladbury (1979: 160) commented that awareness of Christmas had an effect on 
young children in the Turkish community in London. She says, Turkish children 
expect presents from their parents at Christmas and families feel obliged to do 
SO. 
During the course of the field work, this unusual thing for Turkish people was 
also observed by the researcher and the issue was also included in the face to 
face interviews. In addition to Ladbury's observation, it was found that even 
Turkish shops and organizations in the three boroughs actually do Christmas 
decorations. A Turkish Association (ATA) even invites its members to celebrate 
Christmas and new year. 
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For the shops, this can be seen as normal because they try to get the attention 
of their customers. However, for some of the Turkish organizations the situation 
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is rather complicated. When the reason for these decorations was asked the 
answer was generally simple. "Well, you see everybody does it why don't we? ". 
Although Christmas decoration is a part of Christianity, this type of decoration 
was even observed in the Alevi Cemevi. When the respondents were asked 
about Christmas decorations, surprisingly the great majority of the 20 
respondents have said that they either decorate their homes or their children's 
rooms. Some of them even mentioned that in the Turkish community, people 
have started to give Christmas presents to other Turkish friends or relatives. 
As one of the respondents puts it, 
It might seem a bit strange but it is true. I know a lot of Turkish 
families. When the Christmas arrives, Turkish children force their 
parents for the Christmas decoration of their rooms. Not only that, 
but they also write cards to their classmates or friends. Christmas 
celebration is a part of Christianity. Although we have nothing to do 
with this religion, we simply do things as Christians do during the 
Christmas. For example, in my work place, to celebrate the 
Christmas I prepared some Turkish food and other friends brought 
some other food. As far as I know, Turkish people have also started 
to give Christmas presents to their Turkish friends and relatives 
(Resp 13). 
Another respondent said, 
Well, I remember ... the last Christmas we bought some presents for my sister who is 8 years old now. We also bought presents for 
some of her classmates. My dad put a Christmas tree in her room 
and decorated the tree.... She wrote Christmas cards to her friends 
as well. ... If we don't do it then my sister gets angry and cries for it because she gets this culture from their teacher and English friends. 
So, when the time comes she asks exactly the same things as an 
English child would ask (Resp 9). 
Another respondent said, 
Well, we are Muslims and we have nothing to do with another 
religion. However, when Christmas time comes, it is my 6 years old 
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brother creating problems in the family. He sees from his friends and 
learns that he has to be given presents for Christmas. If we don't 
give him any present, then he thinks we don't love him and he gets 
cross with us. I mean, what can you do? You cannot tell a child that 
this is a religious thing and we are different from Christians. In the 
end we have to do what he asks us to do (Resp 7). 
As can be understood from these quotations, the effects of the host society on 
Turkish young people are considerable. Through education or pressure from 
friends they feel that they need to do similar things as English people do during 
the Christmas without considering the fact that it is a religious thing. Even more 
religious Turkish people, sometimes have to do Christmas decoration for their 
youngsters in order to cheer them up. However, as we said, this does not mean 
to them that they are involved in Christianity. 
As another interesting point revealed from some of the face to face interviews 
and observations during the researcher's visits to the respondents homes, 
Turkish children aged 4 to 9 mainly speak English when they play with other 
friends, even if the friends are Turkish as well. 
As one of the respondents pointed out, 
It is really interesting. You should see them (children) when they 
are playing with their friends. I mean, they only speak English 
with their friends. I know they also speak Turkish very well but I 
just can't understand why they only speak English with their 
friends. You can even see them speaking English when they are 
playing alone with their toys (Resp 17). 
When we look at what mother tongue these children have, it is, no doubt, 
Turkish as they first learn the Turkish language in the family. Necef (1996: 237) 
quotes from Gimbel that mother tongue is always the language people are 
emotionally and strongly attached to as it is closely interrelated with childhood. 
From this point of view, our findings actually reveal a problematic situation. 
Although Turkish children's first learnt language is Turkish, in most situations it 
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does not have any importance in their imaginations or play worlds. Therefore, it 
is almost impossible to talk about the emotional attachment to the mother 
tongue among these children. In a way this is a normal outcome of living in a 
different country. Children are surrounded by British children's programmes on 
television and by British children in nurseries and schools so are more likely to 
find themselves more comfortable with the English language. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has represented the findings of the research in relation to the 
relationships of Turkish young people with the host society and the other ethnic 
minority groups and tendencies towards integration into British society. 
As our findings clearly confirm, the overwhelming majority of the respondents' 
ability to use the English language is either good or very good. Only ten 
respondents stated that they have an average level of English. As argued 
earlier, the ability to use the language of a host society is the first requirement 
in order to talk about relationships with the host society. In general, the majority 
of the respondents (78.1 per cent in table 9.11) think that making friends with 
British people is easy or very easy. However, when we take into account sub- 
ethnic group differences, it can be seen that the majority of those who think 
friendship with British people is a difficult matter belongs to the Turkish or 
Kurdish Sunni groups (Table 9.12). Alevis in this sense comprise considerably 
smaller numbers. Table 9.13 has also shown that Alevis are likely to have more 
British friends than Sunnis. 
Nearly a quarter of the respondents feel that friendship with British people is a 
difficult matter. As we noted earlier, the main reasons for this appeared to be 
religious and cultural differences and the fact that they live in the Turkish 
community in London which provides them with wide range of opportunities 
which leave less space for relationships outside the community. 
Our findings suggest that in the neighbourhoods of the respondents, parents 
are not involved in any relationship with British neighbours. However, as the in- 
depth interviews revealed more than half of the 20 interviewees go out with 
British friends and make home visits as well. 
The majority of the respondents stressed that they do not have any problem 
with the police in the neighbourhood. (Table 9.18) However, a considerable 
number of them have commented that the attitude of the police towards them is 
260 
not fair as the police stop and search them quite often and ignore crime 
committed against Turkish people. In relation to the treatment of British people 
in the neighbourhood (Table 9.19), it can be said that the overwhelming 
majority again see the situation as normal in other words they do not have any 
problems. However, in general, the majority of the respondents stated that they 
came across prejudices by British people (Table 9.20). Our findings here 
indicate that there is again a difference between Alevis and Sunnis and that the 
rate of Sunnis who came across prejudice is considerably higher than that of 
Alevis. 
The findings of this research confirm that there is a difference mainly between 
the Alevis and Sunnis in terms of making friends from other ethnic minority 
groups. As table 9.25 revealed, Alevis tend to think that friendship with these 
groups is a difficult matter while Sunnis think the opposite. As argued earlier, 
the main reason for this is the fact that some of other ethnic minority groups are 
also Muslims and this make Turkish and Kurdish Sunnis, somehow, closer to 
them. As one of the Turkish Alevi respondents explained, Alevis have no 
problem with other ethnic minority groups if they are not Muslims or do not use 
religion in the first place when they make friends. 
Our findings have shown that nearly half of the respondents and the 
overwhelming majority of parents maintain links with friends and relatives in 
Turkey. The difference between Alevi and Sunnis here is again considerable. 
As table 9.27 showed, Alevi respondents have fewer contacts with people in 
Turkey than Sunnis. However, the main determinant is found with the length of 
stay in the UK. As the length of stay in the UK increases, the chance of having 
contacts with people in Turkey decreases accordingly. The great majority do 
not tend to return to Turkey permanently and find that both countries are 
important. 
As for integration into British society, it should be noted that the great majority 
of the respondents want to keep their cultural differences alive. As table 9.39 
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has revealed, they agree that Turkish people born in the UK should be brought 
up with the knowledge of their original culture (language, history and religion). 
What is more is that the majority of the respondents watch Turkish and Kurdish 
TV channels or read Turkish newspapers or other publications in order to learn 
what is going on in Turkey. However, it should be noted that keeping cultural 
differences should not be seen as an obstacle for integration. Our findings 
clearly indicate that although marriage within the same sub-ethnic group is 
valued more, the overwhelming majority see no problem with marrying a British 
person. The majority of them also would not try to prevent their children's 
marriage to a British person (if they had children in future). However, among 
Sunni respondents, it is likely to come across those who would try to prevent 
such marriages (table 9.40). 
As table 9.41 showed, a considerable number of the respondents would like to 
mix socially with English people, showing that integration into the host society is 
possible. What is more interesting is the Christmas celebration observed in the 
Turkish community in London. Many of the Turkish shops and organisation 
have Christmas decoration and Turkish children force their parents to get 
Christmas presents. It was even stated by a respondent that some Turkish 
families give presents to other families during Christmas. 
In conclusion, it can be said that Turkish young people in London to a greater 
extent are open to integration while it is still important for them to keep their 
cultural differences. If they find confirmation of this tendency of integration by 
the host society, it will be possible to see a higher level of integration in future. 
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Chapter 10: 
Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
This chapter concludes the thesis by drawing together the findings of the study 
integrating them with the theoretical issues raised in chapter 3. This study has 
examined Turkish young people living in London by looking at sub-ethnic group 
identities and their effects on their relationships at the family, community and 
host society level. 
10.1. Rethinking the Turkish experience of migration 
As we noted earlier, the Turkish presence in large numbers in Western 
European countries does not have a long historical background. Yet, the 
number of Turkish people in these countries has reached the considerable 
number of over 3 million in four decades since the early 1960s. Many (in fact 
more than 2 million) live in Germany, making it somewhat a second home or in 
a more realistic sense, the real home. 
As the review of Turkish migration to West Europe (Chapter 2) revealed, there 
are certain characteristics to be found in this process. The first is Turkey's 
inability to control it. As seen in chapter 2, the aim of Turkish policy-makers was 
to send only unskilled workers abroad hoping that they would contribute to the 
Turkish economy by getting new skills abroad and using them when they 
returned. However, when we look at what really happened, we can say that, as 
Castles and Miller (1993: 105) stated, many of the migrants selected at German 
recruitment offices in Turkey were actually skilled and employed workers. Since 
they were already in employment, it did not help the number of unemployed 
people decrease at a noticeable level. As seen in chapter 2 (p: 19), the number 
of unemployed people showed a rising trend starting from 1962 through 1972 
although recruitment of Turkish workers was very intensive in the same period 
(See Paine, 1974: 34). It is very interesting to note that Turkey did not actually 
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foresee the possible outcome of sending workers abroad until the second five- 
year development plan was written in 1968. For the first time Turkish authorities 
saw the importance of the remittances of migrant workers in this plan and they 
accepted that this phenomenon was not anticipated by the first plan. (See DPT, 
1968: 31) 
The second characteristic of Turkish migration can be found in its stubborn 
continuity. In other words, depending on the fluctuations in migrant worker 
importing countries (such as oil shortage in 1973), strict policies were put in 
force to stop immigration and encourage the return of migrant workers. 
However, Turkish migration has never been stopped. It continued first in the 
form of family reunification, second in the form of illegal immigration, and lastly 
in the form of refugee waves. 
The third characteristic of Turkish migration is the intention of permanent 
settlement of in the receiving countries. They established Turkish 
neighbourhoods in the cities of the host countries and opened shops, cafes, 
travel centres, branches of Turkish banks etc., to help Turkish people living in 
the same area and to make the life easier. The findings of this study confirm 
that the great majority of Turkish young people do not intend to return Turkey 
permanently. They have already chosen to stay in the UK. This is the fact that 
makes the idea of returning home a myth. 
The final characteristic of Turkish migration can be found in their relationships 
with the host society members and organisations. The first generation migrants, 
due to heavy work conditions could not find any opportunity to acquaint 
themselves with the culture of the host society. However, as the second and 
third generation Turkish people attended schools, they learned the language of 
the host country and to some extent the way of life and culture as well. This has 
caused a gap between the first generation migrants and the second and the 
third generation Turkish people who were born and grew up in the receiving 
country. They started to feel confusion over two cultures and a sense that they 
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are between two cultures. For example, in Germany they come across 
restaurants which do not serve them. What is more, in Germany and The 
Netherlands racist attacks have killed a number of Turkish people. 
Although the existence of prejudices on both sides cannot be ignored, the 
solution appears to be the integration and recognition of multicultural 
democratic rights. As our findings also confirm, Turkish young people born and 
growing up or grew up here feel that they cannot live in Turkey due to problems 
such as (re)integration into Turkish society, human rights issues, unemployment 
etc. As Caglar (1994) and Kaya (1997) stated, many migrant worker or their 
children feel discrimination when they visit Turkey during their summer vacation 
and they do not feel comfortable with the treatment they get from their 
neighbours or villagers. It is indeed a rightful statement that anyone in Turkey 
can witness peoples calling migrant workers 'Almanci' or 'Alamanci' (someone 
who is Germanish or German-like) to refer to the fact that they changed and are 
different people now. 
10.2. Methodological reflections 
This research was designed to investigate Turkish Young people living in 
London and their experiences with sub-ethnic group identities in the context of 
relationships inside and outside the community. The main aim was to find out if 
there are any differences between these groups in their relationships with the 
community and host society members. It is the researcher's claim that Turkish 
youth from mainland Turkey in Britain has never been studied in detail to show 
the differences found in sub-ethnic group identities (As mentioned previously, 
the early three studies done in England did not go beyond a single Turk-Islam 
identity). Therefore this study is the first one which has dealt with sub-ethnic 
group identities. 
The main data gathering tools were constructed questionnaire and in-depth 
interviews. Therefore, this research has used both qualitative and quantitative 
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data to strengthen and provide detailed information alongside the findings of 
questionnaires. The selected sampling technique for this research had to be 
snowball sampling, as the use of a random, representative, sampling technique 
seemed impossible within the limitations of a Ph. D. study. 
As the sampling technique employed for this research could not produce a 
representative sample, our findings cannot be generalised to the whole Turkish 
population living in London. Although we dealt with quantitative data which was 
not gathered from a representative sample, statistical analysis were used in 
order to test relationships between variables in the form of chi-square analysis. 
Our findings confirmed that there are significant differences between sub-ethnic 
groups in relation to their relationships with the community and host society 
members. Therefore, the researcher believes that the findings of this research 
are very significant and can lead to new research. 
10.3. Applying theoretical issues (ethnicity and multiculturalism) to 
Turkish young people living in London 
Chapter 3 of this thesis has reviewed the theoretical issues concerning ethnicity 
and multiculturalism. As we discussed earlier, there are two main approaches to 
ethnicity: Primordial and Situational. 
According to the first of these approaches, one receives ethnic identity at birth. 
Primordial attachments are ties of blood, religion, language, region, race, etc. 
(Shils, 1957; Geertz, 1996; Parsons, 1975) 
The situational approach objects to this view and focuses on the rational 
structure of human action. This approach claims that people can switch to other 
identities when they feel the outcome would be better. According to this 
approach, ethnicity is defined by social forces, not genetic forces. As the 
defining force is social, then ethnic boundaries can change according to the 
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changed social situations (Barth, 1996; Stokes, 1994; Mason, 1995; Smaje, 
1995). 
As criticised earlier, the use of one approach would not be enough to identify an 
ethnic group. It is necessary to look at both approaches in order to have a 
broader understanding. 
When defining a group according to ethnic identity, the question "who am I" 
plays an important role. In Turkey, it is known that the Kurds are an ethnic 
minority depending on language and cultural differences. As for religious sect 
members, as we discussed earlier, they also have a sense of who they are and 
who the other sect members are. Coming from a long historical background, 
one can easily find the signs of sharp differences between the two sects: the 
Alevi and the Sunni. As far as primordial ties are concerned, people are born 
into these differences. In other words they gain the ethnic identity at birth. 
Therefore a Kurd, Turk, Alevi or Sunni gets this identity from his family. In this 
context the primordial attachments cannot be ignored. However, the problem 
gets complicated when the connections of the two sects to the Turkish and 
Kurdish identity are concerned. One, being Kurd or Turk also belongs to one of 
the sects and this situation creates 4 sub-groups which we call sub-ethnic group 
identities. 
- Sunni Turks 
- Alevi Turks 
- Sunni Kurds 
- Alevi Kurds 
An Alevi Turk, for example, feel closer to an Alevi Kurd rather than a Sunni Turk 
or Sunni Kurd and the same is true for a Sunni Turk who may feel closer to a 
Sunni Kurd if he is not a Kurdish nationalist. 
The situational features of ethnicity can also be observed. For example, Alevis 
do not talk about their sect unless they are asked to do so. The reason for this 
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comes from historical conflicts which made them hide their sect in order to 
escape from the pressure of Ottoman sultans. (See, Sener, 1989; Bozkurt, 
2000). The same is also true for the Kurds. Firstly, due to the constitutional 
banning in Turkey they cannot publicly declare that they are Kurdish. It is an 
offence to do this and can be seen as a separatist movement. Therefore, many 
Kurds if they want to get a good education and a good career, to some extent 
have to play down their Kurdish identity. However, there is no restriction for 
those who hold the main ethnic identity -Turk-Islam (Turkish Sunni)- to express. 
As this identity is the basis of national state the situation is already in favour of 
its members. In other words, Turkish identity is the main determinant of creating 
the rules to be respected by all ethnic and sub-ethnic group members. 
As discussed earlier, these groups have a sense of who they are and who the 
others are which make the ethnic identities clear. Although the situational 
characteristics of ethnicity cannot be eliminated easily, it is still a difficult thing 
for a Turkish citizen to hide his/her ethnic or sub-ethnic identity. It may well be 
the intention of parents not to tell their children about their ethnic origins, but 
children sooner or later come to understand who they are in schools or other 
public places from others. It is to some extent very easy to guess someone's 
ethnic identity by just looking at his/her birthplace (town, village) or where 
he/she lives. Therefore, it is plausible to claim that although at a personal level 
one can avoid his/her ethnic identity, in practice it is very difficult to completely 
forget it because of others' reminding. 
The situational characteristic of ethnicity can also be seriously criticised at the 
group or societal level. Although individuals can switch to another identity or 
hide their ethnic identities in a rational choice procedure, history has proven 
that, at a higher level, relationships between ethnic groups have always been 
problematic (See Stokes, 1994). Alevi-Sunni conflicts, for instance, coming from 
the period of the Ottoman Empire had caused many revolts by Alevis against 
the Sultans. Examples of this conflict have been witnessed in Turkey until 
recently. On the other hand the Kurdish question in Turkey has also shown that 
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the situational characteristic of ethnicity has little to do with social movements 
level. Although the PKK is seen as a terrorist organisation by the great majority 
of Turkish people and the authorities, it is also known that without substantial 
support from the Kurdish population, it could not have fought against the 
Turkish army for 15 years. 
Multicultural issues discussed in chapter 3 aimed to provide a perspective with 
which it was thought possible to create beneficial relationships between ethnic 
minorities and the host societies. As discussed earlier, multiculturalism, seeking 
equal rights for different groups, can help prevent prejudices and racial 
discrimination on both sides. The problem here has two important sides. On the 
one hand immigrant receiver countries have become multicultural countries, no 
matter that they claim the opposite. In this context, with the idea of settling in a 
country, the immigrant groups become ethnic minorities by establishing their 
own networks. Therefore, it is very important for Western European countries 
which have a considerable Turkish population (Germany, France, The 
Netherlands, Britain, Sweden etc) to take required measures in order to 
decrease the tension between the host society members and the immigrant 
groups. The means of better integration without trying to erase cultural 
differences have to be taken into account and this can only be achieved by 
giving equal rights to the groups settled in the country who have no intention of 
returning home permanently. 
The other side of the problem very much involves Turkey. Turkey is also a 
multicultural country no matter how strongly the authorities deny it. The Turkish 
experience of national state is an example of forced assimilation of different 
ethnic minorities (See Ekinci, 2000). Turkey does this by the means of its 
constitution. It is strongly claimed in the constitution that all the people living in 
Turkey are Turkish and cannot claim otherwise. The language of education is 
Turkish and no other languages can be used in schools unless there is an 
international agreement with a country to establish a school and use its 
language. As noted earlier, Necef (1996) also touches upon assimilation of 
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Kurdish people into the Turkish language and therefore culture. His findings and 
the findings of this study show that there exist a considerable number of Kurdish 
people who describe themselves as Kurdish without having any satisfactory 
level of the Kurdish language. As noted earlier, because the Turkish language is 
officially used in schools and all other organisations, there is no chance for 
Kurdish to be taught as a written language in schools. Therefore, many Kurdish 
people cannot read and write in Kurdish. The situation is also the same for TV 
and radio channels as they do not broadcast in Kurdish. Therefore, very little 
space has been left for the Kurdish language to be spoken: family and friends 
and, at a higher level, village. 
As far as Alevis are concerned, as noted earlier, their practice of Islam has not 
been recognized officially as the mainstream Islam has been represented by the 
Sunni sect. Although Alevis did not hesitate to support Ataturk to establish the 
Republic of Turkey, soon their sect was to be ignored again. However, Alevis 
have never had any problem with the secularisation of the state as 
secularisation has meant the end of the pressures of the Sunni sect. Although, 
we cannot claim that Alevis also tried to be assimilated into the Sunni sect, it is 
a well known fact that, until recently, they also had to practice their way of Islam 
in Turkey in secret places. However, they are now erecting their places of 
worship called 'Cemevi' without any problem and they are now more free to tell 
anyone who they are and what their differences are. 
As for the Kurdish question, the last fifteen years of conflict between the PKK 
and the Turkish army has shown that forced assimilation started with the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey, has not solved any problem. Today 
there is an increasing tendency on both sides for the democratic rights of ethnic 
minorities to be discussed and for problems to be solved in a peaceful way. 
Therefore, it is very important to note that multicultural rights of ethnic minorities 
should also be an important matter for Turkey in solving the problems and 
easing the tensions between ethnic and sub-ethnic groups. 
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10.4. The usefulness of examining sub-ethnic group identities 
Turkish young people, in western European countries are now appearing as 
second or third generations. Many of the scholars, as mentioned earlier, are 
concerned about their changing cultural values and adapting new identities 
such as half German / half Turk, half Dutch / half Turk etc. They see this as a 
threat to Turkish culture as the new generations, they think, melt into the host 
societies' cultures. Some other scholars see this new situation as a third way of 
expression of Turkish young people abroad. As they are able to use both 
cultures' characteristics and use both languages easily in their conversations 
with friends, this is seen as a third culture because neither a native member of 
the host society nor a native Turk could understand the conversation and this 
make it unique. This switching to both languages was also one of the important 
observations of the researcher during fieldwork and the face to face interviews. 
The findings of this study also confirm that so called hyphenated identities (see 
Chapter 7) exist among Turkish young people in the UK. As seen in Chapter 7, 
some of the respondents reported their feeling as half British / half Turkish or 
British. However, it should also be noted that their awareness of sect 
connections is still alive and goes with these identities as well. 
Although there is a growing interest among scholars in different ethnic and sub- 
ethnic group identities of Turkish people, most of the available literature suggest 
that the only Turkish identity is Turk-Islam identity and with Islam it is actually 
meant the Sunni sect of Islam. For example, the previous research conducted in 
the UK by Ladbury (1979), Sonyel (1988) and Kucukcan (1999) does not reveal 
any sufficient information about different ethnic and sub-ethnic identities of 
Turkish people. This was one of the important points used in the research 
design of this study to cover the differences and measure their effects on the 
lives of Turkish young people. 
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Despite the general tendency of seeing Turkish people as belonging to Turk - 
Islam identity, when one surveys the available literature on ethnicity it is not 
surprising that answers on how ethnic identities come into existence and what 
makes ethnic groups different from one another can easily be found. For 
example what makes an ethnic group salient is the fact that the differences 
found in that group such as language, religion/sect, culture and most 
importantly the feeling of the members of the group that they are different from 
the others. It is true to assume that to talk about ethnic groups there must be at 
least two different groups interacting with one another. 
As for Turkish young people living in London, our findings suggest that they are 
aware of their ethnic and sub-ethnic group identities. Especially, with the 
chapters 7,8, and 9, the differences between Alevi, Sunni Kurdish and Turkish 
groups are noticeable. The great majority of the Alevis claim that their parents 
do not make all the decisions about them, while considerably fewer of the 
Sunnis claim the same. The tendency of making friends within their groups is 
also noticeable. However, as mentioned earlier, Sunni Turks do not seem to 
have the intention of making friends with any of the Kurdish groups. 
Nevertheless Turkish Alevis do not have any problem with making friends with 
Alevi Kurds. It is also interesting to note that when they are asked about their 
feelings towards other Turkish/Kurdish ethnic groups, the majority either sees 
them as different or explains that they do not like them. As for their relationships 
with the members of the host society, Alevis are more likely to find that 
friendship with British people is either very easy or easy, while a higher 
proportion of Sunnis think that it is a difficult matter. It is also confirmed by the 
number of British friends among their first, second and third best friends that 
Alevis have more British friends than Sunnis. 
This actually shows us how important it is to take into account these sub-ethnic 
groups when dealing with Turkish immigrants abroad. This ethnic plurality is a 
reality of Turkey and therefore seen where Turkish people live, no matter if it is 
in Turkey or abroad. The ignorance of many scholars who study on Turkish 
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people abroad - though the fear of being prosecuted by the Turkish authorities 
accusing them of being separatists might play an important role - has also 
misled foreign researchers studying Turkish people. Yalcin- Heckman (1996) for 
example, does not consider any possibility of the existence of Alevis in her 
study. Similarly, Stigler (1995) makes a serious mistake by describing all the 
Kurds and people coming from Anatolia as fanatic religious people. 
This study, as we mentioned earlier, is the first attempt in Britain to examine 
Turkish young people using the sub-ethnic group identities and their effects and 
it is the researcher's claim that new research on Turkish people should take 
them into account if they are to deal with ethnic identities. 
10.5. Turkish Youth in the family and community circle 
The findings of this research have shown that there is a significant difference 
between the girls and the boys in commenting on the understanding of their 
parents (see Table 8.8 and 8.9). Boys are more likely to think that they are well 
understood by their fathers. The reason why girls think the opposite can only be 
explained by the parental control mainly from the father and brothers. This is a 
special characteristic of the Turkish family. The patriarchal structure of the 
Turkish family does not give female members as much freedom as it does to 
male members. Depending on religious or patriarchal issues even those who do 
not see themselves as religious can apply parental control. What is most 
important for a Turkish family is the honour crystallized in women's honour 
(keeping their virginity until marriage and being loyal to their husband for the 
rest of their lives). Therefore, parental control on girls should be understood 
within this frame. 
However, although parental control is very common among the families, this 
research has found some evidence that there is a significant difference between 
Alevis and Sunnis (see Table 8.13). The great majority of the Alevi respondents 
stressed that not all the decisions related to them are made by their parents 
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while considerably fewer of the Sunni respondents claimed the same. 
Therefore, it can be said that in Alevi families children are left more free to make 
decisions for themselves than in Sunni families. This can be seen as a result of 
religious issues playing an important role in Sunni families. 
Table 8.15. has also shown a significant difference between Alevi and Sunni 
families. The majority of the Sunni respondents think that their parents believe 
that they should marry a person who belongs to their culture, while the majority 
of the Alevi respondents think the opposite. However, as for their thoughts on 
marriage, the majority of the respondents think that if they are in love with 
someone, this is enough to marry him/her (Table 8.17). Therefore, it can be said 
that although parents look for cultural sameness with their children's marriage, 
the children place a higher value on the importance of love. 
The important thing with the relationships of Turkish young people inside the 
community appear to be friendships and thoughts about other groups. The 
findings confirm that Turkish young people think that making friends within the 
same group (Alevi, Sunni, Turk, Kurd) is very easy rather than making friends 
from a different group (table 8.23). Our findings have also shown the 
importance of sect or language differences when Turkish young people 
explained the ethnic identity of their best friends. (Table 8.24) This situation 
actually shows the use of sub-ethnic group identities among Turkish young 
people. They know who they are and who the others are. As noted earlier this is 
one of the basic needs in constructing an identity. Turkish youth, as our findings 
confirm (Table 8.25; 8.26; 8.27), therefore, tend to choose their friends from the 
group they belong to. Alevi Turks, for instance, tend to make friends from Alevi 
Turks and Alevi Kurds by constructing a bridge between Kurdish and Turkish 
identities while Sunni Turks overwhelmingly choose their friends from only 
Sunni Turks. The reason why Sunni Turks do not construct the same sect 
bridge with the Kurds can only be found in Kurdish question. Although they 
share the same sect, because of the Kurdish nationalist movement they prefer 
not to have a Kurdish friend. Kurdish Sunnis and Alevis, meanwhile, seem to 
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have more friendships than Alevi and Sunni Turks. Here again, the Kurdish 
question brings the members of two sects closer to each other, while being a 
Turk does not play the same role for the members of two sects. 
10.6. Turkish Youth in the host society 
Our findings suggest that there is also a difference among the sub-ethnic 
groups on friendships with the host society members. Turkish and Kurdish Alevi 
respondents are more likely to think that friendship with a British person is not 
difficult. Among those who have British friends as their first, second or third best 
friends, Alevis comprise 88.40 per cent of the total 57 respondents (table 9.13). 
This is a strong evidence to show that Alevis are more open to friendships with 
British people than Sunnis. 
As for treatments by the host society members, it can be said that Turks in 
Germany can in certain respects at least be compared with blacks or Asian 
people in the UK. We have already noted that some German restaurants do not 
serve Turks. The existence of racism against Turks in Germany has resulted in 
serious attacks, which claimed a number of Turkish lives. As is known, the 
racial problem in Britain mainly has to do with black and Asian minorities. It 
should be noted that as far as racial issues are concerned, Turks appear to be 
more relaxed in Britain than in Germany. 
As noted earlier, the reason why Turks get more hostile treatment in German 
than in Britain is the fact that they are the biggest ethnic minority in Germany, 
as blacks and Asians comprise the biggest minority in Britain. As seen, in both 
countries, the racism or xenophobia is mainly focused on the largest ethnic 
minorities 
As our findings show, the majority of the respondents think that the treatment by 
British people and police in their neighbourhood is normal. However, although 
we said that they are more relaxed in Britain than in Germany, when it comes to 
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explaining their thoughts about whether British people are prejudiced against 
them, the majority also think that British people are prejudiced and the main 
reasons given for this by the respondents are British people's dislike of Turks, 
Islam, and lack of knowledge about Turks. 
The findings of this research also confirm that a significant number of the 
respondents faced racial prejudice, mainly in schools from the classmates and 
teachers. 
In brief, it can be said that racial discrimination is seen in both Germany and 
Britain. The only difference is the level of this racial discrimination and Britain, in 
this matter, seems to be less hostile as far as Turkish people are concerned. 
10.7. The final question: Towards integration or isolation? 
Although they live in north London, they are not isolated from the host society in 
their neighbourhoods at all. In other words they do have British and other ethnic 
minority neighbours . As our findings suggest, although parents do not have any 
relationship with British neighbours, the children do. This should be seen as 
normal. London is a cosmopolitan city and a lack of relationships among the 
host society members could also be true as well. 
When Turkish young people are asked to choose which country is more 
important to them, our findings suggests that nearly half of them cannot do this. 
Most of them think that both are important and for some although both are 
important, Turkey is more so. 
Their connection to the country of origin is kept alive by means of Satellite 
receivers, which allow them to watch Turkish/Kurdish TV channels, and daily 
Turkish newspapers come from Turkey or Germany. 
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The idea of returning home is still not more than a myth. The majority of the 
respondents do not tend to return to the home country. Only a small number 
have the intention of going back. Therefore, as they are determined to settle in 
this country, their integration problem into the host society becomes an 
important matter. Almost all of them think that new generations should be 
brought up with the culture of the country of origin. This is a common factor 
found in most minority populations. As assimilation of the new generation 
Turkish young people does not seem to be possible in the foreseeable future, 
integration matters, therefore, should be given closer attention. 
The findings of this research suggest that the more resisting groups against 
integration are Sunni Turks and Kurds. As seen in table 9.40, significant 
numbers of them think that they would try to prevent their children 
(hypothetically) from marrying a British person. 
It is interesting to note that, the Turkish population in London, to some extent, 
takes part in Christmas celebrations. It is mainly the children who force parents 
to do so but some of the informants claimed that giving Christmas presents (to 
British Turkish friends) is now seen in the community. 
Another interesting thing observed by this study, is the fact that Turkish children 
up to 7-8 years of age, speak only English with their friends and when they play 
with their toys alone. Mother tongue question here intermingles and makes it 
difficult to explain the matter, though it is plausible that they are surrounded by 
the English media, English friends and Turkish is only connected to grown ups. 
10.8. Suggestions for future research 
This study has shown that dealing with only a single Turk-Islam ethnic identity 
when conducting research on Turkish people abroad cannot yield a broad 
understanding of the situation and therefore does not show the real picture of 
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Turkish people. The assumption that Turks have only Turk-Islam (Sunni) 
identity because 99 per cent of the Turkish population are Muslims, can only 
end up with the exclusion of Alevis and Kurds. As we noted earlier, an 
overwhelming majority of scholars have only little to say about sub-ethnic 
differences of Turkish people and this has misled foreign researchers when they 
studied Turkish people abroad by not taking into account different groups. 
Therefore, the first suggestion, the researcher wants to make is that new 
research should take into account sub ethnic differences of Turkish people 
when dealing with integration, and relationships of Turkish people with different 
groups. 
Another suggestion is that this research, due to the limitations of a Ph. D. study, 
could not on to research if the situation was same for those living outside the 
community (London). A few observations by the researcher on Turkish families 
living outside London, has raised this issue. Their experience of living in a host 
society could well be very different from those who stay connected to the 
Turkish community in London. Therefore, further research on Turkish people in 
the UK should include those living in different parts of the UK. The Turkish 
community in London itself has both positive and negative effects on integration 
into the host society. One can easily support him/herself without needing to 
interact with the host society by using the facilities provided in the community. 
Therefore, although The Turkish community is a way for survival, it also 
prevents a better integration as well. In order to measure the difference, one 
needs to look at those who live outside the community. 
It is also important to study Turkish (young) people living in other countries in 
order to have a deeper understanding of the circumstances in these countries. 
Therefore, comparative research, combining, for instance, all the Western 
European countries which have considerable numbers of Turkish people, is 
needed in this field as the studies on Turkish people abroad were designed to 
measure things other than integration and sub-ethnic groups. Comparison 
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between the UK, Netherlands and Germany, for example, is likely to be 
particularly useful. 
Finally, the observations of the researcher on Turkish children up to age 8, has 
shown that they speak only English with their friends and toys when they play 
with them. This is only commented upon in the context of the mother tongue 
issue. However, the researcher thinks that it is open to new research from other 
disciplines, most probably psychology or social psychology. Although these 
children are bilingual and have no difficulty speaking both languages, why they 
prefer speaking English with their Turkish bilingual friends is indeed very 
interesting and needs closer attention. 
279 
REFERENCES 
Abadan-Unat, Nermin, (1976), "Turkish Workers in Europe 1960-1975", in 
Turkish Workers in Europe 1960-1975, Ed: Nermin Abadan-Unat, 
pp: 1-44, Leiden: E. J. Brill 
Abadan-Unat, Nermin, (1986), Türk Dis Görü 1960-1984, Ankara: Ankara 
Üniversitesi yayinlari 
Abbott, David (1998), Culture and identity, London: Hodder & Stoughton Educational 
Afetinan, A. (1982), Tarih Boyunca Turk Kadininin Hak ve Gorevleri, (The Rights an 
Duties of Turkish Women throughout the History) Istanbul: MEB Yayinlari 
Ahmad, Feroz, (1993), The Making of Modern Turkey, London: Routledge. 
Al-Rasheed, Madawi, (1996), "The Other-Others: Hidden Arabs? " in Ethnicity 
in the1991 Census, Volume two, ed. Ceri Peach, pp: 206-221, London: 
HMSO 
Andrews, Peter Alford (1992), Turkiye'de Etnik Gruplar (Ethnic Groups in 
Turkey), Translated by Mustafa Kopusoglu, Istanbul: Ant Yayinlari 
Anwar, M. (1976). Between Two Cultures, London: Commission for Racial Equality 
Arat, Yesim (1992) "1980'ler Türkiyesinde Kadin Hareketi: Liberal Kemalizmin 
Radikal Uzantisi", (Women Movement in Turkey: The Radical side of Liberal 
Kemalism) in Necla Arat(ed. ), Türkiye'de Kadin Olgusu, Istanbul: Say 
yayinlari 
Aydin, Erdogan, (1996), Nasil Musluman Olduk: Turklerin 
Muslumanlastirilmasinin Resmi Olmayan Tarihi (How Did We Become 
Muslims: An Unofficial History of Converting Turks to Islam, 11th 
Edition Ankara: Doruk Yayimcilik 
Banks, Michael at al, (1992), Careers and Identities, Milton Keynes: Open 
University Press 
Banton, Michael, (1972), Racial Minorities, London: The Chaucer Press 
Barth, Fredrik, (1996), "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries" in Theories of Ethnicity, 
Eds: John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, pp: 75-82, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Besikci, Ismail, (1993), Kurt Toplumu Uzerine (About Kurdish Society), Istanbul: 
Yurt Kitap Yayin 
280 
Betts, Raymond F., (1961), Assimilation and Association in French Colonial 
Theory 1890-1914, London: Colombia University Press 
Blaschke, Jochen, (1989), " Refugees & Turkish Migrants in West Berlin", in 
Reluctant Hosts: Europe and its Refugees, Ed: Daniele Joly and Robin 
Cohen, pp: 96-103, England(Aldershot): Avebury 
Bozkurt, Fuat (2000), Cagdaslasma Surecinde Alevilik (Alevism in Modernity), 
Istanbul: Dogan Kitapcilik 
Bridges, Tom, (1997), "Multiculturalism as a Postmodernist Project" in 
http: //jefferson. village. virginia. edu/pmc/pmc-aIk/essays/bridges. essay1 
Brown, Colin, (1984), Black and White Britain: The Third PSI Survey, 
London: Policy Studies Institute 
Brubaker, Rogers, (1992), Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 
London: Harvard University Press 
Bruinessen, Martin van, (1996), "Kurds, Turks and the Alevi Revival in Turkey" 
in Middle East Report, pp: 7-10, Vol. 26, Part 3 
Bryman, Alan, (1988), Quantity and Quality in Social Research, London: 
Routledge 
Bulmer, Martin, (1996), "The Ethnic Group Question in the 1991 Census of 
Population" in Ethnicity in the 1991 Census, Volume one, ed. David 
Coleman and John Salt, pp: 33-62, London: HMSO 
Bulmer, Martin and Rees, Anthony M., (1996), "Conclusion: Citizenship in the 
twenty-first Century" in Citizenship Today, Ed: Martin Bulmer and 
Anthony M Rees, pp: 269-285, London: UCL press 
Caglar, Ayse (1994), German Turks in Berlin: Migration and Their Quest For 
Social Mobility, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Department of 
Anthropology, McGill University, Montreal 
Castles, Stephen, (1984), Here For Good: Western Europe's New Ethnic 
Minorities, London: Pluto Press 
Castles, Stephen, and Kosack, G., (1973), Immigrant Workers and Class 
Structure in Western Europe, London: Oxford University Press 
Castles, Stephen, (1993), "Migrations and Minorities in Europe. Perspectives 
for the 1990s: Eleven Hypotheses", in Racism and Migration in 
Western Europe, Eds: John Wrench and John Solomos, pp: 17-34, 
Oxford: Berg Publishers 
281 
Castles, Stephen and Mark J. Miller, (1993), The Age of Migration, London: The 
Macmillan Press 
Chaliand, Gerard, (1994), The Kurdish tragedy, translated by Philip Black, 
London : Zed Books in association with UNRISD 
Coleman, David and Salt, John, (1992), The British Population: Patterns, 
Trends and Processes, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Coleman, James S. and Husen, Torsten, (1985), Becoming Adult in a 
Changing Society, Paris: OECD 
Crispino, James A., (1980), The Assimilation of Ethnic Groups: The Italian 
Case, New York: Center for Migration Studies 
Dalman, Metin and Tabak, Ismail, (1995), Avrupa'da Insan Ticareti ve PKK, 
Istanbul: Türk -Alman Basin Ajansi 
Daniel, William Wentworth, (1968), Racial discrimination in England : based on the 
PEP report, Harmondsworth : Penguin 
Degirmencioglu, Coskun (1989) Mehmet Izzet, Makaleler, (Mehmet Izzet: Essays) 
Ankara: Kültür Bakanligi 
Dixon, Beverly R. et al, (1987), A Handbook of Social Science 
Research, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
DPT, (1963), Birinci Bes Yillik Kalkinma Plani (The First Five Year Development 
Plan, Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi 
DPT, (1968), Ikinci Bes Yillik Kalkinma Plani (The Second Five Year 
Development Plan, Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi 
DPT, (1972), Ucuncu Bes Yillik Kalkinma Plani (The Third Five Year 
Development Plan, Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi 
DPT, (1979), Dorduncu Bes Yillik Kalkinma Plani (The Fourth Five Year 
Development Plan, Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi 
DPT, (1985), Besinci Bes Yillik Kalkinma Plani (The Fifth Five Year 
Development Plan, Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi 
DPT, (1989), Altinci Bes Yillik Kalkinma Plani (The Sixth Five Year 
Development Plan, Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi 
Dummett, Ann and Martin, Ian, (1984), British Nationality, Second Edition, 
England: Russel Press 
282 
Dunsmuir, Audrey and Williams, Aurey, (1990), How to do social research, 
London : Unwin Hyman 
Eade, J. et al. (1996), "The Bangladeshis: The Encapsulated Community", in 
Ethnicity in the 1991 Census, ed: C. Peach, London: HMSO 
Ekinci, Tarik Ziya, (2000), Vatandaslik Acisindan Kurt Sorunu ve Bir Cozum 
Onerisi (The Kurdish Question from the Citizenship Perspective and a 
Suggestion), Istanbul: Kuyerel Yayinlari 
Erbas, Hayriye, (1996), "Constitution Boundaries and Changing Identities: 
Ethnic Relations of Turkish Immigrants in London", Unpublished 
presented paper to workshop on " Immigration and Politics of 
Belonging" Euroconference on Collective Identity and Symbolic 
Representation, Paris July 3-6 1996 
Erbas, Hayriye, (1997), "Class, Ethnicity, and Identity Formation: Immigrants 
From Turkey in London", presented paper in ESA Conference on 
"20th Century Europe: Inclusion/Exclusion", University of Essex, 
Colhester, Essex, 27-30 August 1997 
Erder, Necat, (1984) "Sunus" (Introduction) in Türkiye'de Ailenin Degisimi, Ankara: 
Türk Sosyal Bilimler Dernegi 
Erdogan, Kutluay, (.... ), Alevilik Bektasilik (Being Alevi and Bektasi), Cep 
University, Yeni Yuzyil Kitapligi, Iletisim Yayinlari 
Erdogan, Sinan, (1988), Dis Goc ve F. Almanya'dan Donus Yapmis (Sivas 
Ortaokul ve Liselerinde) Genclerin Uyum Sorunlari Uzerine Sosyolojik 
Bir Inceleme (international Immigration and a Sociological Analysis on 
Integration Problems of Youths (in Secondary and High Schools in 
Sivas) who Returned from Germany, Unpublished MA Thesis, 
Sivas: Cumhuriyet University, Institute of Social Sciences 
Et-Tiycani, Muhammed, (1996), Kur'andaki Sunnet Ehl-i Beyt'e Gonul 
Verenlerin Yoludur (The Sunnat in the Koran is the Way of Followers of 
Ehl-i Beyt), Translated by Zeki Ozkaya, Istanbul: Can Yayinlari 
Eyuboglu, Ismet Zeki, (1989), Alevilik - Sunnilik (Islam Dusuncesi), (Alevism- Sunnism (The thought of Islam)), Istanbul: Der Yayinevi 
Ex, J., (1966), Adiustment After Migration, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Family Policy Studies Centre, (1988), Young People, Fact Sheet 5 
Fielding, Anthony, (1993), "Mass Migration and Economic Restructuring" in 
Mass Migration in Europe, ed: Russel King, pp: 7-18, London: Belhaven 
Press 
283 
Findikoglu, Ziyaeddin Fahri, (1991) "Türkler'de Aile Igtimiyati" (The Family in Turkey) 
in Aile Yazilari 1, Ankara: Basbakanlik Aile Arastirma Kurumu 
Fink, Arlene, (1995), How To Sample in Surveys, London: Sage Publications 
Geertz,, Clifford (1993), The Interpretation of Cultures, London: Fontana Press 
Geertz,, Clifford, (1996), "Primordial Ties", in Ethnicity, eds: John Hutchinson 
and Anthony D. Smith, pp: 40-45, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Ghassemlou, Abdul Rahman, (1965), Kurdistan and the Kurds, London: Collet's 
Holdings 
Gil-White, Fransisco J. (1999), "How Thick is Blood? The Plot Thickens... " 
published at http: //wings. buffalo. edu/philosophy/faculty/smith/courses99/mal 
Gitmez, S. All, (1983), Yurt Disina Isci Gocu ve Geri Donusler (Migration of 
Turkish Workers Abroad and Returnings to Home Country, Istanbul: 
Alan Yayincilik 
Glazer, Nathan and Moynihan, Patrick, (1963), Beyond The Melting Pot: 
The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York 
Cam, Cambridge: M. I. T. Press 
Glazer, Nathan, (1983), Ethnic Dilemmas 1964-1982, London: Harvard 
University Press 
Goldberg, David Theo, (1994), "Introduction: Multicultural Conditions", in 
Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader, Ed. David Theo Goldberg, pp. 1-44, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
Gordon, Milton M., (1964), Assimilation in American Life, USA: Oxford 
University Press 
Gorsel Ansiklopedi, (----), Buyuk Genel Kultur Ansiklopedisi (Big General Culture 
Encyclopaedia, Gorsel Yayinlari 
Gozubuyuk, Seref and Kili, Suna, (1982) Türk Anayasa Metinleri, (Turkish 
Constitutions) 2. baski, Ankara: SBF yayinlari 
Greeley, Andrew M., (1971), Why Can't They be Like Us?: America's White 
Ethnic Groups, USA: Clarke, Irwin & Company 
Gstrein, Heinz, (1991), Avukatsiz Halk Kurtler (Defenceless People: Kurds), 
Translated by Kemal Yalim, Second Edition, Istanbul: Akyuz Yayinlari. 
Guardian Weekly, 18 May 1997 
284 
Guler, Kemal, (1992), "Anadilin Onemi ve Milli Kimlik" (The Importance of the 
Mother Tongue and National Identity) in Bati Avrupa Turkleri: F. 
Almanya'da 30. Yil (Western European Turks: The Thirties Year in 
Federal Germany), Avrupa, pp: 109-118, Ankara: Turk-Islam Birligi 
Yayinlari 
Guttmann, Allen, (1971), The Jewish Writer in America : Assimilation and 
the Crisisof Identity, New York:: Oxford University Press 
Hasretyan, M. A., (1990), Turkiye'de Kurt Sorunu: 1918-1940 (Kurdish Question 
in Turkey: 118-1940), Berlin: Wesanen Instituya Kurdi 
Hedges, B. M., (1978). "Sampling Minority Populations" in Social and 
Educational Research in Action, Ed: Michael Wilson, pp: 244-263, 
London: Longman Group 
HMSO, (1993a), Ethnic Group and Country of Birth, 1991 Census Volume 1 of 
2, London 
HMSO, (1993), Ethnic Group and Country of Birth, 1991 Census Volume 2 of 
2, London 
Home Office, (1988) Statistical Bulletin: Refugee Statistics, Issue 16/88 
Home Office, (1989) Statistical Bulletin: Refugee Statistics, Issue 25/89 
Home Office, (1990) Statistical Bulletin: Refugee Statistics, Issue 22/90 
Home Office, (1992) Statistical Bulletin: Refugee Statistics, Issue 12/92 
Home Office, (1996) Statistical Bulletin: Refugee Statistics, Issue 9/96 
Home Office, (1999) Statistical Bulletin: Control of immigration, Issue 10/99 
Horowitz, Donald, (1975), "Ethnic Identity" in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, 
Eds: Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, pp: 111-140, USA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Hutchinson, John and Smith, Anthony D., (1996), "Introduction" in 
Ethnicity, Ed: John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, pp: 3-14, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
Icduygu, Ahmet et al. (1999), "The Ethnic Question in an Environment of Insecurity: 
the Kurds in Turkey" in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 22 
285 
Icli, Gonul and Yalcin, Cemal, (1995), "Universite Calisma Yasaminda Cinsiyet 
Ayrimi: Cumhuriyet Universitesi Orneginde" (Sex Segregation in the 
University worklife: The Case of Cumhuriyet University)(Sex Segregation in 
Academic Work) in Cumhuriyet Universitesi SosyalBilimler Enstitusu Dergisi, 
No: 17, pp: 33-51, Sivas 
Iktisadi Kalkinma Vakfi, (1994) "Kurtler ve Turkiye" (Kurds and Turkey) in 
Iktisadi Kalkinma Vakfi, No: 121 
Isaacs, Harold R., (1975), "Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe" in 
Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, Eds: Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. 
Moynihan, pp: 29-52, USA: Harvard University Press 
Jahoda, Marie, (1984), "The Roots of Prejudice" in Minorities: A Question of 
Human Rights?, Ed: Ben Whitaker, pp: 37-48, Pergamon Press, 
Oxford 
Jansen, C. J., (1970), "Migration: A Sociological Problem" in Readings in the 
Sociology of Migration, Ed: Clifford J. Jansen, pp: 3-35, New York, 
Pergamon Press 
Jeffery, Patricia, (1976), Migrants and refugees : Muslim and Christian Pakistani 
families in Bristol, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Joppke, Christian, (1996), "Multiculturalism and Immigration; A Comparison 
of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain" in Theory and 
Society, pp: 449-500, Vol. 25 No. 4 
Kagitcibasi, Cigdem, (1987), "Alienation of the Outsider: The Plight of Migrants 
"International Migration, pp: 195-210, Vol: XXV, No: 2 
Kagitcibasi, Cigdem, (1990) Insan Aile Kültür, (Human being, Family and Culture) 
lstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi 
Karakasoglu, Yasemin, (1996), "Turkish Cultural Orientations in Germany" in Turkish 
Culture in German Society Today, eds. David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky, 
pp. 157-180, Oxford: Berghahn Books 
Kandiyoti, Deniz, (1977), "Sex Roles and Social Change: A Comparative 
Appraisal of Turkey's Women" in Journal of Women in Culture and 
Society, No: 3, pp. 57-73 
Kandiyoti, Deniz, (1991), Women, Islam and the state, Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Kaya, Ayhan, (1997), Constructing Diasporas: Turkish Hip-Hop Youth in 
Berlin, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Warwick University 
286 
Kaya, Ayhan, (1998), "Multicultural Clientelism and Alevi Resurgence in the 
Turkish Diaspora: Berlin Alevis", in New Perspectives on Turkey, 
pp: 23-49 Spring 1988,18 
Kaynak Yayinlari: 101, (1992), Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kurt Isyanlari II 
(Kurdish Revolts found in Army's Archieve), Istanbul: Guney Yayincilik 
Kendal, (1 980a), "The Kurds Under the Ottoman Empire" in People Without a 
Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, Ed: Gerard Chaliand, pp: 19-46, 
London: Zed Press 
Kendal, (1980b), "Kurdistan in Turkey" in People Without a Country: The 
Kurds and Kurdistan, Ed: Gerard Chaliand, pp: 47-106, London: Zed 
Press 
Kilicarslan, Ayten, (1992), "F. Almanya'da Turk Kadinlari" (Turkish Women in 
F. Germany), in Bati Avrupa Turkleri: F. Almanya'da 30. Yil (Western 
European Turks: The Thirties Year in Federal Germany), Avrupa, pp: 
55-70, Ankara: Turk-Islam Birligi Yayinlari 
Kocturk, T. (1992), A Matter of Honour: Experiences of Turkish Women Immigrants, 
Zed Books 
Kokosalakis, N. (1982), Ethnic identity and religion : tradition and change in Liverpool 
Jewry. Washington, D. C. : University Press of America 
Kongar, Emre, (1985), Türkiyenin Toplumsal Yapisi, (Turkish Social Structure) 5. 
basim, Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi 
Kongar, Emre, (1998), 21. Yuzyilda Turkiye: 2000'li Yillarda Turkiye'nin Toplumsal 
Yapisi (Turkey in the 21st Century: Turkey's Social Structure in the 2000s, 
25. Basim, 1(stanbul: Remzi Kitabevi 
Kucukcan, Talip, (1999), Politics of Ethnicity, Identity and Religion: Turkish 
Muslims in Britain, England: Ashgate Publising 
Kurnaz, Refika (1992), Cumhuriyet Öncesinde Türk Kadini (1839-1923) (Turkish 
Women Before the Republic (1839-1923), Istanbul: Is Bankasi yayinlari 
Kymlicka, Will, (1995), Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
Ladbury, S. (1979), Turkish Cypriots in London, Economy, Society and 
Culture, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London 
Landau, Jacob, (1996), "Diaspora and Language" in Ethnicity, Ed: John 
Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, pp: 221-226, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
287 
Lee, Everett S., (1996), "A Theory of Migration" in Theories of Migration, Ed. 
Robin Cohen, pp: 14-24, Cheltenham: Edward Elgard Publishing 
Lee, Raymond M., (1993), Doing Research on Sensitive Topics, London: Sage 
Puplications 
Leets, Laura, et al., (1994), "Explicating Ethnicity in Theory and Communication 
Research" Presented at the International Communication Association 
Annual Meeting, Sydney 
Locke, Don C., (1992), Increasing Multicultural Understanding: A 
Comprehensive Model, USA: Sage Publications 
Mango, Andrew, (1968), Turkey, London: Thames and Hudson 
Marcus, Aliza, (1996), "Should I Shoot You?: An Eyewitness Account of an 
Alevi Uprising in Gazi" in Middle East Report, pp: 24-26, Vol. 26, Part 2 
Mason, David, (1995), Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
May, Tim, (1993), Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process, 
Buckingham: Open University Press 
McDowall, David, (1992), The Kurds: a Nation Denied, London : Minority 
Rights Publications 
McLaren, Peter, (1994a), "White Terror and Oppositional Agency: Towards a 
Critical Multiculturalism" in Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader, Ed. 
David Theo Goldberg, pp: 45-74, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
Miah, Muhammed Elias, (1998), The New Youth Movement of the Bangladeshi 
Community in the East End of London, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 
Department of Sociology, University of Surrey, Guildford, England 
Miles Matthew B. and Huberman, A. Michael, (1994), Qualitative Data Analysis, 
London: Sage Publications 
Milliyet Gazetesi (Milliyet Newspaper), 18.10.1997 
Moch, Leslie Page, (1992), Moving Europeans, USA: Indiana University 
Press 
Modood, Tariq et al, (1997), Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and 
Disadvantage, London: Policy Studies Institute 
Mutlu, Servet, (1996), "Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study" in Middle 
East Studies, pp: 517-541, Vol. 28, Part 4 
288 
Necef, Mehmet Umit, (1996), Ethnic Identity and Language Shift Among 
Young Turks in Denmark, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Center for 
Contemporary Middle East Studies, Odense University, Denmark 
Oommen, T. K., (1994), "State, Nation and Ethnie: The Processual Linkages" in 
Race, Ethnicity and Nation, Ed: Peter Ratcliffe, pp: 26-47, London: UCL 
Press 
Ostergaard-Nielsen, Eva Kristine, (2000), "Turkish and Kurdish Transnational 
Political Mobilisation in Germany and the Netherlands" Working Paper 
#00-02-J, The Center for Migration and Development, Working Paper 
Series, Princeton University 
Oz, Baki, (1992), Osmanli'da Alevi Ayaklanmalari (Alevi Revolts in the Ottoman 
Empire), Istanbul: Ant Yayinlari 
Oz, Baki, (1995), Alevilik Ile Ilaili Osmanli Belaeleri (Ottoman's Documents as 
related to Alevis), Istanbul: Can Yayinlari 
Paine, Suzanne, (1974), Exporting Workers: The Turkish Case, London: 
Cambridge University Press 
Park, Robert E., (1967), "Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups" in Robert 
E. Park on Social Control and Collective Behavior, Ed: Ralph H. 
Turner, pp: 114-132, London: University of Chicago Press 
Park, Robert E., (1967), "The Bases of Race Prejudice" in Robert 
E. Park on Social Control and Collective Behavior, Ed: Ralph H. 
Turner, pp: 157-178, London: University of Chicago Press 
Parnwell, M., (1993), Population Movements and the Third World, London: 
Routledge 
Patterson, Shelia, (1963), Dark Strangers, Middlesex: Penguin Books 
Patton, M. Q. (1987), How to use qualitative methods in evaluation . Newbury Park, London: Sage 
Peach, Ceri, (1996), "Introduction", in Ethnicity in the 1991 Census, Wolume 
two, ed: Ceri Peach, pp: 1-24, London: HMSO 
Parsons, Talcott, (1975), "Some Theoretical Considerations on the Nature 
and Trends of Change of Ethnicity" in Ethnicity: Theory and 
Experience, Eds: Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, pp: 53-83, 
Cambridge: Harward University Press 
Pears, Edwin, (1911), Turkey and Its People, London: Methuen and Co 
289 
Phoenix, Ann and Owen, Charlie, (2000), "From Miscegenation to Hybridity: 
Mixed Relationships and Mixed Parentage in Profile" in Hybridity and Its 
Discontents Politics, Science, Culture, Eds. Avtar Brah and Annie E. 
Coombes, pp: 72-95, London: Routledge 
Pierse, Catherine, (1997) "Violation of Cultural Rights of Kurds in Turkey" in 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, pp: 325-341, Vol. 15/3 
Pike, Fredrick B. (1969), Latin American history : select problems; identity 
integration, and nationhood, New York : Harcourt Brace 
Price, Charles, (1969), "The Study of Assimilation" in Migration, Ed: J. A. 
Jackson, pp: 181-237, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Poulton, Hugh (1997), Top hat, grey wolf and crescent : Turkish nationalism and 
the Turkish Republic, New York : New York University Press 
Ratcliffe, Peter, (1994), " "Race" in Britain: Theory, Methods and 
Substance" in "Race", Ethnicity and Nation, Ed: Peter Ratcliffe, pp: 108- 
133, London: UCL Press 
Ratcliffe, Peter, (1994b), " "Race" in Britain: Theory, Methods and 
Substance" in "Race", Ethnicity and Nation, Ed: Peter Ratcliffe, pp: 2- 
25, London: UCL Press 
Rist, R. C., (1978), Guestworkers in Germany , New 
York: Praeger Publishers. 
Rooney, Michael and Steele, Jane, (1997), "The United Kingdom"in 
Information For Citizenship in Europe, Ed: Jane Steele, pp: 276-338, 
London: Policy Study Institute 
Safran, William, (1986), "Islamization in Western Europe: Poltical 
Consequences and Historical Parallels", The Annals of The American 
Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 485 pp: 98-112, USA: 
Sage Publications 
Sayari, Sabri, (1986), "Migration Policies of Sending Countries: Perspectives 
on the Turkish Experience" in The Annals of The American Academy 
of Political and Social Sciences, pp: 87-97, Vol. 485, USA: Sage 
Publications 
Sayin, Önal, (1990) Aile Sosyolojisi, (Sociology of the Family) Izmir: Ege 
Üniversitesi yayini 
Scott, Wiliam A. and Scott, Ruth, (1989), Adaptation of Immigrants, Oxford: 
Pergamon Press 
290 
Secmez, Osman, (1992), "Genclik Meselemiz" (Our Youth Problem), in Bati 
Avrupa Turkleri: F. Almanva'da 30. Yil (Western European Turks: The 
Thirties Year in Federal Germany), Avrupa, pp: 71-80, Ankara: Turk- 
Islam Birligi Yayinlari 
Sener, Cenral, (1989), Alevilik Olayi (Alevism), 5th Edition, Istanbul: Yon 
Yayincilik 
Sezgin, Osman, (1992), "Avrupa'daki Turk Iscileri ve Cocuklarinin Egitimi" 
(Turkish Workers in Europe and Education of Their Children), in Bati 
Avrupa Turkleri: F. Almanya'da 30. Yil (Western European Turks: The 
Thirties Year in Federal Germany), Avrupa, pp: 47-54, Ankara: Turk- 
Islam Birligi Yayinlari 
Shankland, David, (1996), "Changing Gender Relations Among Alevi and 
Sunni in Turkey" in Turkish Families in Transition, ed: Gabriele Rasuly- 
Paleczek, pp: 83-97, Germany: Peter Lang GmbH 
Shill, Edward, (1957), "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties" in The 
British Journal of Sociology, Vol: 8, pp: 130-145 
Simpson, J. Hope, (1938), Refugees, Great Britain: The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 
Skellington, Richard et al, (1992), Race in Britain Today, London: Sage 
Publications 
Smaje, Chris, (1995), Health, "Race" and Ethnicity: Making Sense of the 
evidence, London : King's Fund Institute 
Smaje, Chris, (2000), Natural Hierarchies: The Historical Sociology of Race and 
Caste, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
Solomos, John and Wrench, John, (1993), "Race and Racism in Contemporary 
Europe" in Racism and Migration in Western Europe, Eds. John Wrench 
and John Solomos, pp: 3-16, Oxford: Berg Publishers 
Solomos, John, (1996), Making the Race. Stating the Case: Thinking About 
Racism, Identity and Social Change, Inaugural Lecture delivered at 
University of Southampton, England 
Sonyel, Salahi Ramadan, (1988), The Silent Minority: Turkish Muslim 
Children in British Schools, Cambridge: The Islamic Academy 
Sonmez, Necmi and Kirisci, Kemal, (1998), "Asylum in Turkey: Forced Migration from 
the Balkans to Turkey and the Case of Kurdish Refugees and Internally 
Displaced" in AWR Bulletin, pp: 181-188, Vol. 36/45 
291 
Soysal, Mumtaz (1987) 1.00 Soruda Anayasanin Anlami, (The Meaning of the 
Constitute) Istanbul: Gercek yayinevi 
Stam, Robert and Ella, Shohat, (1994), "Contested Histories: Eurocentrism, 
Multiculturalism, and the Media" in Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader, 
Ed. David Theo Goldberg, pp: 298-324, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
Staples, Ken (2000), Hong Kong Culture: Hybrid, Bicultural, or a Continuing 
Renewal, Unpublished Conference Paper, ASAA Conference, July 
2000 
State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, (1997), 
Marriage Statistics 1995, Ankara: DIE Matbaasi 
State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, (1998), Divorce 
Statistics, 1996, Ankara: DIE Matbaasi 
Stigler, Elke B. (1995), Turkish Women in Germany, Unpublished Master of 
Art Thesis, University of Surrey, Department of Linguistic and 
International Studies, Guildford, England 
Stokes, Martin, (1994), "Introduction" in Ethnicity, Identity and Music: The 
Musical Construction of Place, ed: Martin Stokes, pp: 1-28, Oxford: Berg 
Publishers 
Storkey, Marian et al, (1997), Cosmopolitan London: Past, Present and 
Future, London: London Research Centre 
Taft, Ronald, (1966), From Stranger to Citizen, London: Tavistock 
Publications 
Tan, Dursun and Hans-Peter Waldhoff, (1996), "Turkish Everyday Culture in 
Germany and its Prospects" in Turkish Culture in German Society Today, eds. 
David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky, pp: 137-156, Oxford: Berghahn Books 
Tastan, Vahap, (1996), Degisim SurecindeKimlik ve Din: Kayseri'den 
Yurtdisina Isci Gocu Olayinin Kulturel Boyutu (Identity and Religion in 
the Process of Change: The Cultural side of the migration from Kayseri 
to Other Countries), Kayseri: Kayseri Buyuksehir Belediyesi Kultur 
Yayinlari 
Tekeli, Sirin (1985) "Türkiyede Feminizm" (Feminism in Turkey) in Yapit, Toplumsal 
araptj'rmalar dergisi, Sayi 9 
The Guardian, 18 February 1999 
Thompson, Jane L. And Judith Priestley, (1996), Sociology, 2"d Edition, 
London: Made Simple Books 
292 
Turkdogan, Orhan, (1984), Ikinci Neslin Drami: Avrupa'daki Iscilerimiz ve 
Cocuklari (The Trauma of the Second Generation: Turkish Workers 
and their children in Europe), Istanbul: Ayyildiz Matbaasi 
Turkish Ministry of Work and Social Security, (1996), 1995 Yili Raporu 
(The 1995 Report), Ankara 
Turkish Ministry of Work and Social Security, (11998), Published at 
http: //www. calisma. gov. tr/tc/tablo7. htm 
Velidedeoglu, Hifzi Veldet, (1976) Ailenin Cilesi Bosanma, (The trouble of the 
Family: Divorce) Istanbul: cagdap yayinlari 
Waever, O., et al, (1993), Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in 
Europe, London: Pinter Publisher 
Watson, James L., (1977), "Introduction: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Class in 
Britain" in Between Two Cultures, Ed: James L. Watson, pp: 1-20, 
Bristol: Basil Blackwell 
White, Jenny B., (1995), "Turks in Germany: Overview of the Literature", in 
Middle East Studies Assoc Bulletin, pp: 12-15, Vol. 29, Part 1 
Worsley, Peter, (1984), The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development, 
London: Weindenfeld and Nicolson 
Yalcin-Heckmann, Lale, (1996), "Moral and Religious Socialization Among the 
Turkish Migrant Families in Germany" in Turkish Families in Transition, 
ed: Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek, pp: 164-185, Germany: Peter Lang 
GmbH 
Young, Lola, (2000), "Hybridity's Discontents: Reading Science and Race" in 
Hybridity and Its Discontents Politics, Science, Culture, Eds. Avtar Brah 
and Annie E. Coombes, pp: 154-170, London: Routledge 
Xn, (30.05.1997), http: //www. planet-turkey. com/xn/yoresel/haberler. html 
Zebrowska, Anna, (1986), Integration or Assimilation: A Study of Second 
Generation Poles in England, Unpublished PH. D Thesis, Guildford, 
England: University of Surrey 
Zurcher, Erik, Jan, (1995), Modernlesen Turkiye'nin Tarihi (History of 
Turkey's Modernization, Istanbul: Iletisim Yayincilik 
293 
ý^. XUC! 
U- 
ýN 
Vv9- 
_ýT+. 
C 
= .ý2 
. 
2p Zm 
m 'O 
H 
V. 
ý E Cy 
cx E 
.. 
ý.. t0 
HI ;ý cs 
`n Y 
ý 
ÖýÖC 
_. O 
Xý 
N ...., y 
. ýcºý ýx 
i-ý- . rFi 
p0 
7r 1 c0 zy r_ 
a ew ý>>V 
oo', _° o .d 
Fý 
A . °r,,, -0 -6-2 v :Oü Ci N A. 
Pä3x 
ö 
"° 
Ä 
>UÖ 
.mÜ>L 
ý '2 
püY '. 
N 
y 
ý oo ý 
[- 
rN .G 
° °' ZE 
c2ý ýo ýY Vl 0 H 
""9 
_ 2'0 ;3 ti 
-W 
0 .. 
tuuN 
N .D . '. 
F? 
3ým 
pN_ 
üö8 
"N 
°" Cc 
ýup 
to OC 
-0 
uO 
tVUpý 
.CLNU 
g3 ?? a 
py 
cý 7Y 
N ý" rF 
uc 
ou"- 
ýTäu 
c Eý 
[ýL 
OpTL 
cZEaý 
.. Eüö 
>uý 
.ý "C 
0. 
WH 
LÖuC ö0 
p3täW 
"v 3 o4c 
"ti ö9 b-, 4 
2 
.ýs .ý "ý ý 
u4ANy 
Q' yu 
pp7 
u7 c' 
onE uHd 7 
.`- 
uK 
a°, >äE 
Ir 
u 
u 
0 
L 
.ý 
ýC 
V 
N 
100 
ý 
p 
ý 
N 
8 
ý 0 °ý 
.s K d 
9 
00 
Otýf~ 
yOý 
N ;! ä 
0 pw 
>1 
0 ö 
0 
U) C 4. a ÜC00 
ie Nü 
> . -. 
eEi 
AC7 
U ný. 5C7 
tn 
C. 
00 
N 
ý 
x 
u 
0 
8 
ý.. ý 
ä$ 
ýý.. 
ýi 
F 
°' uÖ r-ý 
xo 
O fs 
T 
W 
O 
Ö 
ü 
y 
... O 
0. 
U 
Ca 
ýk 
vl 
:3N 
00 
E 
UU aýC7 
C 
'ý 
ý 
ý 
N 
X 
v x w 
d 
ý .ý 
Ü 
.: ý ý 
U 
ý 
N 
U 
ý 
ZE 
171 
0 
x ýö 
ýö 
dA 
Üä 
JN 
(] 
^ý 'Oa 
a`ý .ý`C"? 
ý 
ý, C] ß7 ö 
ý_ 
o 
EM7O Lu 
ý" "--" . 
ý'" yW 
Oý7TG Oý 
in L C^ +O 'ý v1 y . -. Na 'fl G« 'Öp i. OÖ ^Ct: uy W 
en ^ 
NýG TvAb 
Oa 
f^ý, N vy _ 
CM ÖNVi 
TTý. v 
" .. dNT . 
'_'. CNý. 
- ... T= [- '. ' F. C .pý 
uýü m ýu la H, rz- 
öx=ü rZ 
2v ýV ý-'N 'ti7 
W L 
Eu ý 
h= "ý 
ýjYTý 
" Yýý 
V6C.. 
ý. > 
ä0 zýý xx w^ým 
N ý"" ý h.... , b.. ý.... ý. V] f/ýý VJ -ýV V]- rA - ýIý 
ý u 3 
0 0 3 
4 
y 
U 
.5 u 
00 
0 
co 
C 
.ý 
ä u 
.ý 
.ýN 
N 
C 
1r ý 
ä.: a co 
ý 
s ö 
ell 
U 
N 
ý 
ý + N 
00 N 
C" ýý 
-0-- °n ri 'b 
C ý` N 
.: tn . -. 
-cc 
N 
ý! 1 
ýa u 
pp MC 
Ö 
ý! 
T 
3 -9 
xHN 
ý} 
ä- 
ü 
t_ 
O 
4 
OV 
o0 
Ö 
d¬'c 
0 dwý` 
öý 
o .K 
.äý 3= 
öÜn. 
ý.. 
4 riýo 
a 
^ ; 
-a 
Vi 
dýýýÜ 
3d 
Oý 
' 
0= 1. N 
O 
.0 
ýT 
ýu 
ZO 
3ü 
.r 
äý 
u 
Eö 
N Y1 
ä 
öb ' 
u 
rx 
ög "O ö 
,e "E "' 
ý 
3 
-. --. , ä- ä 
dww 
o. _. ý. MO 
93 
,O V 
aC 
Ä 
N0 
ýý dqQ 
äo 
0 
rL 
Omw U'C7 
b. -ý i-O n.!? Y 
Ws r" -- vi 
trww ev i+N ý 
ä0 
ý 
Fs 17,  
öý 
ýr 
ý VN^ 
40 
N 
LýW 
L 'ý ý» 
L. 
d ý w 
ý=ý 
Cy 
C 
O 
"V 
ý 
E 9 
L 
w 
la 
E$+ 
ý00ý 
w .... öA N6 
oL 
8 
51 
ýöO 
O ýO 
3v 
CD N v1 
U 
>_ N 
hE 
ýn u 
... ý 
uý.. 
rO 
e 'ü 
oz 
N `ý 
c" 
u 
ýý 
A 
, 
ýöQo 
^^ o^ 
Yýý aý 
C . -r i-. 
c wn 
.ý W bo 
ö =ý 
a .= 'o 
Vi '+ M 
rN Vl 
I 
öY 5 
Za ra 
.o 9 
_H 
d 
CýC 
'e ý2 
eý >- ý_ o O ý. tý. ý _. äN 
a A C 
d 
dw Jý 
NJ 
Hd 
yý mý 
ý . ý 
a U 
ý 
4 
ý 
a 0 
ýv 
3 
ar, 2 
03 
c6 a 1Z3 öö 
öQ 
ýN 
N 
ý-a 
äý 
Y 
ý 
I. 
d 
ý d 
.. 
T 
>CO 
tp 
t7 
QT 
a Aa 
d ý ý a 
ý ý ý m 
N 
Gn 
ýE 
.nö CH 
OJ 
ýCY 
'O "O 
7 
Cý 
0 
Cd 
ýýý 
Im AA 
ÄAý 
VNNNý 
_ý .ý. 
2 55.. Ss 
Mt V1 
ýO [ý 
t. 
d A 
ö 
7- 
L. 
Y 
ý 
a 0 ý 
I 
Al 
ý 
.0 
u 
Ü 
ý 
ý 
.ý 
E 
.0 
v 
ý 
U 
s ö 
ý 
'C 'C 
:c :n 
w 
_w zx 
cc 
W) In 
P .ý .ý 
u ai 
a r. 
ý. '7 ý 
44 
ýý 
ýý 
C1 M 
1. 
W 
E' 77 
xO x0 
AM 
ýNN 
ý77 
W Co 
> 
d. i 
C2 - -- G 
G 
.rMG 
rnWQ 
CC 
00 
zz 
ýý 
>T >T 
.ý .ý 
uý 
>> 
C .C. 
aý 
äý 
¬¬ 
00 
ww 
st 
iC K 
UO Cl) 
F) c 
uu 
M Mp 
8O L. C 
.. 
ýý 
c: r- 
ß. Nh 
ý 
o: 
o. u 
üö 
öi 
`3 " C: 
C.. 
ý 
a 
.3 ýQ 
C5 
u 
'C 5 
d-n 
e9 
9ý 
WX 
Ld i3 
dL 
.ýJ". "L S] 
CCý -' L 
O. ý4-. ý0: 29 
a_ `` _F . _A ... 
9A 
N 
V 
ti 
d 
tiRW 
ý^ 
'Cý 
i7 
ý 
i, 
vv 
V]W V]CQ-ý+V?. SENM 
uF ýý ti 
, 
qS c üS5 
T; ýý 
.X_.: . 
ýJ L 
ýý 
ý 
ý L 
3e 
as in u ZÄ .f id 
N 
tä 
2.2 
v0 
.. ý. 
'en ý 
d F: t; 
o :a 
Q-ý NM 
N 
U 
u ý 
ä 
w 0 
N 
d 
ý 
G ý 
ý > 
U 
T 
:ý 
11 jz 
ý ý ý ä... ý 
ý C 
ý 
ý 
C 
O 
U 
ý, 
a 
^? +3=..... 
äLZ älz -0 F>NM 
ýý 
ir 
O 
E 
8 
L. 
OD 
C 
-> 
ý 
I- 
(C 
L 
Lt 
ý 
O 
T 
I 
Ica d 8 
tp 
ý00 
t0 
 . 
ä 
N 
a 
uC 
uF 9a 
e >. 
ýo u 
'aOT. 
es JD ý, a Cý 
wC 
dy 
hC 
C ý 
y7 
ie9 
Y Ipy 
«m 
Y IA 
L C. 
lrui 
t7 
3w 
N y. 
IY 
10 
r. 
Y 
ýý. 
ma 
;n 
=ý 
C3 m dý ýW 
s-a 
41 Lý 
Q3 y 
.. ý .. ý < ý 
5@¬i¬i¬iiii; 
iiii`fi 
3 
E 
l' C. 
-a 
N 
ý `ý =- 
JD n m .0E E5 .a m> vkj on E 5- 0 
QdxT -g 3? ý 
WCXvC 
.ý '^ kULE 
t7 ýü fl CO T 
0 7'0 C7T pp. ý Y ; op 
ý'O u 
äw°aýwoczÜ"a'ýwýw'Ll ýaGrÄ 
I.......... 
ri.. 
-NM4 V1 
ý OÖ Ö- "-" "+ "ý """ f/) . -. 
4 
T 
h: >" 'C 
.ýý 
ýuü 
ýv c 
.c au= 
1. n ýV 
uý. r 
v. 
ý 
ýý 
" 
TfV ý! 1 
l0 ý 
ý 'ü 
äiÄy 
WO 
e. O 
Yy-0 .2CÜ 
_"ýý 
"u Ä. 
ö ea 3 
. 
yý `ur L 'pppp ^ý 
WdC :ýd ýý 
7ý 
CV Oý C: ýu ýý " E 
:Hy.. 
.QV 
ä> 
pp, 
ý 
to p" (j t ý'" ý' 
. 
OCguu Cý 
x>, 3" C22c.. 3ý. "5 ý 
Q1 ý 
ý ýý 
........ - Ce c7 -ýcSriýJi btýoö(7 
°ýýýý 
>, -ci _ u 
UMU 
aý E yöý 
dvý Fý.. 
3° 
ýOV 
aý 
ý ý :ý 
c" ýý 
Ly 
uA 
xm 
C, c N 
V1 
ý 
C" 
N 
7 
C 
7 
ý. 
O 
r 
V 
d 
Vl 
ä 
ý 
N 
8 
Wý 
lQ 
a 
ir 
ý 
9 
N 
ý 
ý C 
GL_ý 
ýz b- 
ým a 
ti -F. 
>ýcö x_ 
t> 
a °.. 
5YN. ý. n. 
W C}. 
-ý' 
Cý} 
mm 
aýi 
`'ý 
ýe . 
'7 
, 
ýý Z ..:.. =. 9 ^' "- . -. Y. ET LL ý7.. ý. ... ý. C ý. ., Iý.. I 
ti ý 
t/. 
H 
°_ 1 ý 
n r- '" - [, 
ý 
. 'C e. 
Yuü. 
cýdEw: °' L. -cCuý.. __ .. _ ._.. ý... N ... , Sf ý! .ý.. ty. '? C ý! ,,,. __ '? C v ýýý. 5 Fýy ýý ý=ýO -- cy rý v Jý "C O .., cJ ri ý vi ý, O -cv rý v Jý 
=s2 
vd 
.0h .2., --_ 
=ä' 
LG=_.. " L. Vý ti M^6! 
e. d 
.ö "ö 
ý Q" NN .h OI L^ 
vd ýJ 
Ci öýýýE 
all 
ýý e'g Ec°, üý' ý=uCý 
"ýr. 
I 
ýý 
Rf ýNßV (' 
N '3 V. 1. ý"ý 
T3 äýý 'ý . 
ýe 
.Cýä". 
j4 "ý 
ýýmw "7 
o ; Z, . 
ýý. °c .^E ``ü -' 
ä =o Eg>, ý 
.. uaa.. 
dN.. ca 2ýA. 
1. '_ NO '7 N ÖD C i0 
aEä >y 
äGm 
.2 
Y-=ýX 
cd tC . 
ý". 
" :: i 
ýLd O" 
ý ý"". 
dO "2 C7 .GC 
a0 
a 
"- 
E 
pX ? 
"D 
öu y> ý. 
ryä, 
ý,. ý 
A97ý. 
Xu. Xm. X 
4N" 
Ü" 
61 
Ü+ ä 
. 
>, 
4OY . 
ý. ' 4.0 1. .. 
T. 0 LýEÖ 
2' 
Ed 
61 
i, 'J 
c .. 
2 ro 
31-c< 
AÖ7p ýý. >r ÖDbX 2 i, o- 7gÖ. 5, cr 100K p" L AU" ýömw¢aGä ^ cu tH wH_ -`"; u_ý. 'oA_x ýr? ýcrýoýx 06 L--v i-. ---ai. ý. ,i-dd... ý.. fQ "-" N 1+1 ý vl ý V7 vn Qa . =. N1v V7 . ". f/I . ". f/1 """" fA "ý' ýN Mýt v1 ,C-NM v1 V] 'Yi ý" N fý1 V vl 
4 
ý 
Ir 
ý 
O 
T 
x 0 Ct 
hý 
ýh. 
I 
C" 
ý 
N_ 
ý 
T 
ä 
°ý 
_n 
Z 
GVr 
V=ýý 
ýIü 
+L 
00 
"y 
N 
E^. 
C 
cvri4 
" 'fl 
`' 1 NV- 
0. p 'C ai N7 
11 
0 
.0 
.CO 
1ý. N 
ti 
ö^ 
L C" Lv O OIý O Yv 11 
'O yv 
ýUCn 
rý .ýNM0M 1= 
N1 ý Ci ýN M4 V1 Y ßi 
-NMh0 Ri . 
=. NM4 
v1 
iw 
äoc: ý2 öcZdö ei 
aci ?? .3 
rEä ý> > ü. °y ö 
p_aý 
am, 
is t0 Cý OC T 7'C '7 C 
H' 
4. m "Vý77 
3C id 'J 
C 
"r 
TW >s 
0. ý. ' i. 
j is 
mOO 
0 OE ; 
-r- 
"V 'O g 
VOifJ 
0NCN 'fl 'C ' Oü O >s ý-ý 
ai cC--,; -. ä3 `° fl H '3 m 
>°, aý oo 
Eö 3ý 33ýäoý io ý eýa 
H3wm `° ý oo 
m is öý ovo 
ý 
^ 
J4III4 oä >+ >3os : ý2 :`om ý° .. 
ýö 
eo L° 
" >+ m 
9> 
"ý 
> xý°, 
aýiýöö 
3ü 3Q ýo xü $ö T3 
ü25> s.. e 
ü25 
a,, .... v ýr ........ ,n , ý.......... ! .ýc C" N. N.. NvNy.... ý... , iy a. v ... ý.. N y..,.... ý.... 01 f9-NM"} 4--19 0 e0º.. ýNMý Cl - 0- d- Otv1-NMVV1 OtVI. -NM4 h OýV1'+NC1vv1 
ý 
ý4 
C 
O 
4 
O 
uu 
ý 00 
Ci ý+ pp WA 
6ý 
pA ý 
lO 
O l. 'pp u 
ý' AO Zý $pp 
ü 
ý' OOýýý. 
i0 
ýu 0> 
gÖ 
uý u b> 
gÖ Oý uý >gÖ 
>CD ¢az ý °>ý7¢aZ ` ý>C7¢aZ 
" pý.: NMdv1 tOpý-ýNMývI >ýý^+NfC1ýv1 ü 
ai'i 
Au 
Xtý 
Q0 
.ýY7 
.. O 
výWF b uuý 
ýyO o0 
ýCQ tä 
ý3 
oo 
wý 
n 
al C°L- gu.. öcent- bü 
`'.. Z, g " ,+ 
41. cugöqu >$ ö aý 
$ö 
Eu7 = fl>C7¢az 
ý 
ö>C7¢az s1D>C7¢az 
O U... ON". C 
: ývNClc} V'1 ýrvNMýYI M4 kA 
TÖýÖCTÖ ý. 
4. T. t. _, Tý. y4. 
ý 
. 
ýý' wÖ "- Lm .ýQ: wÖ "ý i'.. ie .ýCrÖ "^ 
bý 
"ý e gCT. ýON x M, i U, ý:, ON x "6cg ^. ^OtCix 
.,..., 'ýý.. 
ýý.. 
rl 
3 
-1.1 
CX 
7^ 
Öv 
a ,n w ... ý+ T a "- ý. ý 
9 
03 
ýý ._ Yý-. 
=C 
V v 
V L 
L 
-m "6 b -ýL >0 
4- W Co 
5N 
e ... wr a "- aý Aý 
uý 
OCCý 
Cý? 
C id dvý 
up °' 
N 
Cýýi 'O 
eD. äp °uT 
CC ý'O N 
ýý 
v6 
E 
kU 
F 
i ý, 
>. y .+N 
JD c3 
l0 ^ 
nIT, 
ýý N J, 
dýý waa 
ý"'HFý-F 
N.; Nvc V7. r V]... 4 
;Nh 
O 
ýT 
sr eY 
"e. 
J Cý" 
ý =3ý 
äb' c°°ö 
coO 'h ü 
"= 
vE> 
Zcd 41 $ Loo 
a, W týö 
ýý 
Ö 
ý d ý 
I. ý ý 
LY 
co lb 
ý> 
> 
l^ V .. M 
.. M -> py pC uC 7 
d 
fl 
N e0 : ß-ý5 6'ea 
N L 
zxvývýww 
ý ^. .... ... N-`.. .... .... .... CA -- ýNMýN 
z ý" ,. ý ,. ý ý 
0 rd 
. ._ 3E 
ßý 
ýy 
C2 
roý0 N 
ýy mh 
a' öo °c 
ý' C "O ý öW 
ý" E "' ,. 
i""ý y^ Ov 'U 
:: "ý '_ . c'i ý, "ý . - Q 
o .... ýH. 
ýýu "n " 
ýc = ?s 
ý. twd 
:iHe 
H 
.cF 
ä' 
-0 Q3ý9: 
c " ösöE; 
8 O 
:O i'. ýÖN 
3uTd 3wF `ý O 
, ¢ooaI !z 
m ýý..,. 
33ý 
ý ý.. 
6 -"4 v -- 
NA 4 V7 
O 
ý 2 ü 
I. 
t7 
d ý a 
I- 
'm 
c" 
N 
7 
O 
ý 
ý'. 
7 
ý 7 
C 
OC 
,Yu 
Vý 
wü 
a ,. ü 
U 
Ný 
ld 
1ý 
.. 
k N 
i7}r ýJ- 
kýA 
> . ý°'ý x: C ?>0M. 
_-; > .0 'Ö yuu ýy 
l0 C>>M 
Cýu S) T 
ýH 
6u) 
ýX 
WSfi)výfnW 
Öý '^. 
.... ... N -1 
fAýNCr1ah 
d ý 
0 
Y 
V 
F 
C" 
Y 
cC 
d 
O. 
N 
ý 
0 
ý 
0 
ý 
c 
u 
l. N 
;CN 
C "ý C ý ,,.., ,u byW 
.Nyý 
c3'S 
$ý3 
I ýi v i, Uä.. C 
EU Co 's 
E E= 0 
ýrosr ö'y 
O j` AÄTL 
, ¢ÖÖn:. 
°. 
a_____ 
O--ýNf"1 ýY1 
ý 
rý 
ö e r F ýý Er 
:2 ýý -- .. d C7 V1 
--ý >ÖO 
Cos 
aO 
ýý 
YWQ 
e a, F 
WOvý 
YOaMOÖ 
WN: 
7> U'>F. 
k 
12 s 
ý ývýý ýýN 
o cNr=: 
v ý, > °üF 
, pdpý C7W 
WaW 
.= ^x 
ýrý 
ýý 
C 
Y 
O 
W 
ý 
ý vE 
JNýý 01 R1 
ýU 
a. 
_, 
-4 6 e 
aä :: JA öö-, 
äý V cc 
.... oE wo 
u 
v d, ý=ü 
_ýýd 
L 
el. ,ý 
07 
'O C) O JW 7 
äi Y ai 
y 
aEi ai 
. 
]` EouNy 
ý 
"ý 
i0 
l7 7 
ýp 
Cu'Z7 
. 
zo 
YXTýr! n" 
dEAOw lV 
cý.. ý! «R 'ý C" 
.a: 
. 
öx0 55 
° IS "° 
öýý 
e. ä 
ý[=t1>-aCaC, Saa 
C/I-ýNN1ý 
VIýÖIý 
C 
'C 
ý 
ý 
C C A t 1 
ý 
s 
.5 ,o V 
7 
ý 
ý Y 
V 
7 
F 
u G N 
;, F-! v 
0 
3 
ý 
`ý' 
u 
ý 
ý ¢x 
00 
.T 00 
ý yy a>°, ýv, c> 
ý- ._,. .ý a a= ao .oý .r 
ý N_ 
. 
7 
ý 
C 
ý 
uW 
co ý 
ý 
C 
d b ý 
NN 
7ý 
Ir Nüu 
VTý 
ýg A 
C 
d eý y ä .yýW 
ý. = 
ßý 
yý N 
UM 
oC7ýa, 
9hFW 
a ý. CN V1 
OÖ 
02 ý .y 
YV 
H. 
.. -. 
ýý ü C7 Fý 
ýo Tý 
. , fl üC ._ 
ý'Eý ýý 
äxÜä 
- 
1; ý. ä 
0. N 
u 
ý 
ýV 
Y .T u= 
ý 
_ýýý 
. r RMý R G 
L" 
ý 
ý6 
V 
ýCNO 'ý 4-ýT 
d``,, WFýü 
"e 
ýäýýaý 
ý Wý 
ýyy3V Oýý 
2NH ,ý 
jýý' 
aa 
ue ý -" ýý 
Ö 
-fa 
rF- Hc 
oý yc 
C0 0c0 o Og 
00 .., 
V 00 ý. 
ý. 
°OU r- N 
00 t7 ý 
00 
00 E O 
O 
33 
d3c3 um "v eq 
a, 
n'fl"°_ ý. ° 
ý, b. ý aýý a 
.r.. n .C .C 504 nÖpF. 
ý 
. ý.... 
dfV h OÖ 
Ö 
J2 
L. 
Fü 
Vn 4) 
wyý 
°? > 
'C H 
, x'uz-0 
V 
L 
c" 
2öez! 
NY .- ý90 
.. he ö 
>, E 0,3 zd y}Ä 
'ö pýöG 
Wý 
.X kh C en 
'ä Z 
y 
W 
m0 Eý 
eý UT 
ýý äx 
g- 
ýN 
ý 
A 
Yý 
ý+ 
I7.1 
Mý 
, vä 
ýý ýýv 
 V7 -d t- ^M . -. C/1 - fV M-} 
c" ý 
8 
40 
r 
ýý^x,. 
dý--ýä 
Y 
y. 
N 
.+ 
03 Y ý 
- ö> wmü 
üý .o oc"ý c.., ia E ac. E ýa +. VrN= cö d dý i7 Ü ý. ý 3ý. cs= 3 s, 5 
ý3ýo0000oa cn U) 
N i. .. r. .. °7.. .... ý .... -"-fl-'-' 
-. ä- NýýA ýb r-L 6ý4 rý M' v- 
u 
'a 
V 
', 
R rA 
.X en 
FO 
of 
mý 
oý oc 
ýz 
ýN 
Äý 
iý 
Mý 
ýý 
ýý -- F !ýü 
dý 11E 
dý 
ýX[ 
tA 
cý 
cF ti 
> ý.. 
Hi 
WFOc7i m 
ýuQ 
:Sý' L 
ý 
öüý 
;o 
ab A 
ý' TK 
d 
, nEýV 
'ö 
o 
A 'c gä 
vv. -. v^ 
a--' cvr, 
ý 
d öv 
59 h 
uZ 
C 
Oy c7 
ýý. 
.0 ý" 
uY 
"O ? 
cq m 
4 
Ö 
ý 
ý ý ceb 
g 
- yý ýý 
dv OLG 
Q 
w 
. Y. 
E 
7 
i ýC 
b0 O 
Lý w 
ZÜ 
ýOH 
9Ät, 
ýU x 
_ýý dý 
dä 
G r. ý 
C .. i 
öN4 
3 
ý 
ý c 
ý 
=ý 
ýý ý Ei 
ý, 
Yý 
0 
_1ý 
x ýx 
eUo 
dbE 
ýn. 
mcý 
üýýý 
ö ý° 
=ý 
oý 
a "- 
C 'H . 
:% 'ý 'C 
C ±ý : :;.. 
a; oý w d.. Y 
V- 
ýO 
I- 
I. ý. 
»o "ý Wc 
-A : c:. 6 ;, 541 -, A ýn v`ýi 
E 
"' 'EK 
O! 
Ä4. 
-H 
Gp> 
ý3öa 
ýP: 
20 
ä-A tA 
L 
ý ý e 
ý 
ý 
ý 
ý 
m ý ý ý 
L. 
'Z 
ý 
ý 
ý 
> d 
.ý ý a 9 
C 
yA 
Y 
8 A 
ý 
.ý Y ý. ý. u 
Fý 
.e,. .. eo '- Nvvýýý 
ý' NýRH 
'0 ý" 
ý 
ýýý 
N 1. ý 
C 'E ZM 
m 2nm 
.. 
c.. 
Ö3 
YN^ 
öv3 
aN 
týt 
. ' C6 
= a, r 
6 ýE z 
2>"a 
ý 
V8 
FL 
ýý 
'fl T41) 
, 1'., 
N 
ü. 2 0 
_T 
0 
bý 
vý ýý 
ýo ýz Äý 
ýy 
di u 
ýr 
ý^ ýý 
ý 
a 
c" 
.o 
:4 oD 
0 
of 
O 
O 
C7 ý 
zÜ 
¢ 
v 
L U ý 
Vl 
d 
>- 
M 
Cý 
_0 
"N 
ýL 
ýU 
ýý sý 
0 A Lý 
rý - ýý 
ü 
yO. 
O 
MD 
L ° WE 
L0 
.s ¢z ; .... o .ý N V1 
0 14 
d ý 
V 
ý ý 
M 
:j ý 
x 
ý 
u ö. E 
CZ 
3voý 
e. .. 
K ý, 
no ö t;.. ä 
d ý 
s -- C ýo ý ýý 
.Zv 
. ýý ÖN 
p ý! ýO 
O r;. M. 'C 
i".: i. 
2y3 
Ä 
-'ý 
xü 
I <0 I> 
2"Z 
ä- 6 -ý 
-9 
ýÄ 
y týi N 
O 
EE Jý 
C°E 0Q'" c dCC 
i>>, y 
,RbrE d Ev 
-ý .i ýv L° ü° "5 Ä laý 
r 
ýx°ý 
Ö N1 
9NýNpOÖ.. -ý 
ý. 
-9 
Eý`E 
jNM CO iw 
Gý X ^C. X 
= ta ýý ea 
. -ý. 
v 
'fl yd Cý 
y 
fa 
61 
öA 
wN 
ý 
EH Ll UW 
0 
ýCC ý "a ý So 
V 
ýpp gu 
mý ý° Eu "c u VM 
xaeCJxAý 
_... _. v.; .. V] vM V1 lý O, "-" . M. 
C$ 
.. ý, ä00 
ar 
r.. m2 ti 
Mpý0 
" 
YÖ 
aE 
C" 
ýO 
CJ 
ÖO 
Y 
.EU 4ý 00 y .y 
n 
X. ý H"y 
epL 
'ý^^aUCýÖ 
pN Vý ýÖoööN 
"> 
C 
ý öw 
"m c 0 
U 
ý 
I. 00 
ý 3 
ýý 
"Äýü ;°> °A ýh 
1r iYi 
Ü 
ýI Exa. ° 
auQ 
. 
°. ý 
CL UU-C 
.C -- p4 u cie" ö` =c °ý"-., "fl E"_nu 'Ö "G y "C 
. fý N rn eý 
i1. 
ýý 
11 
Oý ^_ O 
0- ol -ý cnvlc- oN 
"ý1 
uoO1 
, 
__ 
Vý 
ý _ 
C. " 
ý xi CT 
Ný 
Ez 
6^ 
AM 
L º: 
61 ý, =- 
ýo 
,ýü 
>.. 0 
TV 
C Ici 
cn 
ic 
F. 
ý C. C 
O . -. 
EM 
N 
ý 
W 
3 , ý, Ee 
_ ,o`5 
IC) A 
C 1' 
0 00 Yu 
. fl 'O 
tV 
9 ýý Cv 
CN 
ý Y 
A W' 
UW 
.i^Ný 
IT - rA r 
AN 
J2 
ý- 
c" 
äý 
u 
"ü 
O 
ýz 
a^ 
el. 
m0ý t7 C ti O 
Cý 
ýM 
"V 
C. 
yý 
Ö 
7 
,vý 
"; ý 2 ýb "y U 
L "' 
mE 
b-ý Lv° 
d3ä, n°s 
., ý 
oyo sý p`" 
ý 
Cýýä, c7 
YCOý 
ýý"ý ýý >C 
r 
.. 
C. ý"VCHýý_ 
ý 
.~C d övÖ 
0 
0 
T 
3ý 
ý1 ^ fV 
0 =. a 
O fd ý 
Q 
Y 
L 
'O 
ý 
u 
Vl 
u ý+ 
ý 
I- d ;ýz 
ýö 
uj 
ý 
I_vl 
Vl 
, 
dQ 
u0 
rý 
x 
ýfV l7 E" 7 Tý. ý 
ýI üX C1 °' iä 
u -0; .x> ;ü; 1. ýX ia Tx 
t-K: ) 
um 
m 
ýý 
ý.. 
0 
I 
9 
O 
.ý 
Z 
ý 
O 
3 
ý d 
ü 
T 
.e 
U 
L 
E 
L 
-ý ý 
, ýo 
.. 3 ýT 'd ý 
_ ,ý ýý 
ýý ý 'ý ý U. 
LÜu 
._ 
T .C Ota, 
yCL .ý>U 7^ 
E" 
EH 'ý- äo 
'fl u 
x aE 
- NM4 vyb 
.ý 
U E 
u U 
ý 
0 m ö 
ý 
r N 
ý 
J' 
F 
ý 
T 
ý 
ý h 
as 
0 
o 
o 
an 
Y3 Q'C c >, '" 
NWOE Uý 
OyV.. 
ý 
'ý 
üt 
r+ . -. v^ 
a -- . }h 
V 
uU 
72 
>ö o ä0 
ai y T'J L ai ö i'e ü'y c 
°oü5 "c 
c" Eu v' 
>' ac°ü oE 
3>ýý5E 
-o. °ü 
C Qt. - 
1y°ýy 
'c7 
w1 ý 
'O y 
Fý 
V+ 
>ocÜ 
J. du _" 
ý_ =qC 
Vi [7 
.u 
0 
r. ýT 
Cý 
C 
._T 9u 
6/ 
NC 
G 
... ai 
aec 
C C 
xl ýr; ýö F= 
ý__ ýý Cýý 
ý ý? L. 
ý ý' 
ý ; 
.ýLC? 
C 
_ J; - 
c 
ý--Äm 
th 
'+ 
NM 
C 
d 
ý 
Vý 
R: 
v.. .. 
yA 
yY 
G ý' 
ýý 
L ý_ 
ý V1 
C" 
ýV 
Cý 
Lý 
ýý 
ev 
aý a ýý 
_ý ýx ýý ýv 
dý 
ýN ýOE'^'. 
ýý 
.Q.. 
ý. 
12 41 5 
ý5 
A != 
` 
V .5 0 
ý 
t 
'C 
0 
ät 
3 'ö 
Ü 
cý 
0- .C 
ý 
s. Fr 
N 
4" 5 ü. ý, W =3F, 4-! - 
w ý 
ýV -A 
c1 ýö ZIÄ n. >` 
3ýC 
YViý 
a .a9 CA ayý 
ý>"= u 
oa... 
a, a, eu ü 
ý ý. 
ly O 
in .. . -. .. 
a.; -.. d,. a -- ci r, a . -" 
3ö0 
ý .5ý. ýt 
ÖX 
cF 
ýý 
Z G7 
0- 
ON 
ý-- ßr 
3ý 
iF b^ 
M 
. 
c" Z 
c" 
ý 
C 
N 
d 
`eo u 
a ,.., 
v°°Y 6m 
as 
ý. 
w 
m 
r 
oi 
:2 
» 
m ý 
c 4 
R 
03 
a m 
Y 
W 
ý 
d 
'O 
ü 
ý 
d 
of 
ý ý c cc ý' 
pd 
FTi. T 
00C Cx 
"ý'. T. 
Av dN ýN 
0>F 
ý> ää 
ý= ýý ýý 
c" 
ý" >, 
. 
ý+ Y 
00 V 
O? 
0 
ü 
A 
r 
C 
Jý 
Laý. ý 
O4 
Gý 
Lý 
OW 
ý"ý 
Öý 
O 
"W 
O 
9 r_ 
V% 
CC 
ae 
. 2Ö E^ 
0 C 
äW ýw 
ý^ ý, ^ 
ýo ý E 
ýý v y H1 C 
mý 
"3 C 
.... ý 
N 
4r 
O 
.0 V 
0 
.W 
E 
ý 
0 `z 
ä" 'ý =- 
yN, CN 
0 
C0 
o0 3ýavoý 
n^ m- a%- a. -; al a_ IT, ä- P-a . -. 
C" 
ý 
d 
Y 
Ir 
F 
0 
ä 
0 
a 
u 
C 
O 
u 
ý 
OO 
ýz d r. 
(V 
be a 
ý ä 
d '° "c 
ý 'C 
dý _w 
Vl 
N 
E 
ý 
d > äx 'ý 
- ýo 
b7C ;QL 
y 7dC Az y. 
; fl L. 
Ö Vý ý'Ö .G Týd 
ý, ä "ý ýýý u'C A `' 
ýaaü 
Ya°aEE 
in ýyE on 4 
vý vT 
LN O c' aý ý.. 
A 
. 
d. 'ý V" 7ngC N :6 
33 IU 
n. 2, ä" ET., Y 
'Ö 
ý 
tý 
NLL.. ý 
,LEC 
m.. -x -2 22 9, 'c t; .ne äýýo 
ý 
=F= 5 '" öü 
°ý 
> .. op öx ýýL: a?: ý 
-e u !7u'Lc 
F ;, °cQ_ ;v äi to r >, ' y 'O Eýyu7Z 17 
ý. 7 .77 
:: -0.2 aaE-E .u -kc . -s x1 'm 'm 
äi zcoa, .s .ý: ýý5a3 'w 'w "w 
_yý': 
ýý 
t- ýY 
CO9 ý ýrvcrý yy 
dv rö 
ý 
r= ßYF 
^rrn F_.. `,. ... CJrTI --- tg c- YW IWI WW.. a.. Mr r+. 
.: ^ ýäý N .. d..... ý` tý dýr ...: .... vi -. Ne1 V] i, " t/1 oo - Nen 'T V) N6 r- 
ý = 
U UQNCG 
y C ý. N 'ý" ý"E 
üý 
Uý "C E L ýtl 
ýý7 vQ. Yi Uga 
cýxCq 
L 
_x _ ý,... 
ppvw C. 7v.... 
Gfpv0 vý Ö 
cv MF e} F ýn X16 c- F oö a ' 
"> Cý 
m XUdyC 
C °ý 
"N 
ý" cO J 
E 
. -. ° ö° ° Ec ' > ' ° .ü ýo ý, -; . ý" ý T. x 0.1 E Z hUU Uu Q aC °' Ll a rA 
- 
` 
( 
pa r C7 
ý 
cX 
LGy 
... ývv ý". ' Ö 
NMFýFJýaC%b noöý ý 
"j "ý U 
U 
Y 
UG ~U. 
XUdhG 
ä. 
 
G ý" ý .. Eýx o. En ° 
F e iu ßj mý^^Y x a2ýL1^ 
,, owd .... ý.. ý.. a .. " N MF 'T NaC b cýFoö. ý d 
UU °3 
E üd;, 
x 
Y ='c Ä 'ä uüe p ° 
y 
o _ p ü ä eu G 
2r m °vý ¢v ¢aC ý-yyÄ ZäY 
ý ý 
ý vv .. ý 
Ö 
öý d N % FvJ e i c- o - i 
UUU 
uU U 
.. xUx i' G 
E Fýa N F"acýe yM ý üE rý "E ý vý üeüä =' a 
cm 
C? 
`ý a -: 5 
-E¢<ý2A 
go ý 
C7 : w .... .. .. d NMahnF OÖ O, 
u 
u ä 
ä>>>> o 
FFýuL °ü 
o ý? oocc°'0 ut Ö' < n< p' oo ýn < F a 
vON 
ý "Öh 
U 
ÖÖ 
f O 1VI 1 
L 
O 
uu 
G äyyEv 
p }ý 
= , -` .c 
e 
= N Xy FH 
V; 
r 
"eoC üCü N2 5ü G" OL 
ýÖ'bÖ ' ' ý nQ, n QF 
voN H1 
-t 
hI- OÖ (A 
>, 
UU 
ö" ä 
" i >E: > ýt >> > yFFJCSC Nc,, 
7 öD GüGüýp. c 6. 
Oö 
o°a f. 
ä ¢¢I='äÖ 
-+vNAvi OÖ dd 
ý 
u 
ö ýQ Ev 
^. e äx`o 
>>2 C 
3 NC 
N 
. 
f'ýx Hc ü 
ö Yeü iEI$ 
Öý 
d 
3 
äu 
> "E > t> 
Y 
> > `tFF. ýL Yrö 
3 p°°e ü üY `"ý o. 
c äo 
F^ .. ,2 ° QF ä0 0 
Oov 
ýý . 'ONM4 V1ý6 I- 
ÖÖ 
.. o , 
N 
ý 
0 
äý 
~Tý 
äxa 
ä >_, 
^f11 
d MýÖ 
, 'O C 
ýý 
EE2 iC : Zö: e, " 
Oqý .-Y 'y u} 
LYi 
ýN 
JD 
33 ä0 m 
5ý..  
wyNV1 
yL 
Yý 
C9 
CGi 
2 
9O 
Nd 
. i3 20 
ov 
üpý 
h M. ZC2 
... 5 ýý Cr 
dc5ä ö 
E V 
ý ýo " 0 U, ti ý 
'0 V 
ý 
.ý 
F- 
h 
ý 
.ý 
L 
. ý, 
5 :ý- 
YC 
;>OO 
W- 
"yH 
.H w`i 
49i. 
_ 
Cý/ 
Ä-' 4N vA 
-A 
c -. 
v 'm 
ää 
dE.. d 
ý. ý 
4hý 
Wý .ýý 
L. ,.. 104 -. 
L 
IM 
Oy 
T 
.. 
IM aE E 
wý 
tý 
9 Lý ld 
aaUu üý E 
nA 'O 
TdO 
-ý Y vr Y 
Yý 
Hr .ýd tý AOý. 
Y 
M WA Ä E' EEe 'ý'cm 
Q+ 10 
°äý F7 -- ý- 
" 
7>CYNý ýÖ 
öýv 'fl 
ý CA Uxä, 
ýýýý ýNýÖC2T 
O 
r. 
if ->> . _ýý ., 0,.. m ta 
xýN. E>v ýuä Ö'q E 
`a >u 'ci äp ý 
'ä° üe:; 'ý "° ä äEE 
. ,e 
=ýä>°, 
W 
ci Y .. 
LýyY 
y ýý va 
2 ,8> GQ 
Nvýý 
VI . ýr tý'1 
Y1 
-ýý_ dZä 11 ý 4 
. -C. 
bi 
uO LC 
°O L 
in 03 
C2 -V . ^en 
viP 
ý U 
u 
OE 
cý op C7 0 ai ý 'ü 
x3 
öFH 
E. ýýý n r.. Lö 
.. u 00 'C l"; 
-. 
. 'ý . ý. y`° __ ý" 
aý 
_ 
wl 
. wn 
V .. oWa2 tA 
wT F= c. v c `ý öEý 
& 
'° CD 
ö_oE. 
-d va 
2 
>"7>ý "03 'L V> 
.° . ý^, " :. ýFku :C.. .. e 
.6F! CS °' z"; aP 
>; '7 n. d5--a --- ... CG-... _-_ öa 00 Q' CC 
C E. GCÖLcyN 
6 ý'^^ EFVV.. 
. '. 1 
cý.. v.. N4 ,6 Ö 
(V ýý7 
pGeCp ýOL. 
0ý0 '. ý7 SFt 
0EYoý on 
Hýý; E"' 
yö 
Qä 
ypVy 
Q 
"Q 
"Q 
^ýýrOy 
NC 
~ 
üýL Öý OT pýý c'd ý 
.... 
`ý' arorý3 ao ° 42 
ý gq C yV 
G/ 
CC- 
"C 
üYýLý;, ýý N' p e7 
ý `a v 
C0 vs =o ä8. Cý cu -0 3 392. W EEro oý a3 eob ý 
2 id l' 
Z 
eý 
LVÄ; r- -^ ä, cý 'ö ýT c3 ý3e. % 
Z .°v o`ýg r 00 
wüý. ý-mm .= ýöö ha:.... ý.., e .... .. n...... m ...... r. h o. N......., ý....... N.... ý... amd. ý e, v) a. r e%i v, 0- c%, v, cý 
nN 
'ý 4 
o wý n ynN; E 
3 ä;;, R 
-TVV 
üN4 b 
s 
bý 
U 
w. 
Cý 
O 
ý 00 
,ýtý 
ýýU 
ö r- 9- 
öýýý 'eo 
D-1 GNb]. 
I-- 
U 
I-. v 
ý2 -0 ZN 
ý. := 
ýý 
G 
2 
ý 
U 
> " U 
I- 
ä 
.,, 
5 Vl 
7. ý> 
Vy 
ljý 5 
ýý ý 
ý_ 
=ý° ýýý 
c~i 
6. 
E 
V ý tN qdý 
ýýdO 
29 : go --ý ';: 
c" o 
ý3 
.ý 
E 
. 
°x 
Ä 
,uu aTi 
-ý 
= ý0 ö ö= 
=tixm 6 
? NýýÖ ý? o 
Yý 
ýU 
'O T 
ÖD Ný d1- 
a"- T 
uu c :: " 
ý 
`K. uoý"a, o 
K. 
ti"fl o°d 
üý, 
p 
.WG aýi 
ý e0 .äVXý 'ö0 
º. _ 
ýu=cu 
ýb u ü 
Wä =aur 
_o 
ý= o2 : xü 
.... v 
V7 :: _J. ýA 
ýý 
ýýX 
Öýý 
ý. % Q Qa 
ýýý N4b 
Ü 
Ir 
f7 
v ý 
N 
ýC 
'. 3 N 
V 
ýO 
;, 9 ca 'h 
v? ý 
,C 
c .. 7 a m"- O° äd 
.ýaHm 
C.. 
ý. ý,? ' ý 
«k 
_O . m $. 'Ä 
ýývHw 
cý. äc 
.ý 
oý ,=äa .: uuý. 
N aý 0 . 1, ý= u No r.. 
C" 
LLI 
ýhO 
ýU" 
3äý 
C) -Z 
N_: 
cüTL ý'ý ýý- a 
öýiÖ ý^UOý 
5ti. ''A 
ý" FCc ý° wE 
ýOOvN 
ß pq cnýäp 
ýc3^ý Ev ia 
cý3 
i. up>, 
Ca. mW äv'n 
pö d" o ef 
O 
61 '! 
pEJ 
>' 
"_ ;CypN- pJ 
.C c0 OD pNnA" a3ýä mýe c öE 
d ä. _° 
'y ýý .9u o11 
ü° 
ja 
ý°' v3g3uwu ödo cts möev>p 
ai 
ü 
ü 
.ö 
äo Cl. 
v Tý O. Q 
hoC is Cý wý. 
7 TT0 
, 
ýý2 °ýöýý ýýý=4ýö 
ýýýý 
d-M V1 
, iz 0 (n:. 
.C 
3 °O 
Vl 
CO 
ýC 
¬990 
oý ý. 
v __ lO vvv. -. ýp v.. 
",. ý 
of ^H1J, cý- Oý-' NM4 ýA b 
oý 
tNý 
.ý 
I. öa 
c" 
d ý 
0 
.3 
Eöý 
T w0 C 
d '> > 
ý N ld 
N 
ýýý. 'ý Lý-- 
. "N 
E 
2 
0 
ou 
I 0 
° 
U ý 
E 
ý 
0 
ý 
ae 
.ýu 
p, ý7 
x. 9 
ýý . : -ý v ý.. C 
`ý 'Q 4 b0 
pý 7ýCu wx 
U+ 
CC 
vý än]C EG1üm 
ýee ..: l. a ... fV ý ýF ýN1! f m 
I--: - ---- c GA "a 
C 
to 
äý pEq7d 
7E a C 
u. .-g 
ä :: -=. '_ä ä vý >. -Q mo ýe Eý ýZ ;X; O :2 
LC 't! Cy? N~AL t7 6! 
FOH 
lu >' 
O 
-e LiO 
C .axýÖwCý 
.2J 
W . 
Cr. 
r c °,, ' T- W! }. r'^Drn ý, cý, e 
ý^. ___ _ y f/2.. ý^'... NMý VI\Ö V7.3O .... Mh V]^ý}[ý 
C 
O 
ÜT 
äi ; 'ý G. 
e, -, E 
ýri ý 
d 
ý Y ý 
L 
a pr 
Y2 V1 
vüc 
ý" Eý 
d'0C 
a, "`- "u F I) 
ä3ýý.. a oTýO 
r äEE E ý. 
ý it 2w 
M uu c 
ý .... 
dNtz : °Eö 
aä >, ; 
eÖ 
p, O 
Lýö 
00- 
yäuý. Ö 
ý .. 
yN 
v1 oÖ 
.ý q 
a 
0 
'E o 
00 ý °8. 
A 
tiý 
M= 
ý3ý3e 
>ö °= "cüý Ör-. h 
y : fl >. 
w r! v 
ý+ýE. - 
C-4 fn ýýý 
Co . 
11711-71 1h Ili, 
6 
.4 
oN9: 
E o. 
ö 
; yoý 
Gý '-'. ý 
ý E- ,oQ öH Er 
c ýO ö ý° 
ä-4 
s 
A ý6 C 
GA C 
-ý Vs 
ýU 
o a 
m. ?ýý 
a 
E 
d 
N 
ý C 
U 
.XY 
N 
ä 
. _ý 
7 
L 
to 
t 
d ý 
I) 
ä "G 
u öa 'v 
eC 
ea ýo t co ha 
iiý 
O, 
M 
i0 C 
:2yt tÖ 
vf 
Ü 
V"E .X 
LWT Cý 
t 
4> k. 
CCtdd 
VýýA "ý. ý 
es =ýýý 
E 
ß 
f! 
X 
O> 
-v 
ý 
ý«CyYY 
Lw>. UÜV 
a, ýOC7C7C7 
.ý 
6üüd dý ý, 
WWWWW 
a .. .ý 
V]. Yý"Ntý1ý V1ý0 
ý 
ý .8 
Vl 
ý 
ý 
d E 
` 
ý. 
. 
:a 
eo 
Y 
L. 
"= Cd 
Hý 
ý 
Y ßj 
i 
9ý 
ö 
aö ýr 
Aý 
ca ý LO M 
Az ä 92 
xw 
Z) 
00 O 
W 
NC 
ýý 
yNN 
ý" 7 
.. 
C ýý 
ý 
ýv 
0 
Nc : üy 
äý-0 
V 
"C O 
ý- 3 ýL0 
ö Lu 0 
`o00 
:3 3"S"° yCCC 
L0dÖ 
GG 
O 
yC 
ýy 
:DCO 
-Ei 3ý00 
ýNN 
Nýý 
Cü= 
,2 "O :aCE i7 !i !4 
7V yý N'y y oädu .c c F= ýJrö 
A >, 
düJÜü0 
> -Z 
d 1. "--. . -. . -. ^-. . -ý .. 
l0 7.. ý,,..... .. 
cg - c4 ri e Jý ýb oi - 
Ö 
iý 
Y 
d 
L 
tr 
I- 
0 ý 
'00 
A N 
ta 
8 
Y 10 
Ud 
ýE 
Nbý 
ýýü a u ý-' -ý 
C 
W ý. 
V 
_T i. 
ýen 
tL ýj ý ý" r 
V_Y 
F6x. 9 Ä E"= 
, 
ö. 
uý 
= 
... e 'G .. 
E. 
=u0 ý>xy Ä°ää, 
Ü 
ý 0 
4ý 
u 
u 
0»- 
um 
e 'C .. A 
c6 
b 
a 
Go 
20 äü 
?+m 
E 
at 
e ý N 
.C 
.ý ý 
ir 
", 
F 
ý ' 
0 
7ý 
ä 
pc 
i< 
to 
... ý 
C 
mv 
ýý ýý ýý <A 
iv ýýýý 7,17, YY 
Vi - fV M It h 
oü 
X ýg 
cd 
3 
ýä 
.. Q' 
01 'ý' y 
ai cQ = 
wQb 
O 
'Ö 
pUp 
l0 Nüx 
U' 
W U'O U. 'O .3 0- V 
.. EEE 
' 
öc äo v äoý 
TTTTTL 
UUUUt 
,ý.. .... .. d -+ NM4 v1 
L 
es 
ui. 
O 
ý 
ý 
c 
ö ?ý 
9 "yý 
4" 
%. - 
üe 
a >` o u y f7j 
ý 
I-" 
. 
a. 
a w"ý E 1d 
=°"ý'ývE 
näp 
Y. -n - : -- 
L 
'm 
L 
t7 
F 
H 
W 
d 
ý ä 
ý 
a 
äx 
m ý. ý. " 
LN 
E 
Lü 
W 
dv 
00 ... 
FN 
.. c 
t9 N 
.. L CO 
ta - 
ýUýN `1C t0 ýý 
wü ro'äo. 
E Äaü 
QC7x. 5aGC0 c 
ý r.. -... o 
vv 11, v 
ppp 
ýý 
V7 
vN M4 V1 V7 'C 
n Cc 
... 
: 
a-: cýr%, 4 v% 
ý 
jVy 
Cr 
y 
C" e`3' 
ri". 
X 
3 °, ö 
^y 
0g0 Ü0"C 
2 [L 
"O 
pV 
,o n' K 
je 
ef üuýö 
mEsý ia _' 
ý+ ý äý Eü 3ý o 
Eý. 
- 
cýýEü a5 
TTTT 
, CU , CU , CU , CU 
u 
FFFF-' 
Ö 
C 
ýý N 
OG 
NO 
aý+ G ýr 
E :ý 
0 SH 
ýd 
29 
00ý 
C 'O 
O 
tOn 
W> 
d 
eý 
rý 
_I- 
ýýez 
ý ý.. Ol. N 
ýu 
Oý 
ýN 
0 eý'i __ Aýü 
aoE., 
ä =. - 
9 
.. a ý E 
ý. 
ä 
fJ 
d 
ý 
d 
E 
N. 
ýo r 
ýo N 
1. 
Yý t0 
NE. ý 
a, a "ý, co >, c- ry LLý 
Q .N-ýy OQ ý^ .DvUn 
dü 00vý' °ý 
Ný ÄFe a' CI 00 oü 
Y> 
'C L. ,Xü 
aCi 
M 
'ý Ä4 e0 L .... 
iýýý 
e 
ý'cu 
xa 
Fs nnäC. r. . 
ý 
... 
ý7ý 
ý'ý 
üý 
N 
m' 
wmmmmÄm 
VIý nvNM4 ýb 
C" 
L" 
E 
ý 
E 
Eö 
» 
.?. tE 
ýo - 
.0 -7- "ý M 
C 
W 
t 
L 
V 
-ac 
Ww 
2x 
o v, a ý- 
ýý 
Co A 'o x 
ýý ýý 7N 
C 
0 
.a Y 
C 
d ý 
I. ý ý 
x 
äý 
Y 
Ir 
7 
F 
q 'Z3 
äiM 
d 
ü 
a. F 
no 
d 
e" ö 
sz 
ö 'r N 
ý. 
{.. 
Vý 
L 
c" 
d 
L 
9D 
t 
0 
E-F du 
3ý 
C e. n. 
c1 .0 h o' 
> dö ýc 
0 
ý 
ýO 
L 
Nyý 
.. u_ý U t 
.ýoc c 'ý ýv Qa oq 12 ü 
C 
öre ý_ 
ýOc 
3'e ö, ý,, E '2, 
mýýx ý 
Is 3HX -b v C3 ?CtR 
iý2oý °° 
O. GOq ýp 
Lý .CýLC 
o 
Q 
nÜ uý iC 
3ý °c'aiO'ý 
2? = =O t 
" 
.üy 
°c 
C °_ ?o 
eoý r -v 33 
1n 
ä 
m 
40 
ý 
.. 
ý 
N 
O 
OJ 
3E 
do 
d. 9 
i- 75 
Lr 
Wv 
n. (1) 
E 
oý 
Yý 
äý 
x .. ýN 
E 
ýE ý ý 
na hý 
3 
0 ý 
R L ý' >+ Ee 00 TTy 
a+ ýoý 
e. ý n.. 
cvcccc 
co -: of -NA4 -n ý6 r 
ý 
2 
tl 
N 
% 
y 
U 
U 
C 
K 
v2 v 9 
A 
I; q 
.Z 
-ý t7 .X 
.ýLv Cuy. 
ý,, 
["'QyCA 
"', ýG"NýýÖoö z d 9u 
ÖD ü 
Y 
ý. A a tO 
93 G. , r_ 
.c 
"` 
.x 
dwGv>>ew 
-- ........ ,- rv 
A ý 5 
A 
t- TTT T- 
&A - (n W) t- rn 
.a b- L>>y 
ýxxL 
ü 
^: -e °R ^yN 
C 
uua cCy 
33d 
aoocý 
OHNV 
N 
... 
ý 
.NnhH 
ýdd0 
6" 
C2 
00000 
Y. 
Q 
`ý+ 
ý. . 
ý. c. ýi 
p C... 
N4 
,6 OÖ 
C. p. 
d I! e0 nn 
üCý 
,O73 -9ö 
y 00 xoý 
ot iýXFFý 
39- cý QLo 
0" -- ý ýý 
'C 
0. 
=- I_ ý^^^ 
CF d4o ý3 ?"ööö 
'ýdz ýy. ýN 'ä aa CD " 
V L. N 
>I t 
'ä Hmän 
süaaa 
yC000 
ri 
NVUNN 
NU 
ºr Oý ty ty ht 
1 'ýý. 
ý0000ý 
a« . a-: MJ, tL Oý -9 
N 
v 
2 
.ý ýo 0 .3 
ý ý e Y 
d 
E 
C 
'O 
d 
uý. ý 
.Q 
.2 a- ý Y 
I- 
ýp 
F 
N 
C 
ý 
ý2 
t 
.Z 
x 
zr e "ý ýVL 
ývdvd 
F" 
Je 
c 
ä E- aCF- aL= ; iz 
qq GC ý 5. d77p 
ýQQnný .ý ý d äg A 
A'ý aa; c 
r. 'ýcx rv: 
äý'C ü eCi 
üdü 
-w "p äi äü äu M 
ly ""- >>>>> 
,ýüj33 ýx 
"ö .ý .ý .ý .ý .ý ^0 ü wo"n0"an 
ýý 00o0oqöDoO 
CC^, 
.... .. .^" 
'fl 5 >, 
yy pý üüüvd idý 
,ýEö 
, 'ý 
ýý L týi 
L 
7C) ýe ýCp -y ýnFC7UC7CýC7 Wýa, ü ý.. 
_ _.... 
ý: ý,. 
C/1 ý "ý 
N N1'ý Vj \Ö [, OÖ 
v 
o- 
0 
r: 
L N_ 
Ny 
WL 
ýC 
r3 ýo 
3 '$ 
.. o a .e 
W 
0d 
!l . ý. 
'7 Eýýýý9 
LHyLý 
7>> =u 
FýGFýC N 
QQvý ri F- 
cr ä 
`61 
000CGC 
ýup y 
NoÖÖÖOO 
ý_ NUUUUU 
t0 V 
FNNNNN 
A7A 
Aý AA 
UVVUV 
00000000' ü 
0000000 rJ ooooaoooooooooO 
rý ^ CCCC^CC 
a-ý "c4+rivkn 
bcýob 
ý d tt T ýý 
N 
7N 
ýN 
>00 7 
7p 
I 
ý 
L 
ý F 
ä> 
Cý 
oQ 
ý. ý 
ý. s V 
aö = DC 
60 
° N 
C. . ao 
o 
dyu 
rmW 
r 
w 'C 
3 T.. 
äU 
.XY7 
7ý 
7C 
ow 
ý° o^ 
ýx 
'S 
pN 
xF 
'ö ^ 
dC_ 
Cx cn- 
t7 
F 
V1 
xy 
tz 
L 
t7 
c" 
pN 
9L C2 
°0 [NNVQ `ý' lNNV4 
ex 
uV `o c- 
ýo " ö4 
ý 
Y . -. 
Ci 
M 
ax 
,o 
v 
V 
41n 
d lV 
00 
t+l 
Y 
C 
%n ýQT 
d2 
bý4 
v cc Ö Y(V ýN 
_i. C dd 
'O p ý° a+ ia 
aý .x 
ex vo 
.. 
'ý c" 
aEen 
0o a, ý. : 
ýCý- 
=W`. 
'ý 
Y 
ýO 
16 cr -_ Cr 
ýý 
-(A -. 
9 
t V 
7 
h 
E 
W) 
n. L 
.. 
ýd7 
UV 
ö 'ý "C 'v 
E Z' aa ý 
`" 
i". " 
^ "'; 
v 
"ý C 
". 
C. dC 
>a "-" y `ý dVü3ý 
CA wÖw 
Y" 
'Ö 61 ^ 
Rf ý ý. Y 
r- .ý IF 
« 
ä 
ö 
wý ^W !ý 
M 
"ýO N 
.4 tv 
E. 
j 
>1 
Ö7ýý 
xH xv 
acn.. a-. 
ý Aý 
ý ý ý Y 
ý d E C 
7 
d 
ý ý 
YE 
ro 
p7ý. 
QCÜCp'^K_-0 
t7 
ýý, 
V, vvvvvva. +vv 
Nr"it}v'1ýb no0Ök 
ÖO Y 
a tr 
aöe N 
ý 
0 
CT 
r 
"'t' ý . ^. ý, äý F= .S 
ýY C"> C"j Cý= a`'i O öööý °' !? ýD "ö0i04 M 1r 
i: FDLvýQ 
, Q? C -rz m3>, 
ev . -. .. , -, ... -... 
. 
^ý ý ý.... ý.. Mý Vl I- OG Öl C"-" ippv 
VN 
y yC 
Y"ý 
i N`" Oi NýL 
97Z 
.X OC 
ýZ Ä cý ä 
JD Y 
y E" [-ý+ ýC .ýyN 
ý 
Y... 
X 
TbX L"C. 
> C. > C= uO CO 
+Ci 
Öý"Oýä u= ua ppýcA 
ý, ^Wü F- aG vý Q vý aC ý Gl 22 Q 
V] %A ý+ VI di '+ 
NMv v1 ýD Iý oö Öý VI E 
I. 
d 
ö 
x 
C 
ý 
'Ö 
C 
ýq 
R 
4 
CIA ö 
Ltp - 
N 
' 
U 
ý 
w 
't7 
ý 
U 
> 
4 
ý 
u 
w 
C 
M 
D: »0 
xý ý:. WL 
rc^ 
F- ca ý; 
ý .Y NX" 
ýx ý C. ý 
_ . 
ý. 
ö 
xx'd"o a, 
'a "ý > "ý 'ý ý "= 
ü 
w>> >_ ý_ ý"C"S 
PCs x¢^¢Hooo 
ý-ýNMvi 
r- 00 ö% 
ö 
Y 
, y'd 
VT 
.d 
Cý .y E- F+ ýt. ý4 .C 
'C 
ýY 'U Cj C> Yy 6yi 
ý' äFý^Q^QFmÖ 
~Vv 
yw d VI -N C'1 cr v1 
r 00 Ö+ 
-d 
_-- 
7O 
0 ý 
ý 
ý+ 
a, 
ýx 'ý ýoÜ 
cä F=F: ký4sr : 
°'. x'vc'>"c'>: si"= ü ýýýý ý> >= ý= 5 cý 
i, F-aGýnQvýGE- aCO 
°: ý............ 
ýý Oßi... be G 4-' N M4 výö r-ý ooý 
Cy 
L. 
O 
O 
öb 
O 
0 
ý 
O 
r 
a 
0 
Ow 
A 
ý 
ý E 
v ' 
0 ý 
ý G 
W 
O 
d ý wo 
Y 
ý 
I- 
U 
oý 
:9 
ý ý LO 
9z 
ýv ÖN 
O 
A 
ýý 
ä' 
M 
Ö 
g 
0 
:0 
C 
C 
U. 
.Q 
.A .y 
C 
ý 
to 
aý ýo Vý7 
'O >ý. 
_ý ýö 
h "N 
OMoÖ ü'ý ý 
"T V" 
N l= ^4X> d "- 
Cýý7 L 
lV 
yV 
O 
i""ý i""ý ýý 
"ý 61 
Nr 
LV 
oc--"E 
'Oä -E$ÄE". 
0 
dd ýgg ooE öý 3>Ex "G 
el Cp i7 =ýp vi" 
'ý "'GF"ký- ý; v 
ý h"ý0'> T cý U 
Ü=== Ö 
NaavýH 
ýYý i"r i""ý r"ý ý "ý Cv 
^' V]. 
ý+"="ell Nr(: 
H 
0 
m 
ö 
c 
U 
zz, 9^ LOC 
vGO 
ý rJ 
Eöý3 
ou 
L7 
o r. 
ý''ý "° äo 
yýoa d 
a; _F"ý 
N"g 
. 
O. OD C Cy 
C L' 
qý 
Cy VI F" 
.C 
3YQQQ Qý 
ý 
Ov 
ý°., k"(VýýÖoöÖN da L 
.wd 9 
yL N_ 
OO lJ 
bL 
cL, 1 Cý 
9 
3dä 
ga 
ö 
.e 
G 'ö ýýý LýýO 
w .r 
E 
d 
Ir ý 
OC 
dý 
V 
ýO O. 
dE 
N "ý 
Oq 
2 .. w 
6! ý 
_dM 
°" s ýc 
rý 
N 
U 
ý 
L 
X 
ý 
7 
ýCq 
7 
ö 
a 
--ý°t-5 
äE in In >>""=vý 
8 °. c. =g'"`° > 8r- F> 8ýt 
=< «< 
v . ". . -. . ". . -, 0.0 
........ Co r- 
C 
u 
'C 
2 
u 
öä 
(1" 4) Ho 0 
7O Og 
L 'ý pq w 
Crý LL 
ýÖý 
eCi ýo 
tE 
ý. MoP. ü 
EE 
" 
uE E sý. 
cr 
c=w 
Ö Cý Cýy 
xWÜ0 a> 
Co = 
.iý. ___ 
d E"' ... 
NA4 
ý" 
,ä ýN E 
L 
W 
4 
E 
C 
d 
hG' 
E 
d > d d 
M 
ý 
q e.. '2 E 
Cäü 
mu 
:2zý 
u> 
Üwxý 
c" c 
cl 8 
Vl 
C6 
0 
Y 
L 
:ý 
H 
"a 0 :ý ý 
ý 
:ý x 
.ý ý ä 
Y V :7 
F 
dý d_ 
o 
e>, 
äE 
ý º. 
ýý 
ea.. 
ýý W 
vt y 
ýý 
'fl E 
^-ýJ= 
ý'1 ä 
ýo ý E 
0 
d 
H 
w 
=e ý C3 
o .. ev 
du 6ý 
Cy 
.5 
"c ý 
C^ 
Oý CEI. 
N 
d 
Gýj 
W yC 
dV 
°"cz 
r. tý a>>ýý 
VinWT. C] 
M "^"' "" vvv ý, ý ývw. i 
V]-NM V] ;i -1 M v5 -+ 
.; 
_d ýq 
W 
ý 
E 
E 
03 
00 c 
t, 
-5 L" VN 
ý? " .5 
u t" 
ý" 
O C" 
ý 
, CT 'ý :2 3=> 
a"i OL 
, ý-z.. C" .. .. ".. d-1 NMaF -N M 
.ýý 
öý 
_, 00 d: D = 
mz 
J7 Ä 
ýx 
N. 
a! 
.ý 
Vl 
C 
ý 
ý 
9 
Ö 
ÖO 
I. 
R 
ý 
C 
C 
Yý 
, 
ri 
ý 
ýý 
Hz »F ý 
co 2-- Z 
"ý i0 
PO 
»r 
4 
1. 
C äöA 
dx 
.. 
dN ti 
C t.. T 
2H 
ý VY1 q 
«0 C1m 
ý ""-: m vvv 
htiýýý h" NMýA \6 rý 
ic 
C" 
N 
ä 
E 
a 
s 
.ý .Y I. 
7 
F 
93 
ýC N 
-T 
E_ 
abv L4 
ý~ a ^« > 
ý 
0 
.ö ý > d u 
1; 1 L1. 
n. R 
ý 
u 
, öä N L-rn 
mX 
.. 
ý u 
. 
Öä 
.. ý ri N 
". / y 
-U 
Äü 
uý Fy 
c" "C 
üý 
ý > 
"ä ý` ü 
ý. ý"- °' öä 
,ýoý 
ýýý 10 i.. .u co = Vj CM 
6J 
0N4 
°ýV8 
mm u 
°J E 
öö vý EE 
.e 
.- 
°_, 0. GI w 
L C1 p. ýüO 
0ä 
tn _aCN "ý a 
00 
M Lr 
ö. 'ä =o 
z0 
K TýTdN 
='ý CL 
>>3CÖ 
Od.. i ýT 
3Q v oý 5v 1-4 :Z.: 'g ý fýl YV 
0Z!.. Co y 
a-ý 
r 
N" 
0ý 
1'^ . 
ýü G7 
CC Vc 
X ý= 
GT 
u 0.1 ý 
ýEÄ 
in ..... ý 
T. `r  
0 
,cý NO7O 
ýT C 
C 1+ ý ýý 
ROVü 'M 
ia"ý'aý ý 
Y "[ 
'0 "r- 
uY 
.. ; fl 
"= u 
Xý 
Eu, 
2- 
ä 
ý 
.M dý 
BC 'a 
^ .nC 
GO CýT 
ýý ?E 
tu -O ON 
Y" 
ý 
'O C 
öEýöý: ai yo =-ö " .. >. - üý 
dýTNN 
F 'c H? c 'öo co 
cý9A 
, _°, 
Ld, .CC .ýý: 
QC 
t0 C :p iy tý 
CC 
Co - ?C 
ý2YU .2 CY ý 
}ý, 
F ýgC1E=ä -ýý 
0ö Y.... 
.... .. 
ýýv... i.. + 
E2ý 
uZ° öD 
v 
VZ pý upÖýY 
OO0 1] 
G 
y ýy 'O .D yýýuou 
oýää 
F3tt: 
YYýCHy 
ööööHH 
cccc 
000o va 10va 7a 
a a 
: ': 
C ü' äi' üüüü 
,ý 
ý2 °6C....,.....,.., C 
äýýý äwýNýýýb r-' 
ý 
d 
d d 
ý 
41 
a ý 
e ,ý 
ýv ý. mý 
Iz: j; : 
OadO Q" ä'ö 
EE-4; N e 
C ýCO eÖ 
t0 W .C0.1 
p r... r. ý 
aý ... ... 
ac, 4 4 ob 
ý 
I. .ý 
m 
a 
Oy 
a0 s 0 
-22 
TXý 
ý Ir 
HC 
IY 
ýN 
=Ö5 
^L 
O "a N 
ý3 
O i. 
.ýýk 
00 G' ü 
VaOT yý 
C<D Qý 
h ---v 
ä 
C. ý 
ý 
ýv 
.. 
F. 
ý L 
Cý N 
, 
t.. a .'ý... 
ÖC^ 
^h 
Öý0 
_. _... pNý, Öob 
"ý Ü 
_T 
d 
l7 
V 
V 
uO 
"H 
"V 
pp 
Lt 
Ö. I° 
C T^ 
o_w . 9D pü 
pýCüO. 
_ .ö 
i....., -,... -. 
CO ----- a- Mv-) r- ä 
E 
d Eäx=ä`=e ; eT 
Q.; ä C? 
ý C7 
.............. 
00 ývv 
f/]"-ýNr'ýýh 
ý 
ý 
wo 
51 
A 
ý ý 
Eý 
"" 1ß 
eC 
T_ 
tý 
.Y 
G 
L 
yL 
yu: 
". a. 
V1 t0 
üu 
M ým 5-) .5 ý 
äi Cy0uc 
C3 4yp, nO 
ýYoo039 
ao uý 
co 
ý 
aE'ýc5e, ýýn I 0 
C_ 
Xý 
E ä, 
I. U. ý 
O 
OD 
5 
ý. 
ý ý ý 
S. 
ä Gq 
ýN. 
J 
ý 
.ýG 
ýb ýu Äý 
ýX 
'a F" tu ÄN 
c. °1 
dN 
In 
WýýC 
EOp, 
b'o äa 
TZ v ýyO 
CC 
a0 ý ýa 
ü iA. 
CT: 
.e 
OD ü 
.CT b rN NA 
04 ^u 'O m y,.,, XX 
OS CO y 'ý' 
ý". ýx(Y1G7 
ý 
ý "c 
8ý 
ýö 00 
ý 
c ý 
L 
ä 
c" ý 
CT 
ýý u,. ý, Ö7 
l7 N 
ý 
, 
ýxp^ 
ý 
ry 
Y .D 
CL 4) ö 
8x 
O 
E 
Hoýýy 
-5 --... c 
OC .üC 
vw Eb0 
el h to -0 
E' L ,GT 
dEEd 
t7'm^ 
.ý . ý'O nf dE 
"ý a 
.ýHCC 'O 
... 
Cy 
1r f7 NN 
1ýy 
Výby 
C ýy fC 
d 
zca cam 
ývvv Sv Opý ., ^N 
r1 t 
ý/7 ý+ 
N ,i M4 
C" 
a 
3 
.°s 
L 
,ýü 3_r 
öc 
yt 
ä'? 
ýF A 
ü ý. Y 
ö£°''c 
utcý, 
(ý^ dÜC 
dh73 
.O 67 
yQr ON ý 
° r. - Enü 
o. c 
ý . ».. 
ä0 
a, ^ .... m a- cAr, 4 
a I. u 
ýi [0 5 
>, Ö. ýý .. a 
m 
ä 
= 
ý 
a 
N4 
V tdd 
u 
ta 
'o 
p. W ý^ 
C 'N N 
ýC]Vl 
yN 
.ý ý 
ÖCß^ü. 
ýÖO =ü ed 'ýý' py 
.ý: 
op T. ý .ý '3 CuA 'C Ö ea 
"" . -. . -.. -. . -. . -. 
V] --N M4 vj V1 -+ f+1 Vj 
m 
u 
C" 
.0 
L 
O 
ii ý ýDO 
p 
"C. 
O 
L0 
u 
FL 
ý, 00 
äo ö 
OA 
1+ N 
d r9 L 
C7 
yO 
Cý>$ 
6i 'V>, N 
ý W CC 
ea"C cL_ 
3 pq °N 
CLL. 
yON ýy 
f9 
x 
1. 
ýi 
a- ý 
iý'J ty 
3GÖÄ 
O3u 
ý 
a3i 
ö" 
LV Z3 
aýs 
üý 
3dUUL 
, 333ö 
0 
.ON 
CT 
. 
Lr !ý 
O 
,Y 
Op 
yu_ 
Co 8 äb -ii 
7Ü"ü 
JD i° 
cä 
A . ý'. ou. 
= ei 3 
."u 
mE JD 
7ÜNUT: 
ä, 
vL E 
7au .ý aý 
ö äyus 
w> 
tN. p 
äv - >, '= ur 
O1 vvv ý l9 vvv... ý 
aýNt14 a. _+-rNC7 ýJ, 
a 
'fl 
a 
ý 
+e 
ý 
So N 
V 
ý ä 
.a 
3 
0 c 
ý ý 9 
C 
ý 
ý 
'0 
ý 
ý 
R 
ý 
C 
L. 
ý 
W 
a ý 
Ö 
ÖA 
T. X 
-CC 
EaO 
ý 
.. 
ý. U 
rýýT 
:2ý$ 'v iý x'ý ý-g G Yý ýe nt 9 äi >, ed eý 
Ö'Yýý 
v_a. 
Aý 
ý ei L 13 F" C 
ti 
.Q: LVD aý >+ Ä E. u. ýXu 
dýxý -ý" 
ý 
"^ 
v_7x 
"ýJD 
Ä 
uTi. 
f`1 
CNý c' ý7 ý7 7 t> >ý ý7 ý7 ý7 
°V UV UV 
UUUU 
'ö aN a 
l -u u m -u >C 
Mý 
d>>>>> mÄÄ 
cä > 
ý>a^ 
_ 
vý '> 
Y--------- 
(4 ^ý VI 
p.. 
-+ h. 
ý.. YV VY1ý6 1- oöÖN 
uu 
.9 Ly 
O 
uu 
tr ýp 
äý 
ýu 
CL C. 
r4 
ýCN 
Yw 
uc 703 
c" ýv 
yÜ 
7Ü 
0N -t 
a- 
0 ý 
c 
.ý 
0 ý 
ý 
L 
d °' 
0 
CL 
'V 
CO ö 
oc: 
v__ 03¬°. 
o .c Ö e z9 
fY ^ 
Ch -y y 
d- f-1 h 
> ý r 
° 
0 ý 
ý ý 
0 3 
ý 
e ý ö0 
e ý 
coQ u F., 
.? 
e 
WLU 'rý' 
ÜW 
TpCLU' 'Ö 
>, 7 E 
.Zý 
cý .= -v' 
ýu $i 
º. o oýz`'_' öz AE>ý :s ýv 
N 0 
-2 ý 
ý ý 
N -N 
Tx .ý 
99u' '6 is 4 
O 
d 
E 
t, 
Ö 
Yý'ýýCw 3u 
ý. 'ä 
h ?? ý . 0. ýn .. ü_ .. .ýi ._a, 
ä: tr ?+ >N 
öümQ. coo eH a... vý"' ý "v'C"- uu Em yc c"C " ... 5 `Nt 
yýpOUO pý ý 
ý . eý" ý wr"S'> ._ý, ° 
7üý ýp 
x ý" ý 
' I 
ý 
a äh äü äý- NMývi ýNoc (21 
ý ,_i. 
+ 
_ güu uH U, U. uH ° (] QHN Jý Os 
P! R7 eC f0 ed '> >7 "ý' 
uuuvu hýýý 
Ir >_ý^ý»ý=ý- zzzz 
a ....... 
z Ü 
w U 
Q 
ý 
Q 
cti ý 
a 
. C,, x 
ýa 
z 
0 
ý 
x 
ý 
z 
w w F ý 
a 
it 
t. E 
N 
40 
8 
a 00 
.. 
hö 
ýU 
41 E 
ä0 Tý 
61 b 'O 
rsT vý 
ýYvÖ 
Uý 
n 
e0 .ýT: 
"XTG 
ä"_ T. 00 ý 
go m 006.0 .= . 
00 
I. :j........ = 
WW WCIWWx 
......... -. 
f/J^ýNMý}v1ýÖ 
z 
N 
z 
vý ........ 
U Eýaä ° 
As" 
'b Z2 ý C !o üa. X 
wýäC 
a 
w o. +; ý 
E 
Q .°9; -. 
ý_ý 
'ý ý_ , ý° 
ýdwX7ý 
C7 s'_ hy 
°X ci 
ýýýýý rm 
a -ýöE> ýCCCy 
C 
LT. 3O 
. üý 
E^_ 2 
ý9 "E C.: ld U 
d 
ý 
9 
C 
ý 
ý 
C 
W 
t7 
ý ý a V L 
O 
ý 
IA 
C 
N 
G -B ýý 
üidi7 
_........ --_aw ý........ üZýÄ 
ý 
w........ 
T. 'ý co T'ý d 
i7 ý+ .. ý. .. 
Y 
Vr vX -ä v" .a a........ ýý ýE"_ = 
O -0'0 ýa.. ýý N ýý 
Q 
. 
Uý 
Nv 
ýN5 .D 
's C 00 
NeC4: `ý ýy 
Z C-0W ÄNY 
K.. 'ý-------. 
ýýýýýä 
aY 19 'ý> ai c -4 
/1 ........ _.. ý 
I- 
x 
w 
ä 
x 
w........ 
. c` öi ý= x 
r_ Q500ý= 
2ä 
y. 
= to E 
' 0z. . 29 y =_ ý" *'I h [zl cr .ä to 7 
GA 
"C qý 
.aC 
TýX 
-3 x 4j ý ýoý ýcaCCy 
W} 
ý33CL 
oýýýýög3 
EG ° 
, mg 
° äo äCöC 
öCz 
d 
........ . sa 
ýý ýe 
C 
° d 
ý 
F 
O_ 75 != 
3 ä'W ý'ý aý Ec ä 
°= 
'$F 
8 
-2g. ä"3oý . 
°. 
o° 
Cccämd 
QW ý-_ Tqý 
c3, C. aui 
CL 3. t°'.. 5q3 
aä Hý cÄ00 ný L 
TO ýQ .ýC... 3 ý. co 
EO 
, 
-cäw ý'ý'E c 
cý 
06 =u_. 
ý 
°: O 'C E! U¬ c 
"61 
ý 
0ý amozo 
r- >u '" u> o 
p« i7 .J p0: CdV Q' f+ 7Od 
C 
Ö'Z YÜT4.0 L 
puöuF cý O üý 
ýö 
M 
^E"°oo 
w ý. EWO 3ýýya, _ 6oý1eR 
COowL 1°ý W fl ý rý Ci 
m 
"ý 7ýaH a'O 
Oý 
L 
a~, oaü 
vý «Z«oFü4c 
0 ;EC `ý 
Y........ EýCc0., 00 ý f' 
UU 
1. öä ön tcüZ ýý Z IRJ s 
>, 
3^ý. _ L13RA{? 1, 
tow 'u 
3ý aý ýEEaQ 
äwvr, 
e, 4 J, bý........ 
ý °07 ¢ý'v° ý 
ö` 
'w ZC 
ý E 
ä. 
ý ý 
m 
Y 
ý a 
Eý 
dý öý 
14 cc Hý 
0 94 ý. 9 
ZO 
03 q 
ý 
c ý.. a" 
a, "" ON 
y r. 
,°` ti .5 ý dE 
_° . wo ý We 
ýý Q1 ö3 CL _ v .:., c 3 äio 
cýý a3i 
a'ýi . 
'ý ääý .ýý 
ýýu 'öo ý 6`. - :: 
z 
xä 
wz 
Ný 
:ä ha < 
'ýz äz 
>ý ýQ 
ý Ný Äa 
W] w ý.. ý L 
äö 
I 
., °ý öz Ww 
wý ýH 
ýý w 
ý 
ýý 
a 
zQ w w 
4 
ý 
Q) 
rö 
., ý 
0 
ýA 
4) 
Rý . Oý. 
4) ýý 
a) bl v aý cý 
ýx 
rý rö N 
ý0 
a) ý-+ ý 
N 
i Z 
